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Abstract 
A number of influential early International Relations (IR) theorists explicitly 
theorised politics in terms of ‘tragedy’ and their discourse was revived at the be-
ginning of the 21st century. This thesis engages with this ‘tragic’ tradition of in-
ternational political theory and pushes the debate in directions that have previ-
ously been hinted at but which have nonetheless remained largely unexplored. It 
is argued here that from the late archaic to the end of the classical period in an-
cient Athens, eros (‘sexual love’, ‘passionate yearning’) and its cognates came to 
form the conceptual basis of a political discourse that fused elements of sex, 
power, and gender into what we might call a kind of ‘erotic politics’. This dis-
course is clearly reflected in tragedy; many dramas take eros as a central theme 
and explore the role that the emotion could (and should) play in the community. 
Although it is usually transgressive and destructive, tragic eros is nevertheless 
redeemable in terms of the benefits it can bestow on the city when handled 
wisely. Using this contextualised reading of tragedy as a reference point, the dis-
sertation critically analyses the texts of two influential commentators on interna-
tional politics, namely, Thucydides and Hans Morgenthau. It is argued that both 
of these authors were heavily influenced by the Athenian discourse of erotic 
politics, especially as it appears in tragedy; love, power, and tragedy were cent-
ral to both men’s understanding of international politics. This analysis will 
provide an original perspective on Thucydides’ and Morgenthau’s political 
philosophies and will open up new ways at looking at some of the ‘tragic’ situ-
ations that recent scholars have identified in contemporary politics. 
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Glossary of Ancient Greek Terms and Persons 
Aeschines = politician and orator, born in Athens 389 B.C. 
Agon = duel, competition 
Alcaius = lyric poet, born in Mytilene c. 620 B.C. 
Alcibiades = politician and general, born in Athens c. 450 B.C. 
Anacreon = lyric poet, born in Teos c. 582 B.C.  
Andreia = manliness, courage 
Arche = rule, empire, power 
Archilochus = lyric poet, born in Paros c. 680 B.C. 
Aristogeiton = middle class Athenian tyrannicide, lover of Harmodius 
Catharsis = release, purgation 
Demokratia = democracy, rule of the people 
Demos = the people 
Demosthenes = politician and orator, born in Athens c. 384 B.C. 
Dionysus = god of wine, theatre, wild nature, vegetation, fertility 
Dynamis = power, might, force, empire 
Dyserotas = sick desire, diseased lust 
Eleutheria = freedom 
Ekklesia = popular assembly responsible for making decisions and electing offi-
cials 
Ephebes = youths of military age 
Ephialtes and Otus = mythological giants said to have stormed the heavens to 
take Hera and Artemis as wives 
Erastes/erastai = lover/lovers 
Erinyes = Furies 
Eros = sexual love, lust, passionate yearning 
Eromenos/eromenoi = beloved/beloveds 
Eumenides = Friendly ones, Well-wishers 
Hamartia = blunder, go astray, miss the mark 
Harmodius = aristocratic Athenian tyrannicide, beloved of Aristogeiton 
Hubris = arrogance, over-confidence, outrage 
Ibycus = lyric poet, born in Rhegium c. 600 B.C. 
Isocrates = rhetorician, born in Athens 436 B.C. 
Kalos k’agathos = fair and noble 
Kratos = power, strength, force 
Nemesis = retribution, revenge, catastrophe 
Nicias = politician and general, born in Athens 
Nomos = law, custom 
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Ostrakismos = a democratic procedure expelling any one citizen from the city 
for ten years, used to neutralise perceived threats to the state  
Panathenaia = prestigious Athenian festival with athletics and games  
Peitho = persuasion 
Pericles = politician and general, born in Athens c. 495 B.C. 
Philia = love (of family, friends, spouses) 
Phusis = nature 
Pindar = lyric poet, born in Thebes c. 522 B.C. 
Polis = city-state 
Pothos = desire, longing for what is absent 
Sappho = female lyric poet, born in Lesbos c. 630 B.C. 
Sophia = wisdom 
Sophron = wise, moderate, sound of mind 
Sophrosune = moderation, self-control, soundness of mind 
Stasis = civil discord, civil war 
Strategoi = elected military commanders 
Tantalus = mythical figure who butchered his son Pelops to serve as food to the 
gods in a banquet 
Themistocles = politician and general, born in Athens c. 524 
Theseus = mythical founder-king of Athens 
Tolma = daring 
Tuche = fate, chance 
Tyrannis/tyrannos = tyranny/tyrant 
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Part One 
All’s Fair in Love and War? Tragedy, Eros, Politics 
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CHAPTER ONE 
“One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.” 
 – Friedrich Nietzsche 
Introduction 
The First Battle of Ypres, a vortex of senseless violence known to the Germans 
as the Massacre of the Innocents (in reference to the great number of young and 
idealistic men who lost their lives there), left an indelible mark on the minds of 
all who were involved in it. It would, in fact, resonate across Western Europe for 
decades afterwards as a cultural symbol of the fratricidal insanity of the Great 
War.  
Soon after participating in this battle, one newly promoted and decorated Ger-
man soldier would come to a final, and fateful, conclusion about life – namely, 
that it was “a constant horrible struggle” (quoted in Kershaw 1998: 90-1) of 
which international politics was the most visceral instantiation. Nevertheless, the 
young corporal known as Adolf Hitler relished the bloodbath at Ypres, and he 
continued to fight with distinction. 
Across the Channel and some fifteen years later, Professor Gilbert Murray (an 
eminent classicist and intellectual architect of the League of Nations) surprisin-
gly found himself in agreement with the now-leader of the Nazi Party. Murray, 
though he was himself no militarist, argued that if peace-loving students of in-
ternational politics were to “see the truth,” they had to: 
face the essential tragedy of life. Biologically, the whole animal 
creation, or at any rate the carnivorous part of it, kills in order to 
live … This constant fighting and killing is one of the primary and 
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fundamental facts of life, which must be realized if we are to un-
derstand any moral problems. (1929: 15) 
As the Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford, the foremost interpreter of the 
Greek world to his generation, Murray was aware of life’s tragic elements (Wil-
son 2009a). Murray took from his distant observations of the Great War and in 
particular his close reading of Greek drama the same terrible lesson that Hitler 
and millions of other men had learned face-to-face at Ypres and Verdun and the 
Somme: international politics, like life in general, was a tremendous struggle of 
which conflict and suffering are certain, central and intractable elements. 
Murray granted to the militarist that conflict, or ‘strife’, as he called it, was ne-
cessary for the development of moral character; for him war was “a true tragedy, 
which must have nobleness and triumph in it as well as disaster” (quoted in Per-
ris 2010/11: 432). He believed that violence and barbarism could be constrained 
by restructuring conflicts in ways that allowed the unavoidable – and, for him, 
desirable – strife at their core to unfold in civilised, non-violent fashion, in the 
same way the duel been transformed into the law-court. War was, like the duel, a 
barbaric manifestation of strife; it was simply an accident of history, and the 
strife that caused it could be resolved with more peaceful manners.   
Given that the terrible destruction wrought by modern war placed the very exis-
tence of civilisation in jeopardy, Murray said, it was the duty of all peoples to 
acknowledge and rectify the outstanding faults in domestic and global society 
that had allowed interstate conflict to take on such a savage form. The manner in 
which they could do so was to construct a set of international institutions – a 
League of Nations, as it were – that would help to redirect the combative pas-
sions of human beings in ways that would make another war between the great 
powers if not impossible at least unlikely.  
In January 1933, when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Murray’s 
dream of a League of Nations had already become a reality; its members, in fact, 
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were busy negotiating an international disarmament treaty. But by the end of 
that very same year, Hitler had terminated Germany’s membership of the 
League and under his leadership the country launched an aggressive campaign 
to rearm. Six years later, the Wehrmacht – by that time the strongest army in Eu-
rope – marched into Poland, triggering the most destructive war the world has 
ever seen. 
*     *     *   
Many early International Relations (IR) scholars – including Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Hans Morgenthau and Herbert Butterfield – followed in Murray’s footsteps and 
theorised international politics in terms of ‘tragedy.’ Trying to fathom the horror 
and unprecedented destruction wrought by modern warfare and totalitarian ag-
gression, these authors believed that the idea of tragedy seemed to be an appro-
priate starting point from (or at least a handy metaphor with) which to conduct 
an analysis of politics, insofar as tragic drama and the study of international rela-
tions dealt with the very same subject matter – the agony of humanity. 
With the rise of positivism after the Second World War, however, the discourse 
of tragedy fell into obscurity and would remain in this condition until the turn of 
the millennium, after which a number of books and articles dealing with the to-
pic of tragedy in international relations appeared in quick succession. Many 
prominent scholars of IR have involved themselves in this debate. 
Of the various insights that are raised in this debate (which revolves primarily 
around the study of Greek tragedy) two seem particularly relevant to internatio-
nal relations and to the concern with human suffering that guides their study 
(Erskine and Lebow 2012a: 8). The first, in the tradition of Murray, is that tra-
gedy is caused by clashes of irreconcilable ethical values embedded in different 
social institutions; the diverse variety of such institutions is an expression of the 
plural and dynamic nature of the world. Some such situations can be overcome 
through careful reflection and even more careful action to transform the envi-
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ronments of the institutions that originally gave rise to the conflicts or to trans-
form the institutions themselves. I call this the ‘structural’ approach to tragedy. 
Another school of thought argues that tragic outcomes in international politics 
are the result of the misjudgements of powerful actors who, intoxicated by suc-
cess, become blinded by overconfidence in their own capacities and/or the jus-
tice of their cause. Such misjudgements can be manifest in both action and 
thought, and the arrogant overconfidence (which the Greeks called hubris) that 
begets them is both a product and productive of different kinds of societies. The 
development of hubris tends to fray the bonds of attachment that support com-
munity and to encourage discord, hatred and violence. By finally breaking these 
bonds, the hubristic actor sows the seeds of a catastrophic reconfiguration of so-
ciety that often leads to his or her own destruction. This is, we are told, a univer-
sal pattern of human action, the lessons of which remain applicable to contem-
porary politics. I call this the ‘agentic’ approach to tragedy in IR. Some of those 
who take this line also argue that Thucydides, Morgenthau and possibly also 
Clausewitz shared a tragic vision of politics and that their work cannot be fully 
understood without having first learned the lessons of tragedy.  
The aims of this chapter are to fully flesh out the ways in which tragedy has 
been employed in contemporary IR theory, to determine the merits and flaws of 
these differing approaches, and to outline my own contribution to the discussion 
that has been built around the question of tragedy in international politics. In 
doing so, I will provide a preliminary answer as to how I will answer the gui-
ding question of this research project: ‘how can the study of tragedy enhance our 
understanding of international relations?’ 
Section One: Reviewing the Literature 
(i) The Structural Approach 
In a thoughtful and thought-provoking essay, Mervyn Frost (2012) defines the 
epicentre of a tragic situation as an ethical conflict, or agon (‘duel’, ‘competi-
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tion’). This conflict is between two ethical codes, both of which have a valid 
claim on the actors involved. Only one of these ethical codes, however, can re-
main unviolated: in a tragic situation it is not possible for the wishes of both par-
ties to be accommodated. This, Frost tells us, is what it means to agonise. Well-
meaning people acting in ethically appropriate ways can find themselves in si-
tuations of which suffering is an unavoidable outcome; given the particular 
constitution of the actors and practices in question, any action (or non-action) is 
bound to harm somebody. In these circumstances, acting so as to circumvent 
tragedy becomes impossible. James Mayall (2012) and Chris Brown (2012) 
share this general understanding of tragic situations in their responses to Frost’s 
essay. 
Building upon Hans Friedrich Gutbrod’s (2001) reading of the tragic in the work 
of Herbert Butterfield, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau, Frost writes 
that the potential for tragedy in international relations arises from the fact that: 
we live in a plural world in which different states (and the nations 
and peoples they contain) are guided in what they do, internally and 
externally, by a wide range of different ethical, religious and cultu-
ral codes. In this plural world there is no clear overarching set of 
values to which all subscribe. There is also no clear goal towards 
which these diverse states, nations and peoples are moving. Where 
any particular state sets out to implement its preferred set of values 
in the world, it is likely to come up against resistance. It will en-
counter a world in which its own power confronts that wielded by 
other actors. The reality of power politics might in turn bring about 
consequences far removed from those originally sought; it might 
bring about tragic consequences. (2012: 22)  
The principal agon that both Frost and Brown see at work in today’s world is the 
one that exists between the duties attached to the ethic of global civil society, in 
which all human beings are afforded certain fundamental rights, and the duties 
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that are inherent to statehood, such as the maintenance of sovereignty and the 
pursuit of the communal good. Tragic outcomes of this agon include military in-
terventions in the name of humanity (e.g. Somalia, the Balkans and Iraq) and in 
policy areas concerning global distributive justice (e.g. protectionism versus free 
trade; border control versus freedom of movement). 
As Richard Ned Lebow notes, “Frost is primarily interested in tragedy as a nor-
mative theory that allows us to frame and understand ethical dilemmas and their 
consequences more clearly” (2012: 66). This is as true for Mayall and Brown as 
it is for Frost: for all three scholars, the study of tragedy can help us to clarify 
the ways in which protagonists are constituted within specific social practices, 
each of which has an ethic embedded in it, and illuminates how these practices 
can come to catastrophically conflict.  
Where Frost seems to differ from Brown and Mayall, however, is in his insis-
tence that understanding the existence of tragedy in international relations will 
not only help us to perceive some contemporary ethical problems in internatio-
nal relations more clearly, but may also help to create the intellectual conditions 
by which we can learn to overcome these problems. Because tragedy dramati-
cally highlights the social constitution of actors in a diverse range of social prac-
tices – the embedded ethics of which can compel behaviours that cause antago-
nistic conflicts ending in disaster – it inspires rational reflection on the possibili-
ties of changing the social institutions that created the tragic agon. By doing so, 
it provides us with theoretical tools for identifying opportunities for making 
practical progress; the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of the Eu-
ropean Union are invoked as support for this thesis. Although tragedy therefore 
“does not solve ethical problems, but, rather, poses them to us” (Frost 2012: 42), 
the development of a tragic sensibility may have the potential to stimulate inspi-
red yet realistic attempts to enact progressive transformations of international 
politics. 
!17
While not dismissive of this view, Mayall and Brown are wary of its optimistic 
bent; Mayall, for example, argues that “even if one pattern of behaviour with 
tragic consequences can be transcended, another is always likely to loom up 
from beyond the horizon” (2012: 46). Mayall and Brown instead emphasise that 
committed reflection on the existence of tragic situations is lacking in the work 
of many contemporary international political theorists and that this is in urgent 
need of addressing. The absence of a tragic sensibility, they argue, has given rise 
to a misplaced and widespread faith in the capacity of rational argument to heal 
the suffering of humankind; this is evident in analytical philosophy’s obsession 
with concrete definitions and complete logical coherence – there is no room in 
it, according to Brown, for the real world’s ambiguities and contradictions – and 
in many political theorists’ underestimation of the residual power of the tragic 
morality of honour and competition at the international level.  
In Mayall’s and Brown’s own words, “[a]n awareness of tragic outcomes is a 
necessary antidote to the hubris of progressive thought” (ibid: 46) insofar as 
such an awareness causes “us to act modestly, to be aware of our limitations and 
to be suspicious of grand narratives of salvation which pretend that there are no 
tragic choices to be made” (Brown 2012: 83). Recognising that the political 
world is inherently pluralistic and complex requires that we exercise extreme 
caution in attempting to force this reality into the mould of a cosmopolitan ideal. 
Apart from allowing us to frame significant ethical issues in international rela-
tions more clearly, then, a study of tragedy helps to check the development of 
hubristic overconfidence in our ability to steer the world in an unambiguously 
progressive direction. In this sense, Mayall and Brown remain committed to the 
idea that a study of tragedy can help us learn to make the world less painful, if 
only by showing that the hope of making the world a better place can actually 
make it worse. 
(ii) The Agentic Approach 
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A number of other scholars pick up on the theme of hubris and in their deve-
lopment of it expand the scope of tragedy’s contribution to IR wider than 
Mayall’s and Brown’s critiques of liberal international political theory allow for. 
This approach, which is exemplified by but not restricted to the work of Richard 
Ned Lebow, is based in an explicitly Aristotelian understanding of tragedy as a 
poetically condensed imitation of reality that has a positive ethical effect on its 
audiences. Greek tragedians, on this view, “believed that the cycle of hubris (ar-
rogance), ate (seduction), hamartia (missing the mark, miscalculation), and ne-
mesis (catastrophe) would repeat itself as long as humans stride the earth” (Le-
bow 2012: 65). 
Tragedians, in other words, recognised that it is a universal tendency of power-
ful actors to become overconfident of their own success and of their ability to 
foresee and control the future, which leads them to commit gross errors of jud-
gement that sever their ethical connections to the communities to which they be-
long. One frequent and serious consequence of this is the humiliation of others 
members of society, who feel compelled to seek vengeance. 
Tragic dramas were attempts to educate people of these facts and, through the 
elicitation and catharsis (‘release’, ‘purgation’) of particular emotions such as 
pity and fear, to psychologically compel spectators to be on guard against hu-
bristic behaviour. This reading of tragedy “encourages us to confront our frail-
ties and limits and the disastrous consequences of trying to exceed them” (Le-
bow 2003: 43). Furthermore, by focusing our attention “on the role of agency, 
and, more specifically, on the kinds of actors most likely to succumb to 
hubris” (Lebow 2012: 64), it leads us beyond the characterisation of tragedy de-
veloped by Frost, Mayall and Brown (who concentrate more on the broader 
structures of tragic situations than on the agents who participate in them). 
To some it may still seem “quite a stretch to claim that Greek tragedy can teach 
us important things about how to study international politics” (Euben 2012: 93). 
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Nevertheless, it should be “no stretch at all to say that Thucydides can” (ibid.). 
Indeed, Thucydides’s History continues to be read in military colleges and uni-
versities around the world and is accepted by most IR scholars, especially realist 
ones, as an important text for students of international relations to engage with 
and comprehend (Cook 2006). As Michael Doyle points out, for most scholars 
in the discipline “to think like a Realist is to think as the philosophical historian 
Thucydides first thought” (1990: 223).  
J. Peter Euben believes that the usefulness of a study of tragedy and IR lies in 
the fact that there exist substantial continuities between tragic drama and Thu-
cydides’ History that are “significant enough to establish the former as a preface 
to, and necessary condition for, understanding the latter” (2012: 93). Lebow, 
David Bedford and Thom Workman fully agree with this proposition; indeed, 
they go one step further and argue that “[t]he entire history is conceived of as a 
tragedy” (Lebow 2003: 42) so as to reveal “Thucydides’ lament for the eclipse 
of reasoned moderation in Greek life generally, and in Athenian conduct in par-
ticular” (Bedford and Workman 2001: 52).  
Although these scholars disagree somewhat about the didactic directions of both 
tragedy and Thucydides’ text, the idea of hubris is central to all of their estima-
tions of Thucydides’ debt to tragic drama. Understanding the nature and conse-
quences of hubris is, according to these scholars, important for two main rea-
sons: first, it helps us to recognise Thucydides’ overarching problematique, and 
thus to comprehend the meaning of his work at its deepest level; and second, on 
a level closer to the surface of the text, it allows us to fathom the political dyna-
mics of the war itself by virtue of their similarity to the dynamics of tragedy. 
According to Lebow, Thucydides’ vision of politics was, like tragedy, a res-
ponse to the massive social, political and economic changes that swept Greece 
in the three hundred years preceding the fifth century B.C. These changes, 
which included large increases in population, increasing urbanisation, growth in 
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trade and diplomacy, the specialisation of labour, and advances in military tech-
nology “can only be called a process of modernization” (2003: 152). The crucial 
issue that occupied Thucydides – his meta-theme, so to speak – was the wides-
pread abandonment of old or malfunctioning social institutions and their rapid 
replacement by destabilising ‘modern’ practices. Witnessing the dynamism and 
plurality of social life so boldly manifested in the final stages of this process 
forced Thucydides to put the problem of modernisation “into historical and 
conceptual perspective as a first step toward making sense of ongoing change 
and its associated threats” (ibid: 303).  
Thucydides, Lebow tells us, understood the consequences of modernisation as 
expressions of “evolving identities and discourses” (ibid.); human beings were 
not trapped by historical circumstance or by ‘fate’ but were, rather, always re-
producing, reinventing and representing their culture, institutions and possible 
choices in new ways. Thucydides recognised that language enables “the shared 
meanings and conventions that made civilization possible” and that when 
“words lose their meanings, or their meanings are subverted, the conventions 
that depend on them lose their force, communication becomes difficult and civi-
lization declines” (ibid: 161).  
The Greeks became conscious of this fact as their traditional beliefs and conven-
tions were challenged and undermined by the enormous changes that modernisa-
tion effected. One of these great changes was the flowering of philosophy and 
the reasoned scepticism toward myth, religion and established truths that it en-
couraged. Philosophy, itself the product of the evolving identities and discourses 
made possible by modern systems of exchange, developed the competitive 
Greek logic of the agon around the prize of truth; philosophy was essentially a 
wrestling match of abstract reason that only the strongest philosopher could win 
(Strong 2012: 148-9).  
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“At the heart of this approach [to knowledge]”, Benjamin Schupmann observes, 
“is a pervasive rationalization of phenomena that allows for the logical equation 
of things and events in the real world by discovering their rational essences as 
quasi-noumenal ‘forms’” (2012: 132). Philosophy, like all thought, relies on 
concepts: to develop a theory of human nature, for example, the philosopher 
must arbitrarily abstract from billions of particular concrete manifestations of 
reality (all of which he cannot intimately know and which are constantly under-
going change) and eliminate the differences between them to forge the concept 
of the ‘human’ into which all appropriately similar units can equally fit. But 
equality of this kind is the product of the mind’s idealisation of phenomena, not 
an inherent quality of the world; identity is a function of language insofar as the 
mind selects ‘individual objects’ from fluid ‘reality’ and places them into 
conceptual categories that make of these particulars identical (or at least similar) 
units. In other words, a philosophy of ‘human nature’ is a creation, not a disco-
very. 
This manner of thinking is, of course, perfectly normal for human beings; in-
deed, it is necessary for an agent to categorise, infer, remember, learn and act in-
tentionally in the world (that is, it is necessary for an agent to survive). But the 
successes of natural philosophy in shaping the environment to serve the needs of 
humanity led people to forget that a reality in perpetual flux was not in fact re-
ducible to concepts, causes and effects and to forget that any philosopher was, 
by virtue of his system’s reliance upon concepts, the creator of truth rather than 
its discoverer.  
Tracy Strong argues that tragedy, as a political education, was designed to keep 
its audience “from resting on the need to believe, as it were, that a word has one 
and only one correct meaning” (2012: 146-7). Tragedy was therefore a means of 
preventing the rise of philosophical tyrants. The fantastic success of rational, 
conceptual thinking (as embodied in the approach of Socrates), however, led its 
adherents to a belief in its absoluteness as a system of comprehending the world, 
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that is, it led to an unshakeable faith in the power of rationality and conceptual 
schemes to fully understand and direct the destiny of humankind. Reason, in 
short, became a tyrant of the mind (at least in significant sections of society), 
and this led to the death of tragedy. Schupmann describes this philosophical de-
velopment as an early form of the scientistic rationalism that Lebow, Brown, 
Mayall, and others identify as the dominant philosophy of modern social science 
(Strong 2012). 
For all of its success, Lebow tells us, rationalism ended up biting its own tail. 
Originally focused on the phusis (‘nature’) of the universe and the nomos (‘law’) 
that governed it, rationalist philosophy eventually focused its attention on hu-
manity and began to fundamentally question traditional understandings of the 
nature of humankind and the laws that governed it. By doing so, it helped to des-
troy people’s faith in the immutability and validity of the norms and institutions 
that had for so long defined their relationships with the world; this development 
“changed the way people thought about each other, their society and obligations 
to it, and encouraged barbarism and violence by undermining long-standing 
conventions and the constraints they enforced” (Lebow 2003: 147; cf. Dodds 
1951). Some actors concluded that the self was the locus of meaning and that 
morality was nothing but an expression of egoism; dissatisfied with their lot, 
they cut themselves off from their societies and began to wander off into the 
wilderness of nihilism. The community of Athens was one such tragic figure. 
We can now examine the second layer of tragedy’s influence on Thucydides’ 
text. Following Francis Cornford, Euben (2012: 94) points out that Thucydides’ 
narrative sequencing of the Athenian invasion of Sicily after the Melian Dia-
logue is not historically but, rather, dramatically determined; likewise the Fune-
ral Oration of Pericles and the subsequent description of the plague. Each of 
these important sections of the History cannot be appreciated simply in temporal 
terms (the digression on the tyrannicides, for example, is historically – but not 
literarily – puzzling); they must be read against the city’s increasingly hubristic 
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leadership and the tragic resonances of such hubris if they are to be properly un-
derstood.  
There are, therefore, elements of and consequences to the behaviour of certain 
actors in the History that, by virtue of Thucydides’ dramatic rendition of them, 
do indeed very much resemble the categories identified by Aristotle as being 
central to the genre of tragedy. Bedford and Workman (2001) make this case 
implicitly by employing these categories in their analysis of the History. Lebow, 
however, summarises the argument most succinctly:  
Like the playwrights, Thucydides depicts cities and their leaders as 
archetypal characters confronting archetypal situations. His history 
is not an exhaustive narrative, but a sparse, abstract and artfully 
constructed account that selects and emphasises those aspects of the 
story that serve their author’s broader purpose […] It is an illustra-
tion of a more general human pattern: success spawns greater ambi-
tions, overconfidence and self-defeating behaviour. (Lebow 2003: 
42)  
By personifying Athens and others as tragic heroes, that is, Thucydides was able 
to exploit a well-developed and widely understood set of concepts to explain the 
behaviour of agents at various political levels, from the interpersonal to the in-
ternational. Thucydides created a vision of politics that stressed the similarities 
rather than the differences between international and domestic politics. He made 
clear the importance of language, convention and community in preserving the 
stability of both; without broad social agreement on the meaning of words, va-
lues and norms, on which the bonds of affection that constitute community are 
based, the conventions that depend on them lose their force and society begins 
to disintegrate (Lebow 2003: 161).  
The deterioration of these affective bonds often encourage, and are intensified 
by, the unrestrained pursuit of individual interest, a behavioural trait most likely 
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to occur in those actors who come to identify themselves as being above and 
beyond society and therefore “no longer bound by the laws and conventions of 
man” (ibid: 131). When the hubris of these actors results in hamartia and the 
infliction of injustice on other members of the community, the nemesis of offen-
ded parties is bound to follow and is likely to provoke tragic catastrophe (Bed-
ford and Workman 2001). For Thucydides, just as for the tragedians, self-interest 
“defined outside of the language of justice is [therefore] irrational and self-de-
feating” (Lebow 2003 p. 276; cf. Monoson and Loriaux 1998). 
Like Aristotle, Lebow writes, Thucydides believed that the function of tragedy 
was “to expose us to the monstrous possibilities of human behaviour without at 
the same time infecting us with the madness that leads to that behaviour” (Le-
bow 2003: 43) – an exposure which, to be sure, was no inoculation against di-
saster, but one which could still help to make his audience more introspective 
and attuned to the dangers of hubris developing in their persons and political 
communities. Representing the Peloponnesian War as a timeless tragic drama in 
which the limits of responsible politics are broken was the expression of Thucy-
dides’ “hope that familiarization with the time-worn script [of Athens’ tragedy] 
would encourage future actors to become wise enough to write new 
endings” (ibid: 366). 
Bedford and Workman seem convinced that the tragic vision of politics is confi-
ned to the History; by appropriating Thucydides to support their arguments, they 
argue, subsequent realists “could not miss the mark more thoroughly” (2001: 
54). Lebow, however, makes a sophisticated argument that the work of Carl von 
Clausewitz and, in particular, Hans Morgenthau must also be read in the tragic 
tradition, insofar as these thinkers shared Thucydides’ belief that “order was 
fragile, that human efforts to control, or even, reshape, their physical and social 
environments were far more uncertain in their consequences than most leaders 
and intellectuals recognized, and that hubris – in the form of an exaggerated 
sense of authority and competence – only made matters worse” (2003: x). Ka-
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mila Stullerova supports Lebow in this regard, at least concerning Morgenthau: 
“Limiting hubris”, she writes, “is the single invitation for ethical intervention 
Morgenthau and Lebow consider inherent to tragedy” (2012: 117).  
The greatest lesson that these influential figures in the discipline took away from 
history and the events through which they lived, we are told, was “the need to 
know one’s own limits” which is also “the core insight of tragedy” (Lebow 
2003: 309).  The involvement of strong emotions in the process of reflection is 
crucial in learning this lesson; it cannot be assimilated in the detached and abs-
tract way we so often associate with academic learning. Studying tragedy is one 
method by which to experience this fact. By engaging both our emotions and 
our intellect – by instilling, in other words, both a deeply felt and critical appre-
ciation of the vagaries and contradictions of life – tragedy and the vision of poli-
tics that emerges from it encourage the growth of what the Greeks called so-
phrosune (‘wisdom’, ‘moderation’, ‘self-mastery’), which ordinary abstract rea-
soning, although it may lead to great ‘knowledge,’ simply cannot reproduce.  
To sum up the agentic argument, the propensity of modern IR scholars to foster 
scientific, rationalistic theories of human beings as naturally autonomous and 
egoistic agents encourages hubristic behaviour in international relations. Incor-
porating the lessons of tragedy into the discipline, as per Thucydides (and ar-
guably Clausewitz and Morgenthau), can help to mitigate this: a tragic unders-
tanding of politics has the potential to make us “more empathetic, prudent and 
insightful – and less arrogant and far-reaching in our goals” (Lebow 2003: 188) 
in “recognition of the self-defeating outcomes of excesses of power and confi-
dence” (Erskine and Lebow 2012a: 10). Alongside the greater understanding of 
these three pivotal figures in international relations theory that an awareness of 
the tragic dynamics of hubris affords us, for authors taking the agentic approach 
to tragedy in IR the most important contribution that a study of tragedy can 
make to the discipline is through its potential to limit hubris through the deve-
lopment of sophrosune in both theory and practice.  
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Section Two: Critiquing the Literature 
(i) The Structural Approach 
The parallels between Mervyn Frost’s and Gilbert Murray’s understandings of 
the didactic value of tragedy are rather striking. Both believe that agonising 
conflict is central to both tragedy and international politics. Both agree that, ha-
ving acknowledged the existence of tragic situations, through rational reflection 
on these situations it is possible to imagine civil ways in which to transform the 
social environment so as to minimise the violence and suffering such situations 
produce. Both agree that modern audiences cannot afford to allow pessimistic 
passivity in the face of massive violence. Furthermore, both seem to be justified 
in taking this message away from tragedy – or, at least, from one tragedian, na-
mely, Aeschlyus. As Erskine and Lebow point out, one needs only: 
recall his Oresteia, in which one violent deed breeds another, all 
conceived and carried out in the name of justice. The cycle of re-
venge, which in the end pits the Furies (Erinyes) against Orestes, is 
finally ended by a court established by Athena. The jury of twelve 
Athenians is deadlocked and Athena intervenes to cast the deciding 
vote for Orestes. She convinces the Furies to accept an honoured 
home beneath the city and henceforth become well-wishers (Eume-
nides). Justice, which took the form of revenge in the Oresteia and 
in Athens, is transformed from a private to a public responsibility. 
Argument replaces violence as the means by which justice is pur-
sued. (2012b: 189) 
On the other hand, given the historical record recounted in the introduction to 
this chapter, the sceptical reserve that Mayall and Brown show towards Frost’s 
(and Murray’s) position seems entirely justified. Murray’s and others’ attempts 
to civilise the combative passions of European peoples through the institutions 
of the League of Nations may have resolved or redirected some sources of po-
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tentially violent conflict, and, as Mayall grants, such an approach may have si-
milar success in the future. Nevertheless, optimists such as Frost and Murray 
would do well to remember that when faced by actors like Fascist Italy, Imperial 
Japan, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the League ultimately proved im-
potent, arguably even deleterious to the causes of peace and freedom. Indeed, it 
is plausible that the League, by virtue of its commitment to discourse and its 
abhorrence of violence, contributed significantly to the postponement of a mili-
tary action that was to a large extent inevitable, and thereby enabled leaders of 
aggressive states to prepare for the war they knew was brewing. Such inaction, it 
might be said, thereby magnified the intensity of the ‘tragedy’ that engulfed the 
world in September 1939. 
Where does the truth lie here? Are Brown and Mayall wrong to be sceptical of 
Frost’s apparent optimism? If, however, they have a right to be so, should Ae-
schylus no longer be considered a tragedian? Alternatively, if the Oresteia is tru-
ly a tragedy, why did it lie so treacherously in the early years of the discipline? 
As in good drama, there is reason to believe that each side here possesses an 
element of right. However, to understand how this might be so it is necessary to 
place tragedy within its historical context and to read tragedies as specific texts 
within this broader frame of reference. Doing so, as I show at greater length in 
Chapter Three, suggests that the logic, symbolism and historical circumstances 
of the Oresteia reflect an authorial concern with civilising conflict within the 
city of Athens, while international war, for Aeschylus, was in fact something to 
be desired insofar as it provided an outlet for pressures that would otherwise tear 
the city apart. On this reading, Frost would be entitled to take away from Ae-
schylus the idea that it is indeed possible to transform institutions to avoid cer-
tain forms of violence. Brown and Mayall, however, are also right to find in tra-
gedy the sentiment that violence and suffering, on one level or another, are in-
evitable aspects of political life.  
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This leads me to my first point of criticism of the structural approach. What each 
of the otherwise very insightful scholars who engage with tragedy in this way 
misses, and what an adequate historical contextualisation of tragedy reminds us 
of, is the fact that the Greeks experienced not only emotional pain when viewing 
drama but also great pleasure. The Great Dionysia, the festival at which tragedy 
was performed, was an occasion for celebration as much as it was for mourning. 
This is a serious disconnect between the ancient and modern audiences of trage-
dy; the latter are overwhelmingly inclined to believe that “tragedy is distinctive 
in its emphasis on negative emotions” (Stullerova 2012: 117), while for the 
Greeks tragic drama definitely had positive emotional value. The Oresteia, for 
example, ends on a positive note for the city of Athens, which gains an eternal 
ally in Orestes, the domesticated power of the Furies as a weapon of war, and 
newfound civic harmony. Similar outcomes occur in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Co-
lonus and Euripides’ Suppliants. It is implausible that the Athenian audience 
would have lamented the outcomes of these plays. The emotional disjuncture 
between ancient and contemporary spectators of tragedy thus raises doubts about 
the universality of its lessons or at least about the ability of moderns to fully 
comprehend them.  
The broader point of which this criticism is only one part is that, in the words of 
Quentin Skinner, “we must probe below the surface of a text in order to attain a 
full understanding of its meaning” (1972: 394, original emphasis). As David 
Runciman writes, “[the] accumulated evidence of the last 30 years about the his-
torical circumstances surrounding the composition of the great texts … has 
made it practically impossible to argue that these texts can be understood simply 
by reading them, regardless of what their authors may have meant by writing 
them when and as they did” (2001: 84). The reason why this is so is that without 
having some understanding of the audiences that a given text was meant to ad-
dress, of the place of that text in a particular tradition, its use of a particular 
idiom and so on, we are liable to learn lessons from the text that its author may 
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not have intended to give. If we wish to extract rather than superimpose mea-
ning upon tragic texts, therefore, we need first of all to grasp the range of things 
that could recognisably have been done by staging tragic dramas and by the 
treatments of their particular themes at the particular times that they were produ-
ced (Skinner 1972).  
Many of the authors writing on tragedy and international relations profess to 
respect this argument, but nevertheless insist that “just as texts take on meanings 
beyond those intended by their authors, so do genres” (Erskine and Lebow 
2012a: 4). However, if this is the case – if these scholars are not seeking the les-
sons inherent to historical tragic texts, and are content to “mine the rich trove of 
tragedy and reflections about it” (ibid: 6) for use as “inkblots a la Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Freud”  (Lebow 2003: 57) to interrogate contemporary problems 1
– several important questions arise: Why return to tragedy, and why to Greek 
tragedy in particular?  
Euben admits that he is made “uneasy about saying (as Frost does) that trage-
dians were concerned with ethical dilemmas and portray a world full of actors 
with clashing ethical perspectives and strong unyielding commitments to them 
[… because] the language of good and bad seems too much the product of Aris-
totelian and Christian moralizing” (2012: 89). Strong seems to concur, adding 
that another “problem with the conflicting demands view is that there is nothing 
for tragedy to accomplish. As the way of dealing with the conflict all that can be 
done is to establish toleration” (2012: 145). 
Theirs are valid concerns. If structuralist scholars are seeking to inculcate humi-
lity and tolerance in their readers, why do they not invoke the ‘sin of pride’ as 
did Niebuhr and Morgenthau? Why do some authors use the term hubris – an 
 Lebow’s editorial position in Tragedy and International Relations (Erskine and Lebow 1
2012a) seems to have changed from his earlier position in The Tragic Vision of Politics 
(2003); there Lebow argues convincingly for a contextualised reading of tragedy.
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ethical concept expressed in a dead language belonging to an ancient society of 
slaveholding warriors – to evaluate contemporary behaviour? Instead of tragedy, 
why not engage with the stories and moral categories of the Bible, with which 
many contemporary societies – especially Western societies, with whose politi-
cal behaviour most scholars are primarily concerned – are much more familiar?  
Doing so could theoretically help to alleviate the problem that Robbie Shilliam 
finds in contemporary studies of Greek tragedy in IR (namely, a neglect of the 
‘Adamic’ possibilities of objectified people to create themselves as subjects wi-
thin a New World colonised by the West) insofar as the Biblical narrative is fun-
damental to the self-understandings of many colonised peoples in a way that 
Greek tragic narratives are not. “The key issue”, he suggests, “is to resist presen-
ting the Caribbean islands [or any other colonised land] as a simile of the Ae-
gean … because this would ‘humiliate’ the landscape of the New World in so 
far as it robs this nascent public space of its Adamic constitution” (2012: 178).  
Indeed, Shilliam argues elsewhere that the “black biblical hermeneutic” can re-
demptively reconfigure antiquity as African “through the material and spiritual 
prominence [… it gives] to Ethiopia in contradistinction to putatively European 
powers, especially Greece and ‘Rome’” (2011: 108). The gain of taking this ap-
proach, he tells us, lies in “loosening the obsession the Western Academic often 
holds of her/himself as subject, and to imagine herself/himself – for a while – as 
objects in the drama of someone else’s awesome subjectification” (2012: 181).  
So it may be, but if after this while we wish to return to the subject at hand, we 
might ask why scholars do not engage with more modern texts, written in living 
European languages, like those of Shakespeare, Marlowe, Wagner, or even Ar-
thur Miller, to whose work Aristotelian and Christian categories of analysis per-
haps fit more appropriately. These authors, who, to employ Shilliam’s terms, can 
still be considered geo-culturally separate from the Greeks, nevertheless write in 
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a self-consciously tragic tradition. Reading their work would appear to make it 
easier to avoid the folly of learning lessons that were never actually taught. 
Related to these questions of context is the problem identified by Catherine Lu, 
who writes that the “narrow account of tragedy as ethical dilemma … deprives 
the genre of its stimulating and provocative role in political and theoretical ana-
lysis” insofar as “there are different types of tragedies” (2012: 158-9). The is-
sue, broadly speaking, is whether tragedy can unambiguously speak to us as a 
genre as opposed to a collection of various authors whose many texts, although 
sharing many similarities, differ in a number of significant ways.  
A classical example of this question is the fictional agon between Aeschylus and 
Euripides for the title of ‘Best Poet’ in Aristophanes’ comedy, the Frogs. Accor-
ding to Dionysus, the judge of the contest in the play, in Aeschlyus’ day the men 
of the Athenian navy “knew nothing but to call for grits and sing ‘Yo-ho!’” Un-
der the tutelage of Euripides, however, the sailor has learned to question his su-
periors, and now only argues and refuses to row (1073-6). Aristophanes’ play 
suggests that each poet, when writing tragedy, sought to teach the wider Athe-
nian community very different lessons about appropriate political behaviour 
(Arnott 1991). And while it is of course a platitude that rather than reflect reality 
the comic stage exaggerates and distorts it, presumably no one seriously dis-
putes the existence of at least some didactic element to tragedy. Indeed, this is 
precisely the reality that Aristophanes plays upon; his comedy would make no 
sense without it. 
It follows that we should be careful when talking very broadly about what ‘tra-
gedy’ tells us. In Lu’s words: “A pluralistic account of tragedies rather than a 
singular ‘tragic vision’ reveals the ways in which the genre of tragedy ought to 
open up rather than settle ethical debates and reflection about human agency and 
responsibility in world politics” (2012: 159). I agree with Lu, and I believe that 
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an adequately contextualised reading of tragic drama will help us to open new 
avenues for reflection about the place of tragedy in international politics. 
(ii) The Agentic Approach 
What I have called the agentic approach is less vulnerable to criticism regarding 
the attention it pays to the historical context in which tragic drama was written, 
insofar those who take it usually give some consideration to the ethical universe 
in which the Greeks lived. Ned Lebow’s work in particular provides a rich and 
insightful account of tragedy and the three authors he believes share the vision 
of politics that emerges from an appreciation of it. His readings of specific tragic 
texts are sensitive to detail and are well grounded in the secondary literature on 
the plays in question. Likewise, he pays due attention to the complex milieu of 
social, economic, political, and philosophical factors that influenced how Thu-
cydides and the tragedians thought and wrote. 
Nevertheless, there are important objections to be made against some of the as-
sumptions made and conclusions reached by those taking the agentic approach. 
The first of these concerns the dissonance that exists between the ethical quali-
ties agentic scholars allege is fostered by tragedy and the historical descriptions 
of the Athenians who produced and consumed tragic drama. Erskine and Lebow, 
for example, argue that the potential for learning from tragedy is embodied in 
the figure of Oedipus. They claim that Oedipus the Tyrant brings his fate upon 
himself “by a double act of hubris: he refuses to back off at the crossroads when 
confronted with a stranger’s road rage, and he trusts ‘blindly’ in his ability to 
reason his way to a solution to the city’s infertility, despite multiple warnings to 
the contrary” (2012a: 8-9). The Oedipus we meet at Colonus, however, has un-
dergone a transformation: 
He has reflected on his fate; his blindness has led to vision and he 
has shed his hubris and become a wise and prudent man. Wisdom, 
or sophia, for the Greeks, and for the aged Oedipus, consists of a 
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holistic understanding of the world and one’s place in it. It is a 
source that comes from being at one with nature and human society. 
(2012b: 187) 
Erskine and Lebow insinuate that it is this latter Oedipus that we should aspire 
to imitate in thinking about and practicing international politics. But while the 
claim that Oedipus has an important value for the city of Athens is a just one, the 
idea that the Athenian audience would have seen in a broken, blind and beggarly 
old man an appropriate role model is at odds with the fact that honour, youth and 
power – not disgrace, advanced age and dependency – were some of the most 
important values in Greek culture. As Euben notes, “the ‘prideful’ man made the 
world come alive, whatever else he might do” (2012: 89). The act of a free man 
(and a prince at that) ‘refusing to back down’ from an aggressor would hardly 
have been considered hubristic by the Greeks. On the contrary, it would have 
been an ethical response mandated by the honour system that prevailed in their 
societies (cf. Cairns 1993).  
In this context, as Euben points out, it is important to remember that what saved 
Thebes from the terrible Sphinx was Oedipus’ extraordinary knowledge. His in-
vestigation into the killing of Laius, furthermore, ended the plague that was af-
flicting the city, even as it destroyed his own house. Had Oedipus the Tyrant lis-
tened to his advisors instead of following his instincts, he would have continued 
sleeping with his mother while forcing the people of Thebes to suffer the conse-
quences of his family’s abominations (which in Homer’s version of the tale he 
actually does). It seems unlikely that Erskine and Lebow would, on reflection, 
condone as sound political advice the warnings of Jocasta and Teresias. 
On a similar note, it may justly be asked as to how the empathy fostered by the 
tragic vision can be reconciled with some of the historical anecdotes describing 
Athenian behaviour during the Persian War, in the course of which the newly 
democratic (and tragedy-obsessed) Athens came to possess its great empire. 
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Consider, for example, Xerxes’ satrap Artayctes’s execution at the order of Xan-
thippus, the father of Pericles, after the Persian’s son had been stoned to death 
before his eyes (Hdt. 9.120.4), or the sacrifice of three of Xerxes’ young ne-
phews to Dionysus by Greeks under the command of Themistocles, “the man 
most instrumental in achieving the salvation of Hellas, and foremost in leading 
the Athenians up to … high repute” (Plut. Them. 13.2). 
Furthermore, how can the “[f]ear that the act will undermine 
everything” (Schupmann 2012: 140) that underlies the sense of caution alleged-
ly fostered by tragedy be reconciled with the characteristic daring of the people 
of Athens? In Euben’s words, “[d]id the Athenians ignore tragedy on their way 
to empire? How could they, given that tragedy was part of a religious ritual and 
form of political education that helped constitute democratic culture?” (2012: 
89). 
This dissonance between the estimation and the reality of Greek life, is, I think, 
rooted in what is an understandable but fundamentally flawed reading of Aris-
totle’s Poetics. For the agentic approach emphasises the importance of tragedy 
in eliciting pity and fear in order to emotionally deepen our understanding of in-
ternational relations, and the Aristotelian concept of catharsis, which those 
scholars taking this approach understand to mean either the “release” (Erskine 
and Lebow 2012a: 3) or “purgation” (Lebow 2003: 43) from the soul of toxic 
emotions, is central to this process.  
Although according to the long tradition of scholarly comment on the Poetics 
these are acceptable definitions of the meaning of catharsis, such an understan-
ding does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that, for Aristotle, the aim of 
drama was to foster deep-seated and long-lasting feelings of fear and pity 
(which, the agentic approach suggests, leads to the political virtues of prudence 
and empathy), as contemporary IR theorists maintain it was. On the contrary, it 
is logical to assume that catharsis, as a ‘release’ and especially as ‘purgation,’ 
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expunged these feelings (or, at least, ‘bled’ them within tightly controlled 
bounds). In other words, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that according to 
Aristotle the tragedians did not want their audiences to possess strong feelings 
of fear or empathy, but to be largely rid of them. This conclusion is very much in 
accord with the sentiments of Aristophanes’ comic Aeschylus, who declares that 
he composed his work in order to “rouse the citizenry to strive to equal [the tra-
gic heroes] when it hears the call to arms”; he intended to teach the men of 
Athens to “lust for battle” and to “yearn to beat the enemy” (Aristoph. Frogs 
1021-45) – not to fear or feel great sympathy for him.  
Richard Beardsworth makes a second objection to the agentic approach, which 
relates to its methods. He points out that the formula for tragic outcomes (in 
which a hubristic individual tightly woven into the fabric of a community with 
strong and, most importantly, enforceable rules breaks free from that society and 
transgresses sacred moral boundaries, thereby triggering retribution and his or 
her own downfall) that Lebow and others apply to international politics is much 
less applicable to the international level than it is to that of relations within an 
ancient city-state. In his words, “the bond revealed between individual unit and 
international community is much thinner than that in Greek tragedy and, for 
many thinkers and international actors today, is precisely what is not presuppo-
sed by international society” (2012: 100; cf. Sheets 1994). 
International law, the human rights regime, notions of just war and so on do in-
deed form an increasingly important basis for a global society of states, Beard-
sworth notes, but given “the radically different order of political bond in [tragic] 
dramatization of the ancient polis and in contemporary world politics, to argue 
already for the immanence of ethical community to world politics must … be 
done in less determinate, less substantive terms” (2012: 100-101). Furthermore, 
the fact that the emphasis of the agentic approach on nemesis as a secularised 
‘revenge of the gods’ being the causal factor of the tragic hero’s destruction 
seems to assume, when applied to the international realm, the existence of a cen-
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tral authority that can distribute punishment to wrongdoers. In contemporary in-
ternational politics there is, as is well known, no such authority. Lebow and 
others thus address different levels of analysis, community, civic duty and loyal-
ty and in doing so, Beardsworth correctly notes, “ride the distinction between 
the domestic and international too easily” (ibid: 100).  
The agentic claim that Thucydides wrote his history ‘as a tragedy’ is also du-
bious. There is good reason to believe that this idea potentially distorts the mea-
ning of Thucydides’ text. A tragedy “was first and foremost a play, a play that 
performed and was intended to perform a significant political and cultural edu-
cation” (Strong 2012: 145). There is little ground to believe that Thucydides 
wanted or expected his work to be read aloud or performed in any other fashion 
(a point Lebow alone concedes but which he attributes to the decline of oral 
culture [2003: 42-3]). As Richard Rutherford points out, “tragedy engages the 
emotions by direct enactment; history sometimes does this, but the episodes in 
which this happens are framed by the stabilizing narrative voice of the historian, 
who guides the reader and suggests evaluations and explanations much more 
frequently and explicitly than is possible in drama” (Rutherford 2011: 508; cf. 
Hornblower 1994). The very form of the History’s presentation, in other words, 
speaks against an interpretation of it as a tragedy. Aside from all this, Thucy-
dides “partly defines his project against the poets whom he condemns for their 
rhetorical indulgences and desire for popularity at the expense of truth” (Euben 
2012: 93, original emphasis).  
In other words, understanding Thucydides as a tragedian is to place him into a 
category with which he himself could not have identified. While he may certain-
ly have drawn upon tragic themes, ideas and imagery, he was not a tragic poet 
and he makes this fact explicitly clear. It is therefore misleading to claim that the 
History is itself a tragedy. Doing so suggests that Thucydides’ work inspired the 
very same intellectual and emotional reactions in his readers as those that tragic 
drama inspired in its spectators, which, if only because of its mode of presenta-
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tion, it very likely did not. The major differences that exist between tragedy and 
history therefore lead to the conclusion that analysing Thucydides’ text through 
the lens of Aristotle’s theory of drama is not appropriate.  
Notwithstanding these hermeneutical and methodological problems, perhaps the 
most troubling problem with the agentic approach is that its primary conclusion 
about the relevance of a study of tragedy in IR (to wit, its teaching of the neces-
sity of establishing sophrosune as an antidote to hubris) leads to a logical im-
passe when its policy prescriptions are applied to state actors. 
Chris Brown correctly notes that most of the contributors to the debate on trage-
dy in IR have a “take on the world [which] is largely state-centric and [which] 
gives due importance to the role of power in international relations” (2012: 76). 
He also observes that the central realist notion of the ‘security dilemma’ can be 
expressed as a sort of tragic situation, and cites John Mearsheimer’s The Trage-
dy of Great Power Politics (2001) as an example of this. These are important 
points that must be developed further, especially given that most commentators 
ignore Mearsheimer’s contribution to the debate entirely. 
As has been shown in detail above, the agentic approach to tragedy “warns of 
the dangers that accompany power’s overconfidence and perceived invincibili-
ty” (Erskine and Lebow 2012b: 185), makes individuals more aware of the li-
mits to their knowledge and the contingency of their place in the world, and 
helps more generally to make us “more empathetic, prudent and insightful – and 
less arrogant and far-reaching in our goals” (ibid. p. 188). In order to survive or 
to at least maintain their security, the agentic approach warns, states must avoid 
becoming either the perpetrator or the victim of hubris (to which testify the fates 
of both the Athenians and the Melians in the History, or that of Antigone and 
Creon in the Antigone). Possessing sophrosune is the best way to ensure the rea-
lisation of these goals. Given that it encourages the growth of sophrosune, a stu-
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dy of tragedy is therefore in the best interest of those who study and influence 
state policy. 
If we understand the state to be a concrete individual actor in global politics (as 
those taking the agentic approach do) and one to which Aristotelian categories 
apply, however, then we very soon run into problems.  
For there is at least one thing that can be taken as a fact when considering inter-
national politics: groups of people, like individuals, have an inherent capacity to 
act offensively against other groups of people or individuals (whether with fists 
or feet or with weapons as extensions of these appendages). States are no dif-
ferent in this regard.  
States may, of course, have no intention whatsoever of acting offensively against 
other states, and can imagine, empathetically, that other states may have no in-
tention at all of acting offensively against them. Nevertheless, the agentic ap-
proach tells us that if states and their leaders are sophron (‘wise’), they must also 
be keenly aware of the limits to what they can know. As a result, Mearsheimer 
does well to point out that “[a]nother state may be reliably benign, but it is im-
possible to be certain of that judgement because intentions are impossible to di-
vine with 100% certainty” (1994/5: 10). Sophron states, furthermore, should be 
aware of their ‘mortality’ and vulnerability; they can never be certain that other 
states will not use their offensive capabilities against them in a way that might 
not only damage them but might completely annihilate them.  
Preparation against such an outcome is especially necessary in a world in which 
there are no ‘gods’ (that is, no international government), and where the nemesis 
for any potential hubris must come from individual members of the offender’s 
community (that is, the international society of states). Defending order in inter-
national politics in such a world is, in other words, left up to international socie-
ty, and this is perhaps why “not every act of hubris has tragic 
consequences” (Erskine and Lebow 2012b: 197): sometimes international socie-
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ty is simply unable or unwilling to police wrongdoing. This, in turn, eliminates 
some of the disincentives for powerful actors to behave hubristically, and in-
creases the incentives for individual states to ensure that international aggres-
sion, which might end in their own destruction, is less likely to take place 
against them. The international, in other words, is largely a self-help system. 
We have thus established that there is no reliable mechanism to punish hubristic 
actors on the international level, that states must therefore take care of them-
selves, and that states must maintain a healthy level of distrust toward other 
states if they are sophron and aware of their limits. Taken together, it can well be 
argued that these conclusions should encourage wise states to pursue a position 
of power over other states, because having such power is the best guarantee for 
them against becoming the victim of another state’s hubris, even if this state is, 
for the moment, reliably benign. Having such power also implicitly places states 
in a better position to punish actors for any instance of hubris. Thus Mearshei-
mer concludes: 
[The] cycle of violence [that characterised the 20th century] will 
continue far into the new millennium. Hopes for peace will proba-
bly not be realized, because the great powers that shape the interna-
tional system fear each other and compete for power as a result. In-
deed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power 
over others, because having dominant power is the best means to 
ensure one’s own survival. Strength ensures safety, and the greatest 
strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incen-
tive are fated to clash as each competes for advantages over the 
others. This is a tragic situation, but there is no escaping it unless 
the states that make up the system agree to form a world govern-
ment. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect, ho-
wever, so conflict and war are bound to continue as large and endu-
ring features of world politics. (2000: xi-xii) 
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In a tragic world, it would be far-reaching to posit complete disarmament as a 
goal; taking the risk of beating one’s own swords into ploughshares would be 
considered, if not an act of hubris toward one’s own people, at least extraordina-
ry folly (as Gilbert Murray would later come to recognise). Remaining guarded-
ly under arms is, in these circumstances, an act of proper moderation and pru-
dence. When all sides adopt such behaviour, however, they are led into a situa-
tion in which violent clashes between states in the pursuit of power over one 
another become all too likely. Thus, at least for Mearsheimer, a truly tragic situa-
tion arises. 
Lebow, Bedford and Workman and others reject the rational choice model that 
underlies this theory and they have a much broader and deeper understanding of 
power than the largely material one advocated by Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, as 
I hope to have just shown, by considering states as actors to whom the lessons of 
tragedy applies, the ‘tragic vision of politics’ very soon begins to look cross-
eyed and its logic, as a rule of thumb, somewhat disjointed. The road that appea-
red to have left messy tragic endings behind actually leads us right back into 
them. Something is obviously amiss. Just what is lacking will be made clear 
over the course of this thesis. 
Section Three: Overview and Method 
So far I have argued that, while having contributed much to the discipline, both 
the structural and agentic approaches to tragedy in IR do not exhaust the instruc-
tive possibilities of a study of tragedy and international relations and are flawed 
in some significant respects. In the rest of this chapter I outline my own contri-
bution to the debate on tragedy in international relations. 
I agree with Lebow that an adequate contextualisation of tragedy is crucial if we 
are to understand the meaning of tragic drama and if we want to trace the way in 
which it influenced subsequent international political theory. I also agree with 
Euben and Strong that Greek tragedy provided its audience with an important 
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political education, and that this was bound up with issues relating to democra-
cy, tyranny and empire. My thesis is that an in-depth, contextualised understan-
ding of tragedy yields a much richer understanding of how democratic Athe-
nians thought about and dealt with the issues of tyranny, democracy, war and 
empire, and that this deeper understanding sheds a great deal of light on signifi-
cant but understudied elements of the work of Thucydides. Furthermore, I agree 
that Hans Morgenthau can be located within the tragic tradition, but for different 
reasons than have been offered to date. Apart from the new perspectives that my 
interpretation brings to bear on these two thinkers, my thesis provides some pre-
liminary answers to some of the ‘tragic’ problems that they did, and we continue 
to, face. 
I differ from agentic scholars such as Lebow insofar as I reject a predominantly 
Aristotelian interpretation of tragedy and concentrate instead on what I see as 
the most important and enduring political themes in tragic drama. Following 
Skinner’s two suggested rules for approaching historical texts, I will focus “not 
just on the text interpreted, but on the prevailing conventions governing the 
treatment of the issues or themes with which that text is concerned” and “on the 
writer’s mental world, the world of his empirical beliefs” (1972: 406-7).  
We must do this, because, as Skinner writes, there is a “perpetual danger, in our 
attempts to enlarge our historical understanding, […] that our expectations about 
what someone must be saying or doing will themselves determine that we un-
derstand the agent to be doing something which he would not – or even could 
not – himself have accepted as an account of what he was doing” (1969: 6, ori-
ginal emphasis).  
Contemporary scholarship on tragedy in IR falls into this trap, at least insofar as 
it ignores almost entirely an important theme in tragic drama – what the Greeks 
called eros (‘sexual love’) and its role in political life. Ned Lebow, to his credit, 
is aware of the importance of eros in tragedy, the History and Athenian society 
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more generally (2003: 278-281). Nevertheless, he does not explore this theme in 
any depth. This is unfortunate, because eros features prominently in plays such 
as Aeschylus’s Suppliants, Danaids, Agamemnon, Eumenides; Sophocles’ Wo-
men of Trachis, Antigone; and Euripides’ Bacchae, Medea and Hippolytus. In-
deed, I will argue that an adequate appraisal of the nature of eros is crucial to 
understanding (a) tragedy and its role in democratic Athens; (b) the pervasive 
influence of tragedy on Thucydides and, thus, the deeper meanings of his text; 
and (c) how the ‘erotic politics’ identified by the Greeks have been utilised in 
more recent political theory, specifically Hans Morgenthau’s. My dissertation 
will investigate these three interrelated areas and is divided into three sections. 
I begin Chapter Two by outlining the contours of sexuality in ancient Greece.  I 2
engage with and interrogate the influential modern thesis that sexuality in an-
cient Greece did not conform to the dichotomy of homo- and heterosexuality, in 
which the objects of sexual desire are classified by sex (male and female). In an-
cient Greece, sexual partners were classified according to their role in sexual re-
lations, namely the ‘active’ role (defined by penetrating) and the ‘passive’ role 
(defined by being penetrated). The active role was associated with dominance 
and superiority, and was confined to males; the passive role was associated with 
submission and inferiority, and could be taken by males as well as females. 
Sexuality in ancient Greece was thus closely bound up with relations of power 
and the construction of gender. 
I then discuss the representation of eros in poetry, religion and philosophy and in 
light of these consider the psychophysiological dynamics of eros, which include 
not only appetitive but also affective and aesthetic components. I then examine 
representations of extra-sexual eros (that is, eros applied to non-human objects), 
which are usually found in political contexts. 
 Sexuality is defined henceforth as the socially conditioned complex of beliefs about, com2 -
mentary on and practices of sexual behavior. 
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Following this I investigate the role of eros in classical Athenian political dis-
course and practice, what I call ‘erotic politics.’ Firstly, I provide a brief history 
of pre-democratic Athens. Archaic Athens was plagued by violent competition 
between aristocratic clans; this rivalry was eventually quashed by the institution 
of a tyranny which finally brought peace and prosperity to the city. Eventually, 
this dynasty was attacked by a pederastic couple composed of a middle-class 
man named Aristogeiton and his aristocratic younger beloved, Harmodius. The 
attempt at tyrannicide failed, but it initiated a sequence of events that eventually 
toppled the regime and ushered in a new form of political organization: demo-
kratia. 
Despite their failure to remove the tyrants, Aristogeiton and Harmodius were 
hailed as heroes under the new democracy. The ‘tyrannicides,’ as the pair was 
known, were considered ideal democratic citizens, and the love and mutual es-
teem that characterised their relationship were represented by the state as the 
emotional pillars of a ‘tyrannicide model’ of citizenship with which the men 
were encouraged to think about their own relationship to each other and to the 
polis.  
Eros figured in democratic self-definition in another respect also. In official dis-
course, ‘the tyrant’ was the anti-type of the democratic Athenian: indulgent, 
violent, and cruel, ‘the tyrant’ was immoderate in all of his actions and appe-
tites. Nowhere was this more so than in the realm of sex. ‘The tyrant’ was 
consistently associated with an uncontrollable and transgressive species of eros 
that the Athenians tried their best to differentiate from the ‘just’ eros of the ‘ty-
rannicides.’ Adultery, rape, incest, necrophilia – a whole array of perversities 
were pinned onto this generic and hateful figure.  
But alternatives to the democratic narrative did exist. In these discourses, the fi-
gure of the tyrant was presented in a much more ambivalent – sometimes ou-
tright positive – light. His power was thought of as godlike and beautiful, and as 
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such an object of illicit desire for both individuals and the community as a 
whole. ‘The tyrant’ therefore provided an image with which classical Athens 
could not only reaffirm its democratic identity, but also with which it could, un-
der certain circumstances, flirt and even positively identify. 
One of the arenas in which Athens could engage with the figure of the tyrant in 
this manner was on the tragic stage. This is the focus of Chapter Three. First I 
review the contemporary literature that deals with the political context of trage-
dy, and argue this context reflects the concerns of democratic Athens with tyran-
ny and related themes such as war and empire. Following this I discuss the reli-
gious context of the Great Dionysia, and argue that this, too, helps to shed light 
on the dramas performed there. The foundational myth of the Great Dionysia, 
which was recounted each year in the opening procession of the festival, 
concerns the original refusal of the Athenians to accept the god and his sub-
sequent punishment of them. This punishment took the form of ‘impotent poten-
cy,’ or ithyphallicism; a condition of permanent erection that led to pain, inferti-
lity, over-excitation and death.  
When considered in light of the political and religious context of the play, toge-
ther with other aspects of Dionysian cult, many tragedies can be seen to take up 
the theme of erotic politics. The representation of eros in tragedy is almost uni-
formly transgressive and destructive but not, on account of this, necessarily 
shameful. I argue that by encouraging identification with characters afflicted by 
diseased eros, tragedy created a fantasy realm for the Athenian in which they 
could subject their values and norms to scrutiny and exercise darker aspects of 
their imagination. At the same time, however, the ritual context of tragedy reaf-
firmed the values and norms of the polis and attempted to inculcate democratic 
ideology and foster civic unity in its participants.  
This discussion will conclude the first section of the dissertation. By its close, 
we will have seen that the ethically ambiguous notion of eros was central to an-
cient political thinking. Eros was intimately bound up with Athenian notions of 
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sexuality and political action; it provided the ideological foundation for ancient 
democracy; and it lay at the core of the Greek understanding of tyranny. The no-
tion of eros was closely related to the Greek understanding of power, which ob-
viously had implications for their international politics, especially in terms of 
war and imperialism. Tragedy explores these topics, which were crucially im-
portant to the Athenians and in their broader sense remain central to the disci-
pline of International Relations today.  
In the second part of the dissertation, I turn my attention to Thucydides’ History 
and attempt to bring the insights gleaned from earlier chapters to bear on it.  
Many scholars have shown in great detail that eros plays an important but wide-
ly misunderstood role in Thucydides’ History. In Chapters Four through Six, I 
attempt to consolidate their arguments while adding a number of my own. 
Eros appears a number of crucial junctions in the History. The first of these is 
Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in which Pericles constructs a model of citizenship 
based on the relationship between the pederastic lover and his beloved (a rela-
tionship which is an allusion to the love of the ‘tyrannicides’). This is the focus 
of Chapter Four. Here, I discuss in depth the ideational parameters of Pericles’ 
metaphor of ‘the lover of the city,’ arguing that this model requires war and the 
death of citizens in battle to reach its logical fulfilment. It was, as such, very vo-
latile and liable to become undone, which it was in fact to do during the Athe-
nians’ disastrous expedition to conquer Sicily. 
In Chapter Five, I argue that both Nicias and Alcibiades (two important political 
figures in Athens after Pericles’ death) are implicated in Thucydides’ narrative 
of the catastrophic Sicilian expedition (which many consider the clearest reflec-
tion of Thucydides’ debt to tragic drama). In the Athenian tragedy, if we can call 
it that, all alike are afflicted by human weakness; their follies combine with un-
fortunate circumstance to produce complete disaster. However, Thucydides ap-
pears to conclude that Alcibiades was Athens’ best hope in the war, and he sug-
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gests that by following unnamed demagogues in recalling Alcibiades for trial on 
trumped up charges the Athenians proved themselves their own worst enemies. 
If anybody was to blame for the disaster that struck the people of Athens, it was 
the Athenian demos itself.  
The tragedy of Athens, Thucydides seems to suggest, lies more in the repetition 
of the behaviour manifest in the community’s mythical mistreatment of the god 
Dionysus than in the personalities and leadership of either Alcibiades or Nicias. 
Alcibiades is capable of unifying the city and leading it to victory, and this he 
eagerly desires to do – on the sole provision that his (own self-estimated) worth 
is fully recognised. Like Dionyus and Pericles, he is the individual most capable 
of arousing – and curing – the eros of his city. But when his people refuse to 
honour him and instead turn against him, he ruthlessly engineers their ruin.  
In Chapter Six, I examine the ‘erotic theory of politics’ that is espoused by the 
mysterious Diodotus in the Mytilenean Debate. In his speech, Diodotus claims 
that all men have at the root of their consciousness an insolent and violent erotic 
impulse that will stop at nothing to achieve its aims. Eros is the egg from which 
humanity’s political dreams hatch; hope and fortune feed these dreams and are 
what eventually turn them into nightmares. I argue that this theory, which can 
only be considered tragic, is shared by both Diodotus and Thucydides himself. 
This chapter will conclude the second section of this dissertation. 
Chapter Seven compares some of the erotic elements of Thucydides’ text with 
similar ideas expressed in Plato’s well-known dialogue, the Symposium (and in 
particular, with the ideas expressed by Aristophanes in the speech attributed to 
him there). There are three elements of Aristophanes’ speech that stand out in 
this regard: first, an emphasis on homoerotic love as the basis of virile democra-
tic politics; second, the idea that eros as the means to reunite with ‘what is our 
own’ and to achieve a wholeness that is politically potent but at the same time 
linked to death; and, third, the suggestion of a web of ambition, criminality, and 
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violence in which those afflicted by eros finds themselves inextricably caught. 
This discussion helps to understand the connections between the tragic eros 
found in Thucydides’ History and the conception of power in the work of Hans 
Morgenthau, insofar as the Symposium acts as a kind of intellectual stepping-
stone between these authors and their texts.  
In Chapter Eight, I leap forward some two and a half thousand years to consider 
Hans Morgenthau’s thoughts on the relationship between love and power. In this 
regard, Morgenthau owes a great debt to the ancients. Before elaborating on this 
claim, I describe the intellectual and political context in which Morgenthau 
composed his texts. While a wide variety of authors influenced Morgenthau’s 
overall political philosophy, his concept of the animus dominandi, which is so 
central to his theory, is indebted not only to authors such as Nietzsche and 
Freud, but also to the classical discourse on eros that these other thinkers them-
selves drew upon. Part of the reason this is the case, I argue, can be traced to the 
volatile historical circumstances in which Morgenthau found himself.  
Following this I examine some of Morgenthau’s comments on freedom and de-
mocracy. I argue that although Morgenthau does not explicitly employ erotic 
terminology when talking about these issues, the concepts and reasoning that he 
uses are on closer examination remarkably similar to those we find in his un-
derstudied thoughts on love and power. This discussion will draw out some of 
the ways in which Morgenthau’s thoughts on love and power relate to his gene-
ral political philosophy. It will also place us in a position to examine the theme 
of tragedy in Morgenthau’s work and its relation to the same in Thucydides. 
In Chapter Nine, I detail the connections that exist between Morgenthau’s 
thoughts on love and power and the theme of tragedy in his broader oeuvre. I 
argue that, for Morgenthau, international politics boils down to the dichotomy 
between love and the lust for power and their root in the loneliness that defines 
the human soul. This is because these phenomena are what create the urge for 
society and as a result give birth to all political orders, whatever scope and level 
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of complexity they eventually come to possess. The tragedy of international po-
litics is only a larger manifestation of the fundamental tragedy of man; through 
the process of collective identification, the individual’s lust for power is trans-
ferred onto the nation and reproduces its dynamics on a much grander scale. 
I then consider the ways in which Morgenthau’s philosophy relates to Thucy-
dides’ History. Although Morgenthau draws mostly upon the Platonic corpus for 
direct inspiration on love and the will to power as responses to man’s existential 
loneliness, he and Thucydides construct remarkably similar accounts of erotic 
politics due to their shared discursive setting in tragedy. Morgenthau found in 
Thucydides a philosophical forebear whose shared understanding of the basic 
elements of human behaviour made selectively quoting from the History seem a 
natural and legitimate exercise. Thucydides’ insights and emphases, further-
more, confirmed Morgenthau’s own.  
In Chapter Ten, I conclude the dissertation by summarizing my findings and out-
lining the broader implications of the thesis for IR. I will also suggest some ave-
nues for further research. 
Before continuing it is necessary to say a few words on method. This has been a 
thoroughly interdisciplinary project, and I have not been hermeneutically dog-
matic in undertaking it; my reading of historical texts is not ‘Freudian,’ nor 
‘Constructivist,’ nor determined by any other kind of -ism. This being said, 
there are some significant influences on my work, which will undoubtedly shine 
through. The first of these has been noted above, namely the work of Quentin 
Skinner and of the Cambridge School more generally. The anthropology of Clif-
ford Geertz and his intellectual descendants factors heavily, especially in the 
first two sections of the dissertation. Finally, when interpreting texts and in des-
cribing the historical links between them I have often utilised the literary theory 
of Stanley Fish, and in particular his idea of ‘interpretive communities.’  
Without having the training of a philologist or classicist, in my discussions of 
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the ancients I have often had to rely on the work of those who have. Given the 
various and often conflicting theoretical and methodological perspectives these 
scholars take, in terms of its eclecticism my reliance upon them may seem so-
mewhat troublesome. Nevertheless, when selecting and presenting evidence 
from the vast store of material available I have endeavoured to ensure that this 
evidence is not decontextualised or ‘contraindicated.’ When using ancient 
sources I have stuck to the same rule and drawn on those authors who were 
roughly contemporaneous with the periods under discussion (namely the archaic 
and classical). Where sources of a later date are used, I have, to the best of my 




This chapter is divided into two sections. I begin the first by outlining the 
contours of sexuality in ancient Greece, which was closely bound up with rela-
tions of power and the construction of gender. I then discuss the representation 
of eros in poetry, religion and philosophy and in light of these consider the psy-
chophysiological dynamics of eros, which include not only appetitive but also 
affective and aesthetic components. I then examine representations of extra-
sexual eros (that is, eros applied to non-human objects), which are usually found 
in political contexts. 
In Section Two, I investigate the role of eros in classical Athenian political dis-
course and practice – what I call ‘erotic politics.’ Firstly, I provide a brief histo-
ry of pre-democratic Athens. Archaic Athens was plagued by violent competi-
tion between aristocratic clans; this rivalry was eventually quashed by the insti-
tution of a tyranny which brought peace and prosperity to the city. This dynasty 
was later attacked by a pederastic couple composed of a middle-class man na-
med Aristogeiton and his aristocratic younger beloved, Harmodius. The attempt 
at tyrannicide failed, but it initiated a sequence of events that eventually toppled 
the regime and ushered in a new form of political organization: demokratia. In 
the new democracy, both the tyrannicides and the figure of ‘the tyrant’ became 
central to the democracy’s self-definition in the ideological function they had as 
positive and negative models of political activity.  
Section One: Love and Society in Ancient Greece 
(i) Sexuality in Ancient Greece 
For the Greeks – or so Aristotle would have us believe – the distinction of sex 
was “a first principle” (GA. 2). The one fundamental difference between male 
and female human beings was thought to hold also in the difference between 
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reason and appetite, light and darkness, limit and the unlimited, unity and plura-
lity, straight and crooked, good and bad, Uranus and Gaea; in all of these ins-
tances, Aristotle says, “the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the 
male ruler and the female subject” (Aristot. Pol. 1.1252b). Masculine and femi-
nine principles were, in other words, embedded in the cosmos; the universe was 
thoroughly gendered, and where ‘Man’ stood for activity, reason and the genera-
tion of form, ‘Woman’ was that which was passive, emotional and the material 
to be moulded. These beliefs were encouraged by, not least because they were 
embedded in, the Greek language and its fondness for gender distinctions. 
These distinctions were, unsurprisingly, also expressed in sexual terms. In 
Athens, sexuality did not fully conform to the modern dichotomy of homo- and 
heterosexuality or even, on some readings, to the belief that sex is a collective 
enterprise. Rather, Athenian sexuality incorporated and, some scholars argue, 
was fundamentally structured by the same masculine emphasis upon activity and 
domination that characterised Athenian social life in general (Winkler 1990a). 
To some extent this should be expected; as R. W. Connell notes, “masculinities 
as cultural forms cannot be abstracted from sexuality, which is an essential di-
mension of the social creation of gender” (1993: 602). 
Building upon the arguments of Michel Foucault, who himself drew heavily on 
the seminal work of the renowned classicist K. J. Dover, scholars such as David 
Halperlin contend that in classical Athens sexual objects came in two different 
kinds, albeit not male and female but rather masculine and feminine, active and 
passive, aggressive and submissive (1986: 39). The sexual deed was considered 
an action that one person performed upon another, the primary meaning of 
which was located in the penetration of a ‘passive’ body (either male or female) 
by an ‘active’ body (invariably male). In Halperlin’s words: 
Different social actors had different social roles: to assimilate both 
the superordinate and the subordinate member of a sexual relation-
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ship to the same “sexuality” would have been as bizarre, in Athe-
nian eyes, as classifying a burglar as an “active criminal,” his vic-
tim as a “passive criminal,” and the two of them alike as partners in 
crime – it would have been to confuse what, in reality, were suppo-
sedly separate and distinct identities. (1989: 261) 
Sexuality, on this account, was therefore a largely (if not exclusively) masculine 
phenomenon in ancient Greece. ‘Sex’ was something that was done by one per-
son to another; it was an activity, restricted to sexual actors (e.g. men). Feminine 
sexuality, if it could be called such, was “objectless, passive, and entirely deter-
mined by the female body’s need for regular phallic irrigation” (quoted in Bassi 
1998: 109). Given that at Athens it was the sole prerogative of the free adult 
male to initiate sexual activity, sexuality there was enmeshed with, if not fully 
representative of, the androcentric social configurations of power that defined 
the Athenian polis. In light of this, Halperlin defines sexuality in Greece as es-
sentially ‘phallic’, that is, as a “generalized ethos of penetration and domination, 
a socio-sexual discourse structured by the presence or absence of its central 
term: the phallus” (1986: 40). 
Many cultural artefacts and representations suggest that this was indeed the case. 
On Attic vases displaying male-female sexual scenes, for example, women are 
represented “almost invariably in a ‘subordinate’ position, the man ‘dominant’; 
the woman bent over or lying back and supported, the man upright or on 
top” (Dover 1978: 101). Even in those instances in which physical penetration 
was absent, as was urged to be the case in pederastic relationships between men 
and boys (in Athens, at least), the act remained polarised; the individual who put 
part of his body (e.g. his thighs) at the service of another’s pleasure would be 
deemed the passive partner of the pair. Artistic representations of pederastic 
partnerships show the junior partner as nearly always sexually inert, which re-
flected the widespread belief that youths should yield to their lovers out of a 
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mixture of gratitude, friendly affection and respect. Anything more than this, and 
particularly any erotic response, would have suggested a willingness on behalf 
of the youth to play the role of a woman or a slave. This, of course, detracted 
from which that made him attractive to his lover in the first place: his budding 
manliness (Ludwig 2002: 52). It was for this reason that intercrural intercourse 
was the culturally favoured means of gratification for active lovers of youths, for 
it spared the boy the shame of penetration and thereby maintained his proto-
masculinity and thus his erotic allure. 
The close conceptual relation of male sexual organs and hubris also seems to 
lend support to the ‘phallic’ model of sexuality. Pindar, for example, spoke of 
the ‘erect hubris’ of donkeys, and other texts mention that hubris in stallions 
and bulls could be excised via castration (Csapo 1997: 260). In Plato’s Timaeus, 
we are told that “in men the nature of the genital organs is disobedient and self-
willed, like a creature that is deaf to reason, and it attempts to dominate all be-
cause of its frenzied lusts” (91b). This description is reformulated by Socrates’ 
characterization of hubris as a disobedient stallion in the Phaedrus. As we shall 
see in more depth in the following part of this chapter, its logic is also implicit in 
Aristotle’s advice to despots who have committed sexual hubris against their 
subjects. Male genitalia were, as it were, a microcosm of men. 
While the ‘phallic’ line of analysis generates valuable insights, some of its ad-
vocates are prone to making serious exaggerations. To maintain that sexual de-
sire is “merely a construct, even a modality of power” (Wohl 2002: 127), for 
example, or simply “a reflection of the dominant themes in contemporary social 
relations” (Halperlin 1986: 40), is to rely on a grossly reductive view of culture 
and sexuality that makes “a bleak political cartoon” (Paglia 1991: 141) of classi-
cal Athens and nonsense of human biology.  
For while sexuality was, in classical Athens as elsewhere in time and space, so-
cially conditioned, this fact does not invalidate the possibility (or indeed the li-
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kelihood) that social norms were themselves affected by the innate psychologi-
cal and physiological tendencies of individuals, whatever cultural baggage they 
may have inherited from their societies (Reddy 1997). At least many Athenians 
believed this to be the case; sexual desire was considered by many to be an ap-
petite largely akin to thirst or hunger; something basic, inborn and biological 
that men shared in common with the animals. This was not all fantasy, of course, 
and modern scientific research has made significant strides in demonstrating the 
various ways in which biological factors such as genes and hormones affect 
sexual desire (e.g. Okami et al. 2004). 
But more importantly, the issue has as much to do with the obsessional Greek 
concern with self-control (and its lack) as it does with patterns of dominance and 
submission during sexual intercourse and the social structures these reflected 
(Davidson 1997). Bruce Thornton contends that the Greeks believed that a man 
who indulged his sexual appetites (of which being penetrated was considered 
one of the most lascivious and bestial) so indiscriminately and excessively that 
he incurred social opprobrium thereby is “shameless not so much because he has 
acted the part of a woman or slave or ‘other,’ but because he has given in to the 
itch of pleasure, has ignored the controls that limit the destructiveness of appe-
tite, the controls without which the Greek versions of civilization and political 
order, indeed human identity itself, cannot survive” (2000: 158). In other words, 
being penetrated was considered a pleasure like others, albeit a pleasure that was 
particularly lewd and hence particularly subject to discipline. 
Certainly, artistic representations of satyrs – whose mythical existence as don-
key- and goat-men lingered just beyond the bounds of the civilised polis, at the 
frontiers of wild nature – support such an argument. The exaggerated genitalia 
and ithyphallic nature of these creatures suggests a boundless sexual energy 
masculine in nature but in its intensity and permanence more bestial than hu-
man. Satyrs are also often represented as playing a ‘passive’ role in sex or self-
stimulation; they seem very happy to be penetrated by animals, other satyrs, dil-
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dos and dildo-like objects such as phallus-birds. Furthermore, satyrs are insa-
tiable in their appetites for food, wine, and sleep. In light of this, it seems that 
willingly submitting to anal penetration is not what marks satyrs out as gro-
tesque counter-models of man, as necessarily ‘unmanly’; what marks them out 
as such is their general bestial licentiousness. What we see in the representation 
of satyrs, in other words, is the imagined influence of the animal in man, packa-
ged as a catalogue of the ways in which lasciviousness and excess – whether ex-
pressed in drinking, eating, sleeping, or the ins and outs of sex – can distort, de-
value and eventually destroy the civilised order (Lissarague 1990; Padgett 
2000).       
To give an example from the real world of the polis, when a male adulterer was 
caught (if not in the act, when he could be killed) he would be subject to a las-
ting public humiliation in the form of having a large radish or spiny fish inserted 
into his anus, before an assembled crowd of fellow citizens, by the man whose 
wife he had seduced. Such a punishment seems somewhat random when seen 
through the lens of ‘phallic’ sexuality, insofar as the adulterer, though a crimi-
nal, always remained ‘dominant’ and ‘active’ in terms of his sexual ‘role.’ Ho-
wever, as Thornton suggests, this bizarre practice becomes comprehensible if we 
accept that it reflects the idea that “anyone who is so sexually driven that he 
would risk death and shame when relief [… at the hands of a prostitute] could 
be had for a pittance, is an uncontrolled compulsive on par with the pathic – so 
let his anus reflect that equality” (2000: 160). We might then say that, like the 
satyr, the (apprehended) adulterer is both ithyphallic and anally receptive; like 
the satyr, that contemptuous slave to his pleasures, the adulterer is a laughing 
stock and a warning for the whole community because of this. 
Although Thornton does not consider how the symbolic sexual aggression, or 
hubris, that the adulterer committed against a married woman’s husband (insofar 
as she was essentially his property and thus an extension of his person) may 
have shaped the punishment in this case (cf. Cohen 1991), we would neverthe-
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less be well-advised to follow his advice to steer clear of the structural myopia 
of the ‘phallic’ model of Greek sexuality and to pay more attention to the psy-
chologies of Athenian men and the ethics by which they tried to regulate their 
behaviour (especially their sexual behaviour) (Nussbaum 1990: 62). 
Consider the fact that courage (andreia), along with wisdom, moderation and 
self-mastery (sophrosune), were cardinal virtues of Athenian manhood (and, 
hence, citizenship) (Loraux 1993). Andreia is etymologically derived from the 
Greek term for ‘real man’ (aner) and given this, Dimitra Kokkini notes, the cor-
relation between maleness and courage became “so deeply rooted in the ancient 
Greek mentality that the combination of women and courage [was] regarded as 
both linguistically paradoxical and as extremely rare” (Kokkini 2010: 32; cf. Ba-
lot 2004).  
Self-mastery and moderation, furthermore, were the root of andreia, as Aristotle 
suggests in his discussion of war as the ultimate test of courage (Nic. Eth. 
1115a), and rationality was a natural component of self-mastery of moderation. 
Thus, Euripides suggests, “rashness in a leader causes failure; the sailor of a ship 
is calm, wise [sophos] at the proper time. Foresight too, makes manly courage 
[tandreion]” (Supp. 508-510). ‘Man,’ in other words, was considered that deli-
berative and reasoning faculty of the subject that controlled and directed its 
quantum of ‘Woman,’ the various emotions and bodily appetites. As John Wink-
ler notes, “‘woman’ [was] not only the opposite of man; she [was] also a poten-
tially threatening ‘internal émigré’ of masculine identity” (1990b: 182). Some 
men were believed to be manlier than others, while other males were not even 
really ‘men.’ The qualities generally considered central to citizenship were, in 
sum, the same as those that defined a man; self-indulgence, rashness and passion 
were their less admired feminine counterparts, and had no place to play in poli-
tics.  
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This would explain why both the ‘active’ adulterer and the ‘passive’ homo-
sexual could be considered, in light of their sexual excesses, essentially feminine 
creatures despite the marked differences in their sexual roles and practices. 
Contra Thornton, men who willingly played a passive role in sex were indeed 
considered more irrational than others when they were penetrated, because only 
more irrational and beastlike beings (such as women or the mythical satyrs) 
were thought capable of degrading themselves by engaging in such wanton be-
haviour. Allowing oneself to be penetrated marked one out as fundamentally 
unmanly; it was a cultural marker of lasciviousness and femininity, which were 
conceptually linked with irrationality and poor decision-making skills. But the 
same was true of men who penetrated others willy-nilly, without regard for laws, 
personal property and other civic boundaries; they, too, were considered femi-
nine, not because they took the passive role in sex (they obviously did not) but 
because they were constantly prone to indulge their desires in the gross manner 
thought characteristic of women. As Martha Nussbaum observes, to indulge 
such genital lust so freely and completely “is already to be in the process of get-
ting fucked – by one’s own appetites, by the control of women’s (or young 
men’s) allure, by life itself” (2005: 167). Whether it concerned active or passive 
sexual behavior, in sum, the unrestrained pursuit of sexual pleasure, like any 
other pleasure, was considered a feminine and thus a politically negative attri-
bute. As such, it received no welcome in the masculine world of the polis.  
As the preceding discussion has made clear, considerations of power, gender and 
status within the hierarchical structure of the polis as well as individual psycho-
logy are important for building an understanding of Greek sexuality, and in par-
ticular the role of genital desire in it. But they alone are not sufficient, for this 
discourse of sexuality takes place largely without reference to eros in its emo-
tional (rather than genital) aspects. A discussion of eros is crucial if we are to 
gain a complete picture of Greek sexuality. It is to such discussion that we now 
turn. 
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(ii) Eros, Sexuality and Society 
Monica Cyrino observes that “the lyric poets of the Greek Archaic Age viewed 
the experience of erotic desire as a potentially destructive force: their poems de-
velop a long and varied series of metaphors to portray eros as a power often hos-
tile and even pathological to the sufferers of love” (1996: 371). Anacreon, for 
example, compares eros to a champion boxer, a blacksmith hammering the hot 
iron of his body, and the fever and chills of a sickness; Alcaius, Pindar and Iby-
cus liken the state of being in love to one of fitful madness; Theocritus sings 
about Eros having sucked out his blood; Archilochus, harking back to Homer, 
evokes the image of the lover as a dying warrior whose flesh is pierced by sharp 
weapons; and Sappho describes the fire under the skin and the painful ringing of 
the ears of the love-struck, who is unable to listen to reason, her senses stunned 
(Cyrino 1996; Carson 1998; Faraone 1999). Other metaphors included “cru-
shing, bridling, roasting, stinging, biting, grating, cropping, poisoning, singeing 
and grinding to a powder” (Carson 1998: 41). Similar images can be found also 
in tragedy, where, among other terrible things, Eros is a “tyrant of men” (Eur. 
Hipp. 538) who remains “unconquered in battle” (Soph. Ant. 780).  
We should pause to appreciate the fact that these images, which have become 
somewhat clichéd and powerless in modern times, were immediate and visceral 
to the Greeks (Thornton 1997: 17-8). Ancient boxing, for example, had no pad-
ded gloves and no protective headgear; a well-placed punch from a skilled and 
strong opponent could break a rib, a nose, a tooth or a jaw – it might even knock 
a person unconscious or kill him. There were, in the case of madness, no sanato-
riums, psychiatrists or anti-psychotics; lunacy was an indefatigable possession 
by a god or demon or some other occult force that often singled a person out for 
harassment, persecution and sometimes destruction by the community. Battle 
was always looming, and an arrow, appearing out of nowhere, could easily find 
a gap in a soldier’s armour, pierce his flesh and lodge its barbed head in his lung 
or intestines; removing it was difficult and dangerous as the wounds were prone 
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to infection, which carried all the associated risks of gangrene, septicaemia and 
hyperpyrexia. Other weapons of war melted skin, severed limbs, spliced organs, 
cracked skulls and crushed bones; and as there were no antibiotics, no chemical 
ointments or painkillers, often enough the burned, broken and bleeding were 
forced to die or recover in a state of agonising pain.  
Conventional Greek syntax is in keeping with these unhappy poetic metaphors 
and compounds the psychology of eros as domination. Eros as a noun tends to 
force itself upon people; it carries them away; it is very much a passion, some-
thing that happens to people, not because of them or as a function of their will. 
The word is often employed together with the verb damazo, for example, which 
in Homer “is used to describe the breaking of a horse, a warrior killing another, 
and the sexual subjection of a young girl to her husband” (Thornton 1997: 15). 
Plato regularly speaks of the lover as enslaved by his desires, a figure of speech 
likely to have been a reflection of popular usage (Golden 1984: 314), and Ae-
schylus, Sophocles, and Euripides all speak of the way in which eros falls upon 
or grabs hold of people, against their will or acknowledged best interests. So too 
did those authors with more clearly political concerns, including Isocrates, Ae-
schines and, as we will later see in much depth, Thucydides.  
Eros, in sum, robs the individual of “limbs, substance, integrity and leaves the 
lover, essentially, less” (Carson 1998: 32). Given this fact, Bruce Thornton says 
with some cheek, “we must not think of our Valentine’s Day chubby babes with 
their ‘weak, childish bows,’ as Shakespeare put it, when we encounter [this kind 
of] imagery in Greek literature. Imagine instead Eros brandishing an Uzi like 
some sexual Rambo or diapered Terminator, and we might get closer to the im-
pact of the image for the Greeks” (1997: 29).  
Thornton’s point is important to note insofar as “to sing of love was not only to 
represent erotic desire but also to establish it as a social practice” (Calame 1999: 
6). As Douglas Cairns observes: 
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the labelling of an emotion in a given culture can make all the diffe-
rence as to what the emotion actually is, and so, when infant mem-
bers of a culture acquire their emotional repertoire and vocabulary, 
what they learn is not (or not solely) how to label discrete psycho-
logical experiences, but how to recognize the situations which their 
culture considers appropriate to particular concatenations of evalua-
tion, feeling and behaviour. (1993: 10)  
Beyond poetry, eros was represented as a primordial force of nature upon which 
life itself depended. The desire for copulation that it stoked in (almost) every li-
ving creature was considered a fundamental biological urge, akin in many re-
gards to thirst or hunger. In the Laws, for example, Plato postulates the existence 
of three basic appetites, which relate to drink, food and sex. Of these lusts, eros 
is described as the keenest. In his Republic, eros is characterised more negative-
ly, as a tyrannical drone that directs the manifold variety of other bodily desires 
in their assault on the rational mind. The sophists and other philosophers like-
wise tended to impose a degree of conformity on the various desires by grouping 
them all together under the rubric of eros (Ludwig 2002: 121).  
That eros was an immense, if not omnipotent, power, that it was almost unavoi-
dable in the course of a normal life, and that it was essentially rooted in the 
world of the animals meant that man was always under threat of becoming bes-
tialised by it. But although it was inextricably sexual and common to all crea-
tures, eros was a great deal more than just a sexual appetite that reduced man to 
the level of the beasts; it was as much a function of the mind as it was of the 
body.  
This claim can be substantiated in a number of ways. The first lies in the fact 
that although animals obviously experience sexual desire, they are (or were 
thought to be) incapable of displaying, at least to the same degree as humans, a 
number of specific affective components of eros. Animals such as dogs, for 
example, were recognised as being capable of maternal love and affection for 
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their masters, but they were not considered able to express the complex of quali-
ties and behaviours that the Greeks would call erotic (and which we might today 
ascribe to a person who has ‘fallen in love’ with someone else). Such qualities 
and behaviours might include exaggerated esteem for the beloved, daydreaming 
and fantasising, obsession, devotion, tenderness, great care, jealousy, an increase 
in energy, a new sense of daring and generosity, a willingness to fight and sacri-
fice for the beloved, giddiness in his or her presence, and so on (cf. Konstan 
2013; Dover 2003; Ludwig 2002). 
The institution of marriage, based on dowries and political alliances as it prima-
rily was, was in most instances more practical and in many instances likely less 
erotically intense than were pederastic sexual relationships. Nevertheless, mar-
riage still incorporated erotic desire into its fold. The most obvious and impor-
tant instantiation of this was in its role in the production of legitimate children, 
which was an important civic and familial duty. For married men, sex was 
considered a form of work comparable to ploughing the fields; it was thought 
that by means of erotic labour, “the Greek husband domesticates his wild bride 
and, just as he does for his land and the beasts on it, brings to fruition what 
would otherwise remain savage and unproductive” (Carson 1990: 149). Through 
wedlock, the wantonness presumed natural to women could be channelled and 
made politically useful; their insatiable eros was yoked by their husbands to 
produce new citizen stock for the good of the gods, the family and the communi-
ty. “In the classical Greek representation of conjugal union, the – in effect essen-
tial – function of reproduction thus depends directly upon the intervention of 
Eros and the fulfilment of love on a shared bed” (Calame 1999: 124). But the 
affective dimensions of eros were not entirely absent from (the ideal) marriage; 
support, affection, and trust were valued attributes in both husband and wife. 
But, at least according to the records, the full breadth of human eros was most 
pronounced in the context of pederasty. Here, Plato tells us, men behaved in 
ways that, if done for any other reason other than erotic love, “would reap the 
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most profound contempt” (Symp. 183a).  This is because many a Greek lover 
would act like a drunkard, a dog, or a slave: 
[He] followed his beloved about everywhere, sometimes spent the 
night in front of his house, serenaded him, composed verses and 
songs in his honour, carved his name on walls, doors and trees, 
hung up garlands of leaves or flowers, like religious offerings, in 
his porch, and sent him all kinds of presents, such as fruit, a bag of 
knuckle-bones, a cock, a hare or a dog, as well as painted vases on 
which the artist had been instructed to engrave the boy’s name, fol-
lowed by the adjective kalos, ‘fair.’ (Flaceliere 1962: 58)  
The reason such affection, rooted in animalistic genital desire though it was, did 
not reap such ‘profound contempt’ seems to be that it helped to generate and fer-
tilise a number of positive political outcomes. In homoerotic contexts, eros ins-
pired a man to exercise with and train his beloved in the gymnasium, to school 
him in poetry and philosophy, to fight bravely and act honourably in front of 
him, and generally to invest a great deal of time, effort, and care into guiding his 
physical and psychological development. All of this contributed to preparing the 
youth for his future life as a warrior and citizen (Percy III 1996; Ludwig 2002).  
Not only did the beloved receive attentive tutoring in a variety of important 
spheres of public life, however, but the feats to which the lover was spurred by 
his wish to impress the object of his desire (in order to capture that youth’s af-
fections) would, ideally, act as an example for the youth himself to follow (and, 
if possible, outdo). As a result, both the lover and the beloved would (so it was 
hoped) continue to grow together in a virtuous spiral upwards (Ludwig 1996: 
541). Thus the pair and also city were thought to reap great benefit from such 
relationships (a point to which the speakers in Plato’s Symposium attest). 
Claude Calame rightly concludes that “whenever it is a matter of educating fu-
ture citizens or of introducing their wives into their roles as fully developed 
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women,” in ancient Athens erotic desire played a central role in “the institutions 
designed to facilitate the passage to adult life, in order to produce a sexuality 
that is at once controlled and productive” (1999: 130). It must be emphasised 
that this ‘eroticised’ sexuality was significantly different from the phallic model 
we have discussed above. Erotic relationships – and particularly homoerotic re-
lationships, which, due to their centrality to the politics of ancient Athens, are 
our primary concern here – were imbued with more than just the social codes of 
power; sex and sexual passion were not always rapacious, oppressive and preda-
tory, as the phallic model tends to portray them as being. While elements of this 
‘socio-sexual discourse’ certainly persisted, and the possibility of shame and 
exploitation constantly lurked in the background of all erotic relationships, a 
great variety of affective behaviours considered inherent to eros were available 
to the lover to shield and protect his beloved from the defilements associated 
with the appetitive aspects of this phenomenon. Martha Nussbaum summarises 
the issue well: 
On the one hand, eros is beneficent, showing a tender regard for the 
young man’s personality and his education; on the other hand, it is 
characterized by strong genital desire, which … is a source of mad-
ness and distraction, a force that disrupts reasoning and threatens 
virtue, but if it threatens virtue, it also seems to threaten, inevitably, 
the good conduct of the lover toward his partner. Nor can we even 
cleanly separate these two tendencies in eros, for it would appear 
(according, again, to deeply entrenched popular ideas) that the very 
madness and distraction in the lover that put virtue most at risk are 
among the sources of his generosity to the beloved … [Hence, 
what] is at stake in sex is not only one’s own self-mastery, but also 
the well-being, happiness, and ethical goodness of another. (2002: 
55-8) 
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These ethical questions were compounded by the fact that, as has been noted, 
eros was considered a kind of possession by a force that originated from beyond 
the deliberative self. Eros was an assault on the rational mind that was difficult, 
if not impossible, to successfully combat; indeed, it was an invasion that even 
the Zeus himself could not resist. This belief apparently diminished the ethical 
responsibility of the actor who fell under the sway of erotic passion and commit-
ted outrage because of it. If a person was consumed by a passion as powerful 
and ethically hazardous as eros, many Greeks seemed to believe that his culpabi-
lity for any wrongdoing done in the name of it should be mitigated. Such 
wrongdoing was, after all, done against his will, or at least without his rational 
consent.  
A brief example from Aristotle’s Politics helps to illustrate the point. Here, Aris-
totle advises tyrants to refrain from committing two common types of hubris – 
violence against free men and sexual abuse of their children (1315a15-28). 
These are the offences that he believes are most likely to cause civil disturbance 
and stasis, on account of the fury they cause in the families of the dishonoured 
victims and the desire for vengeance that this breeds.  
Importantly, when discussing hubris as sexual exploitation, Aristotle suggests 
that the ruler who fails to heed his initial advice to refrain from it altogether 
should at least pretend that his crime was committed under the influence of eros, 
and to make good on his trespass by granting public honours to his victims. 
Doing so will help reduce the risk that the children’s families will seek revenge 
against him. 
Aristotle makes no suggestion that the sexual exploitation he is discussing must 
involve physical violence. Indeed, as David Cohen points out, this issue appears 
to be largely irrelevant. But if this is so, the tyrant’s action does not seem out of 
place in the phallic model of sex; after all, he has not (necessarily) raped the 
youth, only ‘dominated’ him or her. But in this case, how are we to understand 
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Aristotle’s advice? Why should a family be so outraged by what we have been 
led to believe are culturally sanctioned indulgences?  
The point seems to be that the tyrant exploits his dominance to gain his pleasure 
at the expense of the dishonoured youth; if he creates the appearance of acting 
under passion, however, “though the same implicit coercion might be involved, 
the attribution of hubris is attenuated … If the sexual relation arises merely from 
an act of power, rather than passion, then it necessarily merely expresses a rela-
tion of domination where the boy or girl submits to hubris and the disgrace it en-
tails” (Cohen 1995: 146). What it is about eros that erases the hubristic quality 
of the tyrant’s conduct, in other words, is the absence of the intent to assert him-
self and take pleasure in “the infliction of harm, humiliation, or disgrace” (ibid.).  
Given that the penetration of males (and unmarried females) was in itself consi-
dered disgraceful (for the penetrated), the sexual deed could only be excused if it 
was carried out in the name of eros. Instead of merely lusting for sex and the 
feeling of power it gave, as would the tyrant or lecher, the true lover cared for 
the well-being of his beloved. If sometimes genital desire blinded him to what 
the interests of his beloved actually were and he ended up wronging his beloved 
(by penetrating him) because of this, it was the intensity of passion that was to 
blame, not the lover himself. As Deianara in Sophocles’ Women of Trachis says 
regarding the love of her husband Heracles for young Iole: “Whoever stands op-
posed to Eros, with fists clenched like a boxer, does not understand him; for he 
rules over gods as he desires, and over me. Why not another like me? If I bla-
med my husband for the passion which has afflicted him, I would be mad” (441-
446). 
A second distinction between animal and human eros is the extent to which the 
latter is bound up with visual perception. For by taking hold of a person in res-
ponse to a physical stimulus, which was almost always visual (the eyes, the 
means to perceive physical beauty, were considered its primary pathway into the 
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human body) eros became, for human beings at least, intricately bound up with 
aesthetics and value judgment. This is important to note, for two reasons.  
First, it further complicates the simplistic picture of sexuality offered by the 
‘phallic’ model. For it might well be asked why, if “the proper objects of [a 
Greek man’s] sexual desire include, specifically, women, boys, foreigners, and 
slaves” (Halperlin 1986: 39), were only women and particularly adolescent boys 
idealised by Greek men as beautiful and worthy of erotic attention? Why were 
adult male slaves and foreigners rarely, if ever, represented as desirable sex 
partners? As Gloria Ferrari notes, “the effect of classifying sexual partners into 
two categories – ‘active’ and ‘passive’ – is to equate the several diverse targets 
of a man’s attention … Here we face a reductio ad absurdum. If we know any-
thing about notions of sexual relations in ancient Greek society, it is that the 
youth with a citizen’s pedigree is a radically different object of love and desire 
from all others” (2002: 129; cf. Lear and Cantarella 2008).  
The second reason to note the role of perception in the experience of eros is 
quite simple, but no less important on account of that. If the phenomenon of eros 
“has its source in perception, which is common to mankind and other animals, it 
nevertheless involves elements of belief, and hence possibilities of error or mi-
sinterpretation, that are specific to human beings” (Konstan 2013: 25). As the 
Nurse in Euripides’ Hippolytus says, some people “lust for what is vile” (kakon 
erosi, 358) rather than what is beautiful. In other words, one could be mistaken 
as to what was beautiful and what was base; it was possible to fall in love with 
the ‘wrong’ things. It follows that while perhaps eros itself was not amenable to 
rational control, it was possible to rationally reflect on one’s beliefs about the 
constitution of beauty, to thereby to alter one’s conception of the beautiful, and, 
thus, to deliberately choose the direction in which one’s eros should be focused. 
This is precisely the logic that Socrates appeals to in the Symposium when he 
tries to direct his companions’ eros for earthly things upwards into the realm of 
!67
ideas. Philosophia – ‘love of wisdom’ – is practical proof that the eros of man, 
open to the direction of reason as it is, differs from the eros of the beasts. 
This discussion points us to the final manner in which human eros differed from 
the eros of animals. Human eros can be extra-sexual. Erotic desire could be ex-
perienced by humans in non-sexual contexts towards inanimate objects and, as 
we have seen, abstractions such as ‘wisdom.’ Importantly, the objects of eros in 
most of these cases were politically salient. 
Homer uses the word eros and its cognates to describe the longing for simple 
things like food and drink. Such usage corresponds with the English term ‘de-
sire,’ which lacks the power of sexual passion. However, Bruce Thornton points 
out that Homer’s mundane use of the term became much less common over time 
and by the sixth century the implication of potentially destructive excess, “of 
overwhelming desire sexual in its intensity, colours the use of eros in what are 
not sexual situations, creating an effect nearly impossible to duplicate in Eng-
lish” (1997: 14). For the Greeks after Homer, then, “to ‘eroticize’ a desire is to 
claim that a generic object is desired with specific intensity” (Ludwig 2002: 
128). To be specific, the intensity of this longing was of the kind one has for the 
person with whom one has fallen madly in love. Such desire has the potential, 
should it obtain its object, to transport the person who feels it to the highest 
realms of happiness; it is, or at least appears to be, the road to bliss. Yet the emo-
tional heights to which eros can carry individuals necessarily have also their de-
pressions, their valleys and chasms.  
This eroticizing trend can be seen in archaic lyric poetry, for instance in the 
poems of Sappho, who speaks of men loving great armies, and Archilochus, who 
professes that he has no ‘great eros’ for tyranny. Theognis and Pindar likewise 
employ the term in this sense to other non-human objects, such as money or ‘far 
away things.’ Most importantly for our purposes, however, and as we shall see 
!68
in more depth in the following chapter, “the tragedians tend to ‘eroticize’ 
everything, practically as a requirement of their genre” (Ludwig 2002: 136). 
It might be objected that most of these uses are simply poetic embellishments or 
metaphors. For how can we be sure that the author of any passage pairing eros 
with non-human objects means to express the idea that their subject really feels 
about, and acts towards, the object in the same way that the subject feels about 
and acts towards another person with whom he or she is in love? As Paul Lud-
wig explains, “[t]he difficulty for readers who wish to reduce eros … to sexual 
desire is not to explain how sexual desire could be used metaphorically of so 
many mundane objects (that would be quixotic), but rather to show any passages 
in which eros conclusively means ‘sexual desire’ (as opposed to 
‘desire’)” (2002: 126). 
This Ludwig admirably manages to do. Herodotus, he notes, in a number of ins-
tances in the Histories conceptually couples eros and tyranny. The most impor-
tant example of these, for our purposes, is his statement that ‘tyranny has many 
erastai.’ As Ludwig points out, the primary meaning of erastes was the active, 
older partner in a pederastic relationship (although it could sometimes take on a 
heterosexual meaning, for example, in adultery, concubinage or, much less 
commonly, marriage). Thus the word denotes not a feeling but a defined and 
well-understood social role; to employ it outside of its normal context would 
immediately and necessarily conjure in the listener’s mind the affective (as well 
as the sexual) components of eros along with the social behaviours commonly 
ascribed to the lover. “The sense of acting out the social role of courting or 
wooing a political entity (e.g. ‘tyranny has many suitors’)” is therefore crucial to 
understanding Herodotos’ use of erastes in this instance (2002: 148).  
But Herodotus was by no means the only Greek to use language in the context 
of politics in a way that can only be called erotic. Scholars have recently begun 
to explore how over the course of the fifth century, as the fledgling Athenian 
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democracy grew into an increasingly tyrannical empire, questions regarding to 
proper role of eros in politics became more and more important to the city’s 
men. We read that “the metaphor of eros is remarkably common in the political 
discourse of classical Athens” (Wohl 2002: 1). Two consistent themes accompa-
nies this metaphor, “in texts ranging from the eleventh Nemean to the Antigone 
to Thucydides’ Nicias,” – the first being that eros, like pride, goes before a fall. 
The second motif “is the association of eros with tyranny” (Ludwig 2002: 153). 
Politics for the Greeks is “not a separate conceptual area: it is rooted in, and 
imagined in terms of, a world of natural growth and human relationships” (Bux-
ton 1982: 42) and as such the experience of eros on a human level provided the 
Athenians with “a shared consciousness upon which to ground political dis-
course, if not always the discourse of politics itself” (Scholtz 2007: 10). For the 
men of Athens, these scholars suggest, there were enough similarities between 
politics and sex to make the discourse and indeed, the practice of erotic politics 
possible – perhaps even logical. In classical Athens, eros and power were fun-
damentally, and inextricably, connected. This leads us to the next part of the 
chapter, where we will consider the erotic politics of Athens in depth. 
Section Two: Tyranny and Democracy in Athens 
(i) Tyranny and the Birth of Democracy 
The word tyrannis (‘tyranny’) was borrowed by the Greeks from a Near Eastern 
language; its original meaning is thought to have been simply ‘monarch’ or, 
more precisely, ‘sole ruler.’ During the archaic age, the word contained no pejo-
rative overtones (Rosivach 1988). A tyrannos (‘tyrant’), to the Greeks of that 
period, was “a kind of miniature, local equivalent of the almost mythical beings 
who presided over the great kingdoms of the Near East”; all would-be tyrants 
“fancied themselves hailed someday as the Midas or the Gyges of their respec-
tive polis communities” (Anderson 2005: 209). This was recognised by the 
cultural elite of the day; the poet Xenophanes, for example, “understood tyranny 
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as the final expression of the competitive ostentation of an Orientalized aristo-
cracy” (Georges 1994: 38). 
It was in the pursuit of tyranny that the aristocratic factions of archaic Athens 
(and elsewhere) constantly fought with each other, using whatever means they 
could come up with. In the attempt to outmanoeuvre one another and gain su-
premacy within the community, the noble clans not only employed constructive 
methods such as the commissioning of buildings, cult and song in honour of the 
gods and heroes but also less genteel tactics such as murder and mass exile (An-
derson 2005; Forsdyke 2000). Weapons were carried openly at this time (under 
the democracy they would be outlawed in public), which made the situation ex-
tremely inflammatory; any insult could result in parties coming to potentially 
fatal blows, which would lead the members of the different noble clans, follow-
ing archaic notions of loyalty and honour, to spread the hostility even further 
throughout society (Ellis and Stanton 1968).  
Archaic Athens was consequently plagued by bloody attempts at tyranny and it 
remained unstable and unprosperous (Finley 1953; French 1956; Ellis and Stan-
ton 1968). In the mid-540s, however, the leader of one clan managed (after two 
unsuccessful attempts) to establish himself through clever diplomacy, dramatic 
political pageantry and force of arms as the sole ruler of Athens (Boardman 
1975; Connor 1987a). This man’s name was Pisistratus. 
Plutarch tells us that, long before Pisistratus had made an attempt at power, the 
great mediator Solon perceived the man’s character and detected his tyrannical 
designs. “He did not, however, treat him as an enemy, but tried to soften and 
mould him by his instructions. He actually said to him and to others that if the 
desire for pre-eminence could but be banished from his soul, and his eager pas-
sion for the tyranny be cured, no other man would be more naturally disposed to 
virtue, or a better citizen” (Plut. Sol. 29.3). 
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Solon’s instructions fell on deaf ears. However, the reign of Pisistratus was not 
as vicious as Solon had feared it would be. In fact, the tyrant worked hard to 
narrow the political distinction between the aristocrats and the demos. He did 
this by fostering an identification of the citizenry as a whole and the state (as it 
was manifest, of course, in his person), and in the traditional manner of aristo-
cratic self-aggrandisement – that is, by sponsoring major building programs and 
initiating or restructuring several major cults and celebrations, such as the Pana-
thenaia (Ober 1989: 43-4).  
As Pericles Georges notes, tyrants “sought a monopoly of prestige and unchal-
lengeable power by purchase, which began with mercenaries but ended neces-
sarily with shrines and festivals to the gods. To gain the gods as allies, great 
temples rose everywhere in this age” (1994: 43-4). One of Pisistratus’ most im-
portant acts in this regard was the warm welcome he extended to the priests of 
Dionysus – a god who made no distinction between slave and master and accep-
ted all who spoke Greek into his worship – and the institutionalisation of the 
tragedies that were performed as part of a yearly festive competition in his hon-
our (Nellhaus 1989; West 1989; Rhodes 2003). The tyrant’s promotion of this 
‘god of the people’ likely helped to direct religious attention away from the reli-
gion of the hearth and the hero-cults promoted by the various noble clans to-
wards a more democratic celebration that was open even to (Greek-speaking) 
slaves; it suggested that the polis was their ‘real’ family (Knight 1943; Ober 
1989; Whitley 1994).  
Under the tyranny of Pisistratus, song culture was promoted, refugee poets and 
artisans from Ionia (then under attack by the Persians) were given sanctuary, 
merchants and traders were encouraged to set up business, black figure pottery 
exploded as an export, monetarisation progressed rapidly, and Athens, internally, 
became peaceful and prosperous. The support of the people that Pisistratus en-
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joyed made sure that his rivals, should they attempt to oust him, would have had 
to face not only the tyrant’s aristocratic supporters but also the opposition of the 
masses who had come to enjoy the relative peace and prosperity that his rule had 
given them (Podlecki 1966: 133): 
[While] the masses had no more real power than before, the effect-
ive control by elites of their “clients” must have declined as the tyr-
ant worked to weaken the hold of deferential behavior patterns, 
publicly humiliated his enemies, and emphasized ideological bonds 
that cut across class lines. … Mass awe for the elite was being re-
placed by awe for the state. The state was, on one level, Pisistratus 
the benevolent tyrant and on another level, “The Athenians” – all 
citizens. The ultimate result was the beginning of … the “civilian 
self-consciousness” of the Athenian demos. (Ober 1989: 67) 
Pisistratus had decisively prevailed over all of his competitors, both by attract-
ing more allies than they and by defeating them in armed confrontation; he had, 
in short, beaten his aristocratic opponents at their own game. But instead of find-
ing themselves exiled or barred absolutely from public life, many of Pisistratus’ 
former opponents were co-opted to work with and for the tyrant. For many aris-
tocratic Athenians, it seems, living under the tyrant was tolerable; for the major-
ity of commoners, life was very good. 
Greg Anderson writes that in the archaic period the authority of tyrants was “not 
so much unconstitutional as extra-constitutional. Forged in the uniquely super-
heated furnace of mainstream political competition in the archaic Greek polis, a 
tyrannis was ‘normal’ leadership in its most amplified form, conventional de 
facto authority writ large” (2005: 202). Nowhere was this more so than in 
Athens at the time of Pisistratus. Both Thucydides and Herodotus confirm this; 
according to the latter, Pisistratus ruled “neither disturbing existing rights nor 
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changing the laws; using what was already in place, he controlled the city, order-
ing it well and attractively” (Hdt. 1.29; cf. Thuc. 6.54.6). In light of this, it could 
reasonably be argued of Pisistratus that, at the time of his reign, “the feeling the 
tyrannos most commonly stirred in the breasts of others was envy” (Anderson 
2005: 204; cf. Dewald 2003). 
But the picture of tyranny as the greatest of things was to change. When Pis-
istratus died (circa 527 B.C.), his eldest son, Hippias, inherited the tyranny. He 
was supported in his rule by his brother, Hipparchus. The brothers’ reign, for the 
most part, was characterised by the same relatively light-handed manner with 
which their father had ruled. At the opening festivities of the Panathenaia of 514, 
however, nemesis struck the house of Pisistratus; an aristocratic youth by the 
name of Harmodius (whose affections Hipparchus had unsuccessfully tried to 
court) and his adult lover, the commoner Aristogeiton, leapt out of the crowd 
and stabbed Hipparchus to death.  
The accepted explanation for the murder is that, in revenge for the hurt caused 
by the boy’s rejection of his love, Hipparchus insulted Harmodius’s sister and 
thereby initiated a fateful vendetta. Hipparchus, we are told, humiliated the girl 
at his court in a way that cast doubt upon her sexual integrity as a maiden and on 
her worthiness as a member of the Athenian community (Thuc. 6.54.3; cf. Lav-
elle 1986). While trying to avoid a show of force against Harmodius (which, as 
the abuse of a free male citizen, would have constituted an unmistakable in-
stance of hubris) Hipparchus nevertheless deliberately dishonoured the boy’s 
sister and, by extension, her entire family.  
Harmodius, feeling outraged, yearned for vengeance. Aristogeiton, meanwhile, 
was fearful that the tyrant’s brother might use his power to take Harmodius from 
him by force, and wanted to secure his beloved for himself. On Aristogeiton’s 
initiative, therefore, the two began plotting the overthrow of the Pisistratids 
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(only with Hippias gone could Hipparchus be safely reckoned with). On the day 
of the planned assassination, however, the two saw Hippias chatting cordially 
with one of their co-conspirators and concluded that they had been betrayed; in 
an act of desperation they leapt upon Hipparchus and slew him before they 
themselves were captured, tortured and killed. 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton therefore left the job of freeing the city from 
tyranny incomplete. In fact, as Herodotus notes, “by killing Hipparchus, they 
roused up the rest of the Pisistratids and did not at all stop them from ruling as 
tyrants” (Hdt. 6.123.2). Indeed, after his brother’s assassination, Hippias’s beha-
viour became marked by violent paranoia and increasingly brutal repression. But 
his harsh rule became hated and within a few short years some members of the 
powerful Alcmaeonid clan, who had left Pisistratid Athens and taken up refuge 
at Delphi, bribed the oracle there to make a tailored prophecy that they hoped 
would convince the Spartans to help them overthrow Hippias. The credulous 
Spartans took the bait, and in 510 invaded Attica despite the fact that the Spartan 
royal family had extensive xenia (‘guest-friendship’) relations with the Pisistrat-
id tyrants. After initially blundering, the Spartans managed to depose Hippias 
and sent him, together with his family, into exile at Sigeion, a possession of the 
Persian Empire. He would return some thirty years later with his Persian hosts at 
Marathon, where he would be repulsed once and for all.  
During Hippias’s absence, Athens suffered under the yoke of a repressive 
Spartan puppet government, descended into civil war, and in the wake of it all 
introduced a number of radical political reforms. These reforms dismantled the 
archaic aristocratic stranglehold on power and birthed something that had never 
been seen before: a ‘democracy.’ This democracy was political experiment in 
which all citizens – rich and poor alike – were nominally isonomos, ‘equals be-
fore the law.’ All citizens were invited, indeed duty-bound, to participate in the 
defence, government and economic management of the state. And although 
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ideological and economic divisions between classes remained, and some (such 
as the Old Oligarch) even felt themselves to be oppressed by the masses, offi-
cially the democracy was, or at least aimed to be, a collective, single unit: it was 
the demos (‘the people’) which, in rhetoric at least, possessed the kratos 
(‘power,’ ‘strength’, ‘force’) that enabled them to make sovereign decisions 
about the future of the city. The eleutheria (‘freedom’) that formerly the tyrant 
alone had claimed now belonged to the whole people, the demos. Enjoying 
kratos as it did, the demos now also enjoyed real liberty; it was its very own 
master. This was reflected in the personal freedoms accorded to individual cit-
izens in their day-to-day lives; as Pericles would point out, eleutheria was the 
possession of every citizen. But it was reflected also in the fact that important 
decisions were made communally; the decisions made at the assembly, in the in-
stitution of the ostrakismos and in the popular courts were all reflective of a 
communal will, the will of the demos. 
(ii) The Demos and the Death of Tyranny 
Under the rule of the demos, Harmodius and Aristogeiton were officially con-
sidered tyrannicides and hailed as heroes, despite their obvious failure at ridding 
the city of the Pisistratids. Their direct descendants were given free meals, ex-
emption from taxes, and other special privileges; songs were sung in the pair’s 
honour; they received cult honours at their tomb; and bronze statues in their 
likeness were given a prominent position in the Agora. These statues, which 
were the first and for almost a century the only ones to be made in the image of 
individual citizens, summarise the meaning the ‘tyrannicides’ held for the 
Athenians (Raaflaub 2003): 
[At] the edge of the orchestra, the meeting-place of the citizens’ As-
sembly … the tyrant-slayers stood not only as praiseworthy heroes 
but above all as concrete examples of behavior for the citizens dur-
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ing the ekklesia and the ostrakismos. Its paraentic character is par-
ticularly evident from the fact that this monument recognizes not a 
successful achievement but a political attitude … Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton were supposed to encourage [the Athenians] to em-
brace the ideology of the tyrannicides. (Hölscher 1998: 160)  3
What, then, was the ideology expressed by the cult of Harmodius and Aristo-
geiton? According to Andrew Stewart, the official elevation of this relationship 
“not only placed the homoerotic bond at the core of Athenian political freedom, 
but asserted that it and the manly virtues (aretai) of courage, boldness, and self-
sacrifice that it generated were the only guarantors of that freedom’s continued 
existence” (quoted in Wohl 2002: 5). And indeed, the resistance to tyranny that 
the pair embodied became enshrined in law, state ritual and daily democratic 
life: at the beginning of each Assembly meeting, for example, a curse against 
tyrants was publicly pronounced; the oaths of judges and councillors contained a 
clause condemning tyranny; laws against tyrannical subversion were enacted; 
ostracism was institutionalised as a defence against politically overweening in-
dividuals; and each year, before the performance of tragedies at the Great Di-
onysia, a declaration was made announcing a reward for any citizen who man-
aged to kill a tyrant. As Kurt Raaflaub notes, “all this reminded [Athenian cit-
izens] regularly of their civic duty to fight would-be tyrants when and in 
whatever shape they might appear” (2003: 71).  
In this instantiation, the tyrannicide myth clearly worked to encourage the de-
velopment of communal feeling and values of self-sacrifice among the citizens 
 It is doubtful that many of the various interpretations of ‘ideology’ we find in contemporary 3
political science can have fully applied to the city-states of ancient Greece. This being said, 
there certainly were conscious efforts, as well as subconscious logics, that helped to generate 
and shape political attitudes in classical Athens. To avoid confusion, unless otherwise noted I 
will from this point employ Andrew Scholtz’s simple definition of ideology when discussing 
this phenomenon. At base, Scholtz says, “ideology is … social evaluation expressed through 
signs” (2007: 7). 
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of Athens. The motive Harmodius and Aristogeiton had for what they did, as the 
myth is framed here, was not so much personal as political; with selfless devo-
tion they died on behalf their city and fellow citizens, fighting for freedom and 
justice for all. 
Some scholars, however, argue that the so-called tyrannicides also provided “a 
model for a particularly democratic mode of sexuality: every Athenian was an 
Aristogeiton … Through this homosexual relationship, the whole Athenian 
demos can be imagined as a polity of erastai: elite, active, and sexually 
potent” (Wohl 2002: 8-9). On this view, democratic freedom is “freedom from 
the sexual, as well as the political, domination of tyrants” (Wohl 2002: 4; cf. 
Ludwig 2002). Freedom and domination, however, were two sides of the same 
coin of power; being free, for the Greeks, also meant ruling: over oneself at least 
and, ideally, over others (Larsen 1962; Hansen 2010).  
The citizens of democratic Athens, therefore, were “no longer passive subjects 
but active participants in the history-making business of public life” (Ober 2003: 
219), and in becoming so they appropriated all the privileges and responsibilities 
denied them under the tyrant. Inherent to these privileges was the right for cit-
izens to rule, to dominate, and, according to Victoria Wohl, to penetrate “as they 
desire a variety of socially inferior eromenoi [beloveds] – boys, women, 
slaves” (Wohl 2002: 9). Wohl concludes, logically, that “when the people fall in 
love with a vision of themselves as elite lovers, they also subscribe to a broader 
elite hegemony” (ibid: 10). 
Such a view brings to mind the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ which is 
widely understood to mean the patterns of practice that distinguishes and hier-
archically rank “the currently most honoured way of being a man” (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005: 832) against not only femininity (practically, those people 
understood to be women) but also ‘deviant’ or otherwise subordinate masculinit-
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ies (those people understood to be less than men but not women). Hegemonic 
masculinities do not necessarily have to correspond closely to the lives of 
everyday men, but they do express “widespread ideals, fantasies, and desires” 
which provide models of social relations and solutions to social problems (ibid: 
837; cf. Donaldson 1993). Aristogeiton, it might be argued, came as close as 
possible to embodying the hegemonic masculinity of fifth-century democratic 
Athens. As a legendary figure who struggled against domestic tyranny, his life 
was far removed from that of ordinary fifth-century democrats, but despite this 
distance the political ideals and personal virtues that he was thought to have ex-
pressed helped shape common understandings of what it meant to ‘be a man’ in 
democratic Athens (cf. Wohl 2002). 
Thucydides, as we will see in greater depth in Chapter Five, certainly lends sub-
stantial support for such an argument. The quasi-mythical figure of Aristogeiton, 
he clearly suggests, provided common Athenians with a heroic figure with 
whom they easily could, and usually did, identify. Aristophanes, however, sug-
gests that the aristocratic Harmodius (the junior, ‘passive’ partner in the relation-
ship) was also widely used as a civic model. At lines 631-634 in the Lysistrata, 
for example, the chorus of old men declare that “these women won’t set up a 
tyranny over me, for I’ll stand on guard … I’ll stand at arms in the Agora beside 
Aristogeiton: Like this! I’ll stand beside him.” As Josiah Ober notes, when the 
chorus sing ‘Like this!’ we must imagine the men involved mimicking the pose 
of the Harmodius statue, their right (sword) arms cocked back behind their 
heads, preparing to deal the ‘Harmodius blow’ that strikes the tyrant dead. Thus, 
on Aristophanes’ account, the model democratic defender was as much Harmo-
dius as Aristogeiton (2003: 217). Harmodius complicates the idea of Aristo-
geiton as the embodiment of hegemonic masculinity at Athens, however, insofar 
as his own proto-masculine qualities compete with those of his lover. In short, 
although certain aspects of masculinity at Athens – such as the warrior ethos – 
were non-negotiable, masculine identity was hardly monolithic or simple.   
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Ultimately, however, with which partner of the relationship and their respective 
masculinity each and every citizen identified is not so much the issue here. This 
issue, rather, is that the myth of Harmodius and Aristogeiton “operated to show 
Athenians how private eros could provide a path to public deeds, that is, how an 
erotic relationship could be, and properly should be, politicized” (Ludwig 2002: 
161). In other words, although “Athenian citizens interpreted [the tyrannicide 
figures] differently, [… the myth] represented crucial civic values that were 
shared by the entire community, such as responsibility, equality (isonomia, cel-
ebrated in the ‘Harmodius Song’), and collaboration across age groups” (Raa-
flaub 2003: 63). The love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was a ‘just love’ 
defined not only by the passionate intensity of eros but also by the esteem and 
tenderness of philia; it was a physical and spiritual union of the mature and act-
ive mesos polites (the middle-class citizen) and the youthful, beautiful aristos 
(the nobleman). Their relationship, it can well be argued, symbolised the unity, 
reciprocity, mutual trust and respect that were valued and encouraged by the 
democratic polis ((Ludwig 2002: 192; cf. Smith 2011). It was in this relational 
and communal context that the conduct considered definitive of the ideal demo-
cratic citizen was thought best taught and learned. Andrew Scholtz eloquently 
elaborates on this point: 
Aristogeiton, lover and supposed tyrant-slayer, became a touch-
stone for a civically and sexually empowered masculinity … Still, 
desire as one might, to actualize empowerment in self-interested 
ways, to be seen using one’s right of free speech to push policy be-
nefiting not the many but just a few or even one – that prospect 
summoned misgivings, lest ambition develop into a rapacious kind 
of eros. For individualism, once it entered the public sphere, found 
itself face to face with a rival value: communitarianism … [Aristo-
geiton’s] collaboration with Harmodius, and its basis in eros, for 
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Athenians could also model the kind of unity that held the city’s 
enemies at bay, whether at home or abroad. It is important to keep 
in mind that this is not some new sort of eros, different from the 
preceding. In distinguishing between ‘self-assertive’ and ‘commun-
al eros’, I am distinguishing between different ways of inflecting 
the same thing. Self-interest persists, as does a sense of phallic vic-
tory. Only now, these reside in team effort, in the bond formed by 
lover and beloved fighting for the city – in the desire to become 
part of a larger and stronger collective self. (2007: 15)  
  
Scholtz’s comments on bond between lover and beloved, the danger of ‘rapa-
cious eros’ and the interplay between individualism and communitarianism point 
us towards the following section, which deals with the figure of the tyrant in the 
democratic imagination.  
(iii) The Tyrant in the Democratic Imagination 
In official ideology, Harmodius and Aristogeiton stood in stark opposition to the 
generic figure of ‘the tyrant.’ Hipparchus, of course, remained embedded in the 
tyrannicide narrative; he was a necessary and essential element of it. But the 
wrath of the democracy was not confined to him alone; from the beginning to 
the end of the democracy in Athens, much public discourse tended to represent 
the tyrant generically and in overwhelmingly negative terms. 
  
This was, partially, a result of Athens’ traumatic experience of eastern despotism 
during the Persian wars. The very word tyrannos, born as it was from an Asiatic 
tongue, seemed a natural fit with the Greek term barbaros and all the connota-
tions it carried. As if to confirm that link, during the Persian Wars, after the 
Athenians – who were under threat of attack by Xerxes’ troops – had deserted 
their city for the relative safety their ships, Xerxes tore the precious tyrannicide 
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monument from its honoured place in the Agora and had it carted back to his 
palace. He then outraged the temples of Attica and torched the city of Athens it-
self. Many of the stereotypes associated with the east – sensuality, effeminacy, 
cruelty, excess, weakness – were, in the wake of all this, definitively grafted 
onto the generalised image of ‘the tyrant’ in Athenian discourse (Austin 1990; 
Georges 1994; Castriota 2000).  
Along with the Persian invaders came the hated Hippias, once again, reminding 
the Athenians of the crimes their own tyrants had committed. Herodotus relates 
that on the eve of the Battle of Marathon, while waiting for his barbarian allies, 
Hippias had a dream in which he attempted to mate with his mother. This anec-
dote, which is in all likelihood a fiction, is clearly meant to represent not an in-
fantile fantasy of the Freudian variety on Hippias’s behalf but the monstrous 
ambition of the old man; it seems rather obvious that ‘mother’ in this instance 
equals the land that gave Hippias birth (e.g. Attica) and copulation with her, 
conquest and rule (cf. Scholtz 2007: 13). But the dream also alludes to the sexu-
al transgressions of Hipparchus, whose misdeeds and eventual death at the 
hands of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had originally initiated Athens’ nightmar-
ish experience of tyranny. 
However, Hipparchus and Hippias were only continuing what was believed to 
be a general trend among tyrants; a rampant, purely appetitive and thus trans-
gressive species of eros was linked with, even considered constitutive of, the 
phenomenon of tyranny from the very beginning. In the first recorded appear-
ance of the word tyrannos in Greek, the poet Archilochus compares the wild lust 
of a man for a woman to the tyrant’s power over his city. Later, as we know, he 
would sing that he had no such eros for the mantle of tyranny itself.  
Herodotus continues in this vein; in his History, he refers twice to an eros for 
tyranny (including that of the Spartan Pausanias for ruling over all of Greece), 
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and his other uses of eros and its cognates all involve antinomian objects of 
longing (such as family members). In fact, “the whole History more or less con-
cludes with an account of the illicit love of Xerxes, who elsewhere announces 
quite openly that his goal is universal empire” (Davis 2000: 641). Thucydides 
would likewise, in his own way, reinforce the conceptual connection; in fact, as 
will be demonstrated in the following chapters, he would make the link between 
tyranny and transgressive eros a centrepiece of his narrative of the Pelo-
ponnesian War. 
As we will see in more depth in the following part of this chapter, the associ-
ation of transgressive eros and destructive, tyrannical behaviour was ubiquitous 
in Attic tragedy also. As scholars have noted, tragedy reflects “the Athenian ex-
perience of, and continuing preoccupation with, tyranny” (Seaford 2003: 96) – 
indeed, “the fall of Hipparchus and Hippias itself was treated by Athenian tradi-
tion in some respects as an erotic tragedy” (Georges 1994: 79).  It is in this con-
text that “the tragedians tend to ‘eroticize’ … whatever objects of desire might 
cause the protagonist to change his or her fortune” (Ludwig 2002: 132-6). Not 
only the language of tragedy but also its themes and allusions reflect this fact. 
As Calame notes, “there was never any shortage on the Attic stage of dramas 
about love” (Calame 1999: 3; cf. Levine 1949) – we find it at the heart of such 
plays as Aeschylus’ Suppliants, Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, and Euripides’ 
Hippolytus, to name but a few. 
Importantly, the only play we have that explicitly deals with contemporary polit-
ical concerns (Aeschylus’s Persians), confronts the problem of tyrannical eros 
head on. Here, the tyrant’s desire is alluded to in Atossa’s dream, in which her 
son Xerxes tries, unsuccessfully, to yoke two Greek maidens to his imperial 
chariot. This image, which represents the Persian attack on Greece (the central 
concern of the play), unmistakably recalls very common and long-standing 
Greek metaphors for eros and particularly for pederasty and marriage (Calame 
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1999: 122-3). The image also brings to mind the Eurymedon Vase, and in doing 
so it seems to confirm, contra David Halperlin, that the Athenians did in fact 
view “public and political life as a dramatization of individual sexual psycho-
logy” (1986: 40).  
The disciples of Socrates, who in so many other cases are at odds with popular 
opinion, consolidate the conceptual partnership of transgressive eros and 
tyranny. Plato, for example, in the Republic and elsewhere consistently ex-
pounds on, and derogates, the intrinsic connection between eros and tyranny 
(and, indeed, democracy). In Plato’s account, the great winged drone of eros 
gathered together all the other desires as his bodyguard in order to drive weak 
and democratic men insane and into the arms of tyranny. “Even the great tax-
onomer Aristotle cannot separate the tyrant’s sexuality from his political author-
ity,” notes Victoria Wohl, pointing out that, in his discussion of the reasons why 
tyrannies fall, the philosopher says that most tyrannicidal plots begin as attempts 
to avenge the despot’s hubris – and of the historical examples of hubris and its 
punishment that he then goes on to list, the majority are of a sexual nature (Wohl 
2002: 220-1).  
In sum, the overall picture of the tyrant that is painted by our sources is of a man 
who stands beyond and indeed in deliberate opposition to the established norms 
of democratic masculinity. Nowhere is this paranomia (‘lawlessness’, ‘perver-
sion’) more pronounced than in the realm of sex, where the tyrant indulged a lit-
any of criminal acts ranging from adultery and rape to incest and necrophilia. 
Defined by his power, excess, and lack of regard for anybody or anything other 
than the (logically impossible) satisfaction of his own boundless desires, in 
much public discourse “the tyrant is eros as pure drive” (ibid: 249).  
The tyrant, in the final analysis, is a repulsive and disgraceful creature, a dis-
honourable slave to his appetite; weak and feminine, unable to control the wild 
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lusts that run rampant in his body, he possesses the nature of a sub-human bar-
barian, even an animal. In fact, the tyrant was often compared to a number of 
aggressive beasts, including the wolf and the lion (Kunstler 1991; McNellen 
1997). One animal in particular stands out in this regard, however, and this is the 
cock. 
The hubris of a powerful cock was proverbial, the reason being that a bird vic-
torious in contest with another will often mount the body of its fallen rival not 
only to crow but also to bugger it; in Greek iconography, “the cock’s ritual tri-
umph is both a military and a sexual conquest” (Csapo 1993: 18). The reason for 
the ferocity of these fights, the Greeks noted, was at root no more than sexual 
rivalry. As such, it was easy for Aristophanes, in the Birds, to link the cock back 
to the discourse on eastern despotism when recounting the (fanciful) history of 
the cock’s homonym, “the Persian bird” (481-5).  
In such guises, then, “the metaphor of the tyrant, and the historical memory of 
both the sixth-century Peisistratid tyranny and the threat of Persian domination, 
served to define Athenians and were reflected not only in genres like tragedy but 
in the daily realities of democratic Athenian life” (Kallet 2003: 117). But in spite 
of – or, if we follow Foucault (1992), perhaps even because of – this widely held 
and officially sanctioned image of the tyrant, real or provocatively feigned op-
position to the dominant interpretation of tyranny was not at all absent from 
public discourse, and it likely never disappeared from private meditation or con-
versation either. Tyranny, that is to say, functioned “not simply as a liminal con-
struct providing graphic images of incorrect citizen behaviour, but as a defining 
model of political freedom” (McGlew 1993: 183).    
Sophists such as Gorgias, for example, accepted the commonly held view of the 
tyrant as a supremely erotic being, but flipped the official image on its head to 
create a more positive vision of tyranny as “deliberately self-interested political 
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action” (ibid: 1). Gorgias and others recognised that the figure of the tyrant ex-
pressed a hyper-masculinity which embodied the qualities of the god of Love 
himself: all-powerful, dominating, warlike – ‘unconquered in battle,’ as 
Sophocles put it. The political power and correlate sexual potency the tyrant en-
joyed – he could, after all, do whatever he liked to whomever he fancied – fem-
inised all around him (at least symbolically), thereby transforming him into a 
kind of ‘superman’ who enjoyed the freedom of the gods (Ludwig 2002; Wohl 
2002; Raaflaub 2003; cf. Woodford 1989; Loraux 1990). Those supermen who 
managed to achieve a position of absolute dominance (and, so it was thought, 
absolute freedom) did no wrong, for they were acting only according to natural 
necessity; for in the natural world, to which man necessarily belonged, it was a 
rule that the strong tyrannised over the weak. At least by the time of the Pelo-
ponnesian War, such a view seemed to have become relatively popular, a fact to 
which the Athenian speech in Thucydides’ famous Melian Debate rather grue-
somely attests (cf. Pl. Laws: 661a-b). 
Elsewhere and when, important Athenian politicians – the great Pericles among 
them – described their city’s rule over its allies as a ‘tyranny’ in very ambiguous 
terms, and on the comic stage and elsewhere the political position of the demos 
at home was represented, often in apparently positive terms no less, as that of a 
despot ruling over itself and over those factions of the aristocracy that longed to 
subvert it (Henderson 2003).  
The Athenians, it seems, recognised that the functioning of the courts, the de-
fence of the city and especially the magnificent building program initiated by 
Pericles all relied upon the tribute the Athenians extracted from their allies (or, 
more precisely, from their subjects). According to Aristotle, for example, “more 
than twenty thousand men earned their living as a result of the tribute, the taxa-
tion and the money the empire brought in” (Const. Ath. 24.3). The drama of the 
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Great Dionysia likewise depended for its production upon expensive liturgies 
made obligatory for wealthy (and usually aristocratic) citizens.  
As was noted in the first section of this chapter, the splendour of Pisistratus’ 
building projects and his use of them, along with festivals like the Dionysia, to 
consolidate his power vis-à-vis his aristocratic rivals were well-known to the an-
cients. In light of all these facts, Lisa Kallet argues persuasively that:  
The demos, assuming the role of public benefactor, was acting not 
simply in an aristocratic way but like a tyrant, and that its control 
over and magnificent expenditure of wealth provided a crucial 
demonstration of its power not just abroad, but at home. Pericles, 
while deflecting the idea that he himself might be a tyrant, was, in 
effect, elevating the demos to that position, especially through the 
excessive, extraordinary expenditure of its wealth. Like tyrants, 
who may have appropriated wealth unjustly but put it to acceptable 
use in adorning the city, the demos could enhance its power through 
the skillful use of accumulated wealth … [And so] the ambiguous 
image of Athens the tyrant city as ruler of an empire may have been 
accompanied by a more positive construction of the demos-as-tyr-
ant spending its wealth on the city. Furthermore, if the city in the 
form of the collective demos was tyrant, its extraordinary wealth 
and control over resources would make it difficult for any individu-
al Athenian to threaten this order. (1998: 52-4; cf. Else 1954: 25)  
Indeed, we could go further and argue, as does James McGlew, that when the 
Pisistratids were expelled, and after the dust had settled enough for the demos to 
find and firmly grab a hold of the sceptre of sovereignty, the power of the tyrants 
was not finally annulled or abolished. Rather, it was appropriated by the people, 
who put the eleutheria and kratos which previously the tyrants alone had pos-
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sessed to their own self-interested uses. “Insisting (logically) that power could 
remain in the middle (en mesoi) only if citizens were true political equals and if 
the polis were formally identified with the demos, the Athenians maximized the 
numbers involved in all state actions and subjected magistrates to the scrutiny of 
the popular courts” (McGlew 1993: 150; cf. Raaflaub 1998). The same was true 
also of ostracism: decisions over exile had previously belonged to the aristocrats 
and, later, the tyrant, and “the demos’ usurpation of this power was central to 
their assertion of political authority in the community” (Forsdyke 2000: 252). 
Through its inclusivity and univocal nature, the whole machinery of democratic 
government demonstrated, and even justified, the definition of the polis as a col-
lective will whenever the people exercised the powers this definition gave them. 
This will, furthermore, had the same authority and power as had the individual 
tyrant it now replaced (McGlew 1993). In other words, Aristogeiton had not 
thrown Hipparchus’s baby out with the bloody bathwater; he had instead given 
the demos the opportunity to take the tyrant’s place, with all the power, prestige 
and privilege this entailed.  
In the shadows beyond official ideology, then, tyranny could be and clearly was 
understood as “godlike” (Eur. Tro. 1169). As such, it could be the object of an 
intense, albeit illicit, longing for individual men who had to live as men in the 
democratic polis, as mortals that were duty-bound to remain equal to their fel-
low citizens. The figure of the tyrant thus provided not only the anti-type of the 
democratic citizen but also a realm of fantasy and flirtatious identification in 
which citizens could imagine the possibilities and consequences of a life without 
limits (Wohl 2002: 223). As we will see in the next part of the chapter, this was 
especially the case in tragedy, which is one reason why Plato despised it; the 
tragic poets, in his opinion, are no good for cities because they “lead their con-
stitutions to tyranny and democracy” (Rep. 8.568a-d).    
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But tyranny could also figure as a more positive state of being to which the 
democratic community, the Athenian demos, could collectively aspire. The 
communal eros that was rooted in the tyrannicide myth provided a glue with 
which to unite individual citizens in a larger and more powerful collective self, a 
tyrannical self, as and through which ‘the Athenians’ could exercise power over 
others. As we shall see in the following chapters, such a vision did emerge, and 
it found its expression among the Athenians in the form of a muscular democrat-
ic imperialism, an erotics of empire that would ultimately end in tragedy. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that eros was a highly gendered cultural phe-
nomenon. Despite his youth, the male god Eros displayed many of the character-
istic qualities attributed to the Greek ‘superman,’ and eros as an emotion was 
represented as warlike, dominating, possessive, and irresistibly strong. These 
representations helped to shape the way in which eros was lived and experi-
enced; penetrative sex, for example, was generally considered an act of power 
and domination, if not exploitation, as much as it was an act of affection. Power, 
gender and status within the hierarchical structure of the polis as well as indi-
vidual psychology are thus important considerations when building a picture of 
Greek sexuality, and in particular the role of genital desire in it.  
However, human eros was different from animal eros (which was characterised 
by genital lust) in a number of important respects: the affective dimensions of 
this ‘emotional appetite’ were much broader and more complex in humans; hu-
man eros was closely tied up with aesthetics, the values of which were open to 
reasoned argument; and human eros could be experienced with regard to non-
sexual objects, such as wisdom or (especially) power. This is important to note, 
because the semantic use of eros in these contexts meant that certain feelings 
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and behaviours appropriate to the interpersonal experience of eros could poten-
tially be transferred into the political realm to political objects. 
Finally, we have seen that such feelings and behaviours were, in fact, so trans-
ferred. This is particularly true in the case of Athens’ experiences of tyranny and 
democracy. Many men were thought to be ‘lovers’ of tyrannical power, and in its 
pursuit they would act accordingly; obsessively, jealously, energetically, dar-
ingly, and often violently, they would seize the object of their love by force. So, 
at least, figured the tyrant in the democratic imagination. Related but different 
behaviours were expected also from the democratic citizen, whose official role 
models were the so-called tyrannicides; passionate, committed, caring and mu-
tually respectful, Aristogeiton and Harmodius were the ideal types of the newly 
liberated Athenians – their ‘founding fathers,’ as it were. Nevertheless, the tyrant 
remained central to the democratic imagination, both in his function as the ideo-
logical image of the ‘anti-citizen’ but also, on a different and darker level, as the 




In the first section of this chapter I begin by reviewing contemporary literature 
that deals with the political rituals framing the performance of tragedy. Many 
scholars have argued that this context affected the content of tragic drama in im-
portant ways insofar as these rituals articulated and affirmed the social order of 
the city, and by highlighting democratic norms, provided a pre-performance foil 
to the transgressive dramas that followed them on the stage. Following this I 
discuss the religious context of the Great Dionysia. The foundational myth of 
the Great Dionysia, which was recounted each year in the opening procession of 
the festival, concerns the original refusal of the Athenians to accept the god and 
his subsequent punishment of them. This punishment took the form of ‘impotent 
potency,’ or ithyphallicism; a condition of permanent erection that led to pain, 
infertility, over-excitation and death. The punishment was lifted when the Athe-
nians gave due honour to the god, which was institutionalised in the Great Dio-
nysia. I argue that these rituals, like the other pre-play rituals, affected the dra-
mas in important ways. 
When considered in light of the political and religious context of the play, toge-
ther with other aspects of Dionysian cult, many tragedies can be seen to take up 
themes related to what we have called ‘erotic politics.’ This forms the core of 
the discussion in the second section of this chapter. The representation of eros in 
tragedy is almost uniformly transgressive and destructive – but not, on account 
of this, necessarily bad or shameful for the figures afflicted by it. I argue that by 
encouraging identification with characters afflicted by (what is often a diseased 
kind of) eros, tragedy created a fantasy realm for the Athenian in which they 
could subject their values and norms to scrutiny and exercise darker aspects of 
their imagination; they could flirt and play with the image of the tyrant, which in 
official discourse was taboo. The ritual context of tragedy, however, articulated 
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the values and norms of the democratic polis and attempted to inculcate demo-
cratic ideology and civic unity in its participants. Tragedy, in its broader context, 
was thus both subversive and affirmative of democratic ideology. 
Section One: Tragedy in Context 
(i) The Politics of Tragedy 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s belief that Greek tragedy had nothing to do with politics is 
simply wrong. Many scholars have demonstrated that the festival of the Great 
Dionysia was an extremely important one for the city of Athens in terms of the 
function it held as a ritual celebration of both its patron god and of the polis it-
self, as well as in its role as a platform for citizens to explore and comment on 
important sociopolitical concerns of their day. Tragedy, in other words, was as 
much a didactic and political phenomenon as it was aesthetic.  
Influential in this regard have been Simon Goldhill’s articles on the Great Di-
onysia and civic ideology, in which he argues that “there are specific ceremon-
ies, processions, and priestly doings that form an essential and unique context 
for the production of Greek drama and which do indeed importantly affect the 
entertainment” (1992: 98).   
According to Goldhill, given the importance of the ritual institutions surround-
ing the Great Dionysia in the developing democratic ideology of Athens, it is 
reasonable to assume that this ideology is, to a substantial degree, reflected in 
the tragedies themselves. In the course of his argument, Goldhill references four 
institutions that over time were added to the customary context of the festival: 
the appointment of the ten strategoi (elected military commanders) to pour the 
libations of wine before the opening performance; the public announcement of 
the names of conspicuous benefactors of Athens and their award with a crown or 
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garland; the parade and display of allied tribute; and the procession of armour-
clad ephebes (young men, the sons of citizens killed in battle, who had been 
supported to their majority at the city’s expense) onto the theatre stage at the 
same time that the allied tribute was being laid out before the assembled cit-
izens. Peter Wilson (2009b) rightly adds to Goldhill’s list the pre-play tradition 
(which reaches back to the beginning of the fifth-century) of heralds announcing 
awards for those who managed to kill aspiring tyrants. 
Goldhill’s conclusion regarding of all this is that, insofar as they express both 
conspicuous individual distinction and intense feelings of community, the rituals 
reflect “the difficult interplay of the hierarchical pursuit of status within demo-
cracy and the collective ideals of the polis” (2000: 45), an interplay which is 
mirrored in the relation of hero and chorus on stage. Put differently: “the com-
bination of the pre-play rituals and the performances of fifth-century theatre – 
which together make up the Dionysia – offer a … complex dialectic between the 
proclamation of social norms and their possibility of transgression” (Goldhill 
1992: 127).  
This general line of argument has for the most part been well-received, although 
some reasonably take issue with the vague notion of democracy that Goldhill 
utilises (Rhodes 2003; Gibert 2009; cf. Griffin 1998). David Carter and David 
Rosenbloom, for example, argue convincingly that the rituals of the Dionysia 
have as much to do with an ideology of chauvinistic imperialism as they do with 
any specifically democratic ideology (Carter 2004; Rosenbloom 2011). John 
Winkler takes a similar position: if “the tribute and the presence of the city’s 
friends represent its active military alliances,” he writes, “the war orphans who 
are ready to become soldiers in their fathers’ places inevitably bring to mind the 
city’s battles, both past and future” (1992: 41).  
!93
Despite these quibbles, however, scholars broadly agree that “dramatic perform-
ances at Athens question [official] polis ideology and practice within the context 
of their simultaneous realization and relaxation at civic festivals” (Rosenbloom 
2006: 245; cf. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1990; Segal 1997). The plays, in other 
words, tend to throw the very civic norms and values that are displayed in the 
political rituals surrounding the festival into a state of confusion and ambiguity; 
the dramas place traditional ideas about what constitutes the good under inter-
rogation, and at times even subject them to reversal. 
I do not wish to, nor really can I, add much to this discussion. I take the broad 
consensus regarding tragedy as a fundamentally political (and politically pro-
paedeutic) art for granted. I concur that questions relating to the respective roles 
of individualism, communitarianism and imperialism were important themes in 
tragic drama. These questions obviously link back to the discussion of the pre-
ceding section; indeed, they run parallel with the individualistic, communitarian 
and tyrannical strands of eros we considered there. Seen in light of the last 
chapter’s discussion, the abundance of erotic terminology that we have noted ex-
ists in tragedy – “practically as a requirement of [the] genre,” according to Paul 
Ludwig (2002: 136) – becomes much easier to understand.  
“The themes of tragedy,” Pericles Georges notes, “surely must have reflected the 
atmosphere of the overthrow of the Pisistratid tyranny and the foundation of the 
cult of the Tyrannicides, at a time of increasing danger from Persia culminating 
in the brutal suppression of the Ionians” (1994: 79). At least, this seems to be the 
case if we accept the argument that the ritual context of tragedy provided a 
normative structure that the dramas themselves explore and interrogated. Con-
sider, firstly, the tradition of awarding honours to tyrant-killers (in particular, 
those who managed to kill any surviving Pisistratids). This ritual unambiguously 
refers to Athens’ experience of domestic tyrants and, as we have seen, it was part 
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of a broader set of institutions and rituals that together with the tyrannicide cult 
helped constitute Athenian democratic ideology.  
The display of allied tribute implicitly referred to another a tyrannicide legend, 
namely, the Athenian claim to have led the Greeks to victory against the Persian 
invaders. The Delian League – from whence the tribute came – was explicitly 
created, and ostensibly maintained, to counter despotic aggression in Greece. 
The ritual libations offered by the strategoi and the parade of war orphans, with 
their emphasis on military valour and success, complement and consolidate the 
image of Athens as heroic and warlike democratic community and in this regard 
can be said to contribute to the overall civic aims of the festival (namely, the fos-
tering of shared democratic norms and consciousness). Furthermore, the parade 
of war orphans (as we will see in more depth in the following chapter) was con-
ceptually linked with the awards granted to conspicuous benefactors to the city 
in another sense, insofar as both rituals publicly exalted those individuals who 
had made great sacrifices on behalf of the city.    
It was, then, partially through these pre-play rituals that the ideological dis-
course of democratic Athens, saturated as it was with erotic metaphors and con-
cepts, became the focus of many tragedians’ scrutiny. Democratic norms and the 
rituals that reflected them provided a foil for the transgressive drama that was at 
the heart of the Great Dionysia. This being so, we are left with the questions as 
to why, and exactly how, tragic drama interrogated and sometimes undermined 
the democratic norms that were fostered by the pre-play rituals.   
This leads me to discuss one set of rituals, embedded in the festival’s very name, 
which Goldhill and many of his interlocutors strangely overlook in their discus-
sion of the Dionysia’s ritual context. Doing so helps us to more clearly under-
stand why much tragedy explores taboo subjects, confuses conceptual boundar-
ies, transforms identities, and paradoxically undermines the norms that are in-
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culcated by the pre-play rituals. It also helps us to understand why Plato should 
have believed that the poets appeared to “eulogize tyranny as godlike and say 
lots of other such things about it” (Rep. 8.568c). 
(ii) Something to Do with Dionysus (and Eros) 
Tragedy, satyr-drama and comedy all were, to some extent, religious as well as 
political events (as if religion and politics could be separated in ancient Greece). 
They were performed in Dionysus’s honour “and, as it were, in his 
presence” (Henrichs 1990: 257). Both the cult statue of Dionysus and his high 
priest were given privileged seats in the theatre throughout the entire festival, 
and this “shows that a strong dimension in the perception of the festival was that 
the dramatic and dithyrambic competitions were entertainment for 
Dionysus” (Sourvinou-Inwood 2003: 73).  
This fact is reflected also in the opening set of rituals of the Great Dionysia, 
which concerned the advent of Dionysus into Athens and its annual re-enact-
ment in his worship (and, hence, for his pleasure). These rituals were rooted in 
the ‘priestly doings’ that Goldhill mentions but, likely for fear of attracting criti-
cisms like those levelled at the likes of Murray and Cornford, fails to explore 
(cf. Seaford 1981). The rituals began with a sacrifice at an altar near the 
Academy, which was followed by a torchlight procession (led by ephebes) that 
escorted the god’s statue into town, and the sacrificial dedication of a bull to Di-
onysus on behalf of the entire city. The daylight parade was likewise a loud, lav-
ish but nonetheless deeply pious affair – twenty dithyrambic choruses, of fifty 
men each, in full costume making merry, metics draped in bright red robes, hon-
oured citizens sporting golden crowns and flashy garments, priests singing reli-
gious hymns, and holy men hoisting giant phalluses, gifted to the god by the city 
and its allies and colonies, high into the air (Winkler 1992: 37-8).   
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The last element of these rituals is particularly important in the context of this 
discussion. The display of phalluses in the parade explicitly rested upon the 
foundational myth of the Dionysia – that is, the aetiological reason for the whole 
elaborate and expensive festival. The scholia (ancient marginalia) to Aristo-
phanes’ Archanians relates why: 
The phallus came to be part of the worship of Dionysus by some 
secret rite. About the phallus itself the following is said. Pegasos 
took the image of Dionysus from Eleutherae … and brought it to 
Attica. The Athenians, however, did not receive the god with rever-
ence, but they did not get away with this resolve unpunished, be-
cause, since the god was angry, a disease attacked the men’s genit-
als and the calamity was incurable. When they found themselves 
succumbing to the disease, which was beyond all human magic and 
science, envoys were hastily dispatched to the divine oracles. When 
they returned, they reported that the sole cure was for them to hold 
the god in all reverence. Therefore, in obedience to these pro-
nouncements, the Athenians privately and publicly constructed 
phalli, and with these they paid homage to the god, making them a 
memorial to their own suffering. (Quoted in Csapo 1997: 266) 
Using evidence collected from other scholiasts and similar stories throughout 
Greece, Eric Csapo shows that this ‘disease’ was ithyphallicism, or constant 
penile erection. The scholiast’s myth, Csapo says, likely conflated two medical 
problems referred to by ancient writers as ‘satyriasis’ and ‘priapism’: the first 
being defined by obsessive sexual over-excitation, which could lead to exhaus-
tion and death; the second, a permanent erection that permitted neither pleasure 
nor orgasm (1997: 266-7). From his reading of the tragic texts themselves, 
Claude Calame arrives at the same general conclusion: “Dionysus,” he says, “is 
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capable not only of arousing love but also of curing those stricken by it” (1999: 
132).  
Whatever shape the genital disease was thought to have taken (and, as is the 
case with myths, it likely took a few), it is clear that the aetiology of the ritual, 
and of the Dionysia as a whole, concerns the ability of the god to affect, both 
negatively and positively, the sexual (and hence political) well-being of Atheni-
an men (cf. Nillson 1998: 35-6). The Great Dionysia was, among other things, a 
festival both to commemorate the suffering (specifically the sexual suffering) of 
Athenian men at the hands of Dionysus and to celebrate their release from this 
same suffering through pious worship of the god. During this festival, further-
more, worship of Dionysus included not only the provision of animal sacrifices, 
parades and phallic totems but also the dramatic entertainment itself. The ques-
tion that arises in light of all this is: if the more obviously ‘political’ ritual con-
text of the Dionysia affected the entertainment in important and discernible 
ways, did the ‘religious’ context do so, too? 
Dionysus and the rituals conducted in his honour are not, by any means, the 
central concern of every tragedy, and there is no tidy formula by which we can 
understand the influence of the god and the myths surrounding him on Attic 
drama. The precise origins of drama remain unknown and it is true that the ques-
tion regarding the extent to which tragedy was a religious phenomenon remains 
controversial (Sullion 2005). Nevertheless, “in ancient pre-Christian Greece the 
religious and the political were fabrics of thought and behaviour were woven 
from the same threads” (Cartledge 1997: 6), and there do seem to be certain 
vestiges of Dionysian cult practice and belief that remained significant in the 
festival itself and in the plays performed there. Before discussing these, it must 
again be stressed that the claim here is not that tragedy, or even the Great Di-
onysia, was essentially ‘Dionysian’ or ‘all about Dionysus,’ any more than East-
er festivities are all about the (after-)life and gospel of Jesus Christ. The claim, 
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rather, is that crucial parts of the festival – including but by no means limited to 
the parade – are inextricably connected to Dionysus and his worship, and these 
connections, together with the rest of the festival’s context, help us better under-
stand its content (Easterling 1997). For reasons of space and relevance, not all of 
these connections can be considered here; hence only those two most important 
to our discussion will be examined. These elements of Dionysian worship con-
cern the relation of Dionysus to personal transformation and to sexuality – or, 
more specifically, to eros.   
One the most important elements of Dionysian worship that is manifest in all 
dramatic performance is the transformation of personal identity (Seaford 2006: 
11). As Charles Segal observes: “the actor, wearing the mask that has close as-
sociations with the Dionysiac cult from early times, fuses to some extent with 
the personage he represents in the theatre. The spectator, watching the perform-
ance, at some point loses his separateness and identifies with the masked figure 
before him” (1997: 13). 
This transformational element of Dionysian cult was intimately and inextricably 
related to the central place therein of wine and intoxication. Ingesting what 
Timotheus called ‘the blood of Dionysus’ meant that one literally came to pos-
sess the god within one’s own mortal body– or, in the case of excess and abuse, 
one’s body became possessed by him. This, according to myth, was what 
happened to the Athenians who first encountered Dionysus; after becoming 
drunk and insulting the god, they were struck with incurable erections. Even 
without wine, the subject under the sway of Dionysus could become radically 
and simultaneously other: the old became young (like Cadmus and Teiresias in 
the Bacchae); mortal man could even become godly. But so too could man be-
come woman, human beast, citizen satyr, and Greek barbarian. 
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Under the sign of Dionysus, opposites could be united and the boundaries 
between individuals dissolved; and at the Great Dionysia, enough divine blood 
was consumed to make this happen. There, the principles of order and anti-or-
der, of civilization and nature, of limit and transgression, and of self and other 
merged (Dodds 1951; Bremmer 1994). For the Athenians, it seems clear that 
“the whole point of Dionysism, which brings man into immediate contact with 
the otherness of the divine, [was] to become other oneself” (Vernant and Vidal-
Naquet: 204). 
This was, of course, one of the reasons why tragedy had such didactic power. As 
many scholars have noted, ‘becoming other’ allows for the experience of true 
compassion, which contributes to a broader understanding of the common lot of 
humanity (Clapp 2005). But tragic compassion, and the understanding it brings, 
presupposes identification with, and sympathy for, characters usually considered 
sub- or super-human: with Aeschylus’s tyrannical ‘lion-cub’ thirsting with an 
eros for blood, for example, or with the headstrong Sophoclean king who mar-
ries his mother and sires his siblings, or with Euripides’ barbaric wife as she 
butchers her own children. For it could well be argued that these figures are 
more mistaken than truly malevolent; “even the worst tragic perpetrators of tyr-
annical practices, who thereby endanger and damage the polis, nevertheless sin-
cerely claim to champion it” (Seaford 2011: 89).  
Tragic heroism, furthermore, concerns not only the frailties and failures of hu-
manity but also its strengths and triumphs, and the strange and terrible potency 
of tragic characters is often incorporated and utilised, in drama, by the polis in 
the form of hero cult (Seaford 1994). The Furies in Aeschylus’s Eumenides are 
an example of this trend, as is the blind and beggarly old man in Oedipus at 
Colonus; cult worship in both circumstances concerns not the moral value of 
these characters but the value they possess in terms of their power to benefit the 
city, particularly in times of war (Adkins 1970: 69-73).  
!100
In sum, by transcending the self to identify with others, actors in and empathetic 
spectators of tragedy can simultaneously both transcend the democratic city’s 
norms and affirm them, depending on the characters with whom they identify.  4
Moreover, the participants of tragedy – actors and spectators – collaborate with 
each another in this exercise; in the theatre, the entire polis comes together and 
turns its eyes upon itself and its values. This, it seems, is one of the reasons Pla-
to believed tragedians ‘led their constitutions to tyranny and democracy.’ As 
Mary Whitlock Blundell notes, “Plato mistrusts the poets not merely as ‘teach-
ers’ of a rival brand of categorical wisdom, but as purveyors of a plurality of 
viewpoints with which the performer and audience are induced to 
sympathise” (1989: 15).  
We are now led to consider a second aspect in which Dionysian cult and ritual is 
reflected in tragedy, and that is in its relationship to eros. Richard Seaford writes 
that because of the transformational effects of wine, “the overwhelming power 
to inspire communality, whether in the whole polis or in a small group [such as 
the symposium], was ascribed in particular to Dionysos … [For the god] liber-
ates psychologically through wine … and wine tends to dissolve boundaries 
between people” (2006: 26). Furthermore, Seaford adds, “because communality 
breaks down individual self-containment and may replace it with a sense of 
wholeness, Dionysos is – more than any other Greek deity – imagined as actu-
ally present” (ibid: 29).  
Seaford’s comments are valid, but he forgets to mention another important effect 
of wine: namely, its encouragement of eros. In Anacreon’s sympotic poems, for 
example, we are told that Dionysus and Eros are “team-mates”; they work to-
gether in order to ensure that men become “intoxicated by love” (Cyrino 1996). 
 Thus Ned Lebow, to his own annoyance, finds it “harder to hate” (2003: 22) the figure of 4
Nixon he depicts in the short story that opens The Tragic Vision of Politics.
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This partnership is also reflected in Dionysian religion and tragedy; in the 
theatre, for instance, where stood, on both sides of the chair of State (set apart 
for the high priest of Dionysus), a bas-relief of Eros holding a fighting cock 
(Seltman 1925: 93), and also in drama itself – for example, when Euripides has 
the chorus in his Bacchae (233) tell us that “without wine, there is no love.”  
Moreover, many scholars have documented the role Dionysus played as a god of 
animal, human and especially vegetative fertility (Bieber 1949; Keller 1998; 
Nillson 1998), and in this role the functions of Dionysus and eros are hard to 
disentangle (as the opening ritual of the Great Dionysia, the ending of Aes-
chylus’s Danaid trilogy and other tragic passages suggest) (Calame 1999; Lud-
wig 2002). We also find hints of this in the Symposium, a dialogue of Plato’s 
which has “an explicit tragic connection” (Cartledge 1997: 9). In the hangover 
inherited from the Great Dionysia, a number of men gather toast the victorious 
tragedian, Agathon, and propose a group encomium on Eros – to Socrates’ de-
light, given that “the only subject I can claim to know about is love, and the 
same is true I rather think of Agathon and Pausanias, and certainly true of Aris-
tophanes, whose whole time is taken up with Dionysus and Aphrodite” (Symp. 
177d-e). Having earlier declared that of each man’s claim to wisdom about love 
“Dionysus will be the judge” (175e), Agathon concludes his own encomium (to 
loud applause) with the statement that “it is Eros who takes from us our sense of 
estrangement and fills us with a sense of kinship; who causes us to associate 
with one another as on this occasion, and at festivals, dances and sacrifices is the 
guiding spirit” (197d). Together with Socrates, Agathon is in the end awarded a 
prize by Dionysus, in the guise of Alcibiades (Sider 1980) – and justly so, for 
the tragic poet was not wrong. As Bruce Thornton notes, “girls getting pregnant 
at festivals, when the normal social inhibitions would be relaxed and the celeb-
ration of fertility would act as an inducement, seem to have been a common oc-
currence” (1997: 22). Indeed, in the Symposium, at the symposium, it was So-
crates himself who famously became ‘pregnant.’ 
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The partnership between eros and Dionysus during the Great Dionysia thus 
helped to erase, if only temporarily, the many divisions that normally existed in 
Athenian society and threatened its cohesion. This partnership was not genital, 
but it was nevertheless rooted in the philia aspects of eros that characterised the 
love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (which, as we have seen, was central to 
democratic ideology) (cf. Dover 1974: 215). It was in this vein that Aeschylus, 
in the Agamemnon, could refer to the citizens’ mutual eros as a form of patriot-
ism. We see it also in Pericles’ metaphor of the ‘lover of the city’ and in Aris-
totle’s definition of the unanimity of citizens (homonoia) as political philia. 
Through the mutual esteem and homosocial bonding the equality of the Di-
onysia encouraged, the festival helped to unify a citizenry that despite its official 
pronouncements was still in many ways profoundly divided. 
This bonding experience was an intrinsic and inescapable part of the festival, 
given the amount of citizen participation that was required. Jasper Griffin notes 
that everybody in the city “must have either performed in a dithyrambic contest 
or known someone who did” (Griffin 1998: 44), and while the same was not true 
of tragic or comic drama, the fact remains that the Dionysia – with all of its 
elaborate religious and political rituals – involved a large proportion of the city’s 
male population; almost everyone, from the priests of Dionysus to Pericles to 
phallus-toting peasants, took part. Indeed, “the play’s spectators, arranged in the 
auditorium according to tribal order (no different from what happened on the 
field of battle or in the burial of the war dead), was not distinct from the com-
munity of citizens” (Longo 1992: 16, original emphasis).  
The entire Dionysian spectacle, then, deliberately aimed at reinforcing the cohe-
sion of Athens’ men: by financing, posing, acting out, watching, and talking 
about issues of concern to the polis in drama (many of which, as we have seen, 
were framed in the discourse of erotic politics) the Athenians, in spite of any 
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disagreements about the dramatic competition they may have had, were united 
in a larger collective self. At the Dionysia, with its tragedy, satyr play, comedy 
and all its other rituals, the individual men of Athens – noble and common, rich 
and poor, strong and weak – came together as the demos, singing together, dan-
cing together, drinking together, crying together, laughing together. What differ-
entiated the Dionysia from other democratic institutions in this regard were two 
things: first, the sheer scale of citizen participation, and second, the fact that, 
through its drama, the demos dared to explore and test its political values and 
masculine identity (Cartledge 1997; Zeitlin 1992). A large number of Athenian 
citizens, in other words, were dressing up as (and acting like) women, tyrants, 
satyrs and buffoons. This was a risky enterprise, as Plato never tired of pointing 
out. 
For Plato knew well that the collaboration between Dionysus and eros was not 
always benign; his playful yet sinister portrayal of Alcibiades in the Symposium 
testifies to this claim (Sider 1980: 55). Plato must have known full well that in 
satyr-plays, for example, it was “a common topos that drink enhances ithyphal-
licism” (Hall 1998: 18), and he surely recognized that the entire Theban cycle of 
plays turns on the fact that King Laius, despite being warned by an oracle that 
his son would destroy him, begets a male child while drunk and lustful. A simil-
ar point could made regarding the Greek expedition against Troy; the casus belli 
for this conflict was Helen’s abduction by Paris, and the disastrous dispute 
between Achilles and Agamemnon we read about in the Iliad begins over the 
distribution of concubines (Thornton 1997: 22-4).  
Tyrannical and transgressive eros was indeed a favourite theme of the classical 
tragedians whose plays Plato grew up watching (and, to some extent, imitated); 
the poets use it very often as “a catalyst for wider conflicts and ethical issues, as 
well as an image for the dangers posed to the self by external challenges” (Thu-
miger 2013: 27-8). In the tragedies in which it figures, eros is almost always as-
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sociated with madness, unreason, and reversal of fortune in (and through) the 
transformation of self. It is these associations, which other tragic emotions do 
not display to anywhere near the same extent, that makes eros so relevant to tra-
gic action and which is one of the features distinguishing tragic eros from the 
eros of other poetic genres. 
[The] association between madness and eros that tragedy offers is a 
re-elaboration of a poetic cliché, especially that of lyric poetry. This 
re-elaboration is most notable in the fact that the assimilation of 
topoi and language of madness to erotic exchanges applies to both 
predators and victims, and is ultimately objectified in a disastrous 
outcome. Madness and destruction appear to be inseparable from 
the action of eros in the objectivity of facts, as well as in the sub-
jectivity of the individuals involved. (Thumiger 2013: 31)  
In other words, the violence and madness that are identifying tropes of eros in 
lyric poetry are distinguishable from the same in tragedy insofar as in lyric it is 
the confessional subject alone who suffers from these maladies. The madness 
and violence of tragic eros, on the other hand, has catastrophic consequences not 
only for the subject experiencing it but also for the wider community. Another 
distinguishing feature of tragic eros is the fact that, compared to lyrical poetry 
(which tends to focus on other people as love-objects), it is far broader in terms 
of its application. As Paul Ludwig notes, “the tragedians tend to ‘eroticize’ 
everything, practically as a result of their genre” (2002: 136). Tragic eros, then, 
is defined not only by the fact that it is almost univocally associated with mad-
ness, unreason, and reversal of fortune through the transformation of self, but 
also by the fact that it fundamentally and unavoidably concerns the polis. 
This kind of eros is clearly visible in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, when Clytem-
nestra, speaking “wisely as a prudent man” (351), declares her hope that “no 
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eros should fall upon the Greeks at Troy for violating what they shouldn’t” (340-
341) – despite having already fallen prey to such eros herself. Again we see it in 
Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, where the hyper-sexual Heracles is, through the 
suffering and death accidentally inflicted on him by his lovelorn wife, in his own 
words transformed into a woman; and in the Antigone, where the heroine, “in 
love with death” (246), lies down in her tomb-cum-marriage-cum-birthing bed 
to help contribute to “the great growing family of our dead” (977-81). We find it 
also in Euripides’ Bacchae, where Pentheus’s great lust – his erota mega (813) – 
to witness what he supposes are the sexual debaucheries of the maenads encour-
ages him to engage in transvestitism and then leads him to his own sacrificial 
death at the hands of his frenzied mother. The list is practically endless. 
It must be stated, however, that while eros in tragic action is almost always de-
structive, it also often figures as a reference point in its latent potential as a pos-
itive force that provides for civic harmony, fertility and marriage, and agricul-
tural productivity (Kaimio 2002; Thumiger 2013). This is most clearly visible in 
the speech given by Aphrodite at the conclusion of Aeschylus’s Danaids, a play 
which concerns women’s flight from, murder of and eventual reconciliation with 
men. Here, the goddess says that “the sacred Sky feels a desire [erai] to penet-
rate the Earth, and the Earth is possessed by the desire [eros] to enjoy marriage. 
A shower comes to fertilize the Earth from her husband Sky. And this is how she 
brings forth for mortals the pastures of flocks, the living [bios] of Demeter and 
the mature fruit [opora] of the trees … I am the cause of all that” (quoted in 
Pirenne-Delforge 2010: 314). Claude Calame concludes that 
the ritual of the Dionysia and the means that masked ritual drama 
provided made it possible to represent not only the extremes of 
madness into which the onslaught of erotic desires drives us, along 
with all its dire consequences, but also the affinities that the Greeks 
of the archaic and classical periods perceived between the states of 
!106
love and death. At the same time, the chorus is generally there to 
remind us of the constructive and civic effects that the interventions 
of Eros and Aphrodite may produce … Even as it comments upon 
the plot, deploring all the violence wreaked by love, the voice of 
the chorus addresses the public composed of citizens, exhorting 
them to practice moderation. (1999: 149-50)  
Most of Calame’s commentary is fair enough. One point stands open to criti-
cism, however. Eros is by its very nature immoderate; as Aristotle says in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, “eros is like an excess of philia” (1171a10-13). The ques-
tion is then begged as to how citizens are supposed to practice moderation in re-
spect to it; ‘erotic moderation’ seems to be a contradiction in terms. Further-
more, the condemnation of excess and concomitant encouragement of modera-
tion – whilst certainly present in tragedy and as ethical pillars of the polis – in 
many instances does not constitute a particularly complex lesson and as such it 
is one which would, after a while, likely become stale for an audience that sat 
and watched these plays for hours on end, year after year. Indeed, the ubiquity of 
Apollo’s wisdom that one should have ‘nothing to excess’ raises the question as 
to why the Athenians needed a festival as elaborate, expensive and ultimately 
excessive as the Dionysia to remind themselves of this. 
In light of this, I suggest that, aside from the somewhat oxymoronic exhortation 
to practice moderation, three other possible alternatives for dealing with eros are 
identifiable in the genre. It should be stressed that none of these, nor the call for 
moderation, can be said to constitute ‘the tragic response’ to the problem of eros, 
for the point is that they all do. These various perspectives reflect not only the 
differences between individual plays (and playwrights) but also the fact that 
tragedy problematises political issues more often than it solves them. 
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Section Two: Eros in Tragedy 
(i) Tragic Responses to Eros 
The first of the alternatives I have just mentioned includes ethical exculpation 
and (self-)pity. The words of Deianara in Sophocles’ Women of Trachis summar-
ise this position: “Whoever stands opposed to Eros, with fists clenched like a 
boxer, does not understand him; for he rules over gods as he desires, and over 
me. Why not another like me? So if I blamed my husband for the passion which 
has afflicted him, I would be mad” (441-446).  
As we saw in the previous chapter, this logic is embedded in Aristotle’s advice 
to tyrants regarding their commission of hubris, and it evidently reflects a popu-
lar moral evaluation of erotic ‘crimes of passion.’ It is also implicit in Euripides’ 
Bacchae. Froma Zeitlin notes that in this play Dionysus turns Pentheus “from 
the one who acts to the one who is acted upon, from the one who would inflict 
pain and suffering, even death, on the other, to the one who will undergo these 
experiences himself” (1992: 64). The apparent potency of Pentheus’s kingship, 
manifest in his impious hubris and demand to control maenadic ritual, in the end 
actually reduces him to impotence; “feminization is the emblem of Pentheus’s 
defeat” (ibid.). What seals the tyrant’s fate, however, is his erota mega to see for 
himself the rites of the maenads, his lust to overstep the bounds that define a 
man – the bounds that distinguish between man and woman and mortal and god. 
This is closely related to his inability to understand the fertilising, rather than 
simply the destructive, power of Dionysus. For Pentheus does, in fact, recognise 
the potency of the androgynous interloper, in the form of the god’s sway over 
the women (and indeed the men) of his city, but he interprets this power as sexu-
ally threatening, immoral, base, and all-too-human (223-4; 354-5). He interprets 
it as a mortal’s hubris rather than as a legitimate, divine power. Through his fear 
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and loathing of such hubris, he develops the fatal eros that brings about his fem-
inisation and death.  
When considering the character of Pentheus, the words of Pausanias in Plato’s 
Symposium spring to mind: “It is no good for rulers if the people they rule cher-
ish ambitions for themselves or form strong bonds of friendship with one anoth-
er. That these are precisely the effects of philosophy, sport and especially of Eros 
is a lesson the tyrants of Athens learned directly from their own 
experience” (182c-d). Pentheus certainly seems tyrannical in his desire to stamp 
out what he considers the erotic excesses of Dionysus and the bonds that the god 
creates between his citizens. He is, to be sure, a foolish and arrogant character. 
However, when considered in the context of the foundational myth and opening 
ritual of the Dionysia, the king’s transgressive desire should be viewed in a less 
critical light. In this context, the king’s lust would likely have appeared under-
standable, even pitiable; watching (and thus identifying with) the disastrous fall 
of a mistaken man concerned to save his city, many Athenians must have been 
reminded of the foregoing ritual of the festival and of their mythical forebears, 
who had suffered a similar fate (erotic over-excitation, pain, infertility, death) as 
a result of their own misunderstanding of Dionysus. 
Exculpation and pity, however, seem to provide an inroad for the second altern-
ative to erotic moderation: openly capitulating to the god. There are two forms 
such capitulation could take. The first would produce a kind of resigned fatalism 
that accepted the destructive chaos of eros as a necessary and unavoidable ele-
ment of its creative power. To quote Charles Segal: “In this conjoined polarity 
… stands the deeply rooted ancient recognition that nothing comes into being 
without the destruction of something else, without loss, sacrifice, violence … In 
the waste of something inestimably precious there is a hopeless sadness but also 
the recognition that that essence cannot be confined and possessed within the 
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familiar continuities and prosaic durability of the everyday, the predictable, the 
rationally known and knowable” (1997: 16-7).  
Such unhappy fatalism points to its inversed mirror image: namely, embracing 
eros and its power. If, as Euripides suggested, tyranny is godlike and beautiful, 
and if tyranny had many lovers – and if, furthermore, becoming such a lover 
was no fault of one’s own – was there not an incentive to consider whether one-
self was an erastes of tyranny and, if one was found to be so, to embrace the fact 
so as to get a head start on one’s many competitors in the race for the beloved’s 
hand? As the Nurse of Euripides’ Hippolytus somewhat cryptically remarks 
(357-8), “the chaste lust for vile things [kakon erosi].”  
Granted, the fate of tyrants and transgressive characters more generally in 
tragedy is almost always a horrible one, and despite their dignified language and 
heroic bearing it would be foolish to argue that Pentheus or Clytemnestra, for 
example, present models of behaviour that any self-respecting Athenian would 
want to follow. The figure of Oedipus the Tyrant, however, is much more com-
plex and ambivalent, as many scholars have pointed out; he is both a pollution 
and a sacrament to the city of Thebes. The same is true of the horrifying Furies, 
who seek to avenge the slaying of the tyrant-like Clytemnestra; as will soon be 
discussed, they are eventually transformed into the Eumenides, the ‘friendly 
ones.’ Antigone, Ajax and Orestes could also be mentioned. 
But focusing on tragic characters as role models obscures the fact that watching 
them meant much more than abstractly analysing their behaviour. Observing 
tragic heroes in action surely also raised such questions as: What does it feel like 
to possess a tyrant’s power? What does it feel like to challenge the laws of the 
city or even the gods? How would I feel if I found out I had murdered my father 
and married my mother? What would it take for me to kill my own kith and kin? 
What is the value of my life compared to the life of the hero? Is his immortality 
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in communal memory worth such terrible suffering? The eros of tragic figures 
opens up a realm of dark fantasy and troubling questions that can altogether ex-
cite, disgust, terrify and deeply sadden. Perhaps, as Plato suggested, this realm 
could even motivate. 
This brings us to the third and final possible alternative to erotic moderation that 
we see presented in tragedy: a communal cooption of eros and its power. Unlike 
Pentheus, Clytemnestra, Oedipus and other tragic heroes, the mythical Atheni-
ans managed to escape from their suffering, and they did so by institutionalizing 
a festival in honour of the god who had punished them. The power of Dionysus, 
in other words, was properly acknowledged and made profitable to the polis by 
the community’s worship of the god. The formation of an alliance between the 
city and Dionysus was the implicit goal of the festival’s opening religious rituals 
and, to some extent at least, of its dramas; these were all performed as worship 
of Dionysus, a gift to the god that was expected to be reciprocated by the return 
of his favour. We must then ask whether the power of eros could be harnessed in 
a similar fashion. 
A number of plays suggest that indeed it could be. Of these, the Oresteia of Aes-
chylus is most relevant for our discussion. Before proceeding to corroborate this 
claim, a caveat must be given. As David Porter writes, the Oresteia is “a mega-
drama which, as in the great fugues of J. S. Bach, owes much of its power to the 
way in which a multiplicity of subjects and counter-subjects pull against each 
other even as they mesh” (2005: 304). The trilogy is rich, complex and morally 
confusing, and it would be naïve to try to reduce its importance to any particular 
theme or issue or to suggest that it expresses one and only one ‘message.’ Con-
tinuing Porter’s musical analogy, to perform or appreciate a Bach fugue, one 
must try to hear and keep in balance its various thematic lines; but to reach this 
point, “one must focus on, and probably sound too loudly, one theme at a time, 
especially those themes one has previously overlooked” (ibid.). The following 
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discussion, therefore, is not meant to downplay other interpretations of the Or-
esteia or to suggest that the proper role of political eros is the trilogy’s sole con-
cern, only to note that it is an important theme that often goes overlooked (an 
exception is Thumiger 2014). 
In the foregoing discussion, we have seen in fleeting the various references to 
eros that exist in the Oresteia. It was noted, for example, that Clytemnestra 
warns against an eros to violate that which one should not. This theme of trans-
gressive eros threads throughout the Agamemnon. We see it, first of all, in the 
behaviour of the namesake of the play, who is depicted upon his return to Argos 
as glorying in having “destroyed the altars and shrines of Troy’s gods and wast-
ing the seed of her whole land,” in having “cast such a yoke upon the neck of 
Troy” (525-530). When considered alongside Aeschylus’s representation of 
Xerxes in the Persians, as well as the lines regarding eros that are spoken by 
Clytemnestra, it is clear that Agamemnon is being compared here to a tyrant, 
and that the eros against which Queen Clytemnestra warned was his (Edwards 
1977: 34). This is further hinted at in Agamemnon’s capitulation to his wife’s 
insistence that he step on to the purple tapestries in the manner of the barbarian 
potentate Priam – the action that immediately precipitates his death. 
The link between eros and tyranny in the person of Agamemnon is confirmed by 
Clytemnestra in her bitter accusation against the gruesome ancestor of 
Agamemnon, the infamous Tantalus  – he was the one, she says, who through 
the butchering of his child first fostered the “love of lapping blood” (eros 
haimatoloichos, 1479) that now haunts the House of Argos. The chorus seems to 
agree (1481-2): “An old Hubris,” they say, “tends to bring forth … a young 
Hubris and that irresistible, unconquerable, unholy spirit, Daring [tolma], and 
for the household black Furies, which resemble their parents” (764-771). 
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Singing of Clytemnestra’s terribly beautiful sister, Helen – “that vengeful Fury 
who brought tears to brides” (750; 1455-1461) – the chorus relate the story of 
how  
a man once fostered in his house a lion cub, from the mother’s milk 
torn, craving the breast given. In the first steps of its young life 
mild, it played with children and delighted the old. Caught in the 
arm’s cradle they pampered it like a newborn child, shining eyed 
and broken to the hand to stay the stress of its hunger. But it grew 
with time, and the lion in the blood strain came out; it paid grace to 
those who had fostered it in blood and death for the sheep flocks, a 
grim feast forbidden. The house reeked with blood run, nor could 
its people beat down the bane, the giant murderer’s onslaught. This 
thing they raised in their house was blessed by God to be priest of 
destruction (716-736). 
This, they say, was the fate of Priam and his city when they took Helen from the 
Greeks. In this picture, we can see a dark family resemblance between Helen 
and Clytemnestra. Cassandra, fated for misunderstanding and death, tries in vain 
to bring this to the attention to the chorus:  
There is one that plots for vengeance, the strengthless lion rolling in 
his master’s bed, who keeps the house against his lord’s return, my 
lord too, now that I wear the slave’s yoke on my neck. King of the 
ships, who tore up Ilium by the roots, what does he know of this 
accursed bitch, who licks his hand, who fawns on him with lifted 
ears, who like a secret death shall strike the coward’s stroke, nor 
fail? No, this is tolma when the female shall strike down the male. 
(1123-32) 
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And sure enough, soon after Cassandra’s lament, Clytemnestra sinks her dagger 
into both the King and his sorrowful concubine – the latter’s death “a delicate 
excitement to [her] bed’s delight” (1447). This double murder places the city 
under the yoke of a sexually-charged “tyranny” (1355, 1365) to be managed by 
both Clytemnestra and her lover, Aegisthus. The latter’s behaviour, the Chorus 
adds in disgust, is a display as ugly as that of a “cock beside his hen” (1671). 
The transgressive eros that we have seen is typical of tyrants, and of much 
tragedy in general, saturates the Agamemnon (cf. Thumiger 2013; McGlew 
1993: 190-206). The cycle of violence and vengeance that it breeds continues 
into the Libation Bearers, where Orestes takes a bloody revenge against his 
mother, throwing the questions of divine and civic justice, of family ties and ob-
ligations, of fate and necessity, and of manliness and femininity high into the air. 
In the Eumenides, they will finally come crashing down, amid a dark cloud of 
hostility and danger, at the spectator’s doorstep – the city of Athens.  
For after his act of matricide, the avenging Furies pursue Orestes all the way to 
this city, where he seeks refuge in the sanctuary of Athena. The goddess offers to 
act as an adjudicator to the dispute, with the citizens of Athens acting as a jury in 
the trial. Both the Furies and Orestes (and his patron Apollo) agree to this solu-
tion. After the two sides have each made their cases, the jury is hung. This seems 
to reflect the collision of values that is reflected throughout the trilogy; the 
Athenians simply cannot decide who is right, in much the same way as the Ar-
give chorus is stumped by Clytemnestra’s eloquent speech in defence of her 
murder of Agamemnon.  
It is therefore left to Athena to decide the young man’s fate, and she votes that 
he should be spared. She does so, she says, because she was born without a 
mother, fully-formed from Zeus’s head, which means that she is for the male 
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principle and entirely on the father’s side; she cannot award greater honour to 
the death of a woman who killed her husband, the master of the house. 
As thanks, Orestes offers the eternal allegiance of Argos to Athens and his 
powers as a hero from beyond the grave. The Furies, on the other hand, remain 
true to their name; feeling gravely dishonoured, they threaten to let loose on the 
land of Attica a vindictive poison that will blight the crops and leave everything 
barren. But, as “Furies which resemble their parents” (Ag. 771), the avengers of 
Clytemnestra also threaten Athens with a transgressive political eros – the tyran-
nical bloodlust that leads to civil war. Athena worries that, “as if plucking the 
heart from fighting cocks,” the Furies will plant among her citizens “that spirit 
of war that turns their battle fury inward on themselves” (Eum. 861-5).  
Athena has no place for “the bird that fights at home,” and she therefore tries to 
persuade the Furies (in starkly erotic language) that they can have a place of 
great honour in the city as guarantors of the city’s fertility, civic harmony and 
martial success (Buxton 1982). If they hold Persuasion in her rightful place, and 
give in “to the sweet beguilement of [Athena’s] voice,” they will “be honoured 
as the good are honoured” (Eum. 885-6; 868-9) by the goddess’s city. If they do 
not do so, they will come to lust for the city of Athens “like lovers” (852). 
Eventually the Furies relent; they submit to the beautiful voice of Athena and 
her persuasive sense of honour and justice, and promise to take a home beneath 
the city as eumenides. In this capacity, they will unleash a spell upon the land of 
Attica that will ensure “the seed and stream of the soil’s yield and of the grazing 
beasts will be strong and never fail” and which will “keep the human seed alive” 
(906-909). Not only this: “In the terror upon the faces of these,” Athena says of 
the former Furies, “I see great good for our citizens” – for these dark creatures, 
the daughters of Night, will grant her wish that the city’s wars will rage “out-
ward hard against the man who has fallen horribly in love with high 
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renown” (990-1; 864-5). And, sure enough, before they go to their home under 
the earth amidst a joyful and pompous procession, the Eumenides offer one final 
prayer: “Civil War, fattening on men’s ruin, shall not thunder in our city. Let not 
the dry dust that drinks the black blood of citizens through passion for revenge 
and bloodshed for bloodshed be given our state to prey upon. Let them render 
grace for grace. Let love [philia] be their common will; let them hate with single 
hearts. Much wrong in the world is thereby healed” (976-987).  
The prayer of the Eumenides seems to link back to the Agamemnon, in which 
the Argive soldiers and citizens express a mutual eros for one another and for 
the fatherland. A similar sort of patriotism seems to be present in the Eumenides, 
but here we see a definite model, a positive state of being for the citizens to as-
pire to. It is true that in the Agamemnon, communal eros is figured as “a pleasant 
kind of sickness” (545), throwing some doubt as to its value, whereas in the 
Eumenides the bond between citizens is described as philia, perhaps suggesting 
a more tempered love that might be compared to that felt for family and friends. 
But this does not seem to be the case; the erotic overtones of philia in the Eu-
menides are very clear. The transgressive power of the Furies to incite bloodlust 
and war – a power that we have seen is associated strongly with eros and fertil-
ity – is by no means annulled here; rather, it is appropriated and communalised 
and directed outward against the city’s enemies. In particular, it is directed 
against those who have a terrible eros for fame (e.g., aspiring tyrants). Athena 
accomplishes this in a thoroughly eroticised example of persuasion; her use of 
peitho to coopt the Furies eliminates the need for internal violence within the 
city, and adds legitimacy to the erotic union (Rynearson 2013; Buxton 1982). 
Thus, if the citizens of the drama are united in philia – just as they are in the 
theatre itself – they are also united in eros: in the generation of children, in the 
productivity of the fields and, more importantly for our purposes, in the fight 
against potential tyrants.  
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But the happy ending of the trilogy leaves two important questions unresolved. 
First, what effects will the co-opted spirit of the Furies have on Athens’ interna-
tional politics? Given that this spirit will let loose on the land of its enemies “the 
vindictive poison dripping deadly … [which] from itself shall breed 
cancer” (780-5) there is good reason to believe that the erotic fury that has been 
harnessed by the city will be prone to engage in its usual excesses when it enters 
the field of inter-state politics. Second, what will happen if the honours and 
piety promised to the Eumenides in return for their good-will are discontinued? 
It seems likely that they will return from their homes under the earth with a ven-




To conclude, we have seen that the various political rituals conducted before the 
dramatic performances began suggest that the Great Dionysia was, in part, an 
attempt on behalf of the city to mediate the competing demands of individual 
power-seeking, empire and communal stability; this concern was reflected in the 
plays themselves, for example in the interplay between the hero and the chorus. 
I argued that this dynamic can be interpreted in terms of the erotic discourse that 
characterised democratic politics in Athens after the end of the Pisistratids and 
the Persian invasion. Tyranny, at the heart of which was believed to lie a trans-
gressive and very dangerous species of eros, is central to democratic self-defini-
tion and as such a favourite topos of the tragedians. Tragic eros, I argued, is 
defined not only by the fact that it is almost univocally associated with madness, 
unreason, and reversal of fortune through the transformation of self, but also by 
the fact that it fundamentally and unavoidably concerns the polis. 
  
I then suggested that the opening rituals of the Dionysia can help to frame tragic 
drama, although they do so in a general rather than a formulaic manner. I ar-
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gued, first, that the transformation of self that is associated with the mask and 
with wine in Dionysian cult is crucial to understanding the didactic power of 
tragedy, insofar as it encourages actors and spectators to identify with a range of 
perspectives, including those normally considered beyond the pale. Second, I 
argued that the close relationship between eros and Dionysus in terms of the 
roles they play in promoting political potency (and impotence) is reflected in the 
context of the festival itself, where the dissolution of boundaries between indi-
viduals that was encouraged by the performances helped to consolidate the iden-
tity of the demos. This collective identity – this political unity – was essential to 
the war-making capacity of the city. I also showed that the transgressive eros 
that we see reflected in so many tragedies reflects the Athenians’ concern about 
and flirtation with tyrannical power. The exploration of this theme problematises 
the civic unity that the festival’s context encourages. The blurring of boundaries, 
in other words, had the paradoxical potential not only for uniting the citizens of 
Athens but also for dividing them; the creativity of Dionysus and his playmate 
Eros was matched only by their potential for havoc and destruction. 
!118
Part Two 




As a model of democratic citizenship at Athens, Pericles’ ideal of the ‘lover of 
the city’ plays a crucial role in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.  5
In this chapter, I argue that the relationship between an erastes and his eromenos 
and the behaviour it gives rise to can be identified, within the context of Funeral 
Oration itself as well as various other speeches in the History, as the foundations 
not only of Pericles’ vision of patriotism but of Athens’ characteristic dynamism 
also. In light of Thucydides’ explicit statement that this dynamism – and Spar-
ta’s fear of it – were the concurrent causes of the war, the importance for Thucy-
dides of the ‘national character’ or ‘constitution’ in the shaping of political des-
tiny becomes clear. This point is reinforced by the disastrous Sicilian expedition 
(to be considered in the next chapter), which ultimately leads Athens towards its 
tragic fate: self-destruction through stasis (civil conflict). In other words, Thu-
cydides suggests that to properly understand the causes and, indeed, the dyna-
mics of the war, we must understand the causes of Athenian imperialism; yet to 
properly understand Athenian imperialism, we must understand the social 
constitution of Athens; and, finally, to understand the constitution of Athens, we 
must understand the ideal that guides Athenian political behaviour – an ideal I 
dub ‘erotic citizenship.’ 
This chapter is structured around a number of questions. First, how does Per-
icles’ metaphor map onto politics (that is, what are the metaphor’s ideational pa-
rameters)? Second, what is the connection of erotic citizenship to the ‘national 
character’ of Athens? And, finally, third: how does this ideal relate to tragedy? 
Once we have the answers to these questions, we will be better placed to unders-
tand what role Pericles’ speech plays in the structure of the History as a whole. 
 All references to ancient books in this part of the dissertation are to Thucydides unless oth5 -
erwise indicated.
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The chapter is divided into two sections: Section One answers the first two ques-
tions; Section Two tackles the third.  
Section One: Eros and the Athenian Ideal 
(i) ‘The Lover of the City’ 
Reading Thucydides 2.43.1, we can well imagine the scene. As he addresses the 
men of Athens, under a grey sky in the first winter of the war, Pericles slowly 
sweeps his arm across the Attic landscape. From his podium, he directs the eyes 
of his audience over the most beautiful monuments in the public cemetery be-
fore them, to linger on the glorious Acropolis, the Areopagus, and the Pnyx, plus 
the mansions and the markets all safe beyond the city walls, before pointing to 
the country farms and olive groves and the silver sea far off in the distance. He 
returns to the remains of Athens’ war-dead and finally to the city’s men them-
selves, as he exhorts them all “to gaze, day after day, upon the power (dynamis) 
of the polis and become her lovers (erastai).”  
Socrates, despite his usual irony, captures the mood of the audience in Plato’s 
Menexenus: “every time I listen to this kind of speech,” Socrates says there of 
the funeral oration, “I am exalted and imagine myself to have become all at once 
taller and nobler and more handsome” (235a-b). In this instance, however, Per-
icles does not merely ask the men of Athens to feel passionately about the city 
(or, as Socrates implies, about themselves); rather, as Paul Ludwig notes, “he 
asks them on the basis of that passion to play, in relation to the city, the social 
role that lovers play toward a beloved” (2002: 148). For when they have taken 
the city’s greatness to heart, Pericles proclaims, the citizens of Athens must not 
forget that what made her so powerful were those men they are now mourning; 
they must remember that it is for them to live up to the example of the dead.  
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the role of the erastes was defined by a num-
ber of complex norms. In this part of the chapter we will be concerned with sol-
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ving the difficult question of how the interpersonal relationship of the erastes 
and the eromenos can be understood to function on a more purely political level. 
We begin with a discussion of the city-as-eromenos. In this regard, we must first 
consider the issue of the city’s dynamis, which is the quality that for Pericles 
makes the polis so attractive. The exact meaning of dynamis is not fully captured 
by the common English translations of ‘power’ or ‘empire.’ Dora C. Pozzi 
(1983: 222) argues that the German word Macht, with all the resonances that 
this word evokes, perhaps does dynamis more justice. However we finally de-
cide to translate the word, this quality is seen – in the literal sense – to be the 
beauty of Athens, for eros is inspired by beauty, and beauty is perceived by the 
eyes. 
But an abstract, relational (and highly contested) concept such as ‘power’ seems 
difficult, if not impossible, to grasp visually. What the Athenians could see, apart 
from the power inherent to their own bodies, was the exercise of power that had 
been built into the city and woven into the very fabric of their lives as imperial 
masters. It is in this sense, it seems, that some commentators have considered 
the word dynamis to translate into ‘empire’ (Monoson 1994; Balot 2001). Such 
a reading fits well with Thucydides’ description of the public cemetery as “the 
most beautiful quarter outside the city walls” (2.34.5, emphasis added), with 
Pericles’ mention of the comeliness and elegance of the Athenians’ private 
homes (2.38.1), with his belief that what he describes in his encomium delivers 
‘visible proof’ of the city’s greatness (2.42.2), and also with Plutarch’s story that 
the massive public building program initiated by Pericles in 447, undertaken 
with funds procured from the Delian League (that is, with resources extracted 
from the empire), led his enemies to accuse him of treating the city “like a wan-
ton woman, [adding] to her wardrobe precious stones and costly statues and 
temples worth their millions” (Per. 12.2).  
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Furthermore, this view seems implicit in the lessons of the ‘political physio-
gnomy’  in which Pericles instructs his audience: having contemplated the beau6 -
ty of the city and, in the process, having become her lovers, the men of Athens 
are to reflect on the kind of character that made such beauty possible; they 
should recognise the inherent relation between the daring spirit of the dead, their 
knowledge of their duty and their sense of honour, and “the mighty markers and 
monuments of their empire [dynamin]” (2.41.4; cf. Immerwahr 1960). Indeed, it 
could be argued that in Pericles’ view “praise of Athens is really praise of the 
achievements of brave men” (Pearson 1943: 407). However, Pericles also 
stresses that the institutions and way of life at Athens are just as worthy of affec-
tion as these monuments: its democratic governance and independence, equality 
before the law, love of wisdom and the arts, games and festivals, generosity and 
self-control, openness to aliens and foreign produce, and its private freedom and 
public-spiritedness are all good – if not ‘beautiful’ – things to be desired.  
In its metaphorical significance as eromenos, then, it appears that the polis is 
marked by its physical splendour, by its wonderful way of life, and by the daring 
spirit of the men that is reflected by such magnificence; its loveliness is expres-
sive of the noble courage of those who suffered in its name, and of the institu-
tions that gave them the wisdom to know the reasons why they should suffer.  In 
short, the city is a shining example of what is kalos k’agathos (‘fair and noble’) 
– the ancient catchphrase of the aristocracy, a class of men to which the young 
Harmodius belonged. 
But there is more to it than this. For the specifically martial dimension of dyna-
mis that Pozzi wants to flesh out that, until now, has remained somewhat hazy 
becomes especially stark when we consider Thucydides’ use of the word in the 
‘Archaeology’ (his introduction to the larger work). Here, Thucydides asks the 
reader to imagine what future ages might think of Sparta should the city all of a 
 My own coinage, and an idea that warrants further exploration (cf. Tsouna 1998; Cochrane 6
1929; Thuc. 2.65.5). 
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sudden become bereft of its people: on the basis of its mere appearance, with its 
lack of majesty or major monuments, those visitors from the future would never 
believe that Sparta’s dynamis allowed it not only to occupy two-fifths of the Pe-
loponnese but to stand at the head of the whole and to command a number of al-
lies elsewhere as well. If the same fate were to befall Athens, Thucydides writes, 
“any inference from the appearance presented to the eye would make her [dy-
namin] to have been twice as great as it is” (1.10.2). It is clear that dynamis is in 
large part the military might of a polis; it follows that we would be very unwise 
to gauge the power of a city simply from its architectural appearance (although 
this is, Thucydides implicitly suggests, still a factor in the estimation of political 
dynamis). We can thus clearly perceive the strong sense in which Pericles inti-
mates that it is not just the resplendence and balanced way of life at Athens that 
make her beauty so pronounced; it is, he suggests, as much the battle steeds, 
spears and billowed sails of the city at war that will set the hearts of her men all 
aflame. 
The city, as eromenos, is a complex and abstracted amalgam of elements ani-
mate and inanimate, mental and physical, living and dead, present and past, near 
and far. Its beauty is to be found in empire, homeland, and military force; in de-
mocracy, philosophy and liberality; in boldness, honour, and manly courage. As 
Nicole Loraux writes, “the political consequences of this amalgam, which en-
ables the living to identify with the andres agathoi [noble men] whose funeral 
the city is celebrating, are serious, since, like Socrates, every Athenian takes the 
praise to apply to himself and immediately transforms himself into an epic cha-
racter” (1986: 265). For what appears to be a kind of instability in the signifi-
cance of the polis is balanced and even resolved in Pericles’ speech by final re-
ference to the eyes: everything beautiful (that is, all that is powerful) about 
Athens can be seen. It is no exaggeration to say that the beauty of the city really 
comes down to the feats of its citizens – everything, from the empire’s pickled 
!124
imports to its politics to the friezes of the Parthenon, is done. In a word, the 
city’s beauty comes down to its deeds, to its drama (‘action’, ‘doing’). 
We are thus lead to consider the political erastes in his role as the hero of this 
civic ‘drama.’  What does the best of the Athenians actually do for his beloved? 7
Simply put, he sacrifices himself – he dies. Of course, there are many opportuni-
ties for men to serve the city and to win its favour in ways that do not involve 
risking their lives; and indeed Pericles admits that, although they must resolve 
no less to keep the same daring spirit against the enemy, those “who remain be-
hind may hope to be spared the fate of the dead” (2.43.1). The desire for honour 
and standing among citizens resulted in the commission of great monuments and 
temples, the payment of liturgies, and the funding of lavish festivals and 
contests, along with many other fine contributions to the community, and in the 
Funeral Oration all of these avenues for the satisfaction of philotimia (‘love of 
honour’) remain open. However, Pericles makes clear to the men of Athens that 
it is in the act of fighting for their city and, in particular, in the act of dying for 
her, that the greatest valour can be found – and so it is that bloodied corpses, as 
the finest gifts of all, secure what is most desired from the beloved.  
But what, exactly, does death in battle metaphorically signify here? The relation-
ship of the erastes and the eromenos was a form of loving, friendly barter, cha-
racterised by norm-bound gift exchange in which one kind of good (primarily 
education and mentoring) was traded for another (gratitude, friendly company 
and eventually sexual favours). In short, the primary value that an erastes had in 
the eyes of a potential eromenos was in his capacity as an educator; the primary 
value of an eromenos for his erastes lay in his suitability as the quarry of a 
sexual pursuit. Over time, these exchanges built up trust, developed goodwill 
 “Pericles is expressing a truth about patriotism … in terms that echo an ancient aristocratic 7
code. The free compulsion of the Greek hero to follow his own aretē, even at the cost of self-
destruction, is transferred here to a new object, the city, the corporate creation and reflection 
of every man who is capable of feeling as he does. Here the democratic citizen is invited – 
and enabled – to be a hero” (Else 1954: 154).
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and communal solidarity, fostered genuine emotional bonds that were mostly la-
cking in the family lives of Athenian men, and, perhaps most importantly, 
transmitted the kind of values and skills that nourished all of the above and 
which were necessary for youths to function successfully as citizens.  
S. Sara Monoson therefore quite rightly postulates that Pericles’ metaphor, and 
indeed his entire speech, presents a view of citizenship “that prizes reciprocal 
mutual exchange between city and citizens and not, as an anachronistic and ro-
mantic reading of the metaphor in translation might suggest, the selfless devo-
tion of the individual citizens to the good of the city” (1994: 254). For the dead 
men have not given their lives for nothing; the favours that the city grants them 
in exchange for the standard they have set include a pompous state funeral, pu-
blic support for their sons until the age of their majority, and “the most splendid 
of sepulchres – not the sepulchre in which their bodies are laid, but where their 
glory remains eternal in men’s minds, always there on the right occasion to stir 
others to speech or to action” (2.43.3). 
The last of these favours, the promise of immortality in memory, is inherited 
from the heroic tradition. It is nevertheless also closely and quite clearly tied to 
pedagogy, a central component of Greek pederastic relationships. As Pericles 
says, on account of their deeds, the dead men will always be remembered by 
their beloved city in the function they played and will continue to play as role 
models. Through the standard of courage set by their deaths in battle, that is, the 
city-lovers have provided Athens with “instruction in virtue, with paideia [edu-
cation]” (Monoson 1994: 268; cf. Loraux 1986). The city, it follows, must make 
a return on this gift in order for the relationship to reach final consummation; 
and thus it honours the dead men in perpetuity. It is only once the erastes has 
proved his true worth that the eromenos should grant him favour; by granting 
him such the city displays its exemplary treatment of its citizens; in sum, the two 
reinforce each other’s honour in a physical and spiritual embrace. Nevertheless, 
most commentators on the speech pay little heed to the nature of the eroticism 
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inherent to ancient pedagogy, and this is problematic insofar as it passes over the 
translation of violent death in Pericles’ metaphor and neglects the implications 
this has for understanding the reproduction of the civic virtues celebrated by 
Pericles. 
It has been argued that, in some forms of pederasty in ancient Greece, homo-
sexual intercourse between an erastes and his eromenos was thought to embed 
the virtue of the former in the latter through the transfer of semen. Homosexual 
relations thus formed a central element of the youth’s education and played an 
important role in his initiation into the community of free adult males (Percy III 
1996). Athenian pederasty, on the other hand, idealised the physical integrity of 
the eromenos and officially frowned upon physical penetration. Nevertheless, 
the idea of semen as the vehicle of civic virtue and its correlate masculinity was 
always implicit in Athenian homoeroticism and the pedagogical practices to 
which it gave rise. As Werner Jaeger writes, with particular reference to the 
Greeks in general: 
Education, as practiced by man, is inspired by the same creative 
and directive vital force which impels every natural species to 
maintain and preserve its own type; but it is raised to a far higher 
power by the deliberate effort of human knowledge and will to at-
tain a known end … As man becomes increasingly aware of his 
own powers, he strives by learning more of the two worlds, the 
world without him and the world within, to create for himself the 
best kind of life. His peculiar nature, a combination of body and 
mind, creates special conditions governing the maintenance and 
transmission of his type, and imposes on him a special set of forma-
tive processes, physical and mental, which we denote as a whole by 
the name of education. (1967: xiii)  
Taken in the context of the Funeral Oration, where death in battle is presented to 
the audience as the supreme lesson in patriotism, Jaeger’s insights raise impor-
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tant issues for us. For as Pozzi writes, “in this heroic offering of the men’s lives, 
the full circle of giving and receiving is accomplished” (1983: 228). But in clas-
sical Athens, the return which an honourable eromenos was expected to make on 
his relationship included putting his thighs at the service of his lover and thus 
indulging his genital desire. If Pericles’ metaphor is to be complete, therefore, 
just as the erastes-eromenos relationship culminates in the sexual release of the 
erastes as the reward for his educative labours, so must the lover of the city’s 
erotic longing be ‘relieved’ by his own death. Indeed, the lover who was never 
intimate with his beloved would find it hard to believe Pericles’ assertion that 
for the dead citizens “death and happiness went in hand” (2.44.1). It follows, 
then, that the moment of an erotic citizen’s violent death is simultaneously his 
greatest joy, his spiritual ‘orgasm’ as it were. 
Put differently, the relationship of the erotic citizen with his beloved city can 
only be consummated in the context of war; it is only through combat that the 
city receives a full and proper education. In Pericles’ metaphor, it is only 
through death in battle that one can teach the full meaning of manliness. Aris-
totle continued this tradition when he wrote that “in the proper sense of the 
term” andreia is expressed by the man “who fearlessly confronts a noble death, 
or some sudden peril that threatens death, and the perils of war answer this des-
cription most fully” (Nic. Eth. 1115a). In Pericles’ vision, it is only when he is 
found out by the enemy’s blade that the erotic citizen finds true happiness; at the 
moment of his death, the consummation of his love in eternity is assured, and he 
enters a state of erotic ecstasy.  
Martha Nussbaum rightly concludes that, in Pericles’ city, “eros, not law or fear, 
guides action,” and “this reliance on eros puts democracy … very much at the 
mercy of fortune, and of the irrational passions” (1979: 163). But there is an 
even more troubling aspect of Pericles’ metaphor that many scholars, including 
Nussbaum, have overlooked. This concerns the resemblances that the Periclean 
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‘lover of the city’ has with the figure of the tyrant in the democratic imagina-
tion. 
James McGlew argues that Pericles’ figure of the ‘erastes of the city’ engages 
with “an established metaphor [for tyranny] that dates back at least to Archilo-
chus and was still very much current in his own time” (1993: 188). At first 
glance, this statement is problematic; as we have seen in previous chapters, ero-
tic political discourse was ubiquitous in classical Athens, and one erastes in par-
ticular – namely, Aristogeiton – served as an officially-sanctioned model for all 
democratic Athenian men. Pericles is obviously alluding to these images in his 
speech, which Thucydides confirms when, in the context of his digression on the 
tyrannicides, he tells us that ‘the Athenians’ falsely believed that ‘they and 
Harmodius’ had destroyed the Pisistratid tyranny. In light of this it seems rather 
difficult to disentangle democratic from tyrannical allusions in this instance.    
Nevertheless, it does seem unlikely that Herodotus’s famous saying that ‘tyran-
ny has many erastai’ was made after Pericles’ funeral oration, and this lends 
credence to McGlew’s argument; Herodotus was well-received at Athens, was 
acquainted with members of the Alcmaeonid clan to which Pericles belonged, is 
known to have recited his Histories there, and was culturally very influential. 
Political metaphors that involved ‘erastai,’ it follows, would likely have carried 
distinct overtones of despotic desire. Moreover, as we have seen, the image of 
the tyrant as a perverse and brutal erastes was long-standing and widespread. 
Most importantly, however, Pericles would soon describe the empire, which best 
reflects the city’s power (itself the quality he suggests will inspire the eros of its 
men), as being “like a tyranny” (2.63.2). If the power of the city is reflected in 
the empire and its riches, and if that empire is tyrannical and its riches unjustly 
gained, it stands to reason that to call upon one’s fellow citizens “to gaze, day 
after day, upon the city and its power” so that they might become its lovers is, 
effectively, to exhort one’s citizens to fall in love with a kind of tyranny. 
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It would be false to conclude that “the erastes’ desire is the passion of the aspi-
ring tyrant, not the loyalty of the honest citizen” (McGlew: 188) because Per-
icles’ vision is clearly still deeply rooted in democratic discourse. But there is a 
definite engagement with the image of tyranny here, and it seems strange that a 
responsible leader like Pericles would want to flirt with the democracy’s avowed 
ideological enemy in a time of danger and instability. The question becomes es-
pecially acute in light of the Spartan’s siege of Archanae, one of the larger set-
tlements of Attica. At this time, the anger and frustration of an important seg-
ment of disenchanted country-dwellers (who had, as a result of Pericles’ ‘islan-
der strategy’, been forced from the country and now lived in uncomfortable, 
overcrowded and unsanitary camps along the city walls) reached their boiling 
point. This was precisely the sort of reaction that the Spartan king Archidamus 
desired. As Thucydides notes, Archidamus “thought it likely that the Acharnians, 
who, with their 3,000 hoplites, were an important element in the state, would not 
allow their own property to be destroyed, but would force the others as well to 
come out and fight for it” (2.20.4). Watching impotently from behind the para-
pets of the Long Walls as their homes went up in smoke, the people of Acharnae 
and the other demes laid waste by the Spartans would surely have experienced 
strong feelings of resentment – not only towards the Spartan foe but also toward 
an urban elite whose assets had been hardly touched by the war. By playing 
upon the feelings of the Archanians in this way, Archidamus sought to introduce 
stasis into the counsel at Athens (Bosworth 2000). 
To add to all this, Pericles offered a model of citizenship in which the erastai of 
the city are encouraged to “rival one another to show who is most 
worthy” (Ludwig 2002: 148). Doing so appears counterproductive to the goal of 
civic unity; given the fierce competition and antagonism that arose between 
erastai for the hand of good-looking youths, it seems inevitable, on the face of 
it, that similar conflicts would emerge as a by-product of Pericles’ erotic model 
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of citizenship (cf. Yates 2005). In the wake of Sparta’s actions in Acharnae, it 
would seem that this kind of social division was the last thing Athens needed. 
On closer inspection, however, Pericles’ vision reconciles the divergent interests 
of the individual and the community and fosters a far more complicated – if ul-
timately very competitive – sense of homonoia. In Pericles’ model, the highest 
good of the individual is achieved at the moment that he gives away his life for 
his beloved city; at the moment that he dies, the erotic citizen is granted the ho-
nour he most craves, eternal honours from the city. This is a glory that befits not 
only heroes but tyrants also, insofar as great honour places one far above one’s 
peers, and eternal honours places one above one’s peers forever.  
But this is not the final stop of the citizen-lover; as he outcompetes his rivals and 
dies for the city, he also becomes ‘the city and its power’, the object of his affec-
tion. For it is his dramatic example that those who remain must fall in love with; 
this is the link that unifies the dead with the living, and the living with each 
other in their shared honouring and love of the dead. As we have noted, for Per-
icles the power and beauty of the city ultimately lies in its men, and what is most 
beautiful about them is reflected in their deeds (the greatest deeds of all being 
those of the war-dead). In short, it is in death that Athens’ men most fully re-
present the city’s dynamis and its nobility, its existence as ‘Harmodius.’  
By constructing his politics in this way, Pericles does three things. First, he 
transforms (or attempts to transform) virulent self-interest into liberal generosi-
ty; his model citizen receives everything at the same time as he gives it all away. 
This, of course, provides enormous benefits to the polis in terms of the honour 
and riches won through the empire, which itself depends upon the sacrifices of 
the city’s men.  
Second, Pericles’ erotic model of citizenship suggests the possibility “of an in-
dividual having an attachment to the polis that is not mediated by membership in 
a particular family or faction” (Monoson 1994: 258). This was necessary in the 
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light of the civil discord that was brewing in Athens as a result of his strategy 
and Archidamus’s actions in Attica. By asking those unhappy men looking out at 
Archanae from behind the Long Wall to turn their gaze “upon the city and her 
power,” Pericles tried to replace their own particular rustic affections with his 
vision of the city as its men; he redirected their aggression away from the urban 
centre, toward the enemy and, only slightly paradoxically, toward one another in 
each man’s potential as a rival suitor in the race for the city’s heart.  
Finally, in order to achieve both of these goals, Pericles taps into the tragic dis-
course of tyranny in which the tyrant’s power is often presented in ambiguous 
terms, and sometimes as an object of (illicit) desire. Just as Athens’ “daring spi-
rit has forced an entry into every sea and every land,” and everywhere left be-
hind it “everlasting memorials of good and evil” (2.41.4), the erotic citizens who 
die for their beloved city will have “the whole earth for their tomb” (2.43.3). 
Here, Pericles seems to be invoking a similar sort of patriotism to that we have 
seen exists in the Eumenides; like the Furies, he urges the people of his city to 
unite in a spirit of love, to form a common will, and to hate with single hearts – 
the reason being, as Aeschylus would say, that “much wrong in the world is the-
reby healed” (Eum. 987). This is not surprising, insofar as at the time of Per-
icles’ speech there was quite a lot wrong in Athens.   
But the extraordinary energies that are harnessed by Pericles’ model of citizen-
ship are balanced on the tip of a pin – or, to be metaphorically precise, on the tip 
of a spear. As we have seen, he who loves the city so passionately that he longs 
to die for it is, on reflection, also the man who longs to possess the city’s ‘heart’ 
forever, and for himself. The citizen-lover therefore resembles both democrat 
and tyrant, both Aristogeiton and Hipparchus. Thus he goes to war happily and 
whole-heartedly, whether to defend his imperial power or to expand it – the true 
democrat and the true tyrant will find their end on the battlefield in both cases, 
and enrich the life of the democracy by their demise. What survives, in the 
community that lives on, is ‘Harmodius,’ the eternally youthful, eternally beau-
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tiful set of aristocratic ideals that undergirds the polis and is reflected it its dy-
namis. 
When located in the context of inter-state war the political passion of the citizen-
erastai finds its own antidote, and the dangers posed by political eros are there-
by partially neutralised. Pericles’ model of citizenship deliberately directs the 
terrible and tyrannical energy of eros outward, where it consumes itself in battle 
as the fuel for Athens’ imperial war machine. Yoking the power of love in this 
way brings great benefits to the broader community; not only in the form of the 
empire and the riches it brings, but also in the fact that those citizens who (by 
the intensity of their political eros for the city and its power) pose the most dan-
ger to the city are destroyed at the same moment the city falls into their hands. 
War and the public honours for those killed thereby constitute the safety valve of 
Pericles’ vision of erotic citizenship. 
Thucydides, it seems, had a great deal of respect for Pericles’ vision; it was, he 
says, under Pericles that Athens was “at her greatest. And when the war broke 
out, here, too, he appears to have accurately estimated what the power [dynamis] 
of Athens was” (2.65.5-6). Nevertheless, as we shall see, he also understood this 
vision’s limitations – or more precisely, its lack of them. For eros was by its na-
ture immoderate, and when the normative structures on which Pericles’ meta-
phor rested broke down, as they were to do during the plague, the power of poli-
tical passion was liable to turn inwards, upon the city itself. In response to this 
impiety, we might say, the Eumenides became the Furies once again; when pri-
vate interest became uncoupled from public honour, the tragedy of Athens be-
came inevitable.     
(ii) The Nature of Athenian Man 
We now come to consider the question as to what it is exactly that constitutes 
‘Athenian man’ and how central to the content of his character Thucydides him-
self considers eros to be. Doing so will place us in a better position to unders-
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tand the overarching structure of Thucydides’ work as well as the important debt 
it owes to tragic drama, both of which will be discussed in the following parts of 
the chapter. 
According to Steven Forde, if we “bring all that is said about the Athenian cha-
racter in the course of Thucydides’ History, whether by Thucydides himself or 
by his speakers, we get what is in fact a remarkably consistent portrait of the 
Athenians, revolving around certain commonly acknowledged core 
traits” (1986: 434). Daring (tolma) is identified “by all who broach the 
subject” (ibid) as the most important of these characteristics, as it is indeed this 
quality that most profoundly marks out the men of Athens from those of other 
cities. It is the connection of tolma to eros that we will explore in this part of the 
chapter. 
Pericles places daring at the centre of his account of the city: according to him, it 
is the daring of Athens that made this into the most splendid of Greek cities. The 
virtue (arete, 2.43.1) that he sees manifested in the current generation of erotic 
citizens, and which is traced by him to their fathers and from them to genera-
tions of a more distant past, is first and foremost defined by tolma.  
Ryan Balot points out that “the empire had been won through the toil of several 
generations, all of whom tried, to the extent that they were able, to conform to a 
standard of honour and excellence, and they were ashamed to compromise that 
standard” (2001: 513). In fact, Pericles says that the dead men “fled from 
shame” (2.42.4) – an apparently paradoxical and specifically democratic kind of 
courage, which according to Pericles is peculiar to the Athenians. Whilst being 
terrified of shame, then, the Athenians lack the fear of danger. Indeed, they pos-
sess a positive appetite for risk – an appetite attested to even by Athens’ enemies 
(Taylor 2009). 
And while this much is clear, in his Funeral Oration Pericles says “nothing about 
the warlike deeds by which we acquired our power or the battles in which we or 
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our fathers gallantly resisted our enemies, whether Greek of foreign” (2.36.4). 
He therefore he leaves us with little knowledge of how the Athenian character 
was historically produced. Fortunately for us, however, Thucydides himself pro-
vides a partial explanation. 
After outlining the primary reason why the Spartans decided to go to war with 
Athens – namely, their fear of Athens’ growing power – Thucydides immediate-
ly begins an account “of how Athens came to be in the position to gain such 
strength” (1.89.1). He informs us that after having turned back the barbarian tide 
at Salamis, the Athenians, who had abandoned their city in the face of Xerxes’ 
invasion, returned to their devastated homes and at once began to rebuild their 
broken city walls (going so far as to use stone taken from tombs and statues to 
do so). Sparta, and particularly its allies, opposed this act; they were startled “by 
the sudden growth of Athenian sea-power and by the daring the Athenians had 
shown in the war against the Persians” (1.90.1). 
The Peloponnesians were in this regard at least not unduly cautious. The radical 
decision of the Athenians to abandon their city and ‘become men of the sea’ in 
their fight against the Persians was unprecedented in the history of Hellas. In 
fact, from the point of view of other Greek cities, “the unexampled zeal exhibi-
ted by the Athenians in the Persian Wars [… had] not only an admirable, but a 
terrible or shocking quality as well” (Forde 1986: 436-7). 
To understand how this may be so, we should consider the fact that the most si-
gnificant elements in the life of the polis were geographically bounded. Civic 
identity was in large part intrinsically embedded in the land of Attica; apart from 
the obvious attachment, knowledge, and stability that the long-term residents of 
an area generate through daily interaction with their physical and social envi-
ronments, most of the cults and rituals that shaped and defined personal identity 
at Athens required a fixed abode for their enactment. Take, for example, the 
Great Dionysia, at which many important civic rituals (such as the initiation into 
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citizenship of war orphans who had come of age) were performed; this festival 
could never be reproduced at sea, as its connection to the land rooted it firmly in 
the Attic countryside as much as the city proper, and its elaborate ceremonies 
and plays, intended for the entire polis as they were, relied on the enormous 
space of the theatre for their performance.  
As Josiah Ober notes, “standard Athenian convictions about piety and patriotism 
clearly regarded it as proper for every Athenian to participate in the ritual life of 
the polis” (2006: 227). As such, and in light of the fact that at least 120 and as 
many as 170 days of the Athenian calendar featured one or another state-sponso-
red ritual (ibid), it does not appear unreasonable to conclude that, for other 
Greeks, “[the] astonishing deed of the Athenians, which seems to display the 
greatest courage, seems also to bear a certain tincture of impiety as well” (Forde 
1986: 437). 
The Athenians, in short, had lost everything they owned, only to find something 
strange and disturbingly strong within themselves – a discovery which their ri-
vals in Corinth were quick to notice. Thucydides appears to “validate the Corin-
thian assessment of the intangible nature of Athens’ strength and the Athenians’ 
rejection of traditional boundaries” (Taylor 2009: 21). At least this seems to be 
the case when he relates the tale, not without some relish, of the Peloponnesians’ 
attempt to put a stop to Athens’ post-war reconstruction efforts.  
Following the war with Persia, the brilliant Athenian general responsible for the 
victory at Salamis, Themistocles, hatched and executed a bold plan in response 
to the Spartan complaints. He himself would venture forth to Sparta to hold em-
bassy, in order to distract the attention of its leaders until his compatriots, all the 
while working post-haste on the city walls, had completed the fortifications on 
which they had shortly before begun to work. The plan succeeded, and when the 
walls were finally completed, Themistocles spoke openly (and one might even 
say brazenly) to his unhappy hosts: 
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He said that Athens was now fortified, and fortified sufficiently 
well to be able to protect her people; that if the Spartans or their al-
lies wanted to send embassies to Athens on any subject, they should 
in future go there prepared to recognize that the Athenians were ca-
pable of making up their own minds both about their own interests 
and about the interest of Hellas. He pointed out that when the Athe-
nians decided to abandon their city and take to their ships, it was 
not in consultation with Sparta that they adopted that daring [tolme-
sai] resolution, and that whenever they had joined in counsel with 
the Spartans it was clear that no one else had offered better advice. 
And now they thought it better that their city should be fortified; it 
was better for their own citizens and also would be an advantage 
for the whole alliance; for it was only on the basis of equal strength 
that equal and fair discussions on the common interest could be 
held (1.91.5-7). 
Not content with fortifying the city, Themistocles advised the Athenians to wall 
the natural harbour at Piraeus, which they did, on the grounds that as a naval 
power maintaining this position on the sea would give them great advantages 
over their foes in future conflicts. Thucydides, winding the clock back on his 
narrative, then reminds us that it was Themistocles who “first dared” (protos 
etolmesen) to suggest that the Athenians should become people of the sea as the 
forces of Xerxes approached, and that it was he who thereby set in stone “the 
foundations of the arche” and began the “acquisition of power 
[dynamin]” (1.93.4). 
This daring was not, however, confined to Themistocles. Although the decision 
to become sea-men during the war with Persia may have been urged on the city 
by Themistocles, it was ultimately taken democratically; the options were dis-
cussed freely and openly and the decision was made by the community. And this 
was to be most fateful, for if the community had not decided on such a bold 
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course of action all of Greece would now be subject to the Persians (or so the 
Athenians argue); without the help of the Athenian demos and their ships, nei-
ther Themistocles nor even the combined strength of the Spartans and their allies 
could have defeated a foe as mighty as the Persians (1.74.4). But if, as this story 
seems to suggest, daring is ultimately dependent on democracy, and if democra-
cy is ultimately dependent on daring (as Pericles argues), the question inevitably 
arises: which of these came first – not-chicken character or constitutional egg? 
With this question, we come full circle to the erastes-eromenos relationship that 
forms the nucleus of Pericles’ vision of patriotism. Outside of the Funeral Ora-
tion, there are only two references to pederasty in the History, and both involve 
the same legendary figures: Aristogeiton and Harmodius. As we have seen in 
Chapter Two, these two Athenians, the one aristocratic and the other middle 
class, were credited in the popular imagination with having slain the city’s rei-
gning tyrant in an act of great self-sacrifice, winning freedom for the people at 
the cost of their own lives. For their deed the two tyrannicides were hailed as he-
roes by the city and touted as model ‘erotic citizens’.  
Inherent to this kind of erotic citizenship is the quality of daring, or at least this 
is what Thucydides’ would have us believe. In Book Six, he says in no uncertain 
words that the “daring” action that defines the story of Aristogeiton and Harmo-
dius was the child of a private love affair. Thucydides ends his digression on the 
tyrannicides on a telling note: after fleeing Athens and enjoying refuge with the 
Persians for many years, he says, Hippias finally returned to face his former sub-
jects – alongside the barbarian army massed at Marathon. This, as Forde astutely 
observes, quite clearly suggests that for the Athenians “the fight against Hippias 
and tyranny was transformed … into the fight against the Persians and its after-
math” (Forde 1986: 442). The struggle initiated by Aristogeiton and Harmodius 
against barbaric despotism was, quite literally, inherited by their democratic son, 
the Athenian ‘Everyman’ – just as the next generation would carry the fight 
!138
forward against the Spartans in order to maintain, and then tragically expand, the 
empire they had built in the struggle against the Persians. 
It is worth briefly recalling the discussion in Chapter Three. Here we saw in pas-
sing that Aeschylus, in the Agamemnon, associates hubris with tolma – “that ir-
resistible, unconquerable, unholy spirit, Daring” (770). This same daring is what 
Cassandra claims inspires Clytemnestra to strike down Agamemnon and insti-
tute a ‘tyranny’ over Argos. Tyranny, as we know, was bound up with eros both 
in Aeschylus’s drama and in Athenian discourse more generally. As we will see 
in the following chapter, in his discussion of the tyrannicides and their relation 
to Athenians’ treatment of Alcibiades, Thucydides picks up on this theme. Be-
fore moving on, however, it is worthwhile considering another, more indirect le-
vel on which this part of the History can be illuminated through the study of tra-
gedy. 
Section Two: Erotic Citizenship and Tragedy 
(i) Euripides and the Suppliants 
The similarities – and dissimilarities – between various funeral rituals in Athens 
and its various tragedies have been investigated often, in depth, by scholars 
much more competent than I (e.g. de Romilly 1963; Loraux 1986; Goldhill 
1988; Bennet and Tyrell 1990; Ebott 2000; Tzanetou 2005). It is impossible to 
discuss all of the literature in one small section of a chapter, and even to the 
drama that is subject to analysis here some violence must be done. As such, I 
must make clear that this is inevitably a partial reading, and one which does not 
purport to speak the whole truth about either tragedy or funeral oratory as genres 
(if ever that could be done). Therefore, in this chapter, whenever I extract ele-
ments from tragedy to support my claims regarding Pericles’ funeral oration, I 
do so without the pretension that mine is the only manner in which such lines 
can or should be read; nor do I mean to suggest that Pericles and the tragedians 
held the very same beliefs on all subjects under discussion. This was obviously 
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not the case.  
What I will argue is that Pericles’ oration and the Suppliants of Euripides both 
draw on a common but evolving stock of cultural references, myths, and ideas 
related to Athenian democratic ideology. Although Thucydides’ Pericles and Eu-
ripides engage with ideas and arguments in different ways, one primary effect of 
both performances is to encourage similar patriotic sentiment in their audience 
through the presentation of positive (and negative) models of behaviour. The 
Suppliants, however, shines a subtle critical light on many of the themes we see 
presented in the Funeral Oration. As such, it provides insights into the broader 
context in which Pericles made his oration, especially the function that tragedy 
played in this context. A consideration of this play alongside the ritual and ideo-
logical links between the funeral oration and the Great Dionysia as civic institu-
tions allows for a better understanding of the continuity in the didactic content 
of both Pericles’ Funeral Oration and (at least this particular) tragedy.  
Furthermore, as John H. Finley, Jr. long ago pointed out, if certain ideas or ar-
guments that Thucydides puts into the mouths of his speakers appear also in Eu-
ripides’ tragedies, it is likely that Thucydides, who was writing at the end of the 
fifth century, “is not entirely rephrasing in his own way what he conceived to be 
the issues of the past, but that he does in fact keep the echo of ideas and argu-
ments once used” (1938: 26). This is important insofar as the intellectual envi-
ronment of Athens changed radically over the course of the war – sophism, for 
example, made enormous philosophical headway, particularly among the elite – 
and it has been argued that Thucydides was, when writing his History, heavily 
influenced by these trends and that the construction of his speeches reflect this 
fact. Were this the case, then Thucydides may not have fully reproduced what 
was said at the time of Pericles, and how; hence, it is argued, he is likely to have 
distorted, to some extent, the living reality which he purported to capture in his 
narrative. If, on the other hand, Thucydides can be shown to have faithfully re-
produced the discourse that took place some thirty years before he wrote, we can 
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feel secure that the behaviour he suggests was the outcome of these speeches 
was indeed related to their content. On this hangs the question of whether dis-
course and practice in Thucydides are mutually constitutive.    
We should begin with what Pericles, in his oration, declines to expound but for 
that very reason implicitly invokes. Twice when addressing his audience Pericles 
refuses to touch on those “subjects familiar to you all” – namely, the many bat-
tles in which Athenians have proved their gallantry and increased their power 
(2.36.4, 2.43.1). What Pericles is hiding here is the fact that while these battles 
to which he alludes include those fought against the Persians, there is a much 
richer and no less legitimate store of heroic examples to be found in myth (Lo-
raux 1986). These were used time and again in generic funeral oratory – indeed, 
they were its staple: 
Four major myths were used as paradigms in the Attic funeral ora-
tion. In each, specific themes were repeated that illustrated the typi-
cally claimed Athenian virtues and that proleptically anticipated 
similar acts and attitudes in Athenian history. The basic structure is 
as follows. Either a foreign force has invaded Greece or a Greek 
state has committed an injustice in violation of the Hellenic cultural 
code (nomos Hellenikos). Athens intervenes, either driving out the 
foreign invaders or else crushing the offending Greek state militari-
ly, thereby succouring the oppressed, upholding justice and Helle-
nic nomos, and punishing the wicked. In each case she must act 
alone, because other Greek states are either afraid to help or spite-
ful. (Walters 1980: 10)  
Although Pericles does not invoke these myths directly, he nevertheless does not 
find himself in breach of his duty to follow the tradition in which the audience 
was regaled with legendary tales. For the myths are in fact brought to light, al-
beit in the manner of a photographic negative: by explicitly excluding these co-
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lourful legends, Pericles’ speech makes space for other foci but nevertheless im-
plicitly includes them as subtle hues and shadings. The other, older part of the 
traditional funeral oration is so entrenched in memory, Pericles’ speech sug-
gests, that it can afford to be hinted at; the long story can be cut short without 
incurring any damage as an artefact of common knowledge (cf. Ober 2006: 
227). But a strange question then arises: how does the (non-)existence of mythi-
cal exemplars in Pericles’ oration embody a connection to tragedy? 
The answer to this question is can be found in one of Euripides’ dramas, namely, 
the Suppliants. Produced in 423, eight years after the real funeral oration was 
actually made and some twenty before Thucydides penned his own version of it, 
this play takes as its theme one prominent mythical paradigm of the generic fu-
neral oration: the Athenians’ adventure to retrieve the bodies of the seven Argive 
chiefs who died fighting against Thebes and whose burial had been forbidden by 
the tyrant Creon.  
The Suppliants takes place in the shadow of the altar of Demeter and Perse-
phone at Eleusis, home of the Mysteries of Athenian state cult, where Aethra, 
mother of Theseus, is praying. King Adrastus of Argos, who led the disastrous 
expedition to Thebes, weeps with the mothers and sons of the seven chiefs killed 
in action. Together, they supplicate for the return of their relatives’ bodies.  
When Theseus arrives from Athens, having been called to Eleusis by his mother, 
Adrastus begs the king for help to recover the corpses. Theseus chides him for 
having “favoured courage [eupsychia] instead of discretion” (161) and refuses to 
help. At the insistence of his mother and in response to the suppliants’ pleas for 
pity, however, the young Athenian king reverses his decision – but only, he in-
sists, on the ground that “it ill suits [his] character to shun dangers” (335). As a 
‘democratic king,’ he then puts the question to his people, who elect to ask the 
Thebans for the corpses or, if Creon is found to be obstinate, to take the bodies 
by force. This latter response is the one they expected; Creon is a despot, and for 
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the Athenians “nothing is more hostile to a city than a tyrant … [it is he who] 
cuts down daring like an ear of corn in spring and plucks many a flowering 
youth from out their meadow” (429, 448-9). 
A herald sent forth from Thebes suddenly arrives and, relaying the message that 
Creon will never allow the bodies’ burial, advises Theseus that going to battle 
against Thebes and its enemies will bring him only ruin. “Hope,” he says, “is 
not to be trusted; it has involved many a state in strife, by leading them into ex-
cessive rage” (479-480). If thoughtless men were to place death before their 
eyes when voting upon war, which they rarely tend to do, “Hellas would never 
rush to her doom in mad desire [pothe] for battle” (485). Peace, he says, brings 
the greatest blessings to mankind, which men cast away when they “wickedly 
embark on war, man enslaving his weaker brother, and cities following 
suit” (491-93).  
Theseus responds by rejecting the idea that Creon is his “lord and master” (518). 
He thinks it right “to bury the fallen dead, not injuring any state nor yet introdu-
cing murderous strife, but preserving the law of all Hellas” (524-27). He seems 
to agree with the herald that hope can be a treacherous friend, for he suggests 
that “fortune” (tuche) lives a fickle life; “to her the wretched pays his court and 
homage to win her smile; her likewise the prosperous man extols, for fear the 
favouring gale may leave him” (550-55). Nevertheless, he accepts the 
“danger” (572) inherent to war, declaring that the Athenians’ many labours have 
won them just as many blessings, and dismisses the herald’s warning. Refusing 
to give in to “rage” (581), he calmly rallies his army with a rousing speech and 
leads them forth against the Thebans. The Athenians are victorious, of course, 
and carry the bodies of the Seven back for burial. 
On seeing the bodies of their loved ones, Adrastus and the chorus begin to wail 
and seek to tend the dead, as was the custom of women in archaic times (cf. 
Hohlst-Warhaft 1992). Theseus upbraids the Argive king and encourages him to 
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exchange his lamentations for a speech that praises the dead instead of simply 
mourning them; doing so, he says, will be of benefit to “our younger 
citizens” (840-45). Adrastus obliges, waxing lyrical on the various virtues of the 
seven dead men and telling his women folk to quieten down. He concludes with 
the Sophistic thought that “courage [euandria] can be learned” and exhorts his 
audience to “educate [their] children well” (913-917). 
Our attention is then directed to Evadne, wife of one of the seven slain chiefs, as 
she climbs a rock with the intention to leap onto her husband’s blazing funeral 
pyre. Before she makes the fateful jump, however, Evadne declares to her father 
and a horrified chorus that what she seeks to win through her actions is a “great 
victory” (1059) over women everywhere; she wants to impart a lesson that 
should be learned by all the Argives. Her confused and frantic father asks whe-
ther this victory she speaks of is Athena’s doing or else of prudent counsel. 
Evadne enigmatically (ainigma, 1064) replies that it is with courage (aretē, 
1063) that she shall perish with together with her husband. With great joy, she 
says, she will die “the sweetest death” (1005-6) in pursuit of union with her lost 
lover, their bodies forever fused together in a marriage bed of fire. 
After these disturbing scenes, the play winds to an end. We are presented with a 
grim procession led by the dead men’s children, who are carrying the funeral 
urns of their fathers in their hands. While the mothers of the slain shed their final 
tears, the children cry out: “The weight of grief I have to bear has crushed me 
utterly … Father, do you hear your children’s lamentation? Shall I ever, arrayed 
as a warrior, avenge your slaughter – if it may be so – and beget children? Some 
day, if the god is willing, shall the avenging of my father be my task” (1159, 
1143-1150). Athena suddenly appears deus ex machina and directs Theseus to 
extract an oath from these sons of Argos that, when they come of age, they will 
agree to assist Athens in her future endeavours and go to war with her enemies. 
Their exploits in league with Athens “shall be a theme for minstrels’ songs in 
days to come” (1225).  
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(ii) Tragedy and Patriotism 
As Jacqueline De Romilly notes, “both in the general ideas and in the detail of 
the argumentation, almost all the views put into Pericles’ mouth by Thucydides 
are repeated by Euripides” (1963: 136; cf. Loraux 1989). For example, the gui-
ding principle of Pericles’ vision of patriotism –which declares that “both for 
cities and individuals it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest glory is to 
be won” (Thuc. 1.144.3; cf. 2.42.2, 64.3) – is basically reproduced in Theseus’ 
comment that Athens’ “many labours,” including but not limited to the “dan-
gers” of war, “have brought her many blessings” (Supp. 572, 576). De Romilly 
argues that the speech made by Pericles in the cemetery (as reported by Thucy-
dides) and the words spoken by Euripides’ heroes in the theatre appear to “ex-
press the exact tradition of contemporary patriotism, which was incarnated in 
Pericles himself” (de Romilly: 136). Nicole Loraux expounds on the logic of 
this tradition: the aim of Pericles’ oration and of Adrastus’ speech in the Sup-
pliants, she says, “is to urge the survivors to accept the same fate as the citizens 
whose eulogy [they are] delivering. This amounts to exhorting the citizens to die 
for the city, whatever euphemisms are used to disguise the appeal” (1989: 98). 
Furthermore, the play’s concluding remarks that the deeds of the young Argives 
will become a theme for later poets is an obvious reference to the theatre itself 
(Easterling 1995: 6). The sons of the dead in the audience, this line suggests, 
will one day in the future also be sung about for their heroism, like the boys of 
myth they see before them. Tearful lamentation is transformed into a funeral ora-
tion, into an exhortation to the young on stage and in the audience alike to live 
and die like the heroes they see mourned and praised. Appropriately, Athens is 
presented as the political embodiment of heroic virtue just as its intervention in 
the affairs of other Greeks is a righteous defence of the moral law on behalf of 
the weak and oppressed; in this play, the city’s generosity leads to “a sort of per-
petual military activity, and [its] militant compassion becomes 
belligerency” (Loraux 1989: 68).  
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This becomes disturbingly clear when we place the play within the broader ritual 
context of tragedy and funeral oratory. We have seen in Chapter Three that at the 
Great Dionysia, one of the more solemn ceremonies that took place before the 
tragedies were performed was the parade of the sons of men slain in battle. The 
ephebes would march before the entire city as a herald read aloud: “These young 
men, whose fathers showed themselves brave men and died in war, have been 
supported by the state until they have come of age and now, clad thus in full ar-
mour by their fellow citizens, they are sent out with the prayers of the city, to go 
each his way and they are invited to seats of honour in the theatre” (Aeschin. 
Against Ctesiphon 154). Pericles makes explicit reference to this ritual in his fu-
neral oration: it is, he says, one of the jewels of the crown that the city will 
award to those of its lovers who win the race of valour in its pursuit. 
With all this in mind, let us, for a moment, once more exercise our imaginations. 
It is 423, eight years after Pericles delivered his Funeral Oration. Imagine that 
among the orphans given special seats in the orchestra is one ephebe (let us call 
him ‘Eucrates’) whose father was killed by the Boeotians in the cavalry battle at 
Phrygia in 431. Eucrates remembers listening with awe and affection, as a ten 
year old, to the great statesman Pericles, taking comfort from his public words 
of praise after having struggled with his own private grief. The memory of his 
father lingers in his mind’s eye as he is called before the city in full battle dress, 
and he feels the pride swell up in his breast as his patronymic is called out by the 
herald. 
It seems fairly obvious as to what Eucrates might be feeling and with whom he 
would likely empathise when Euripides’ play was finally performed. For him 
especially there must have been particular emotional poignancy at the end of the 
play in the young boys’ declaration of their wish to exact vengeance on the des-
potic Thebans (who, we must recall, are the kinsmen of the Boeotians with 
whom Athens is currently at war, and who only a few years before had refused 
to return Athens’ own war dead).  
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It seems clear also that the sympathy of the larger community would lie with the 
newly minted citizens whose fathers gave their lives in battle, and that the desire 
to destroy the hated tyrant was being encouraged not just in these young men 
but in every spectator. Finally, it seems clear that the despot is equated with 
Athens’ enemies abroad, not with the city itself. According to Nicole Loraux, 
there is little self-doubt in this play; when Thucydides’ contemporaries wanted 
reassurance about their power, she suggests, they turned to tragedies such as this 
(1989: 285). 
There are, however, reasons to believe that the issue is not as simple of this. 
There is, for instance, a significant difference between the Funeral Oration of 
Pericles and Euripides’ drama. Whereas Adrastus eulogises the dead as individ-
uals, and this never occurred at Athens’ public cemetery. At the funeral oration 
in Athens, on the other hand, the city’s egalitarianism required a eulogy that ad-
dressed the dead as a group of men; the funeral orator spoke of a type of man, 
rather than of any man as an individual (Michelini 1994: 242). 
Furthermore, Euripides’ tragedy critically interrogates the ideology of the Fu-
neral Oration. The Theban herald, for instance, seems to associate Athenian im-
perialism with an erotic desire for war (465-491). A pothos for battle, it is true, 
is not precisely an eros for it. Yet pothos was, in fact, “the special name for the 
desire of what is distant” (Cornford 1965: 215); like eros, it was associated with 
the eye, the channel through which the image of the desired object was believed 
to enter the soul and inspire love. It is therefore not a stretch to say that Euripi-
des was thinking in erotic terms (and in Pericles’ terms in particular) when he 
had his Theban herald say that if men were to hold death before their 
“eyes” (omma) instead of hoping that this “misfortune” (dystuchia) would strike 
somebody else, then “Hellas would not rush to her doom in mad desire [pothos] 
for battle” (479-85; cf. Thuc. 2.43.1). The leadership styles of Theseus and Peri-
cles, after all, are not dramatically different (cf. Supp. 515-595; Thuc. 2.65; 
Hölscher 1998).   
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This is especially true in light of Evadne’s self-immolation, before which she 
declares her intention to teach the Argives a lesson in courage by dying the 
“sweetest death” with her beloved spouse. As we have seen in the foregoing 
parts of this chapter, the vision of erotic citizenship that Pericles presented al-
leged that “death and happiness [went] hand in hand” for the lovers who died for 
the city and that their deaths were a lesson in courage. Evadne’s death, however, 
is presented in a rather more negative light; it achieves nothing but further grief 
for her family, and reminds us of the lines in Sophocles’ Antigone that describe 
how eros ‘leads the minds of just men astray and drags them to their ruin.’  
The end of the play, with its assertion that ‘courage can be learned,’ points back 
to the ‘lesson’ Evadne seeks to provide; but if her kind of courage is rash and 
reckless, is her lesson a good one to learn? Her father certainly thinks that it is 
not, and blames Athena. In line with tragedy’s general tendency to problematise 
rather than solve political issues, in these instances the Suppliants appears to 
prod Pericles’ Oration for more answers: is it right to eulogise men who have 
attacked another city unjustly, like the Argives (and, indeed, like the Athenian 
imperialists) have? Should the communalised dead of the Funeral Oration be 
granted individualised praise? To what extent does a construction of citizenship 
in which death and happiness go hand in hand really benefit the city? Are 
Athens’ enemies really so unwise and unjust when they claim that war, and the 
hope that encourages it, is a bane for all involved? Euripides’ subtle interroga-
tion of the ideas expressed in the Funeral Oration suggests that the relation be-
tween this tragedy and the History is more nuanced than scholars such as Loraux 
allow for.    
One link between tragedy and the funeral oration, however, remains clear and 
indisputable: the one begins where the other leaves off. The institutions of fune-
ral oratory and tragedy are intrinsically linked, in other words, because (to put it 
somewhat simply and grotesquely) without the war-dead there could be no or-
phans for the city to put on display on the Great Dionysia. The celebration of the 
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deaths of Athens’ men at the funeral oration is, in other words, ritually paired 
with the celebration of the ‘birth’ of new citizens during the Dionysia. Thucy-
dides was undoubtedly aware of this fact; before he was forced into exile, he had 
likely attended both the Funeral Oration and the Dionysia more than a dozen 
times each. 
We should spell this connection out a little more, for it illuminates some of the 
more troubling aspects of Pericles’ Funeral Oration. The parade of the war or-
phans in the Theatre of Dionysus was, as has been mentioned, the culmination 
of the favour granted by the city to its ‘lovers.’ Within the erotic metaphor, the 
ritual can be seen as symbolic of the city giving birth to manly virtue, embodied 
in a new crop of erotic citizens prepared to give their lives for the city. Those 
men who have died in pursuit of their beloved are born anew: by giving their 
lives in battle they have attained an eternal, if collective, existence in civic me-
mory in which they serve as role models for others still living and those yet to 
come. They live on, however, also through their progeny, who at the moment of 
their majority (until which point they have been supported by the state) “were 
more than ever declared the sons of their fathers, since they owed these signal 
honours to their father’s fine death” (Loraux 1989: 116). As such, the ephebes’ 
dead father, who had been subsumed in a collective in the funeral oration, was at 
the Dionysia recalled as an individual lover of the city who, along with others, 
holds eternal possession of the city.  
Through this ritual, then, the cycle of destruction and creation is completed, and 
the homoerotic relationship at the heart of Pericles’ vision of citizenship reaches 
its logical conclusion. The male seed of the dead men praised in the Funeral 
Oration have been nourished and raised by those men’s beloved, the city, to the 
point at which they are ‘born again’ as full citizens at the Great Dionysia. The 
burial of erotic citizens, metaphorically speaking, has ‘impregnated’ the land of 
Athens with masculine virtue; the city in its turn has raised their sons and ‘given 
birth’ to them as courageous men. These young men, in turn, clad as they are in 
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full battle dress, are ready to begin the cycle anew. In the paradoxical world of 
tragic Athens, then, love is war and war is love, life is death and Hades, to bor-
row Heraclitus’s maxim, is Dionysus. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen that one of the central problems occupying Pericles 
in the History is the proper place of political eros in the city. According to Thu-
cydides, Pericles’ daring patriotic vision based on eros was a brilliant one; like 
tragedy, it incarnated and encouraged the human power released by love – to be 
precise, homoerotic love – that was the basic foundation of both Athens’ demo-
cracy and its empire. It harnessed the dynamism born of self-interest which, in 
its expression through eros and tolma, was what defined democratic Athens 
from its beginning, and yoked it to the community, promising to the individual 
for the sacrifice of his bodily existence the most glorious of earthly rewards and 
the closest thing to eternal life – eternal fame. Through death in battle, the citi-
zen-lover became one with the polis as the embodiment of its collective ideal; 
‘Aristogeiton’, as it were, became one with ‘Harmodius.’ Indeed, it was only 
through the destruction of life that true community could be born; the city requi-
red the sacrifice of men to actualise Pericles’ model of citizenship and to reach 
its full potential. But despite its uses for creating solidarity through war and 
death – a solidarity reflected in the institution of the Great Dionysia – Pericles’ 
ideal was also a vision that was extremely vulnerable to collapse, on account of 
the delicate balance between individual and group interest upon which it rested 
and the tremendous violence upon which it relied for expression. Indeed, in the 
end it would succumb to the pressures and contradictions inherent to it. The 
causes and consequences of this implosion are the subject of the next chapter, to 




This chapter is divided into two sections, which are structured as follows. In the 
first section I argue that although both Nicias and Alcibiades are implicated in 
the catastrophe that unfolds in Sicily, the common attempt to find in either of 
them a clear locus of responsibility is inappropriate. In this drama, if we can call 
it that, all alike are afflicted by human weakness; their follies combine with un-
fortunate circumstance to produce complete disaster, and in this sense both posi-
tions outlined above are – at least partially – false. For despite refusing to appor-
tion individual blame for the disaster in Sicily, Thucydides finally appears to 
conclude that Alcibiades was indeed Athens’ best hope in the war, and he sug-
gests that by following unnamed demagogues in recalling Alcibiades for trial on 
trumped up charges the Athenians proved themselves their own arch-enemies. In 
other words, if anybody was to blame for the disaster, it was the Athenian de-
mos.  
In the second section I consider Alcibiades and his fate in terms of the ‘erotic 
politics’ described in the first part of this dissertation. In large part, this discus-
sion must revolve around Alcibiades’ relationship to the Athenian ideal discus-
sed in the previous chapter. Hence, we must consider the relationship between 
Alcibiades and Pericles; the politics of the former, I argue, are rooted in the pa-
triotic vision of the latter. This connection is suggested by Thucydides’ implied 
comparison of the two men and, more importantly, by the actual manifestation 
of Pericles’ vision of erotic citizenship during the departure of the fleet to Sicily, 
a departure which in itself is symbolic of the (temporary) triumph of Alcibiades’ 
policies at Athens.   
I then argue that Alcibiades is comparable and was compared to ‘the tyrant’ as 
this figure was imagined at Athens; his excesses and transgressions, while dis-
turbing and dangerous to the law and order of the city and the gods, are never-
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theless also a source of great political power for Athens. In light of the insights 
raised in Chapter Four, a consideration of Alcibiades’ character – especially its 
tyrannical aspects – reveals him to be less despotic than Dionysian: the benefits 
that he can confer upon the city are great, if only he is handled in the right way. 
The tragedy of Athens, I will conclude, lies more in the repetition of the beha-
viour manifest in the community’s mythical treatment of the god Dionysus than 
in the personalities and leadership of either Alcibiades or Nicias.  
Section One: The Tragedy of Athens  
(i) The Roles of Alcibiades and Nicias 
It is generally accepted that reading the History – especially those parts of it that 
concern the destruction of the Sicilian expedition – from a ‘tragic perspective’ is 
legitimate (if not warranted).  Indeed, the emotional poignancy of these episodes 8
is palpable to any and all readers; if we are seeking tragic pathos in the History, 
it is surely here that we will find it. According to Thucydides, the men of Athens 
“suffered evils too great for tears” in Sicily (7.75.5); it was here, he says, that 
they “were utterly and entirely defeated …; their losses were, as they say, total; 
army, navy, everything was destroyed and, out of many, only few 
returned” (7.87.6). 
However, as we know, there is a great deal of disagreement over what exactly 
constitutes the ‘tragedy of Athens’ and how tragic drama may have affected 
Thucydides’ historiography. Cornford, whose controversial work is still “the 
 Finley (1967), de Romilly (1963) and most of all Cornford (1965) deserve special mention 8
for their impact in this regard; Harry C. Avery suggests that with these authors “the harvest is 
in” on Thucydides and tragedy (1973: 1). While Avery might perhaps be speaking with extra 
haste, it is entirely true that the scholars he mentions have set the agenda for those who have 
come after; no work on this subject can be complete without reference to their arguments. 
Even W. P. Wallace, who disagrees with so much of Cornford’s thesis, admits that “it is hard 
to read the History of the Peloponnesian War without feeling that one is reading the Tragedy 
of Athens” (1964: 256).
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most comprehensive study of Thucydides’ debt to the literary tradition” (Lud-
wig 2002: 154), writes that the resemblances of the History to tragedy can be re-
duced to two main points: “The first is an analogy of technical construction, 
seen in the use and correlation of different parts of the work. The second is a 
community of psychological conceptions: a mode of presenting character, and 
also a theory of the passions which has a place not only in psychology, but in 
ethics” (1965: 139). This view, shared by many others, posits a dual emphasis 
on the tragic ‘scaffolding’ of the narrative (in its emphasis on suffering, delusion 
and catastrophic reversal) and on the representation of human beings and politi-
cal groups as types that reproduce unethical and destructive patterns of beha-
viour (to use Aristotle’s terms, the text is poetic insofar as it pays attention to 
both the particular and the general). The prime example of the tragic cycle that 
Thucydides seeks to describe in the History is the city of Athens; the democratic 
polis is the real hero of his historical ‘drama’ (cf. Knox 1957; Morrison 1994; 
Lebow 2003). 
Most IR scholars reading the History through a tragic lens are influenced by this 
thesis, and view the disaster in Sicily as the culmination of the tragic narrative 
and the essence of the Athenian tragedy. They suggest that the destruction of the 
Sicilian expedition is a kind of nemesis or ‘divine punishment’ for Athens’ hu-
bris at Melos and elsewhere – a hubris personified by Alcibiades and doomed 
by the inherent hamartia of the ambitious expedition that he is instrumental in 
bringing about. Had the Athenians respected the cautious advice of Nicias and 
resisted the lure of Alcibiades, they suggest, Athens would have been spared the 
destruction wrought by the expedition to Sicily. On this reading Thucydides es-
sentially “turned against Athens the tremendous moral which his countrymen 
delighted to read in the Persians of Aeschylus; … Athens, tempted by Fortune, 
deluded by Hope, and blinded by covetous Insolence, was attempting an enter-
prise comparable with that with which it was her boast to have repulsed and 
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broken at Salamis” (Cornford 1965: 201; cf. Bedford and Workman 2001). This 
enterprise, however, brought about the city’s ruin. 
Many of these authors are highly critical of Alcibiades and find in his rambunc-
tious personality and limitless ambition the enablers of the hubristic expedition 
and, hence, they point to him as the man most responsible for the nemesis that 
destroys the city. B. Jordan, for example, condemns Alcibiades as reckless and 
deceitful for his portrayal of the Sicilians and the Peloponnesians as paper tigers. 
He also condemns Alcibiades for his emotional appeal to the “cupidity and rapa-
city” of his countrymen (2000: 72). David Smith finds in the young general’s 
speech before the assembly a number of references to epinician poetry celebra-
ting tyranny, which, he suggests, is the goal that Alcibiades is less than covertly 
aiming at (2009). In a similar vein, Virginia Hunter points out the rhetorical 
continuities between the Melian Dialogue and Alcibiades’ speech at Athens, 
which are suggestive, she says, of the newfound hubris that pervades both epi-
sodes (1973: 143-4).  
And it is indeed the case that (knowingly or not) Alcibiades seriously underes-
timates the abilities of the Sicilians. His claim that because of their mixed popu-
lation the Sicilians lacked “the feeling that they are fighting for their own father-
land” (6.17.3) and that they are militarily inferior as a result is contradicted by 
Thucydides’ own statement that in battle the Syracusans never showed “any 
lack of enthusiasm or daring; within the limits of their military experience they 
were not inferior in courage” (6.69.1; cf. 8.96.5). Alcibiades’ boasts about his 
successes against the Spartans are also overblown (Bloedow 1990). Perhaps 
most importantly for this argument, however, is the fact that Thucydides himself 
attests to the validity of the main charge levelled by Nicias against Alcibiades – 
namely, that the latter hoped to profit greatly out of his appointment to the 
command – by repeating it almost word for word in his commentary following 
Nicias’s speech (6.12, 6.15). Most people, he adds, would later become frighte-
ned by the unconventional qualities of Alcibiades, which showed themselves 
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“both in the lawlessness of his private life and habits and in the spirit in which 
he acted on all occasions” (6.15.4). 
Strauss notes that “both the distrust of Alcibiades and popular fear are in harmo-
ny with Nicias’ way of thinking” (Strauss 1964: 205). This fact in itself seems 
to lend legitimacy to the feelings of the demos: the warnings uttered by Nicias in 
6.9-14 and 6.20-23 are later confirmed by events just as events turn out to mock 
Alcibiades’ flagrant contempt for the capacities of the Sicilians. And when Ni-
cias’ death is recounted at the end of Book Seven, Thucydides himself mourns 
the demise of “a man who, of all the Hellenes in [his] time, least deserved to 
come to so miserable an end, since the whole of his life had been devoted to the 
study and the practice of virtue” (7.86.5).  
Events and Thucydides both therefore seem to vindicate the wisdom and virtue 
of Nicias: “the account of his death arouses pity and horror in an intense – and 
tragic – way” (Rood 1998: 198-9; cf. Marinatos 1980), and it is clear that Thu-
cydides liked Nicias – “as we all do, as all Athens did” (Gomme 1951: 79). 
Opposed to this portrait of Nicias, Thucydides portrays Alcibiades as man who 
is disturbingly eager to aid Sparta in its prosecution of the war, a perversely 
greedy individual happy to bring about the utter ruin of his native city in order to 
satisfy his own narcissism. Thucydides’ Alcibiades is made to confess that his 
actions are calculated to destroy “both the present power and the future pros-
pects of Athens” (6.92.5) even though, somewhat grotesquely, he claims that his 
deeds are all carried out in the name of love (6.92.3). 
Thus Lebow, Bedford and Workman and others seem entirely justified in 
concluding that while Nicias, as “the voice of reason” in the debate over the ex-
pedition to Sicily, is a commendable leader who is both “sensible and 
cautious” (Lebow 2003: 264-5). Alcibiades is a talented but traitorous wretch 
whose selfishness infects the Athenian population like the plague. In Bloedow’s 
words, “Alcibiades, the cynical, Sophistic imperialist, ruthlessly exploited the 
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now essentially irrational Athenians, and this for purely selfish personal reasons 
as he pursued his grand scheme of conquering the entire Western Mediterra-
nean” (1990: 17). Not only this: when prevented from indulging his megaloma-
nia by a more circumspect citizenry, Alcibiades turned against his people and 
enthusiastically contributed to their humiliating defeat (Bedford and Workman 
2001: 65-7). On this reading, a more despicable statesman than Alcibiades is 
hard to find in the History. 
While perhaps attractive for those who, like us, “live in an age of excess” (ibid: 
67), such a view is nevertheless a symptom of the times. For while Thucydides 
may have found Alcibiades the man quite unbearable, the author of the History 
was explicitly fond of Alcibiades the general. While Thucydides may well have 
considered Nicias to have been a decent and honourable human being, who did 
nothing to deserve the wretched fate that befell him, in his account of the leader-
ship of the Sicilian expedition Thucydides quite clearly paints Nicias as a fai-
lure. That this escapes the notice of so many is due to the fact that they tend to 
confuse two things: “Thucydides’ likes and dislikes of persons (Pericles, Nicias, 
Cleon, and Alcibiades) and his approval or disapproval of their policies, from 
time to time, which do not necessarily coincide” (Gomme 1951: 79, original 
emphasis). 
To substantiate this claim, we must consider Nicias’ misjudgements during his 
debate with Alcibiades – misjudgements that are often whitewashed by many 
scholars. Lebow, for example, simply notes that while “Nicias does his best to 
dissuade the assembly [from undertaking the expedition] … by insisting on a 
much larger force and more extensive provisions than were originally planned 
… [yet t]o his surprise, the more he demands, the more eager the assembly be-
comes to support the expedition, convinced that a force of such magnitude will 
be invincible” (2003: 135) Bedford and Workman, taking another tack, argue 
that it is not Nicias’ speech but the excessive hope whipped up by Alcibiades 
that lures the Athenians on; there is, on their reading, nothing wrong with Ni-
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cias’ conduct, and consequently they exculpate him from any involvement in the 
disaster (2001: 67).  
But on closer inspection of the text, it is clearly the apparent certainty of suc-
cess, inadvertently fostered by Nicias, which is responsible for stoking the lust 
of the Athenians. It is only as a result of his second speech that “eros fell upon 
all alike to sail” (6.24.3). As Clifford Orwin writes, “Nicias, who in his first 
speech has called on his fellow elders to join him in quenching the mad longing 
for the absent (i.e. for conquests) (dyserotes aponton) of their younger compa-
triots succeeds only in fanning the eros of all, young and old alike. Persuading 
them that the augmented project is perfectly safe, he renders it perfectly irresis-
tible” (1994: 12). 
While Nicias obviously does not intend this outcome, he is nevertheless respon-
sible for it; aware of both his inadequacies as a speaker and of the intransigent 
nature of his countrymen, he presses on with his agenda regardless. Rather than 
“accepting the character and institutions which [the Athenians] actually have, 
even if they are not perfect, and … living as nearly as possible in accordance 
with them” – as does Alcibiades (6.18.7) – Nicias prefers to dupe his people 
with what Thucydides himself calls an “exaggerated estimate of the forces re-
quired” (6.19.2). This Nicias does on the misplaced assumption that the Athe-
nians may, in the end, be quite like him (that is, reserved and cautious); when 
faced with the enormity of the expedition the Athenians will, he hopes, come to 
recognise the extreme danger of betting almost all of their remaining resources 
on this one ‘roll of the dice.’  
“I wish,” Nicias says, “to make myself independent of fortune before sailing, 
and when I do sail, to be as safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to 
be surest for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedi-
tion” (6.23.3). With these words, Nicias deliberately distorts the facts of the mat-
ter in a way that wrongly presents the chances of success as high. As Pericles in 
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his Funeral Oration made clear, and as Nicias should well know, the Athenians 
are prone to great gambles and feats of daring when the odds seem good. Here, 
with their “great preponderance of strength over those against whom they set 
out” (6.31.6), they believe they can afford to indulge in “the expensive commo-
dity of hope,” as the delegates to Melos would have put it (5.103.1; cf. Kallet 
2001; Stahl 2003). Nicias completely ignores the advice of Diodotus, the guar-
dian of Mytilene, who had argued that “it is impossible to prevent, and only 
great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once set its 
mind upon” (Thuc. 3.45.7), and unsurprisingly his plan backfires. As a result, 
the stakes are raised much higher than they had been in the plan of Alcibiades 
(the original expedition was just over half of what Nicias argues is necessary). 
Although they do not quite realise it, the Athenians are really now playing for 
keeps. 
There are other elements of Thucydides’ description of Nicias’ leadership that 
portray his command of the expedition in an unmistakably negative light. For 
example, at the beginning of the expedition, Nicias fails to act decisively, des-
pite possessing ample resources, momentum and the element of surprise; indeed, 
he hardly employs the navy, the most effective arm of Athens’ military, offensi-
vely at all. By the time of his dispatch to Athens in 414 describing the situation 
in Sicily, Nicias has led the expeditionary force into extraordinary difficulties. 
“Though solely responsible for the gigantism of the expedition,” Orwin 
concludes, “Nicias never turns it to strategic advantage: without pressing for 
great gains, he exposes Athens to terrible losses” (1994: 121). 
Westlake, too, is damning in his critique of Nicias on this point. The wording of 
Nicias’s dispatch to the Athenians, Westlake points out, was chosen by Thucy-
dides, “and it is scarcely credible that even Nicias can in the original report have 
allowed his incapacity to stand out so glaringly” (1941: 62). And it is true that in 
the letter (as it stands in the History), Nicias admits to having surrendered the 
initiative to the enemy, to being unable to check subordination among his troops, 
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and to have kept his own safety as his top priority throughout. Westlake 
concludes, not without reason, that although the mention of Nicias’s illness may 
arouse sympathy in readers, his own defence of his actions is “so lame as almost 
to amount to self-condemnation” (ibid.). 
Thucydides’ implicit criticism does not stop there. He represents Nicias’ deci-
sion to remain in Sicily rather than return to Athens without the blessing of the 
assembly (Nicias and Demosthenes fear that they will face the charge of treason 
on their arrival back home) as effectively sealing the fate of the Athenian sol-
diers under his command; in this case, Nicias’ personal interest in dying with 
dignity, at the hands of the enemy, rather than dishonourably at the hands of 
Athenian demagogues who would wrongly try him for treason, self-consciously 
trumps his understanding of the public interest to return home.  By making the 
decision to stay in Sicily Nicias commits an act that is effectively tantamount to 
treason (Orwin 1994: 122).  
To add insult to injury, when it becomes clear that evacuation is the only practi-
cal course of action, Nicias delays decampment twice: once, somewhat unders-
tandably, on account of information coming from Syracusan traitors inside the 
city, and again on the advice of soothsayers who are frightened by a lunar 
eclipse and the portent they believe it holds. These delays do untold damage to 
the expeditionary force, whose position, Thucydides says, is “getting worse eve-
ry day in every respect” (7.50); the Syracusans and Peloponnesians get wind of 
the holdups, and become “more determined than ever not to relax their pressure 
on the Athenians” (7.51.1). In an ensuing naval engagement, Eurymedon, one of 
the expedition’s three commanders, is killed, and a great number of ships are 
destroyed as well.  
Thucydides clearly holds Nicias responsible for these terrible losses, and re-
monstrates with him for being “over-inclined to divination” (7.49-50). His mis-
takes are represented as being very much like those of the Melians, who “miss 
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the chance of saving themselves in a human and practical way, and, when every 
clear and distinct hope has left them in their adversity, turn to what is blind and 
vague, to prophecies and oracles and such things which by encouraging hope 
lead to ruin” (5.103). Ironically, then, Nicias’ faith in the power of the divine 
and the possibility of salvation by the gods leads to his own destruction and, 
more importantly, to the deaths of untold numbers of his men. 
Westlake concludes that Thucydides “ignores opportunities of defending or 
commending Nicias, attributes discreditable motives to him, disagrees with his 
opinions, underlines his strategic errors, and, most frequently of all, allows his 
failures to speak for themselves … There is no reason to believe that he rescued 
Nicias from the stigma of being held responsible for the ultimate loss of the 
Athenian empire” (1941: 64). While this conclusion may be formulated with 
exaggerated bluntness (indeed, when read in the light of 7.86.5, it is not entirely 
true), it is nevertheless not without its merits. Thucydides clearly believes that 
Nicias’s tenure as commander produced some horrific consequences for the city.  
It seems fair to conclude that the picture painted by those who would hold Alci-
biades solely responsible for the Athenian tragedy is one-dimensional and does 
not acknowledge the nuance of Thucydides’ representation of the facts. The text 
itself seems to implicate in the disaster both Alcibiades and Nicias, as well as 
the politics they stand for. As Tim Rood puts it, Nicias’ “counter-productive cau-
tion is in harmony with his insight into Athens’ best policy” while “the man 
with some feeling for the grandeur of the Periclean legacy, Alcibiades, is reck-
less in his application of it” (1998: 163; cf. Liebeschuetz 1968; Dover 1981).   9
Neither of the two men, however, can really be blamed through faults of their 
own for the Athenian tragedy. The catastrophe, as Thucydides presents it, is ra-
 Lebow recognises this argument and claims to agree with it, but the general thrust of his lat9 -
er argument clearly exculpates Nicias and condemns Alcibiades for the disaster in Sicily 
(2003: 265-6).
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ther a sum of ‘follies,’ which, when balanced by one another, cannot be truly 
considered flaws. If the two men had been united at the helm of the state the city 
could have made best use of what each of them had to offer (6.17.1). At least, 
this is what Alcibiades alone suggests and (apparently) desires, and Thucydides 
seems to support him: in his authorial voice he states that the persecution of Al-
cibiades was disastrous, and – as we shall see in the third section of this chapter 
– that the factional division of which it was symptom and cause effectively 
doomed the expedition (6.15.4, 6.28.2-29.3). 
In sum, Nicias and Alcibiades are for the city of Athens at once both boon and 
bane: each man embodies, but also lacks, certain aspects of Pericles’ ideal citi-
zen. Returning briefly to the Funeral Oration helps to illuminate the point: 
The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our 
ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over 
each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neigh-
bour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious 
looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no real 
harm. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us 
lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching 
us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard 
the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the sta-
tute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet 
cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace (2.37.2-3). 
Nicias, a god-fearing man, obeyed without question all the laws – both unwrit-
ten and inscribed – but in his speech he gives Alcibiades many an injurious look 
and encourages the demos to do so, too. Alcibiades, who had neither compunc-
tion nor right to judge the private lives of others, still really ought to have exer-
cised more restraint in his own. Had he done so, he would have engendered fe-
wer suspicions about his political intentions and would thereby have blunted the 
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hostility of people like Nicias against him (Woodhead 1970; Palmer 1982). As 
Thucydides says, the position of power that Alcibiades held among the people 
“led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear and in the 
rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the 
Athenian state” (6.15.3). 
But although Thucydides’ words here regarding Alcibiades are undoubtedly cri-
tical, they are not the final ones on the matter (nor are they the ones that really 
matter in regards to it). Immediately after this statement Thucydides tells us that 
the lawlessness Alcibiades showed in regards to his own body and private life, 
together with the extent of his ambition, “gave offence to everyone, and caused 
them before long to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin 
the city” (6.15.4; emphasis added). In other words, in Thucydides’ opinion it 
was in fact the Athenians – not Alcibiades – who finally brought the city to ruin, 
by rejecting Alcibiades’ leadership (as Nicias had urged them to do) and placing 
it in the hands of others (2.65.11). 
That factionalism – or more precisely, the stasis (‘civil discord/war’) that factio-
nalism leads to – is considered a terrible evil by Thucydides is clearly demons-
trated by his famed analysis of civil war in Corcyra (cf. Fuks 1971; Edmunds 
1975; Orwin 1988; Price 2001). More importantly for our consideration of the 
tragedy of Athens, however, it is also demonstrated by his representation of the 
Herms’ mutilation and the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries and how 
these events affected the war. It is to this affair that our discussion now turns.  
(ii) The Problem of Stasis and Erotic Citizenship 
One morning, as the Athenians prepared for the expedition to Sicily, the city 
woke to find many of its stone herm figures defaced and disfigured. The herms 
were simple stone figures that depicted a man with a beard and a phallus; meant 
to ward off evil spirits, promote fertility and act as boundary markers, they 
usually stood at the entrance to private houses or temples. The herm’s phallus 
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was an important political symbol insofar as it was representative of “the citi-
zen’s power, not in a violent sense, but with the implications of potency, authori-
ty and maturity – and, crucially, the successful reproduction of the democratic 
citizen body” (Quinn 2007: 90).  
Herms were religiously associated with the god Hermes, from whom their name 
was derived, but also with Dionysus (Goldman 1942). Given that Hermes (be-
sides his function as the guide of the dead in Hades) was the patron god of tra-
vellers, and that Dionysus was tied up with the city’s drama, the unity of the ci-
tizenry, and political and personal fertility, it is hardly surprising that the people 
took up the matter with deadly seriousness; “it was thought to be ominous for 
the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset 
the democracy” (6.27.3).  
In the ensuing investigation into the affair, some individuals came forward – not 
with information about the mutilation of the herms, but with news of yet more 
iconoclasm and profanation – this time of the Eleusinian mysteries – in which 
Alcibiades was implicated (6.61.1; cf. McGlew 1999). The city’s politics fell 
into a swamp of distrust and rumour, in which the personal vendettas spawned 
by private interests were free to surface. Thus the enemies of Alcibiades mani-
pulated these outbursts of “hubris,” Thucydides says, because Alcibiades “stood 
in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people” and be-
cause they believed that, if Alcibiades were gone, they would become “first 
men” at Athens (6.28.1-2; cf. 2.65.11). These unnamed demagogues therefore 
“magnified the matter” and lumped the mutilation of the Herms and the desecra-
tion of the mysteries together in an attempt to provide evidence of a plot to over-
throw the democracy, behind which stood Alcibiades. The alleged proofs for this 
conspiracy, Thucydides tells us, were “the general and undemocratic license of 
[Alcibiades’ private] life and habits” (6.28.2). 
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Alcibiades denied the charges, and offered to stand trial before leaving for Sici-
ly. Quite reasonably he argued that, were he found guilty of plotting revolution, 
he could be executed immediately; were he innocent, he could lead the expedi-
tion without having to worry about such grave charges hanging over his head. 
He pointed out to the people how unwise and divisive it would be to send him 
off with such a state of uncertainty surrounding him. But his enemies feared the 
sympathy of the army for him (on account of his success in recruiting allies for 
the expedition), and distrusted the people’s resolve in his presence; hence they 
did their utmost to postpone the decision to try him, and via subterfuge succee-
ded in doing so. Once Alcibiades was safely away in Sicily, Thucydides tells us, 
these unnamed parties dredged up enough slander to convince the people to 
form an absentee trial in which to try him; unsurprisingly, the demos was then 
led to the conclusion that Alcibiades was guilty and should be executed. Alci-
biades got wind of this judgement and managed to escape to Sparta. The assis-
tance he then offered his city’s enemies was instrumental in bringing about the 
ruin of the Sicilian expedition and contributed to the eventual downfall of 
Athens.  
Thucydides’ account makes clear the inevitability of the Athenians’ dislike of 
Alcibiades on account of his general licentiousness. But did Thucydides believe 
that the charge of aiming at tyranny, levelled by Alcibiades’ enemies and later 
by the people against him, was justified? Was Alcibiades a closet despot, cu-
ckolding his countrymen with fine phrases and foreign adventures? Or was he, 
rather, the closest thing to Pericles’ heir, a true democratic patriot in the vein of 
Aristogeiton? Or was he something else entirely? The question of Alcibiades’ 
relationship to Pericles’ vision of citizenship is an important one, because an 
adequate understanding of it helps to appreciate some aspects of the tragic in 
Thucydides’ work that have not yet been explored. As such, it helps to unders-
tand the History and the political philosophy that undergirds it more fully. 
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The ‘tyrant-city’ certainly met a dismal fate in Sicily – but what are we to make 
of Alcibiades, on whose personality the city at the point of its momentous deci-
sion is apparently modelled? Alcibiades ended his life – at an advanced middle 
age – in self-imposed exile, but this was not before he had returned to a hero’s 
welcome in the city whose imperial power he had helped to destroy. Indeed, Al-
cibiades lived a great deal longer and a great deal happier than many of his fel-
low countrymen – particularly those who had followed him to Sicily. While per-
haps not finally triumphant, the fate of Alcibiades is anything but tragic.  
Given this, how can it be that the primary lesson of Thucydides’ History – ‘the 
tremendous moral which his countrymen delighted to read in the Persians of 
Aeschylus’ – does not have as its primary example the one Athenian who, appa-
rently, most acts like a tyrant in his personal life and who is most responsible for 
the slaughter at Melos, the attempted rape of Sicily, and the terrible suffering of 
the Athenians themselves? If Alcibiades as a character is representative of 
Athens’ ‘fatal flaw,’ why is he not utterly ruined like the rest of his countrymen? 
Why is he not ignominiously butchered in Sicily, like the pious Nicias? Why are 
the charges of impiety levelled against him at Athens eventually dismissed, his 
treachery forgiven, and his property restored to him? Perhaps it was simply that 
facts got in the way – or perhaps there is more to the Athenian tragedy than just 
Alcibiades’ eros. 
It is true that the picture of Alcibiades that has been handed down by antiquity 
conforms to the democratic portrait of the tyrant. Plutarch tells us that, when 
going off to the war in Sicily, Alcibiades took with him a shield depicting a 
thunderbolt-wielding Eros, and a number of modern scholars have argued that 
this image may have already been used by dramatists at the time of Alcibiades 
(Plut. Alc. 16.1-18; cf. Littman 1970). He was alleged to have imprisoned a fa-
mous painter in his house and forced him to paint it, struck a rival for having 
bested him in a dramatic competition, and won his Olympic victories in a cha-
riot stolen from a fellow Athenian. Most importantly for our purposes, however, 
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is the fact that of all the outrages and extravagances that had Alcibiades accosted 
as undemocratic and lawless, “pride of place goes to his sex life” (Wohl 2002: 
352). 
Alcibiades was, by all accounts, a man of many charms; and he was attractive 
not only to women but also to a great number of adult men in a way that, for 
them, he really should not have been. As a youth, he boasted among his count-
less suitors Socrates, a man whose appreciation of beauty was renowned; much 
later Plutarch compared him to Helen, the loveliest of all the Greeks (and, it 
hardly needs mention, a woman). Stories of the throngs of women he had de-
bauched, of his perverse activity as an eromenos, of the cold-hearted mistreat-
ment of his lovers and later of his wife, and of his strange habits as a cross-dres-
ser, were plentiful and malicious in their detail. While the details of these stories 
were, of course, mostly gossip, there can be no doubt that Alcibiades’ sexual ap-
petite was enormous and that he tended to stray from the Athenian masculine 
ideal in many important respects.  
Thucydides’ narrative reinforces the traditional portrayal of Alcibiades as a ty-
rannical kind of man (Seager 1967). Thucydides appears to suggest that Alci-
biades’ indulgence of a litany of luxuries (especially horseracing) in his private 
life, together with his twin goals of conquering Sicily and Carthage, smacked of 
tyrannical ambition (6.15.2-4). Nicias accuses Alcibiades and his sycophants of 
suffering from a “sick desire” (dyserotas, 6.13.1) for far-off things, an accusa-
tion with which the historian himself seems to agree (6.24.3). Indeed, in his own 
words, Thucydides describes Alcibiades’ bodily perversity and lawlessness (pa-
ranomia, 6.15.4).  
The Athenians, in Thucydides’ narrative, clearly recognise Alcibiades’ capacity 
for dominance and his desire for power over them, of which Alcibiades himself 
dispels any doubts. In his speech before the Assembly regarding Sicily, he re-
counts his incredible triumph and expenditure of wealth at the Olympia and de-
!166
clares that “it is not unfair that he who prides himself on his position [as he 
does] should refuse to be upon an equality with the rest” (6.16.4). Unless they 
want to befriend all the unfortunate wretches of the world and wallow with them 
their misery, Alcibiades says, on like principle the Athenians must extinguish 
their envy of him and “accept the insolence of prosperity” (6.16.4). 
This is precisely what the Athenians do. The Athenians agree with Alcibiades’ 
argument that they cannot rest content with the empire; they agree that they 
must scheme to extend it. They accept, that is, the insolence of empire. By doing 
so, they place themselves above not only barbarians but above all other Greeks 
as well. Thus the men of Athens, at this point, become just like Alcibiades; un-
surprisingly, an “eros” for the expedition then “fell upon them” (eros enepese, 
6.24.3) all alike. It is important to note that the phrase Thucydides uses here is 
identical to the one used by Aeschylus’s Clytaemnestra to describe the eros for 
pillaging Troy that would “fall upon” Agamemnon and his army (eros empiptei, 
Ag. 341). 
Many commentators have seen in Thucydides’ portrayal of the expedition – and 
Alcibiades’ leadership of it –the tyrannical culmination of Athens’ political de-
velopment (e.g. Cornford 1965; Hunter 1973; Forde 1989; Gribble 2012). And, 
indeed, the aim of the enterprise as Alcibiades conceives of it – complete maste-
ry of the Hellenic world through the subjugation of Sicily, Carthage, Italy and 
after these the Peloponnese – is very much in line with Pericles’ earlier admis-
sion that the city’s empire is held like a tyranny, and certainly of a piece with 
Cleon’s claim that Athens’ arche does not differ from despotism at all. But the 
issue of whether this eros for empire is purely tyrannical is in fact not so clearly 
cut.  
Echoing Pericles, Alcibiades tells the Athenians that if they cease to rule others, 
they will be in danger of being ruled themselves (6.18.3). The surest way for 
them to lose control of their empire, he suggests, is to turn away from “the good 
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old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their united coun-
sels brought our affairs to their present height” (6.18.6). The most effective way 
to keep the empire is to act as Alcibiades himself does and every Athenian’s an-
cestors did – in accordance with their nature, however imperfect it may be. Ac-
cordingly, the expedition that Alcibiades helps to lead “is the most erotic, as it is 
the most daring, of all Athenian undertakings during the war” (Forde 1989: 58).  
As we have seen in previous chapters, eros and tolma are fundamental characte-
ristics of democratic Athens; these qualities are what defined the tyrannicides, 
Themistocles and the Athenians he led in their earliest drive to empire, and Per-
icles’ ‘lovers of the city.’ In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that 
Alcibiades’ imperial vision, though certainly not the same as Pericles’ vision, 
was nevertheless organically related to it. 
The Athenians are, as they mostly were under Pericles, fully united in their 
cause: “an eros fell upon all alike for the enterprise” (6.24.3, emphasis added). 
As the fleet readied to sail, the entire city came out to watch “a sight worth loo-
king at and passing all belief” (6.30.2-31.1). The expedition became just as “fa-
mous for its wonderful daring” as for its magnificent splendour, insofar as it was 
“the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most ambitious in 
its objectives considering the resources of those who undertook it” (6.31.6): 
The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains 
and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, 
and providing empty ships, sixty warships and forty transports, and 
manning these with the best crews obtainable; while the captains 
gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to the … 
crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon figureheads and 
equipment, and one and all making the most exertions to enable 
their own ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile, the 
land forces had been picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied 
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with each other in paying great attention to their arms and personal 
accoutrements (6.31.3). 
As Ludwig points out, this intense rivalry between the citizens, which sees them 
“preening themselves on the beauty of their equipment and their heraldry, and 
fighting over such items …, resembles the actions of rival lovers vying for the 
hand of a beloved. Like the suitors whom Pericles exhorted them to become, the 
Athenians pay their courtship to the city of Athens, wooing her in a contest in 
which each strives to show himself worthiest” (2002: 167). When seen from this 
perspective, the Sicilian expedition seems a decidedly democratic adventure, 
and an organic if monstrous outgrowth of Pericles’ vision of erotic citizenship, 
insofar as it was here that it was first fully realised. It should be noted, further-
more, that it was in this context that Thucydides tells us that Alcibiades’ 
“conduct of the war was as good as could be desired” (6.15.4). 
This is not to downplay the tyrannical attributes of either Alcibiades or the Sici-
lian expedition (although as the discussion in Chapter Four made clear, the rela-
tion of empire, tyranny and democracy is ambiguous even in the context of Per-
icles’ Funeral Oration). Furthermore, there is a clear difference between the mi-
litary strategies of Pericles and Alcibiades; the one is conservative and manage-
rial, the other radical and expansionist. Nevertheless, there are unmistakable 
continuities between them, and both are in the final analysis whole-heartedly 
committed to empire.  
How, then, are we to understand Alcibiades? Given the importance of his role in 
what is, undoubtedly, one of the most tragic elements of the History – the des-
truction of the Athenian forces in Sicily – it is important to answer the question 
that hangs over this character in Thucydides’ text. We can best do so by turning 
to Thucydides’ digressions on the Pisistratid tyranny and the cult of the tyranni-
cide, for “the entire Sicilian Expedition and its terrible ending, with its eros and 
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daring, its fears, its hopes, and its misapprehensions, all find their analogues in 
the excursus on Harmodius and Aristogeiton” (Meyer 2008: 25).  
Thucydides believes that “the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of 
the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own his-
tory” (6.54.1). The common citizens of Athens “had heard how oppressive the 
tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become before it ended, and further that 
the tyranny had been put down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by 
the Spartans, and so were always in fear and took everything 
suspiciously” (6.53.3). However, most people did not care for the details of the 
case: “so little pains [did] the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting 
readily the first story that [came] to hand” (1.20.3). They did not know that Hip-
parchus was not, in fact, the reigning tyrant at the time of his death; that Hippar-
chus had been unwilling to use violence to win Harmodius; that in general the 
tyranny had been beneficial to Athens, and the tyrants’ rule not hard to bear; that 
the murder of Hipparchus, rather than being an act of self-sacrifice and public 
spirit, was the outcome of a private love-affair; that the murder did not end the 
tyranny; or that the later (and much harsher) tyranny of Hippias was a direct re-
sult of the reckless daring of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Palmer 1982: 115).  
This ignorance had dire consequences. Having taken the tyrannicide myth to 
heart, and fancying themselves erotic patriots like Aristogeiton (6.53.3, 6.60.1), 
members of the demos began to grow “uneasy and suspicious of the persons 
charged in the affair of the Mysteries, … convinced that all that had taken place 
was part of an oligarchic and monarchical conspiracy” (6.60.4). Many of the 
best citizens were thrown into prison on the word of the lowest men, and, their 
guilt unproven, were put to death. This was done merely to satisfy the people’s 
need to hold somebody accountable. Besides these gross injustices, “everywhere 
something was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades” (6.61.4). His ene-
mies succeeded in setting up a show trial, which he was unsurprisingly found 
guilty; he was then recalled from Sicily to face execution. But, as we know, he 
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escaped to Sparta and helped orchestrate the complete destruction of his city’s 
fortunes in Sicily. 
As many scholars have noted, there are clear parallels between Thucydides’ ac-
count of the treatment of Alcibiades by the demos and the digression on the ty-
rannicides that immediately follows it. Just as the attempt of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton to rid Athens of the Pisistratids was born from private motives, so 
too were the motives of Alcibiades’ persecutors anything public. Aristogeiton, 
feeling a lover’s rage, plotted to destroy the tyranny so as to keep a hold of his 
beloved Harmodius; similarly, the anti-Alcibiades faction wanted to be rid of 
their rival so as to be first men in his place. Furthermore, in both instances the 
demos also suffers: “in the first because the tyranny becomes oppressive, Hip-
pias fearing for his life; in the second because Alcibiades, the one Athenian lea-
der who could have won this war for them, if any man could, defects from their 
side, fearing for his life” (Palmer 1982: 115). Because of their ignorance about 
the tyrannicides, Thucydides suggests, the Athenians repeated the same mistakes 
that Harmodius and Aristogeiton had made almost one hundred years before. 
This is not the end of the matter, however. Although, as we have seen, there are 
parallels between the demos and the tyrannicides and between Alcibiades and 
the Pisistratids which Thucydides sees emerging as a result of the people’s mi-
sunderstanding of their myth, there is also a transformation in the demos that 
does not fit neatly into the tyrannicide-tyrant schema. As Elizabeth Meyer ob-
serves: “that the Athenians, inspired by their distorted memories of Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton, are now inflicting violence on their own citizens is ... a signifi-
cant and terrible shift, and associates the frenzied activities of 415 and those 
who inflict them with other observations about Athens and tyranny” (2008: 23). 
In other words, the demos is tyrant now not only over the empire but also over 
the city itself; Athenian citizens have become tyrannical over their fellow Athe-
nian citizens. The ideology of eros and power that Pericles tried so hard to direct 
outwards has finally come home to roost; the demos which, while maintaining a 
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tyranny abroad, had nevertheless remained free from fear and plots in their daily 
relations with each other (3.37.1-2), has been fundamentally transformed. This, I 
want to argue, is what Thucydides considered the deepest layer of the Athenian 
tragedy.  
Section Two: The Tragedy of Athens 
(i) Alcibiades and Dionysus 
I do not dispute the general view that the destruction of the Sicilian expedition is 
the culmination of a tragic movement in Thucyides’ text. Indeed, this interpreta-
tion is crucial to my own understanding of ‘the Athenian tragedy.’ However, I 
differ from most other commentators by locating the root cause of the Athenian 
tragedy not so much in the outcome of the debate between Nicias and Alci-
biades, that is, in the decision to sail, but in the actions that occurred thereafter, 
in response to the mutilation of the Herms and the affair of the Mysteries. Ano-
ther point of difference is the fact that the primary reference point for my discus-
sion of the link between Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative and tragedy lies not so 
much in any individual play or dramatist as in the mythical context of the Great 
Dionysia – that is, in tragedy’s ritual performance.  
We recall from Chapter Three the foundational myth of the City Dioynsia, in 
which the Athenians, as punishment for their rejection of Dionysus, are all alike 
afflicted by a terrible genital disease that can be cured only by proper worship of 
the god. This worship was reflected in the various rituals that took place before 
the Great Dionysia, as well as in the dramas themselves. The phalli that the 
Athenians constructed in the god’s worship, the scholiast to Aristophanes’ Ar-
chanians tells us, were ‘a memorial to their own suffering.’ This suffering was 
of an erotic sort; it was the effect of ithyphallicism. In effect, it was a kind of 
erotic madness that was both caused and cured by Dionysus. 
There can be no doubt that Thucydides, who was exiled from Athens at some 
point during his fourth decade of life, was intimately familiar with this myth and 
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with the rituals that re-enacted it at the Great Dionysia; he likely would have at-
tended this festival a dozen times or more. He probably even participated in it. I 
submit that it is in this fact that we can possibly ascertain another influence of 
tragedy – or more precisely, of tragedy’s ritual performance – on Thucydides 
that has not yet been considered in the literature. 
When we compare the aetiological myth of the Dionysia with Thucydides’ por-
trayal of the Athenians’ treatment of Alcibiades and his revenge upon them, a 
number of striking similarities emerge. The first of these is the resemblances that 
Dionysus and Alcibiades share in terms of their position vis-a-vis the democratic 
citizen ideal; both figures deliberately undermine what it means to be ‘normal,’ 
and have the ability and will to do so. The second is the Athenians’ misunders-
tanding of the power that both Dionysus and Alcibiades have to benefit the city; 
the Athenian rejection of the difference inherent to both figures leads to persecu-
tion of these characters and, eventually, to catastrophic punishment of the 
wrongdoers. The third parallel is the infliction of erotic madness upon the 
people; in the case of Dionysus, a dangerous ithyphallicism, and in the case of 
Alcibiades, what Nicias calls a dyserotas for that which is absent.  
It is true that the eros Alcibiades inspires in his fellow citizens is not in any way 
described as a punishment of them. But it is represented as an eros that only Al-
cibiades, if anyone at all, can hope to manage; for Thucydides clearly suggests 
that it was only by including Alcibiades in the Sicilian expedition that the enter-
prise had any chance of succeeding. It was only when the Athenians turn against 
Alcibiades and rejected his leadership (which incites his defection to Sparta) that 
the eros for far off things truly became diseased, driving as it did the Athenians 
into the web that Alcibiades wove for them.   
As we have seen, what characterises the Athenian demos most of all in both the 
affair of the Herms and in the tyrannicide myth is their ignorance. The Athenians 
do not really know the precise circumstances of these actions, and in their igno-
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rance they are led, by a false understanding of their own history, to “magnify the 
matter” of the Herms and to wrongly see in it a dangerous tyrannical plot. They 
rely on the word of the basest men of society to imprison and execute the best of 
them. Not least, they accuse of sedition the one man who, of all men, can best 
lead them to victory and condemn him to death. As punishment, Alcibiades al-
lies his formidable talent and knowledge with the military might of his city’s 
enemies. Ignorance, then, is as much the undoing of the Athenians as is their 
eros.  
This, I believe, is the crux of the Athenian tragedy. Like Oedipus, the Athenians 
are imprisoned by their own ignorance; attempting to break out of it, they en-
tangle themselves in the fate they are fleeing from: tyranny and treachery. What 
makes this tragedy ironic is the fact that every year, at the Great Dionysia, the 
Athenians warned themselves of their propensity to misapprehend, misjudge and 
mistreat the Other who is at the same time ‘one of us.’ The quintessential figure 
in this regard was, of course, Dionysus. At the same time as they reminded 
themselves of the error of their ancestors, the Athenians expressed their worship 
of the god and, as such, their ability to transcend their mythical ignorance; the 
potency of Dionysus, closely bound up with his ability to intoxicate and fertilise, 
was celebrated and incorporated into the city. When it came to practical politics, 
however, the Athenians forgot the fundamental lessons of the Dionysia’s aetio-
logical myth: that the Other can be a source of great potency and creativity as 
much as it can emasculate and destroy. Ignorance of this fact will bring ruin. 
By no means am I suggesting that Thucydides is here covertly divinising Alci-
biades as Dionysus in some proto-Hellenistic manner, or indulging in occult fan-
tasy like Herodotus. Religious themes and issues are, generally, conspicuously 
absent in the History; Thucydides seems to make a point of excluding or other-
wise minimising their importance (Hornblower 1992). What I am arguing is that 
it is possible that the structure and language of Thucydides’ digression on the 
tyrannicides and his discussion of the fates of Alcibiades and the Sicilian expe-
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dition may have as an implicit ‘tragic’ model not any particular play but the ae-
tiological myth of the Dionysia. For there are, as we have seen, some remarkable 
similarities between the myth and Thucydides’ portrayal of the Athenians’ 
treatment of Alcibiades and the subsequent disaster that befalls them in Sicily. 
Apart from the structural similarities I have demonstrated above, one other line 
of argument lends some support for this interpretation. As was demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, comparing Euripides and Thucydides can help to shed light 
on the question as to how faithfully Thucydides represents the political thinking 
of the years about which he writes; if the ideas or arguments that Thucydides as-
cribes to his speakers appear likewise in Euripides’ tragedies, then “it is ap-
parent, not of course that the speakers actually used those ideas and arguments, 
but that they could have” (Finley 1938: 25). Employing a similar logic, we 
might argue that if it can be shown that political leaders (ideally Alcibiades) 
were associated or, better yet, explicitly identified with Dionysus (ideally in a 
dramatic context) in Thucydides’ lifetime, and in particular at the time at which 
he composed the History (that is, in his primary discursive setting), then it is ap-
parent, not that Thucydides did see and develop parallels between the Athenians’ 
mythical treatment of Dionysus and their actual treatment of Alcibiades, but that 
he very well could have. 
Sure enough, political leaders were identified with Dionysus in dramatic 
contexts. Pericles, for instance, was satirically identified with Dionysus in a co-
medy (Dionysalexandros) by Cratinus. It is likely that Thucydides watched this 
drama, as he was in Athens and a full citizen at the time it was produced. In a 
similar fashion, Plato would identify Alcibiades with Dionysus in the Sympo-
sium, which the philosopher sets – with deliberate historical inaccuracy (Sider 
1980) – in the shadow of the Great Dionysia of 415, just before the Sicilian ex-
pedition was set to sail.  
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But Pericles is not Alcibiades, a comedy is not a tragedy, and the Symposium 
was written long after Thucydides’ death. Nevertheless, we find in Aristo-
phanes’ Frogs a more appropriate example which carries on the tradition of Cra-
tinus and anticipates Plato’s dialogue. The Frogs was produced in 405 and, on 
account of its popularity, restaged again in 404 – the year in which Thucydides 
returned to Athens to compose some, if not all, of his History. In this play, Alci-
biades and Dionysus, while not explicitly identified, are clearly linked in a way 
that carries overtly tragic and didactic resonances (Arnott 1991). 
The Frogs has as its plot the voyage of Dionysus into the underworld for the ex-
press purpose of resurrecting one tragic poet “to give the state some useful ad-
vice, so that the city might be saved” (1418-22). The immediate political 
concern of Dionysus in the Frogs is the problem of Alcibiades; he is, at the point 
in time at which the play was performed, in voluntary exile. Athens, we are told, 
is in a quandary, because she “longs for [Alcibiades], but hates him, and yet she 
wants him back” (1425).  
As part of the contest of wisdom, the poets are asked what they think of the mat-
ter: should Alcibiades be encouraged to return to Athens, or should he not? Like 
Nicias in the Sicilian Debate, Euripides replies that he would give no quarter to 
a man who is so quick to do such damage; this sort of citizen seeks profit only 
for himself and is no good to the city. Aeschylus, in his turn, responds with the 
Alcibidean advice that “while it is best not to rear a lion in the city, if one is 
brought up its ways should be accommodated” (1431-32). After some delibera-
tion on this advice and the poetic merits of both tragedians, the “soul” (psyche, 
1469) of Dionysus decides the agon in favour of Aeschylus. The chorus then de-
clares that intelligence (sunesin) “is refined not by Socrates … casting aside the 
pursuits of the Muses, and neglecting what’s most important in the art of trage-
dy” (1491-95), and the play ends with the dead Aeschylus being escorted into 
the world of life and light amidst a choral procession made up of Eleusinian 
mystics; “grant bon voyage to the departing poet, as he rises to the light, ye spi-
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rits of the earth,” they sing, “and grant to the city good ideas for great 
gains” (1528-30).  
The words Aristophanes puts in the mouths of his characters are noteworthy. In 
the context of the play, the metaphor of Alcibiades as a lion is clearly a nod to-
ward Aeschylus’s Agamemnon. As we have seen in our discussion of the Ores-
teia in Chapter Three, the metaphor of the lion-cub that grows into a beast is ap-
plied both to Helen (a beautiful traitor who sparks a massive military conflagra-
tion) and to Clytemnestra (a tyrannical usurper). Thucydides confirms that these 
are qualities that the general public at Athens ascribed to Alcibiades. 
One of the Oresteia’s underlying political themes is the idea that tyrannical po-
wer, or, more properly, the eros that drives men toward power is, while no doubt 
a very volatile thing, nevertheless a potentially great benefit to the polis when 
yoked to its chariot of war. This theme is expressed most fully in the Eumenides; 
in that play, we recall, the Furies – whose immense power both for good and for 
ill is fully recognised by Athena – are ‘seduced’ into accepting a place of great 
honour beneath the city from where they will shower their erotically-charged 
blessings on the city, granting it fertility and potency.  
It is therefore fitting that the setting and phrases of the Frogs’ finale “recall the 
great conclusion of the Eumenides – that glorious triumph of a united 
Athens” (Sheppard and Verrall 1910: 258). This was the dream before Sicily, the 
dream of Pericles; and Aristophanes appears to suggest that it has not been com-
pletely broken, despite all the bloodshed and intrigue. Athens, should it accept 
the advice of ‘Aeschylus,’ can find its feet again by recalling Alcibiades and 
granting him the honour he deserves; for all his excesses, this ‘lion’ must be ac-
commodated and rehabilitated. The inclusion of the Eleusinian mystics supports 
this claim. 
The Frogs is, in sum, a dramatic engagement with the very same events that 
Thucydides describes in Book Six, and it is an important reference point because 
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of this. It helps us to answer the question as to what the Athenians were talking 
and thinking about at the time Thucydides composed (all or part of) his History. 
It also tells us a great deal about the ways in which many Athenians considered 
drama and Dionysus to be relevant to interpreting the disaster that unfolded in 
Sicily. Debates concerning the didactic value of tragedy, the role of Alcibiades in 
the Sicilian debacle and in Athenian politics in general, and the strategy the 
community had to choose in its prosecution of the war are at the heart of the 
Frogs, which was, we should remember, a play that won first prize and was re-
produced due to popular demand. For two years running, Aristophanes had the 
entire city talking about these issues, and he did so through the figure of Diony-
sus, the play’s literal and metaphorical guide to the underworld and to the tragic 
past – both of the genre and of the city. The posthumous performance in 404 of 
Euripides’ Bacchae – which dramatises the disastrous attempt of the tyrant king 
Pentheus to capture and control Dionysus – can only have added further gravity 
to Aristophanes’ efforts.  
In sum, Aristophanes and the Athenians he entertained believed that the figure of 
Dionysus could serve as an appropriate tool with which to investigate and eva-
luate the legacy of Alcibiades. Thucydides, who had participated over a dozen 
times in the Dionysia, likely watched the plays of Cratinus, and returned to write 
his History in the intellectual milieu in which the Frogs (and the Bacchae) 
would win first prize, likely agreed with his countrymen. Perhaps he even wat-
ched the second performance of Aristophanes’ play and heartily applauded. 
Book Eight of the History, at least, suggests that he would have sympathised 
with the political message of the Frogs. When discussing the destruction of de-
mocracy and the rule of the Five Thousand, Thucydides writes that 
During the first period the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best go-
vernment they ever had, at least in my time, for there was a measured 
blending of the few and the many, and this it was that first caused the city 
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to recover from the wretched plight into which it had fallen. And they vo-
ted to recall Alcibiades (8.97.2-3, emphasis added) ... 
As Michael Palmer points out, Thucydides makes a very significant admission 
here: the government of the Five Thousand, he says, was the best he had ever 
seen – which means that it was better than even that of the much vaunted Per-
icles. Following the blending of the many and the few, the first act that puts 
Athens back on its feet is the recall of Alcibiades. The last significant event of 
the History is the Athenian victory (orchestrated by Alcibiades) at Cynomessa. 
Thus it seems that:    
The last book of Thucydides appears to point to a regime in Athens that 
can accommodate the ambitions of both Alcibiades and the Athenians, 
that is, a regime in which Alcibiades holds sway in the city in the position 
of predominance once held by Pericles. In practical terms, this means the 
measured tyranny of Alcibiades. Thucydides’ ‘digression’ on the Athe-
nian tyrants teaches us that he does not share the Athenians’ extreme fear 
of tyranny. His blame of the Athenian demos’ treatment of its greatest be-
nefactor consists in his demonstration that there is such a thing as a mode-
rate and beneficent tyrant. (Palmer 1982: 121) 
The hypothesis advanced here – that the most tragic element of the History rests 
upon the model of the Dionysia’s aetiological myth – does not find explicit evi-
dence in Thucydides’ text, it is true. However, there is no explicit evidence in 
Thucydides for any other hypothesis regarding the influence of tragedy on his 
History, either. Thucydides never references tragedy as a genre nor mentions 
any specific tragic poets or dramas. He does not even discuss the Dionysia, 
which, with its various rituals (such as the display of allied tribute), had overt 
and very relevant political import. Even the strongest of cases for reading the 
History as a ‘tragic text’ have therefore been forced to rely on nothing more than 
similarities in language, themes and structure between the History and proper 
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tragedies. As we have seen, it is on exactly such similarities that my own argu-
ment rests. Thus, while the final judgement of this analysis may be ‘Not Proven’ 
– as it must also be of all others – I trust that the argument I have made will at 
least stimulate thought and inspire some reappraisal of common assumptions 
about how Thucydides was influenced by the performance of tragedy in Athens.  
Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that in Thucydides’ narration of the Sicilian dis-
aster, all alike are afflicted by human weakness; the follies of Alcibiades, Nicias 
and the Athenian demos combine with unfortunate circumstance to produce 
complete disaster. Nevertheless, Thucydides concludes that Alcibiades was in-
deed Athens’ best hope in the war, and he suggests that by following unnamed 
demagogues in recalling Alcibiades for trial on trumped up charges the Atheni-
ans proved themselves their own arch-enemies; were it not for their historical 
blindness regarding the tyrannicides and consequent harshness, the Athenian 
tragedy may have been avoided. 
I differ from most other interpreters of the Athenian tragedy by locating the root 
cause of it not so much in the outcome of the debate between Nicias and Alcibi-
ades (that is, in the decision to sail) but in the actions that occurred thereafter, in 
response to the mutilation of the Herms and the affair of the Mysteries. Another 
point of difference is the fact that the primary reference point for my discussion 
of the link between Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative and tragedy lies not so much 
in any individual play or dramatist as in the mythical context of the Great Di-
onysia – that is, in tragedy’s ritual performance. I argued that the figure of Di-
onysus – and the rituals performed in his honour – may well have provided 
Thucydides (and certainly his countrymen) a tragic framework for analysing the 




I begin this chapter by examining the ‘erotic theory of politics’ expounded by 
Diodotus in the Mytilenean Debate. In his speech, Diodotus presents a theory of 
human nature in which eros is the primary driver of political action. Diodotus 
claims that all men are led on by eros, hope and chance in the pursuit of political 
power; poverty and wealth aggravate this problem, insofar as the one gives rise 
to the reckless audacity inspired by necessity and the other to the greedy ambi-
tion born of insolence. Due to the vicissitudes of fate, these erotic adventures 
end all too often in disaster, and there is no law that will prevent this from hap-
pening. This is especially so in the case of communities and states, because 
when acting together individuals magnify their own capabilities and thereby 
tend to act irrationally. Following this, I argue that there are a number of points 
in the History which suggest that Thucydides implicitly lends authorial support 
to Diodotus’s erotic theory of politics. Indeed, as I will endeavour to show, Dio-
dotus’s theory plays a central role in the tragic structure underlying the History 
as whole. This chapter will conclude the second part of this dissertation. 
  
The Mytilene Debate 
(i) ‘A Massive Moral Hangover’ 
In the summer of 428 B.C., one of the last non-tributary members of the Delian 
League, the city-state of Mytilene, staged an uprising against its ally, Athens, in 
an attempt to secure its independence from what was seen as this city’s increa-
singly tyrannical leadership of the Hellenes. The Mytilenean elite had conside-
red breaking away from the League even before the outbreak of the Peloponne-
sian War. Without Spartan assistance, however, which was not forthcoming at 
the time, its members felt the city would be unable to rebel successfully. In 428, 
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however, with Athens at war with Spartans and devastated by the plague, Myti-
lene’s leaders felt that the moment for rebellion was as ripe as it would ever be. 
Unfortunately for the oligarchy, news of their preparations – the construction of 
fortifications, stockpiling of grain, recruitment of archers and so on – soon rea-
ched the Athenians, who equipped a fleet to sail to Lesbos to investigate the re-
ports. Despite being caught off-guard and underprepared by the Athenians, the 
Mytileneans refused to heed the Athenian order to halt the construction of their 
walls. Fighting consequently ensued, and hostilities continued into the summer 
of 427. By this time, Mytilenean resistance had been weakened by the Athenian 
blockade, the success of which was in large measure due to the fact that the na-
val support promised to the Mytileneans by the Spartans had failed to materia-
lise. In a desperate bid to stave off defeat, Salaethus, the Spartan commander, 
equipped the Mytilenean demos with heavy armour. Unexpectedly, the starving 
people immediately turned against the oligarchy and demanded from them what 
was left of the city’s grain with the threat that if their terms were not met they 
would surrender the city to the Athenians. The oligarchs, aware of the danger 
they would fall into if left out of negotiations (and aware of their inability to 
prevent such an outcome from eventually coming to pass), rejected the people’s 
demands and themselves surrendered Mytilene to the enemy. 
The capitulation of the city was not well received in Athens. From the stand-
point of the Athenians, the rebellion was entirely unjustified. Compared to most 
other states in the Delian League the liberties enjoyed by Mytilene were great; 
they had kept their freedom, their independence, and even their navy. The Myti-
leneans themselves, in their appeal to the Spartans for assistance, are well aware 
that their actions smack of treason; it is the rule, they say, that those who aban-
don their allies in war despite “having been honoured by them in times of peace” 
are “thought less well of, through being considered traitors to their 
friends” (3.9.3). As such, they require substantial argument (much of which is 
based on Spartan interests) to win their hosts’ support.  
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The Athenians, then, clearly had good reason to be upset. It was in this atmos-
phere of moral outrage that they executed Salaethus and immediately afterwards 
dispatched a trireme to the defeated city with the orders that the remaining men 
of Mytilene be put to death and their wives and children taken off to be sold into 
slavery. The day following these events, however, saw the Athenians suffering 
from what Clifford Orwin has memorably dubbed a “massive moral 
hangover” (Orwin 1984: 486). Nervous and unsure of a resolution they had 
made in haste and anger, the Athenians reassembled in the morning to reflect on 
what Thucydides calls “the horrid cruelty of a decree which condemned a whole 
city to the fate merited only by the guilty” (3.36.4). During this meeting, Thucy-
dides tells us, a large number of Athenian citizens came forward and called for 
the decree in question to be rescinded. Many citizens opposed them, arguing that 
the decision was the right one and should remain in force. Of this plethora of 
speeches, Thucydides makes us privy to only two.  
The first of these constitutes the initial appearance in the History of “the most 
violent man at Athens” (3.36.6), the infamous demagogue Cleon. Cleon begins 
by berating the Athenians and their democracy for their weakness and irresolu-
tion. He argues that the original decree, which he himself had carried, should be 
upheld; it reflects poorly on his audience that they have lost their nerve, and tel-
ling of their existence as democrats. The men of Athens, he says, seem not to 
have noticed that their empire is a “tyranny” and their subjects “disaffected 
conspirators” (3.37.2), whose obedience is guaranteed not by compassion or 
concessions but by brute strength and severity.  
Cleon’s argument in favour of the motion has two prongs, which concern justice 
on the one hand and interest on the other. Regarding justice, Cleon says that al-
though he can make allowance “for those who revolt because they cannot bear 
our empire, or who have been forced to do so by the enemy” (3.39.2), the Myti-
leneans have obviously long premeditated their rebellion and undertook it vo-
luntarily. This they did despite having enjoyed liberty and independence. As 
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such, Cleon seems to suggest, the Mytileneans have acted like aspiring tyrants: 
“their own prosperity could not dissuade them from affronting danger,” he says, 
“and full of hopes beyond their power though not beyond their ambition, they 
declared war and made their decision to prefer might to right, their attack being 
determined not by provocation but by the moment which seemed 
propitious” (3.39.3).   
Moreover, they did all this at a time when Athens was afflicted by the plague 
and at war with Sparta; the Mytileneans had turned on their long-time allies at a 
time when the Athenians were most in need of friends. “Mercy,” Cleon 
concludes, “is only for unwilling offenders” (3.40.2), and this is one thing the 
Mytileneans are not. In their case, justice necessitates requiting harm for harm 
and given that “no one state has ever injured [the Athenians] as much as Myti-
lene” (3.39.1), the harm the Athenians should inflict on them must be very great.  
Regarding interest, Cleon argues that if the Athenians refuse to punish all of the 
Mytileneans (not only the aristocrats in power but also the demos which, he 
claims, assisted the oligarchs) rebellion will cover the empire like a rash. Only 
the fear of death, he says, can hope to keep the many opponents of tyranny in 
check – for who will not revolt if the cost of treachery is small and its potential 
gains so great? The security of Athens’ empire demands that Mytilene be des-
troyed; continued insurrection, which is inevitable if the Athenians recant, will 
risk the lives of Athenian men and will present a constant drain on the city’s re-
sources.  
Cleon concludes that his advised course of action, though admittedly bloody and 
pitiless, will achieve both justice and advantage for the people of Athens. Com-
passion, pity, and sentimentality have no place in the hearts of men who run an 
empire, he says, and this is doubly true when such men have been gravely 
wronged by insolent subjects. Ruling the empire requires Athens to “teach the 
other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death” (3.40.7); 
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justice, in any case, demands that the Athenians punish the Mytileneans as they 
deserve. 
The second speech in the Mytilene debate is made by a man named Diodotus, a 
mysterious character who vanishes from the pages of the History almost as soon 
as he appears. Diodotus, who Thucydides tells us has in the previous assembly 
spoken most strongly against putting the Mytileneans to death, begins his speech 
in a manner similar to Cleon. Diodotus, too, berates the Athenians – albeit not 
for their weakness or irresolution, as does Cleon, but rather for allowing the 
standard of their political debate to deteriorate to the point that, on account of 
the Athenians’ suspicion of and harshness towards their advisors, “plain good 
advice has come to be no less suspect than bad, and the advocate of the most 
monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than 
the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed” (3.43.2).  
Diodotus, then, effectively admits that (all or some of) what he is about to say is 
not true. On first glance, his comments are perplexing, leading as they do to a 
paradox similar to Epimenides’, the famous Cretan who claimed that all men 
from Crete were liars (Debnar 2000). But as many scholars have noted, Diodo-
tus’s statements are important to understanding why he later claims to reject the 
issue of justice and ostensibly restricts his argument to expediency alone. As we 
shall see, despite his professed anti-moralism and for all of his insistence on 
Athenian self-interest, Diodotus is “secretly in sympathy with the claims of jus-
tice” (Connor 1987b: 85; cf. Strauss 1964; Van der Ben 1987; Orwin 1994; 
Mara 2001).  Dike, in fact, is on closer inspection as important to his speech as 
is expediency: perhaps the greatest distortion of truth that Diodotus feeds to his 
suspicious countrymen is the idea that the question under consideration “is not 
justice, but how to make the Mytileneans useful to Athens” (3.44.4). 
Although Cleon’s argument may appear more just than his own, Diodotus says, 
Cleon’s estimation of Athens’ interest is gravely mistaken. This is because his 
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confidence in the deterrent value of capital punishment is ill-placed. It is clear 
that communities throughout the ages have applied the death penalty to various 
offences (including offences much less grave than the one now under considera-
tion) in order to deter potential criminals, but they have always failed to eradi-
cate crime completely. This is because of the fact that so long as poverty exists 
to give men the tolma born of necessity and conditions of plenty (exousia) exist 
to encourage in them ambitious greed (pleonexia) that is the product of inso-
lence (phronemati) and hubris, so too will the impulse to drive men into danger 
never be found wanting. This pattern of behaviour, Diodotus says, applies to 
states as much as it does to individuals (3.45.4).  
Diodotus then goes on to argue that eros and hope (elpis) – “the one leading and 
the other following, the one conceiving the attempt [epiboulen], the other sug-
gesting the facility of succeeding” – are the primary causes of ruin in human 
life. Although both eros and hope may be invisible to the naked eye, he adds, 
they are “far stronger than the dangers that are seen” (3.45.5). The influence of 
fortune (tuche) in human affairs adds to the danger of these two invisible phe-
nomena; on account of the favours it sometimes grants to men, fortune tends to 
compound the delusions that hope and eros foster. Those graced by fate tend to 
venture into gambles for which they are woefully unprepared, on the irrespon-
sible and usually incorrect belief that their run of good luck will continue unaba-
ted. Diodotus concludes that ultimately “it is impossible to prevent, and only 
great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once set its 
mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever.” This is 
especially so in the case of communities, he says, “because the stakes played for 
are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each man 
irrationally [alogismos] magnifies his own capacity” (3.45.6-7). When men are 
acting politically – when they are fighting for power – ruin is well-nigh inevi-
table. 
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When dealing with freemen, Diodotus says, the right course of action is not to 
punish them rigorously when they do rebel, but to watch them rigorously before 
they rise. Better yet, he adds, one should prevent their ever entertaining the idea 
of doing so – but if it is inevitable, once the insurrection has been suppressed it 
is best to make as few responsible for it as possible. This is because any rebel-
lious subject city which knows that complete annihilation is the price it must 
pay, should its grab at freedom meet with failure, will fight long and hard for 
victory. Should the Athenians make of the Mytilenean case an example for the 
other allies, Diodotus says, attempts at rebellion in the future will be much better 
prepared, and will last much longer, than has so far been the case.  
In sum, given that the death penalty has consistently failed to deter crime in the 
past, it is unlikely to do so in the future and it follows that by maintaining a less 
severe policy against rebels, the inevitable resistance that the Athenians will en-
counter whilst ruling will be easier and less wasteful to overcome. In light of 
this, Diodotus implores his fellow Athenians to refuse to “sit as strict judges of 
the offenders to our own prejudice” and instead try to see how “by moderate 
chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing 
powers of our dependencies” (3.46.4). 
While Diodotus’s theory of man may perhaps stand as a profession of his un-
derstanding of the truth, his claim that good policy is necessarily based in naked 
self-interest does not. The concern for justice that undergirds Diodotus’s entire 
speech and which he claims to banish from it clearly shines through in his claim 
that the people of Mytiline “had nothing to do with the revolt.” If the common 
people of Mytilene are executed, he says, the Athenians will not only alienate 
the demos in other cities by unfairly applying “the same punishment to those 
who are guilty and those who are not,” but will also “commit the crime of 
killing [their] benefactors” (3.47.3). In the last analysis, therefore, Diodotus 
suggests that if the Athenians are to follow through with the decree that 
condemned Mytilene to oblivion they will prove themselves not only very un-
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wise but also deeply unjust. Should they follow his advice, both justice and ex-
pediency are achievable.   
(ii) Diodotus and/as Thucydides 
H. P. Stahl writes that many scholars “have long realized that it is the historian’s 
own voice which speaks through this analysis” (2003: 119; cf. Wasserman 1956; 
de Romilly 1963; Saxonhouse 1996; Ludwig 2003; Zumbrunnen 2008; Lugin-
bill 2011). This claim – that Thucydides ‘speaks through’ one or another of the 
characters in the History – is a rather problematic one; technically, Thucydides 
speaks through all of the figures in his work by the very fact that he is its author 
(cf. 1.22.1). The question of Thucydides’ relation to his speakers – and in parti-
cular the extent to which he expresses his own thoughts through them – is a dif-
ficult one, and an enormous amount of ink has been spilled in trying to answer 
it.  
Nevertheless, Thucydides certainly sympathised with some historical persons 
and disliked others, and he very likely constructed his portraits of their charac-
ters accordingly. Pericles is a prime example of the first category of men (cf. 
2.65), Cleon quite clearly of the second (cf. 3.36.6). The qualities ascribed to 
and descriptions of these two men leave no doubt as to Thucydides’ personal es-
timation of them.  
The standing of Diodotus in this respect is more difficult to gauge, however, in-
sofar as the lack of interest Thucydides shows in this character and his refusal to 
detail the man’s personal circumstances do not give the reader many leads to fol-
low. Such neglect, when considered alongside the similarities in outlook that 
exist between Diodotus and Thucydides, have led many commentators to 
conclude that Diodotus is probably a figment of the historian’s imagination and 
as such not more than a mouthpiece for him.  
There are, in fact, a number of points in the History which suggest that Thucy-
dides does indeed lend his authorial support to Diodotus’s erotic theory of poli-
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tics. However implicit such support may be, Diodotus’s theory forms the back-
bone of the tragic narrative underlying the History as whole.  
If we are to find proof for this claim we must read Diodotus’s speech alongside 
the other sections of the History in which eros appears. These parallels, linking 
as they do the authorial voice and structuring hand of the History with the theo-
retical core of Diodotus’s speech, provide sufficient evidence for the claim that 
Thucydides and Diodotus are, as it were, ‘on the same page’ in terms of their 
political theory. Book Two, with its Periclean speeches on eros and power and 
honour, is the best place to begin this task.  
Book Two covers the first years of the war and is the location of two of Pericles’ 
three speeches in the History. The first of these two speeches, the Funeral Ora-
tion, is a focal point of the History as a whole; this speech expresses “an entire 
philosophy of government” and offers a “rare declaration of the principles on 
which Athenian democracy was built” (Harris 1992: 157-8). As we have seen in 
depth in Chapter Four, these principles include a model of citizenship which re-
quires war and the death of citizens in battle to reach its full potential. Imperial 
belligerence – the erotics of empire – is seeded in the Athenian constitution, 
despite the fact that the democracy’s self-image is founded on the relationship of 
the tyrannicides and their hostility to tyrannical aggression. 
The second speech of Pericles in Book Two is in large part an attempt on his be-
half to lift the spirits of his countrymen, downcast as they are by the plague and 
lack of progress in the war against Sparta, and to direct their sights once more to 
the glorious heights of empire. He warns them not to place their trust in 
“hope” (elpidi, 2.62.5) during their struggle against the Spartans but to guide 
themselves in their actions by an accurate assessment of their resources. He 
counsels them against retreating from the empire, because what they now hold is 
“like a tyranny” (2.63.2) which it would be dangerous to relinquish. However, 
even if in the end they are forced to yield, the hatred that they have incurred by 
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their rule will be short-lived, and it is in any case worth incurring for those “hi-
ghest goods” (2.64.5) – power and the eternal glory it promises – that are won 
through struggle and war. Pericles’ final wish is precisely that the men of Athens 
remember that their city has the greatest name in all the world “because she has 
never bent before disaster, because she has expended more life and effort in war 
than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any seen be-
fore” (2.64.3).  
Before moving on to relate the events of the third year of the war (which 
conclude Book Two) Thucydides takes a moment to analyse the leadership and 
legacy of Pericles. He remarks that it was under Pericles’ rule that Athens was at 
her greatest, and that when the war broke out Pericles had rightly estimated the 
power of the city. Pericles’ advice to the Athenians – to wait patiently, to take 
care of the navy, and to refrain from new conquests and new dangers – promised 
them a favourable outcome in the war. After Pericles’ death, however, the Athe-
nians undertook to do the very opposite of what Pericles had advised; they allo-
wed “private ambitions and private interests, in matters quite foreign to the war, 
to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies – projects 
whose success would conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, 
and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war” (2.65.7). 
These projects expressly included the Sicilian Expedition, although Thucydides 
tells us that this failed “not so much through a miscalculation of the power of 
those against whom it was sent” as through a fault in those who sent it. The de-
cision of second-rate politicians to “occupy themselves with private cabals for 
the leadership of the demos, by which they not only paralysed operations in the 
field, but also first introduced civil discord at home,” set the city on a path that 
inevitably ended in civil war and final defeat (2.65.11-12). In short, Pericles’ 
successors ignored his advice, abused his legacy and led the city into ruin. 
With their references to the trial of Alcibiades, the Sicilian disaster, and the self-
destruction of Athens through individual interest and factional conflict – taking 
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us out of the immediate context of the narrative to appreciate the broader mea-
nings of the History – Thucydides’ comments spring to mind when, in Book 
Three, the demagogue Cleon is introduced to us as “the most violent man at 
Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with demos” (3.36.6). The 
speeches of Books Two and Three are in fact implicitly threaded together, as 
Cleon’s numerous echoes of Pericles clearly suggest (Cairns 1982; Andrews 
2000). For our purposes, the most important of these echoes occurs at 3.37.2: 
here, Cleon claims that the Athenian empire is no longer merely like a tyranny, 
as Pericles had earlier suggested it was; it is now a despot dyed in the wool. 
Apart from this occasion there are a number of other instances in which Cleon 
seems to ape the former “first citizen” (2.65.9) of Athens by taking up “for 
violent and (in comparison) trivial purposes the phrases in which Pericles had 
displayed his steady insight into the larger issues” (Andrewes 1962: 75).  
In both structure and detail, the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus also correspond 
closely with each other (Debnar 2000: 162). In light of this it seems logical to 
take Diodotus’s assertion that men can feel and act erotically in relation to abs-
tractions such as eleutheria or arche as something more than random or coinci-
dental rhetoric. It is, rather, better understood as a pointed and deliberate res-
ponse to Cleon’s reference to Pericles and his legacy. Thus Patrick Coby notes 
that “Diodotus imagines a city, the ‘first city,’ where citizens prove themselves 
better speakers not by frightening their opponents but by employing fair argu-
ments (2.42.5)” (1991: 90; cf. Harris 2013). But Pericles’ encomium of demo-
cracy is not all there is to it; Diodotus finds in the Funeral Oration, and in parti-
cular the vision of erotic citizenship at its heart, a set of rhetorical tools with 
which he can build the bridge of empathy necessary to prevent the Athenians 
from destroying the Mytileneans – a move he believes will prove a terrible mis-
take. 
Diodotus, to recall, effectively argues that it is not “the ambition which belongs 
to hubris and pride” that animates the rebels, as Cleon maintains is the case (cf. 
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3.39.3), but rather “the daring [tolma] of necessity” (3.45.4). Free men, he says, 
naturally chafe under the rule of a tyrant. They rebel not for personal profit, but 
as a result of their eros for liberty, and because they are acting all together in 
their pursuit of freedom – which alongside rule is any free man’s highest good – 
each individual has irrationally magnified his own capacity and hence made 
himself prone to poor judgment. The men of Mytilene, that is, were clearly 
bound to make mistakes such as the deluded venture under consideration. Given 
that such behaviour is the common lot of man, however, the Mytileneans should 
not be too harshly judged. Such mercy is especially appropriate in light of the 
compulsory nature of their love (Coby 1991). 
Like Cleon, then, Diodotus echoes the great statesman of Book Two. Rule and 
the liberty with which it is equated are, as we have noted above, counted by Per-
icles as the ‘highest goods’ for free men (2.64.5), and in his view they are won 
not by stay-at-homes but by those who are prepared to dare and fight for them. 
Tolma is constantly associated with the Athenians in the History; daring not only 
defines Athens in the eyes of friends and foes alike but plays an important role 
in Pericles’ vision of the city, particularly as it relates to the central place that 
Aristogeiton occupies in democratic ideology. With his references to eros, tolma 
and the ranking of freedom and rule (two sides of the same coin of power) as the 
‘highest goods’ for communities of men, Diodotus clearly harks back to Per-
icles. 
His reason for doing so, however, is diametrically opposed to Cleon’s. Diodotus 
seeks to tap into the democratic sympathies of his countrymen – whose collec-
tive self-image is shaped by Pericles’ vision of citizenship and the tyrannicide 
legend on which it is implicitly modelled – and hopes that by doing so he will 
lead them back toward these ideals instead of further away from them. By subtly 
reminding his audience of Pericles’ ideal ‘lover of the city’ and its historical an-
tecedents whilst making the case that other men (such as the Mytileneans) are 
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also capable of loving freedom, that is, Diodotus discretely builds a bridge of 
empathy between the men of Athens and their defeated subjects.  
The logic of Diodotus’s theory suggests that Cleon’s tyrannical lust to destroy 
Mytilene is as primitively stupid as, for instance, a careless beekeeper smashing 
in a beehive after having been stung whilst harvesting its honey; the unfortunate 
bees, whose self-defence ultimately destroys them, are acting only as they and 
any other creature in their position would. Diodotus reminds the Athenians that, 
in their fallibility and in their aspirations, the Mytileneans are their mirror 
image, encourages in them a degree of sympathy for their weaker foes’ resolve: 
Diodotus extends the compulsion to transgress to a tendency to err 
in so doing. This he does the more easily in that one Greek word 
which denotes both (hamartanein, “to miss one’s mark,” “to go as-
tray”). He thus deepens the pathos of the lot of failed rebels, whose 
errors are to be assigned to the same overwhelming forces that 
drove them to venture. And by casting blundering not as contemp-
tible but as a symptom of universal human weakness, he forges yet 
another bond of sympathy between victor and vanquished. (Orwin 
1987: 155-6; cf. Ahrensdorf 1997: 252; Rose 1999: 23)  
The outcome of the Mytilene Debate suggests that in these regards Diodotus’s 
strategy was a successful one. But, as Diodotus himself briefly admits, there are 
innocent and there are guilty men at Mytilene; not all the Mytileneans were, so 
to speak, busy bees, and not all of them deserved clemency. Some of them de-
served to die. Diodotus’s strategy, in other words, was based on deception. 
What, then, are we to make of Diodotus’s erotic theory of politics?  Is it simply 
a rhetorical sleight of hand, designed to trick his audience into softening their 
rage and accepting the claims of justice? Is it thus confined to the circumstances 
in which it appears? Or does it find wider application in the History, this self-
proclaimed possession for all time? These questions are very important, espe-
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cially insofar as it is Diodotus – not Thucydides in his authorial voice – who 
presents this theoretical model. Nowhere does Thucydides himself explicitly 
state that the motivation of the Mytilenean rebellion was an eros for freedom. 
Despite this fact, it can well be argued that, to the extent he was permitted by 
circumstances, Thucydides constructed the speeches and authorial narrative of 
the Mytilene episode so as to anticipate his later digression on the tyrannicides 
and, as such, at least some of the Mytileneans can be considered to have been 
motivated by a political eros (Scanlon 1987; Hunter 1974).  
Consider, for example, that in their address to the Spartans the Mytileneans 
make much of the fear they felt as the liberty of the other allies was being en-
croached upon, particularly as the Athenians “daily grew more 
powerful” (3.11.1; cf. 3.10.4). The Mytileneans argue that their freedom would 
have inevitably been violently wrested from them by Athens at some point in the 
future and, given this, that their deeds should be considered self-defence (3.12.2-
3). This claim, however, is conspicuously undercut by the Mytileneans’ own as-
sertion that if they “were left independent, it was only because [the Athenians] 
thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by specious language and by 
the paths of policy than by those of force” (3.11.3). The envoys to Sparta 
conclude their appeal by noting that the Mytilenean revolt “has taken place pre-
maturely and without preparation – a fact which makes it all the more in-
cumbent on you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy relief” (3.13.2; 
cf. 3.2.1) – and by asking that the Spartans “respect the hopes placed in [them] 
by the Greeks and Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very sup-
pliants” (3.14.1). But the Spartan assistance that was then promised the Mytile-
neans failed to materialise, and the city’s leaders eventually felt compelled to 
surrender – not because they were decisively defeated, however, but because 
they feared that the recently armed demos would “themselves come to terms 
with the Athenians and deliver up the city” (3.27.3; cf. Gills 1971). As we have 
seen, after all this has occurred, at the debate in the Athenian ekklesia the empire 
!194
is semantically framed as a “tyranny” whose subjects, being “disaffected conspi-
rators,” form “daring” and “irrational” “plots” that are born from an “eros” for 
“freedom” which are led on to ruin by “hope” (3.37.2, 39.3, 40.5, 45.4-7).  
For all of these passages there exist striking parallels in the tyrannicide digres-
sion. Following Hipparchus’s advances toward Harmodius, Thucydides tells us, 
Aristogeiton became “afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might take Harmo-
dius by force, and formed a plot … for overthrowing the tyranny” (6.54.3). But 
Hipparchus, we are told, was unwilling to use force to regain his honour, prefer-
ring instead to insult Harmodius in a more subtle and indirect manner (e.g. by 
humiliating his sister). Aristogeiton and Harmodius were nevertheless outraged 
and together with a few other men set about their conspiracy in earnest. Thucy-
dides tells us that “the conspirators were not many, for better security, besides 
which they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the 
example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to recover their 
freedom” (6.56.3). On the day of the planned assassination, however, Aristogei-
ton and Harmodius saw one of their accomplices “talking familiarly” with Hip-
pias, and concluded that they had been betrayed (6.57.2). In a fit of rage, spar-
ked in the one case by eros and in the other by insult, they fell upon Hipparchus 
and struck him dead, thereby delivering themselves into the hands of Hippias’s 
bodyguards. Upon hearing of the murder, Hippias cleverly gathered the crowd 
before him and, by picking out those men who carried daggers, sorted the guilty 
from the innocent and dispatched them there and then.   
The rebellion at Mytilene, as Thucydides presents it through his speeches, is a 
turning point in the history of Athenian empire. Cleon and Diodotus both agree 
that the debate will decide policy regarding rebellion for the indefinite future, 
and it must be partly for this reason that their appeals to the assembly are so em-
phatic and the entire episode so dramatic (cf. Cogan 1981). But it is also highly 
important insofar as it proves the point of Diodotus’s theory. Thucydides clearly 
suggests that, following the Mytilene revolt, the Athenian demos found itself in 
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a position curiously similar to that of Hippias in the immediate aftermath of his 
brother’s murder. What is to be done, the demos is forced to ask itself, with these 
“disaffected conspirators,” driven to irrational daring by their eros for liberty? 
What about the rest of the men subject to their rule? What is the best way to ma-
nage the “tyranny” from this point onward?  
Diodotus urges on the Athenians a policy in accord with Thucydides’ nostalgic 
picture of the general characteristics of the Pisistratid tyrants: moderate, frugal 
with force, and sympathetic to the needs and feelings of their subjects (especial-
ly those under the spell of the eros). The course of action that Cleon advises in 
response to the questions facing the demos, on the other hand, is essentially the 
same as that which Hippias would later choose for himself: indiscriminate vio-
lence which on the surface appears to thin the ranks of enemies and terrify eve-
ryone else into submission. Hippias came to believe that he might remain safe 
by condemning an entire city – his own – to suffer a fury that rightfully should 
have struck only those it did on the day of his brother’s murder. As we know, 
and as Thucydides knew, this strategy failed him; because of his harshness, the 
tyrant transformed a relatively small body of discontent into a revolting hydra 
that eventually made his position at Athens untenable. This was, clearly, the out-
come Thucydides – like Diodotus – foresaw for the Athenian empire had 
Cleon’s “savage” and “excessive” decree been enacted, condemning as it would 
“a whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty” (3.36.4). History, as Diodo-
tus presents it, repeats itself – and wise men, if they are aware of this, can some-
times steer clear of the ruin that the fatal combination of eros, hope and chance 
so often creates.  
But, as I have hinted at, such foresight relies on a privileged understanding of 
Athens’ past. As Thucydides says in both the Archeology and the tyrannicide 
digression, the Athenians in general are ignorant of their own history regarding 
the Pisistratids. The Athenians do not know, for instance, that the savagery of the 
tyrants was an effect not of the nature of the tyrants’ rule but of the “irrational 
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daring” of Hipparchus’s murderers. They do not know that the so-called tyranni-
cides were not rescuing the demos from slavery, but were in fact guilty of dis-
turbing a peace that was salutary to all (or at least most) of their fellow citizens. 
It follows that they themselves could not have fully appreciated the parallels to 
the tyrannicides that are inherent to Diodotus’s speech; the Athenians cannot 
clearly see that they can avoid the fate of Hippias by choosing to execute the 
small number of men who are actually responsible for the revolt at Mytilene. 
They cannot see that both justice and expediency are possible outcomes of the 
debate, because in their rage they cannot help believing that, like “themselves 
and Harmodius,” the entire community at Mytilene is ‘guilty’ of (attempted) ty-
rannicide. To point out the Athenians’ blindness in this regard is politically im-
possible, however, because it contradicts everything they believe in. As such, the 
people must be lied to if good advice is to actually reach them. This is precisely 
what Diodotus does.  
We may presume that he does so with Thucydides’ blessing. As we have seen, 
Diodotus clearly shares Thucydides’ privileged knowledge of Athenian history. 
His remarks on the plight of the responsible public servant subject to the whims 
and scapegoating techniques of an unstable and suspicious popular assembly, 
furthermore, recall Thucydides’ own experience in the aftermath of Amphipolis 
(Wasserman 1956). Like Thucydides, Diodotus is deeply hostile to Cleon and 
explicitly agrees with the authorial judgment regarding the decree for which this 
violent demagogue agitates. This affinity is underlined by the dramatic ending of 
the Mytilenaean episode; the close of the debate is structured by Thucydides in a 
way that can only reinforce in the reader a feeling of revulsion towards the mo-
ral turpitude that Diodotus accuses Cleon of indulging and which his speech ap-
pears to prevent. As Connor notes, “[t]he race of the two ships, the vivid narra-
tion, the hair-breadth escape, the sudden change to the present tense, draw us 
into the action and direct our responses. We want the Mytileneans to be spared 
and are relieved when the second trireme brings the reprieve” (Connor 1987b). 
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Thucydides, in short, sympathised with the figure of Diodotus and fully agreed 
with the statements that he put into his mouth.  
A case can certainly be made against this argument. Diodotus, as we know, se-
riously misrepresents the facts of the revolt at Mytilene. His claims that the 
people of Mytilene “had nothing to do with the revolt” and, “as soon as they had 
arms, of their own motion surrendered the town” (3.47.3) to the Athenians are 
belied by Thucydides narrative at 3.27.3, which makes clear that “it was hunger, 
not loyalty, that moved the demos, and it was the oligarchic government, not the 
demos, that handed over the city” (Cawkwell 1997: 97). Some scholars reasona-
bly argue that it seems unlikely that Thucydides – who placed so much emphasis 
on ascertaining the facts and finding the truth – would have looked kindly upon 
a man who distorts the truth in this way and believes that lies are an essential 
component of policy-making (Quinn 1964: 258; Connor 1987b: 88; Shanske 
2007: 52-5). While Thucydides perhaps sympathised with Diodotus’ opposition 
to Cleon, the argument goes, he likely disassociated himself from the deceptive 
speech with which Diodotus managed to achieve this. Thucydides’ portrait of 
this character, it follows, represents less the author’s own philosophical convic-
tions regarding human nature than it does provide a natural complement to the 
image of Cleon in Thucydides’ illustration of the general deterioration in Athe-
nian leadership consequent to the death of Pericles (de Wet 1963; MacLeod 
1978; Mara 2001; Shanske 2007).  
This criticism is not without merit, but it is not compelling. The dishonesty that 
characterises Diodototus’s speech is, as the speaker complains, necessitated by 
the fear that the demos inspires in its advisors (cf. 8.1.1). While fear is hardly 
characteristic of nobility – a quality that is very important to Thucydides – it 
should be remembered here that even Nicias, who is described by Thucydides as 
having “devoted the whole of his life to the study and practice of 
virtue” (7.86.5), felt compelled to do wrong on account of his fear of the 
people’s wrath. As we have seen in Chapter Five, Nicias lied to his countrymen 
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during the Sicilian Debate, and by doing so unintentionally stoked their eros for 
an expedition which he foresaw would be disastrous. Much more seriously than 
this, however, he doomed the venture to failure by remaining in Sicily on ac-
count of his fear that, if he returned to Athens empty-handed, he would be 
condemned him to death by a vindictive demos. In comparison, Diodotus’s dis-
honesty is self-confessed and publicly acknowledged as such; Diodotus warns 
his audience that not all that follows in his speech to them will be truthful, and 
this encourages them to think very carefully about what he says to them.  
We cannot know if the outcome of the Sicilian Debate would have been any dif-
ferent had Nicias prefaced his speech with similar remarks, but it is clear that 
Thucydides does not hold Nicias’s dishonesty too strongly against him. “Of all 
the Hellenes in my time,” Thucydides says, it was Nicias who “least deserved to 
come to so miserable an end” (7.86.5). In the History, men who in all other res-
pects are decent people can be forced by circumstances into doing wrong. As his 
comments on the fate of Nicias attest, in Thucydides’ view such misfortune does 
not necessarily count against such men. The fact that Diodotus lies to the demos 
in order to convince them of the expediency (and justness) of his policy regar-
ding the Mytileneans, it follows, seems less a reflection of his ignobility than it 
is a marker of the extent to which the standard of political debate at Athens has 
decayed under the weight of the people’s harshness and ignorance and the bruta-
lity of the demagogues they cherish. In other words, the dangerous new tradition 
of insincerity in politics is something that Diodotus abhors but unfortunately 
must pander to on account of the dangers that being honest toward the demos 
poses. For unlike Pericles, who “enjoyed so high an estimation that he could af-
ford to anger [the demos] by contradiction” (2.65.8), Diodotus is a political non-
entity. As such, he has good reason to be afraid of a demos which, according to 
Thucydides, now holds Cleon in the highest regard (3.36.6). The fault for the de-
terioration of Athenian debate, therefore, lies more with the demos and men like 
Cleon than it does with Diodotus. 
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However self-exculpating for Diodotus it may appear to be, the core of his com-
plaint – that bellicose and self-interested politicians like Cleon were leading a 
willing demos on a path of self-destruction – clearly echoes Thucydides’ com-
ments on Pericles’ last speech in Book Two (2.65; cf. 5.16.1), and anticipates 
the Sicilian debacle. In this context, “the Mytilene debate has an intelligible 
purpose. Thucydides’ own analysis, in terms of the less secure influence of Per-
icles’ successors, their struggles for the people’s favour, their quarrels and irres-
ponsibility, has been given directly in 2.65: here we have a direct counterpart, 
one of the disruptive elements, the portrait of the demagogue in action” (An-
drewes 1962: 76). We might add to this the fact that the Mytilene debate reveals 
within the narrative an erotic theory of politics which, while used in its imme-
diate context as an argument against injustice and brutality, is validated by the 
author as politically salient in other instances beyond the revolt of Mytilene.  
We have seen that Diodotus’s erotic theory of politics applies on the individual 
level in the History (the prime example being Aristogeiton) and at the level of 
the community during the revolt at Mytilene. But, as Paul Ludwig notes, “it is 
difficult not to apply his conception of eros [also] to the … attempt of the Athe-
nians themselves for western empire” (Ludwig 2002: 169).  
To appreciate this point, we should recall the set of speeches that take place in 
the assembly before the Sicilian expedition is decided on. This is, apart from the 
contest between Cleon and Diodotus over the fate of Mytilene, the only instance 
in the History in which Thucydides presents “the clash of opposite positions and 
philosophies before the Athenian ekklesia” (Wasserman 1956: 27). During this 
momentous debate, Alcibiades encourages the men of Athens to accept the “in-
solence” (hyperphronoumenos, 6.16.4) of good fortune; Nicias’s well-meaning 
lies backfire to completely undermine his stated wish to become as “independent 
of tuche as far as is possible” (6.23.3) by stoking what Thucydides calls an 
“eros” (6.24.3) for universal empire. Like the tyrannicides and the Mytileneans, 
the Athenians have now become engaged in act of “amazing daring” (6.31.6). 
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Thanks to Nicias’s exaggerations, the resources for this enterprise are by no 
means neglible, but the fleet is more a demonstration of “power and 
wealth” (dynameos kai exousias, 6.31.4) than it is an armament against an ene-
my. It would become famous among the Greeks as an expedition for having had 
the “greatest hopes” (megistei elpidi) in history, “considering the resources of 
those who undertook it” (6.31.6).  
Given that these “great hopes” (megales elpidos, 7.75.2) were, like Athens’ 
great fleet, dashed against the rocky shoreline of Sicily amidst suffering “too 
great for tears” (7.75.4), it does not seem a stretch to say that Thucydides’ struc-
turing of the Sicilian narrative faithfully reproduces Diodotus’s vision of an 
eros, led on by hope and fortune, which cuts a wide swathe of ruin amongst 
men. The similarities in the language and structure of the Mytilene and Sicilian 
episodes are too great to lead to any conclusion other than that the two are deli-
berately and fundamentally connected. This is especially true in light of the role 
that the digression on the tyrannicides plays in the context of the narration of 
events regarding Sicily. 
Thucydides suggests that this pattern of behaviour applies not only to the cha-
racteristically daring and erotic Athenians, but to all of humanity, when he says 
in his authorial voice that “it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless elpidi 
what they long for [epithumousin], and to use sovereign reason [logismoi] to 
thrust aside what they do not fancy” (4.108.4). While Thucydides here does not 
reproduce Diodotus’s speech on eros word for word, and there is a slight diffe-
rence in the role played (or not played) by reason, the sentiments in question are 
more or less identical (cf. Orwin 1984: 494). It may be concluded in light of this 
and the other parallels that exist in the History that the erotic theory of politics 
expounded by Diodotus extends well beyond the immediate circumstances of 
the Mytilene Debate; we might conclude that it represents the political theory of 
Thucydides himself.  
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Thucydides, in sum, implicitly endorses the erotic theory of politics that he puts 
into the mouth of Diodotus. In the History, all alike are subject to Diodotus’s 
law of erotic politics: inspired by eros, and led on by hope and chance, both in-
dividual and states (and both tyrannicides and tyrants) are prone to suffering and 
self-destruction. According to their natural tendencies, poverty and powerless 
give rise to reckless ventures, while wealth and power birth greed, insolence and 
pride. This is especially so in the case of communities, because when acting col-
lectively men tend to magnify their own capabilities and this undermines their 
ability to make reasonable decisions. Only the individual or state “acting in full 
knowledge of this law will be able to avoid the usual risks of unreasonable au-
dacity or overly cruel arrogance” (Scanlon 1987: 297). Diodotus is aware of this 
fact, and therefore manages to avoid catastrophe at Mytilene (albeit not without 
manipulating his people). Thucydides, of course, also knows this very well. The 
question that we must now turn to concerns the influence of tragedy upon this 
erotic theory of politics.  
 (iii) Tragedy and the Erotic Theory of Politics 
As we saw in Chapter Three, eros was a favourite theme of the classical tragedi-
ans. The poets used it often as a catalyst for social conflicts and ethical issues, as 
well as an ideal type of the dangers that powerful emotions posed to the rational 
self. In the tragedies in which it figures, eros is almost always associated with 
madness, personal transformation and reversal of fortune. It is this association – 
which other tragic emotions do not display to anywhere near the same extent – 
that makes eros so relevant to tragic action. The madness of tragic eros has cata-
strophic consequences both for the subject and for the wider community; indeed, 
tragic eros is distinguishable from the self-confession of lyric by the very fact 
that it fundamentally and unavoidably concerns the polis. The characteristic 
qualities and effects of this tragic eros are nowhere more neatly summarised 
than in Sophocles’ Antigone: 
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Eros, the unconquered in battle, Eros, you who descend upon 
riches, and watch the night through on a girl’s soft cheek, you roam 
over the sea and among the homes of men in the wilds. Neither can 
any mortal escape you, nor any man whose life lasts for a day. He 
who has known you is driven to madness. You seize the minds of 
just men and drag them to injustice, to their ruin. You it is who have 
incited this conflict of men whose flesh and blood are one. But vic-
tory belongs to radiant Desire swelling from the eyes of the sweet-
bedded bride. Desire sits enthroned in power beside the mighty 
laws (780-800). 
Many elements of the erotic theory of politics that Diodotus espouses (and 
Thucydides implicitly endorses) are quite clearly recognisable in this famous 
passage. The tragic eros described by Sophocles affects all men without distinc-
tion; it applies to abstract entities such as wealth and far-off things across the 
seas (such as, perhaps, Mediterranean empire) as much as it does to any human 
body; it is unconquerable, all-powerful, and contemptuous of human law; it falls 
upon men and drags them into bloody wars, moral outrage and their own dis-
astrous ruin. As we have seen in the foregoing discussion, all of these themes are 
summarised in Diodotus’s theory and are yet more broadly woven into the His-
tory’s narrative.  
What is missing from Sophocles’ tragic picture is the explicit emphasis on hope 
and chance as the enablers of lust-driven destruction that is central to the erotic 
theory of politics. Chance and hope, however, did indeed figure prominently in 
tragedy. In Euripides’ Suppliants, as we have seen in Chapter 4, both elpis and 
tuche are described as collaborators with erotic desire in leading men into war 
and ruin. This play was, in part, a sympathetic yet critical commentary on the 
tradition of patriotism expounded and personified by Pericles, and in particular 
the vision of erotic citizenship that he offered. Nevertheless, despite these simil-
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arities, it is the case that neither in this play nor in any other tragedy is eros wel-
ded so causally and so firmly to hope and chance (and to power) as it is in 
Thucydides’ History. 
How should we explain this divergence, we might then wonder? But this ques-
tion hardly needs asking. Thucydides was a brilliant and original thinker who 
refused to submit to orthodoxy. If, in his opinion, certain aspects of popular 
knowledge – such as the Athenians’ misunderstanding of their own history – re-
quired correction, he would passionately provide it. If the poets perceived the 
dangerous dynamics of eros but failed to adequately express the links between 
eros, hope, and chance, then Thucydides would do so himself. The real question 
that needs to be asked, therefore, is why Thucydides’ erotic theory of politics 
still shares so much in common with tragic eros, as it can hardly be assumed that 
such similarities are purely coincidental.      
  
Francis Cornford long ago pointed out that “Thucydides possessed, in common 
with his contemporaries at Athens, the cast of mind induced by an early educa-
tion consisting almost exclusively in the study of the poets” (1965: ix-x). But 
this fact does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that “Thucydides never un-
derstood the origin of the war, because his mind was filled with preconceptions” 
that required him to “cut down poetry into prose” (ibid: 133).  
As we have seen in the foregoing chapters, eros was an important tragic emotion 
because the Athenians considered eros to be an important political emotion. The 
experience and expression of eros lay at the heart of their self-identity as demo-
crats and imperialists, and as such their poets believed that it deserved examina-
tion and interrogation on the tragic stage. The eros represented in tragedy, in 
short, was not confined to that art; in ancient Greece, the dynamics of tragic eros 
were actually lived. 
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In light of this fact, it would be mistaken to believe that Thucydides’ thinking 
about politics was entangled in some religiously dramatic net, the existence of 
which the author himself was not – and could not be – aware. It seems more 
reasonable to believe, rather, that Thucydides was engaging with a political issue 
of deep and continual concern for the Athenians, a concern reflected not only in 
its ubiquity in Athenian political discourse but in the ritual performance of 
drama every spring at the Great Dionysia. For the Athenians, at least, eros was 
an important factor in their history, in their politics, in their tragedies – in their 
drama, with all of that term’s meanings in the Greek. The death of Hipparchus 
and Athenian behaviour in the context of the Sicilian expedition all too tragic-
ally prove this.  
Conclusion 
During the Mytilene debate, the mysterious character of Diodotus presents a 
theory of human nature in which eros is the primary driver of political action. 
Diodotus claims that all men are led on by eros, hope and chance in the pursuit 
of political power; poverty and wealth are the conditions that most aggravate 
this problem, insofar as the one gives rise to the reckless audacity inspired by 
necessity and the other to the greedy ambition born of insolence. Due to the vi-
cissitudes of fate, however, these erotic adventures end all too often in disaster, 
and there is no law that will prevent this from happening. This is especially so in 
the case of communities and states, because when acting together individuals 
magnify their own capabilities and thereby tend to act irrationally. Following 
this, I argued that Diodotus’s theory is shared by Thucydides himself. There are 
a number of points in the History which suggest that Thucydides implicitly lends 
authorial support to Diodotus’s erotic theory of politics. Similarities in expres-
sion between speeches and parallels in narrative development suggest that Di-
odotus’s erotic theory – which draws so heavily on the eros of tragedy – plays a 
very important role in the underlying tragic structure of the History as a whole.  
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We have seen, furthermore, that Thucydides’ History and the political theory 
that undergirds it provide an astute analysis of what once were living practices. 
Insofar as his work is ‘possession for all time,’ however, Thucydides obviously 
assumes that the basics of his political theory – eros, hope, and chance – and the 
conditions in which they thrive will remain generally constant over time. This is 
quite a troubling assumption; as we have seen in Chapter Two, the classical 
Greek concept of eros differs significantly from modern Western ideas of ‘love,’ 
‘lust,’ and ‘yearning.’ Indeed, eros was fundamentally tied up with Greek con-
structions of masculinity and the honour system that defined classical Athenian 
society. All of this poses an interesting and important question, which the fol-
lowing part of this dissertation will attempt to answer, namely: does Thucydides’ 
erotic political theory have any relevance in the present day?  
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Part Three 
Love, Power, Tragedy: From the Ancients to the Mod-




In this chapter I will compare some of the erotic elements of Thucydides’ text 
that have formed the focus of the dissertation so far with similar ideas expressed 
in Plato’s Symposium, and in particular, with the ideas expressed by Aristo-
phanes in the speech attributed to him there.  10
This discussion will be helpful in understanding the connections between the po-
litical eros found in Thucydides’ History and the conception of power in the 
work of Hans Morgenthau, insofar as the Symposium, and in particular the 
speech of Aristophanes in it, acts as a kind of intellectual stepping-stone bet-
ween the two. This is because Plato’s dialogues – and the Symposium in particu-
lar – provided a bridge for Morgenthau to enter the ancient world of erotic poli-
tics, and from this world he took the insights that the longing for community and 
the longing for power are impossible to separate, that this hybrid longing was 
tragically destructive, and that it was the most powerful and most ancient anima-
ting force of human action. These insights are very similar to those we find in 
Thucydides, and they are central to Morgenthau’s political philosophy, which we 
will consider in the following chapter.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly summarize the speech of Aristo-
phanes and the speeches preceding it in the dialogue, paying special attention to 
their political ramifications. There are three elements of the speeches that stand 
out in this regard: an emphasis on homoerotic love as the basis of virile demo-
cratic politics; the idea that eros as the means to reunite with ‘what is our own’ 
and to achieve a wholeness that is politically potent but at the same time linked 
to death; and the suggestion of a web of ambition, criminality, and violence in 
which eros finds itself inextricably caught. Following this, I examine those parts 
 In this chapter, all references to ancient books will be to Plato’s Symposium unless other10 -
wise indicated.
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of Thucydides’ History that have been the focus of the dissertation so far in light 
of the foregoing discussion. This comparison suggests a remarkable continuity 
and firmness to certain tragic themes within the constellation of ideas that we 
have called the ‘erotic theory of politics.’ 
Eros and Dionysus in the Symposium 
(i) In Praise of Love: The Speeches of the Symposium 
The Symposium is set at the celebratory banquet in honour of the tragic poet 
Agathon, whose plays have recently won first prize at the City Dionysia. One of 
the participants of the festivities, Erixymachus, has suggested that for entertain-
ment the group discuss the topic of love; everybody else agrees to this and 
commits to making a speech in praise of Eros. Aristophanes comes fourth in a 
line of speakers who address various aspects of the god and the emotional appe-
tite he inspires, all the while threading together the common themes of politics 
and poetry. In order to fully understand Aristophanes’ speech it is necessary to 
briefly consider the speakers who precede him.  
Phaedrus, whose speech initiates the conversation, claims that Eros “brings to us 
the greatest goods”, since he grants us a “sense of shame at acting shamefully, 
and a sense of pride in acting well. Without these, nothing fine or great can be 
accomplished, in public or private” (Symp. 178c-d). This is so, Phaedrus says, 
because being caught doing something shameful by a loved one is such a terri-
fying and humiliating prospect that the person in love will try with all their 
might to refrain from all bad behaviour. He then explicitly connects the power of 
love with politics, exclaiming: “If only there were a way to start a city or an 
army made up of lovers and the boys they love! Theirs would be the best pos-
sible system of society, for they would hold back from all that is shameful, and 
seek honour in each other’s eyes. Even a few of them, in battle side by side, 
would conquer all the world” (178d-179a). Apparently oblivious to the hubris he 
seems to be supporting, Phaedrus buttresses his claim with the assertion that no-
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body will die for a person but their lover, drawing on the tragic examples of Al-
cestis and Achilles as proofs for his argument. This is only one of many ins-
tances in the dialogue in which speakers explicitly or implicitly refer to tragedy 
and its patron deity, Dionysus. 
Pausanias is next in line to discuss the topic of eros. After distinguishing bet-
ween a ‘common love’, which hedonistically pursues bodies solely in pursuit of 
the sexual act and the physical gratification it brings, and a ‘heavenly love’, 
which cares for both the body and the mind of the object of eros, and shares with 
the beloved rather than simply taking from them, Pausanias, like Phaedrus, 
moves on to the subject of politics. He addresses topics that are central to this 
dissertation, and it is therefore worth quoting him at length: 
[I]n places like Ionia and almost every other part of the Persian em-
pire, taking a lover is always considered disgraceful. The Persian 
empire is absolute; that is why it condemns love as well as philoso-
phy and sport. It is no good for rulers if the people they rule cherish 
ambitions [phronemata megala, lit. ‘great thoughts’] for themselves 
or form strong bonds of friendship with one another. That these are 
precisely the effects of philosophy, sport and especially of Love is a 
lesson the tyrants of Athens learned directly from their own expe-
rience: Didn’t their reign come to a dismal end because of the 
bonds uniting Harmodius and Aristogiton in love and affection? So 
you can see that condemnation of Love reveals lust for power in the 
rulers and cowardice in the ruled, while indiscriminate approval 
testifies to general dullness and stupidity. Our own customs … are 
much more difficult to understand [and] also far superior … Recall 
… that [in Athens] a lover is encouraged in every possible way; this 
means that what he does [in the name of love] is not considered 
shameful … [O]ur custom is to praise lovers for totally extraordina-
ry acts – so extraordinary, in fact, that if they performed them for 
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any other purpose whatever, they would reap the most profound 
contempt (182c-183a). 
Pausanias quite clearly is suggesting that the character of the Athenians’ politi-
cal eros, popularly represented by the relationship between Harmodius and Aris-
togeiton, is divine and good, whereas that of the Persians, Ionian Greeks and of 
tyranny in general is common, sensual and vulgar (the tyrant’s condemnation of 
love is not of love per se but, rather, of ‘heavenly’ love). Pausanias adds that “it 
is considered shameful for a man to be seduced by money or political 
power” (184b) if, after having tasted the benefits of these things, he cannot rise 
above them, for none of these benefits are permanent and therefore “no genuine 
affection can possibly be based upon them” (ibid.). Thus the tyrant, who is se-
duced by political power, cannot ever truly care about his people, since his love 
is of the common sort and does not support the growth of real affection. The 
erastes-eromenos relationship such as Aeschylus suggested existed between 
Achilles and Patroclus, on the other hand, is offered as the outstanding example 
of heavenly love and the strength of the bonds it forms between people. Like 
Phaedrus, Pausanias sees manliness as the willingness to take up arms, not only 
in battle general, but against tyranny in particular; and, again like Phaedrus, he 
understands same-sex relations to be the breeding ground of manliness (Ludwig 
1996: 539). As we have noted in previous chapters, these ideas were definitive 
of Athenian democratic ideology. 
Two elements of Pausanias’ speech are important to note: first, through the men-
tion of the Pisistratids and the tyrannicides, ‘great ambition,’ and ‘extraordinary 
acts’ in the context of love, is the intimation of an intrinsic connection between 
eros, political ambition, transgression, and violence. Second is the emphasis on 
the beneficial effects of homoerotic union, which is carried over from Phaedrus. 
As we shall see, both of these elements reappear in Aristophanes’ speech and are 
part of the vision of politics that he promotes.  
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Following Pausanias in the dialogue is the doctor Erixymachus, the erastes of 
Phaedrus, who says at the beginning of his speech that he will try to carry Pau-
sanias’ argument “to its logical conclusion” (186a). He asserts that “Love is a 
deity of the greatest importance: he directs everything that occurs, not only in 
the human domain, but also in that of the gods” (186b) and goes on to claim 
that, as a physician, it is his duty to implant in people the healthy form of love 
and remove its diseased form (essentially the same categories of ‘heavenly’ and 
‘common’ love provided by Pausanias). The doctor does this, he says, by recon-
ciling opposed elements within the body, such as cold and hot, and wet and dry. 
The same regulation of the different elements in the cosmos is needed for boun-
tiful harvests, and also for the maintenance of the order between gods and hu-
man beings, for “the origin of all impiety,” the doctor tells us, is the failure of 
men to cultivate the healthy kind of love and their concomitant indulgence of its 
dangerous and pestilent form (188c). Impiety, discord, sickness, and infertility 
are thereby linked together by Erixymachus under the banner of ‘common love’; 
respect, agreement, health and abundance, he says, are held in love’s heavenly 
hand. 
Although Erixymachus claims to fully develop the argument of Pausanias, he in 
fact appears to arrive at a rather different conclusion regarding the proper role of 
Eros, namely, that it works to bring about harmony through the reconciliation of 
opposites. The implicit conclusion of such an argument, for a Greek mind, 
would be that the finest example of love is found in the love between a man and 
a woman. This description of love does seem to resonate with the kind of eros 
we often see in tragedy, as I will show in the second part of my argument; and 
although it also appears to jar against the theme of homoerotic union as the basis 
of a healthy politics common to both Phaedrus and Pausanias, Erixymachus ne-
vertheless makes it clear that such unions are perfectly acceptable manifestations 
of healthy love. Indeed, he insinuates that they are paradigmatic of it (186c). As 
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we will shortly come to see, however, this apparent contradiction is not as stark 
as it seems. 
Once Erixymachus has finished, it is the turn of Aristophanes to speak. Like So-
crates (whose speech, following Agathon’s, will conclude the round), Aristo-
phanes explicitly diverges from the speakers preceding him: his account of love 
is built not so much on the ground of logical argument or sophistries as it is on a 
species of dramatic myth (cf. Duncan 1977). Furthermore (and again like the 
speech of Socrates) his speech is “offered in a proselytizing spirit” (Scott and 
Welton 2008: 65); both the philosopher and the comic poet are concerned with 
the moral improvement of others. This is important to note, because as I will 
point out in the second part of my argument, just as Socrates’ approach is repre-
sentative of philosophy, Aristophanes’ ethical standpoint can be considered, at 
least in part, to be representative of Dionysian poetry. As Socrates says at the 
beginning of the dialogue, Aristophanes’ “whole time is taken up with Dionysus 
and Aphrodite” (177d). 
Begging his audience to take him seriously (193e), Aristophanes nevertheless 
gives an account of humanity at which we cannot help but laugh. In the begin-
ning, he says, human nature was very different from what it is now. There were 
then three kinds of human beings: the male, the female, and the androgynous. 
Being offspring of the sun, the earth, and the moon respectively, these humans 
were spherical in shape, with four arms and four legs, two faces, two sets of 
sexual organs and so on; they moved like gymnasts doing cartwheels, were pos-
sessed of terrible strength, and in their hearts harboured “great thoughts” that 
verged on hubris (190b; cf. Cairns 1996).  Apparently referring to Homer’s sto11 -
ry of Ephialtes and Otus, Aristophanes relates that the circle-people stormed the 
heavens in a vain attempt to unseat the gods. Having defeated these upstarts, 
Zeus nevertheless refrained from destroying them, as he had the race of giants, 
 This phrase is lifted directly from Pausanias’ speech.11
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since this would deprive him and his fellow gods of worship and sacrifice. Ins-
tead, he divided them in two; a brilliant idea, at first glance, for not only did 
such a move increase the number of humans (and hence the amount of sacrifices 
they could provide) but it also divested them of the power to challenge the gods.  
Unfortunately for Zeus, however, his plan backfired: as all the new humans 
wanted to do in their mutilated state was reunite with their other halves, they ne-
glected to feed themselves and quickly began to die off from hunger and inacti-
vity. To mitigate this problem Zeus invented sex and its pleasures, which, 
through opposite sex union, helped keep human numbers healthy, and through 
same sex union, kept humanity productive.  
But for Aristophanes none of these things – sex, reproduction, and work – are 
definitive of eros; they are, rather, its derivatives. Even sex cannot account for 
the deep joy in being with the beloved. The true essence of love, rather, is to call 
back “the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of two 
and heal the wound of human nature” (191d). Eros, in short, is the pursuit of 
what is similar to us for the sake of achieving completeness in a greater self 
(192e), and it is born into every human being. 
Hence, those halves who are originally sawn from the androgynous sort will lust 
after the opposite sex; and these people, says Aristophanes (in a manner that 
points at the category of common love developed by Pausanias and Erixyma-
chus), are often found to be lecherous and vulgar (191e). Of lesbians, who come 
from the fully female sort, the comic poet does not have much to say. However, 
for the fully male humans, who are attracted to manliness, he has only praise: 
those youths who enjoy the company of men are not shameful, we are told, but 
are in fact “the best of boys and lads, because they are most manly in their na-
ture … they are bold and brave and masculine, and they tend to cherish what is 
like themselves” (192a). To prove this, Aristophanes turns to the example of po-
litics, where, he claims, one finds that such boys grow up to be successful and 
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powerful, and will as they age come to cultivate virtue and wisdom in their own 
young men, thereby perpetuating the health of the polis (cf. Ludwig 1996: 537).  
While in line with the logic of Phaedrus and Pausanias, Aristophanes here ap-
pears at odds with Erixymachus, whose argument is that eros seeks the reconci-
liation of opposites. As Arlene Saxonhouse points out, “Aristophanes’ vision of 
political life cannot encompass what is other. The males entering the world of 
political life seek out those who are most similar and who seek unity in their si-
milarity rather than in the complementarity of differences” (1984: 17). But a 
reading of these speeches as contradictory would overlook the emphasis that 
Erixymachus places on the reconciliation of opposites: he is especially keen to 
point out the harmony that is produced when agreement – that is, common 
ground or sameness – is produced between discordant elements (187a-c). As the 
philosopher Heraclitus, whose philosophical ideas are utilised by Erixymachus 
in the course of his argument (Symp. 187a-b), once said: the way up and the way 
down are the same.  
Wholeness and wholesomeness are thus both defined by a state in which com-
munity and shared attributes constitute the basis of identity and potency. In Aris-
tophanes’ words: “I say there’s just one way for the human race to flourish: we 
must bring love to its perfect conclusion, and each of us must win the favours of 
his very own young man, so that he can recover his original nature. If that is the 
ideal, then, of course, the nearest approach to it is best in present circumstances, 
and that is to win the favour of young men who are naturally sympathetic to 
us” (193c). Aristophanes therefore merely builds upon the theme of homoerotic 
union as the basis of a good society that is common to his fellow speakers, even 
if they have each developed it in different ways (Cooper 2008: 60). This empha-
sis on the benefits of homoeroticism – and its centrality to the polis – is the first 
theme that can be usefully compared with certain parts of Thucydides’ History.  
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Now while eros is undoubtedly of great benefit to mankind in Aristophanes’ ac-
count, he nevertheless makes it clear that love is a means and not an end. It is 
the engine that drives people in search of wholeness and the glue that helps to 
hold them together once they have found a person who approximates their other 
half. For the time being, Aristophanes says, eros does the best that can be done, 
by drawing people towards what belongs to them; “[b]ut for the future, Love 
promises the greatest hope of all: if we treat the gods with due reverence, he will 
restore to us our original nature, and by healing us, he will make us blessed and 
happy” (193d). Eros is not the final emotional condition in which people seek to 
exist; rather it is a state of unity, together with the feeling of power this unity 
bestows, that constitutes its aim, its telos. Aristophanes is quick to add that piety 
is necessary for the restoration of this wholeness; the law, he says, is the gate-
keeper of wholeness, and it must be shown respect if we are to consummate the 
love that drives us on. According to Dorter: “[t]he goal which Eros sets for us – 
the restoration of the state we enjoyed in the Golden Age – is one which can be 
attained only as a reward for piety” (1969: 220). The fate of the Mantineans,  12
which Aristophanes uses as an example to illustrate this point, translates perso-
nal eros into political terms and puts the issues of unity and power into stark re-
lief. It is therefore necessary to briefly consider their story. 
Soon after the conflict that was described by Thucydides came to an end, hostili-
ties between Athens and Sparta once again broke out. During this war the Man-
tineans, at that time democratic allies of Sparta, acted in a way that reminded the 
Spartans of the war that they had fought against Mantinea almost thirty years 
earlier, in 418, when the city had defected from Sparta and attempted to gain an 
empire within Arcadia for itself. The Spartans now accused the Mantineans of 
sending corn to Argos, an enemy state, and of serving in Spartan armies with 
 Mantinea was a city in the region of Arcadia. The question as to whether Aristophanes is 12
referring to the Mantineans in particular or to the population of Arcadia is not resolved (see 
Mattingly [1958]; Morrison [1964]; Dover [1965]). I follow received opinion and accept that 
Mantinea is the proper subject of Aristophanes’ example.  
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minimal effort, if they even served at all. Furthermore, they claimed that as so-
called allies, the joy that was visible in Mantinea whenever misfortune struck 
Sparta was completely unacceptable; so, too, were the rumours that most of its 
citizens claimed that the thirty years’ truce they had kept with Sparta had in fact 
ended early (Xen. Hell. 5.2.1-2). 
Armed with these allegations, the Spartans declared that they could no longer 
trust Mantinea with its city walls intact, and demanded that they be torn down. 
The Mantineans refused to accept Sparta’s dictate, and their city was subse-
quently besieged. After a masterstroke by the Spartan commander put the entire 
defence of the city in jeopardy, the government of Mantinea recognised the peril 
they were in and agreed to tear down their walls. Unfortunately for them, howe-
ver, the Spartans now added the condition that, if peace were to be made, the 
city’s democratic rulers were to be exiled and its people divided into four sepa-
rate villages. The popular regime, preferring to avoid the horrible end that usual-
ly befell prisoners of war, acceded to these demands; they were expelled, the 
walls were torn down and the city was dissolved. As a consequence, the aristo-
crats, who were now closer to their estates in the country and rid of the popular 
demagogues who had previously controlled the city, gained more power over the 
population; so did Mantinea’s men become more pliable, and came forward 
more willingly for service in Spartan armies than had been the case under demo-
cratic government (Xen. Hell. 5.2.3-7). As Dover points out, Sparta’s policy an 
indelible impression on the rest of Greece; for Polybius, it remained “the classic 
example of international immorality” (Dover 1965: 6). 
Aristophanes says that Zeus divided human beings “as punishment for the 
wrong we did him, just as the Spartans divided the [Mantineans]” (193a). The 
analogy with Aristophanes’ circle-people works as follows. In the political 
realm, tyrannical power is equivalent to godhood; in its region, Sparta maintai-
ned such a position of overwhelming strength. It was therefore able to enforce 
its will on Mantinea, the independent and allegedly hostile actions of which had 
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offended it, as the circle-people had offended Zeus. Unity, which had characteri-
sed the city of Mantinea and which was symbolised by the wall that surrounded 
its entire population, is the natural state of a polis and forms the basis of its abili-
ty to maintain its military strength and formulate independent policy. Wholeness 
is likewise what gave the circle-people their strength. Division is of course the 
antithesis of this wholeness: it is an enabler of exploitation of Mantinea’s people 
by domestic rent-seekers and despotic foreign states like Sparta, and it makes 
human beings weak and utterly subject to Zeus. Political eros in this case must 
therefore be the desire of separate individuals or groups to unite with one ano-
ther with the aim of creating, out of their constituent parts, an independent poli-
tical unit capable of following a course of action it has itself determined – since 
this is, essentially, what the democratic city of Mantinea had been before it was 
dissolved by Sparta.  
For Aristophanes, then, political eros is the mutual desire for shared identity and 
political community on a grand scale, in pursuit of independence and power; in 
more modern terminology, one might frame it as the popular desire for a nation-
state. Fostering eros in a political sense, therefore, means encouraging mutual 
affection on the basis of shared ties, identities and interests and promoting col-
lective pursuits in which a sense of community can be actively constructed. Per-
haps the most effective of such pursuits in ancient Athens took place at that fes-
tival dedicated to the god to whom both Aristophanes and the Symposium’s 
host, young Agathon, pledged allegiance: and that is, of course, Dionysus. This 
idea of eros as the means with which to create a citizen body defined by strength 
and independence is the second element of Aristophanes’ speech that has paral-
lels in the History. 
Finally, we come to the position of eros in the cycle of ambition, transgression 
and violence. This relationship is hinted at in the speeches preceding Aristo-
phanes’: Phaedrus speaks of pairs of lovers forming an army to conquer the en-
tire world (a goal that Xerxes and Alcibiades too possessed); Pausanias notes 
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that loving union is the real source of “great thoughts”, connects this fact to the 
tragically tangled lives of the Pisistratids and the tyrannicides, and argues that 
the lover, to attain his beloved, “may commit the most disgraceful or ugly acts, 
including even sacrilege” (Dorter 1969: 217); Erixymachus hints at the tale of 
Oedipus with his claim that an abundance of diseased eros can lead only to im-
piety, pestilence and poverty (Berg 2010: 63). Nevertheless, it is in Aristo-
phanes’ speech that the relationship between eros and crime is fully spelled out. 
In Aristophanes’ account of love, eros appears to be only the consequence of 
ambition and crime, not their cause. For it did not exist, the poet suggests, prior 
to the violence inflicted on the circle-people by Zeus; eros is “the hangover we 
are left with once the drunkenness of great thoughts has been sobered up by the 
punishments and prescriptions of lawful piety” (ibid). Zeus’ decision to slice the 
circle-people in two had as an unintended consequence the birth, in each new 
half-person, of a burning desire to reunite with their lost part – a desire which, 
before the invention of intercourse, brought with it but death for this pitiful race. 
With sex, however, procreation and production were made possible again and, if 
only for a moment, the human longing for wholeness could be satisfied. It 
should be noted, however, that erotic longing and sex are not intrinsically rela-
ted, as are eros and death: as Steven Berg notes, “the link between eros and sex 
that Zeus engineers seems rather to be a ruse whereby the original connection 
between eros and death is concealed, although not severed” (ibid.). With sex as 
the only means to ensure reproduction of the new human race, eros can thus be 
understood as both the giver and the destroyer of human life. 
As much as the embrace of two bodies in the service of love bodes well for hu-
man happiness, insofar as it hints at the return of our original nature, obedience 
to Zeus and his siblings – which is the means to prevent another dissection and 
further diminution in the capabilities of man (193a) – remains, according to 
many scholars, just as important for human beings. According to Scott and Wel-
ton, for example, “Aristophanes believes that respect for the gods is the most 
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important virtue human beings can possess, for it was impiety that caused the 
original beings to be bisected” (2008: 67). For Roger Duncan, Aristophanes’ en-
tire speech “is a diatribe against hubris or the attempt on the part of men to enter 
the realm of the gods” (1977: 282).   
But is Aristophanes’ solution to the problem of human nature really as simple as 
that? There are a number of reasons why we might answer this question in the 
negative. First, the picture of an ideal humanity as perfectly pious and existen-
tially content seems relatively odd for an Athenian, even one as supportive of 
the simple country life as was Aristophanes. Great ambition is, arguably, neces-
sary for great striving, which was the hallmark of idealised Athens; and it was at 
the very least an essential ingredient in the success of the Great Dionysia, which 
was at its core a competition in which the entire community took part. Second, a 
partnership between eros and piety seems unlikely, especially since Aristo-
phanes himself points out that eros is responsible for adultery (191d-e) – not 
only an offence against Hera, the goddess of marriage, but also, at least in its 
most famous example (that of Paris and Helen), a catastrophic offence against 
Zeus. In fact, eros “is impious in its very origin and nature” (Dorter 1969: 221). 
For eros is not the creation of Zeus, but an unforeseen reaction of raw human 
material to the laying down of divine law; it is nature’s refusal to accept the dic-
tate of the gods and the limitations that law has imposed upon it: 
Eros is essentially antinomian and what eros really longs for is not 
so much the union with another human being in order to complete 
our nature, as the overturning of the law that has mutilated and af-
flicted [that nature] … [E]rotic longing is, at the deepest level, a 
wish to renounce one’s law-defined humanity in favour of the sub-
human understood not simply as the bestial, but as the criminally 
impious. (Berg 2010: 65-8)  
!220
For human beings, then, the value of piety, if it has any value at all, lies only in 
its utility for ambition – and the impious ambition to overturn the law of the 
gods at that. There is nothing inherently good about piety, in other words, for it 
is only one means by which eros schemes for its goals; even then, with eros and 
ambition linked by necessity, a chain neither Hephaestus nor his brother Zeus 
can buckle, piety can in the end do little to please the gods in light of its inevi-
table ineffectuality.  
Ludwig translates this personal manifestation of transgressive eros into the poli-
tical logic of Aristophanes’ speech appropriately: 
Once the essentially republican city has been established, political 
unity and the strength made possible by the combined might of the 
city permit men to think high thoughts once more. Further opportu-
nities arise for eros to become vertical, directed upwards, once 
more. The way is now clear for the polis to become an imperial 
city. The goal of apotheosis and the desire for it once more become 
possibilities, and with them tyranny reemerges. The cycle is ready 
to be replayed, this time at the peak or end of civilization rather 
than at the beginning. (2002: 108)    
In the last analysis, then, this link between eros and ambition, together with the 
irrepressible tendency of ambition to transgress and for transgression to call 
forth violence, suggests that human life is an irresolvable perplexity: in terms of 
his relationship with eros, “man is not merely suffering from a sickness, he is a 
sickness and this sickness has no cure” (Berg 2010: 69). And yet, despite the ter-
rible symptoms of this disease – despite the fact that “[t]he realm of conflict, of 
war, of execution, of discourse is composed of partial beings seeking comple-
tion” (Saxonhouse 1984: 19) – it is the emphatic opinion of Aristophanes, 
whose task it was to bring merriment and laughter to his people, that there is 
“just one way for the human race to flourish: we must bring love to its perfect 
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conclusion” (193c). This tragic view of eros as both giver and destroyer of life, 
as an ambiguous emotion linked via impious ambition to both creativity and vio-
lence, is the last theme in Aristophanes’ speech in which we can identify ideas 
about eros that are found also in the History. 
(ii) Thucydides and Aristophanes on Political Eros 
We now come to consider the ways in which the erotic elements of Thucydides’ 
History can be illuminated by the foregoing discussion. In the exegesis of Aris-
tophanes’ speech we noted three themes that were of particular interest, namely: 
the idea that homoerotic love forms the basis of a healthy politics; an emphasis 
on eros as the means to reunite with ‘what is our own’ and to achieve a whole-
ness that is politically potent but which is at the same time linked to death; and 
the intricate web of ambition, criminality, and violence which eros helps to 
weave and into which it is also woven. 
In terms of the first two themes, the most obvious points of comparison in Thu-
cydides’ History are Pericles’ ideal of the erotic citizen and its basis in the story 
of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. The central problem that occupies Pericles in 
the History, to recall, is the proper place of eros in the city. As Thucydides pre-
sents it, Pericles’ daring patriotic vision based on eros was a brilliant but uns-
table one; like tragedy, it incarnated and encouraged the human power released 
by love – in particular, homoerotic love – that was both the basic foundation of 
Athens’ democratic imagination, symbolised by the relationship of Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton, and one of the reasons for, and justifications of, its tyrannical 
empire.  
The ideal of erotic citizenship harnessed the dynamism born of self-interest and 
yoked it to the community, promising to the individual, for the sacrifice of his 
life, the most glorious of rewards – immortality in memory – and to the com-
munity, imperial mastery. Love was the path to glory, and glory to immortality; 
and immortality, for the Greeks, was the hallmark of divinity. The lover of the 
!222
city had the potential to reach beyond his limits, to overstep the boundary bet-
ween man and god through his greater selfhood in – and ultimately as – the city. 
In his death, that is, the erotic citizen became identical with the polis, an eternal-
ly living being, in terms of the lasting lessons in manliness that his death in bat-
tle provided to future generations. Through the destruction of the individual citi-
zen community could be born, giving the city the unity and strength to expand 
itself imperially.  
In sum, homoerotic love is presented in Thucydides as the patriotic glue that 
binds democratic Athens together and the force that gives the city its dynamism. 
However, it is also the reason for Athens’ imperial expansion and the war with 
Sparta that this caused. This kind of eros is, therefore, intrinsically linked to 
death; erotic union with the city is achieved only through the physical annihila-
tion of the individual in battle, and this leads to his rebirth in a greater self. In 
order to reproduce itself, the city requires war and death in battle.  
The Periclean ideal of erotic citizenship is thus very similar to the ideal love 
postulated by Aristophanes; in both cases, the individual seeks unity in a greater 
self, composed of like parts; but consummation of this unity, for both Pericles 
and Aristophanes, demands the sacrifice of individuals. Likewise, in both cases 
is the natural state of the greater self conditioned by a restless ambition that re-
sults in the transgression of social limits and the violence this provokes. This 
point brings us to the third theme in Aristophanes’ speech that bears resem-
blance to ideas found in the History, namely, the erotic theory of politics.  
This theory, as we know, is that human beings naturally tend to fall under the in-
fluence of an erotically charged impulse for freedom and rule (two sides of the 
same coin of political power), which is led on into danger by the hope that their 
luck will not run out. This tendency is conditioned by poverty and wealth, which 
encourage audacity through necessity and greed through insolence; the poor 
want what they do not have and the rich want more than they have got. The dan-
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ger of such behavior is intensified in the case of collectives, because when ac-
ting together with others individuals tend to inflate their own capabilities and act 
irrationally on account of this.  
These are claims to which the author of the History appears to lend his own sup-
port. The question of Alcibiades and the eros that he represented looms large in 
Thucydides’ description of the Sicilian debacle. The Athenians, as Thucydides 
represents them, willingly accept the ‘insolence’ (hyperphronoumenos) implicit 
in imperialism and explicitly espoused by Alcibiades and are  ‘all alike’ over-
come by his lust for far-off Sicily. Unified by the power of eros in their pursuit 
of universal empire, the Athenians in this instance not only seem to prove Dio-
dotus’ point about eros and its relationship to hubris, but inevitably bring to 
mind Aristophanes’ circle-people, the ‘great thoughts’ (phronemata megala) of 
whom likewise proved to be their own undoing. If we accept the argument of the 
previous chapter – namely that Thucydides himself shared the erotic theory of 
politics he puts into the mouth of Diodotus – then Thucydides’ famed comments 
on the Corcyrean civil war only further entrench the link suggested above; Thu-
cydides writes that “with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into 
confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed 
itself proudly in its true colours, as something incapable of controlling 
passion” (Thuc. 3.84,2). As the foregoing discussion of the Symposium makes 
clear, Plato’s Aristophanes could not have said it better. 
It may even be that, as John P. Anton has argued, “Plato constructed this dia-
logue with the aid, though not exclusively, of a model from Thucydides mythis-
toricus … cast mainly in the mold of tragedy, to disclose the philosopher’s radi-
cal vision of eros in the polis in crisis” (1974: 277). The setting and structure of 
the Symposium are certainly remarkable in this regard; the dialogue is set (with 
historical inaccuracy) shortly before Alcibiades led the Athenians off to Sicily, 
the form of tragedy is woven into the very structure of the text, and the themes 
of the genre loom large in the conversation itself (Anton 1962; Sider 1980; Shef-
!224
field 2001). This is especially so in the case of Aristophanes’ speech:  
We can see how close we are [here] to a view of eros frequently 
expressed in Greek tragedy, if we think of a moment in the Anti-
gone. Creon argues for the replaceability of love partners with a 
crude agricultural metaphor: there are “other furrows” for Hae-
mon’s “plow.” Ismene answers, “Not another love such as the one 
that fitted him to her.” With their shared emphasis on special har-
monia [carpenter’s fit or musician’s harmony], tragedy and Aristo-
phanes seem to capture the uniqueness, as well as the wholeness, 
that [… is] lacking in “Plato’s” view of eros. (Nussbaum 1979: 
141) 
The eros described by both Thucydides and Plato’s Aristophanes, in other 
words, is quintessentially tragic, which is defined not only by madness, unrea-
son, and reversal of fortune but by the fact that it fundamentally concerns the 
polis. This is unsurprising, given that for “Plato’s original audience … [t]he fu-
ture of Athens in the light of its tragic past would have been the topic of the day” 
(Scott and Welton 2008: 3). 
Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion has, I hope, shown that several parallels exist between 
the History and the Symposium in terms of the ‘erotic theory of politics’ that is 
central to them both and which has its roots in tragedy. Both Aristophanes and 
Thucydides appear to present homoeroticism as the basis of a powerful and in-
dependent, if ultimately unstable, democratic polis. This power lies primarily in 
the military strength that homoeroticism helps to foster; eros, as the longing for 
community felt by people such as the Mantineans, is the means to achieve poli-
tical unity and is also one major inspiration for the exercise of gallantry in war. 
The erotic drive towards unity is inherently linked to death; the consummation 
in a greater self has as its price the annihilation of the individual. This self-sacri-
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fice is one of the foundations of the strength of the imperial city; it is, as Pericles 
said, the reason why Athens has the greatest name in all the world – without the 
expenditure of life and labour in warfare the city is unable to grow its empire.  
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, is the vision 
of man and his politics as inevitably mired in the disasters that unbridled eros so 
often brings about which both Thucydides and Plato’s Aristophanes share. This 
theory postulates that man is driven, in both private and public life, by an eros 
that is essentially and ineradicably antinomian and which tends to bring about 
catastrophe in wake. The very nature of eros thus guarantees the perpetuity of 
the human tragedy. As I will show in the following chapter, the primary ele-
ments of this erotic theory of politics are found also in the work of Hans Mor-
genthau. While the issues of homoeroticism and its relationship to militarism are 
ignored in Morgenthau’s work, they are nevertheless implied in the logic of his 
argument. This, we will see, has serious consequences for his understanding of 




This chapter is divided into two sections. The first of these will consider the in-
tellectual and political context in which Morgenthau composed his texts. The 
reasons for doing so have been discussed in Chapter One; I argued there that wi-
thout having some understanding of the audiences a certain text was meant to 
address, of the place of that text in a particular tradition, its use of a particular 
idiom, and so on, we are liable to learn lessons from the text that its author may 
not have intended to give. We will see that while, as might be expected, a wide 
variety of authors influenced Morgenthau’s overall political philosophy, his 
concept of the animus dominandi (or ‘will to power’), which is so central to his 
theory, is indebted not only to authors such as Nietzsche and Freud, but also to 
the classical discourse on eros that these other thinkers themselves drew upon. 
Part of the reason this is the case, I will argue, can be traced to the historical cir-
cumstances in which Morgenthau found himself.  
In the second section of the chapter, I consider the reasons for examining ‘Love 
and Power’ in depth, and outline the arguments Morgenthau makes regarding 
these two phenomena. Essentially, Morgenthau claims that the will to power is 
the twin of despairing love; both are aspects of the desire for wholeness and are 
rooted in the loneliness of the individual human soul. They are also what give 
birth to political communities in all their various shapes and forms. I then exa-
mine some of Morgenthau’s comments on freedom and democracy in relation to 
his thoughts on love and the will to power. I argue that although Morgenthau 
does not explicitly employ erotic terminology when talking about these issues, 
the concepts and reasoning that he uses are on closer examination remarkably 
similar to those we find in ‘Love and Power’.  
This discussion will draw out some of the ways in which Morgenthau’s thoughts 
on love and power relate to his general political philosophy. It will also place us 
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in a position to examine, in the following chapter, the broader theme of tragedy 
in Morgenthau’s work and its relation to the same in Thucydides.  
Section One: Morgenthau in Context 
(i) The Influence of Freud and Nietzsche 
The renewed interest in Morgenthau’s work over the last few decades has gene-
rated a substantial literature, much of which has been focused on unearthing 
Morgenthau’s intellectual roots.   13
For reasons of space, I cannot review this literature in any depth, and in any case 
it is not really necessary to do so; as was mentioned above, it is clear that Mor-
genthau engaged with a number of thinkers and traditions, each of which contri-
buted to his thought in various different ways. What I seek to do here instead is 
to build upon parts of this commentary and sketch the ways in which Nietzsche 
and Freud, as towering intellectual figures in early twentieth-century Germany, 
provided Morgenthau with an intellectual starting-point and framework within 
which to discuss the relationship between love and power as a quintessentially 
tragic one. Morgenthau, I will argue, discusses certain political problems in lan-
guage and ideas that are essentially harvested from his readings, themselves 
shaped in important respects by Nietzsche and Freud, of a number of classical 
texts that share a tragic theme.  
The most important consequences of this are his identification of a close rela-
tionship between love and power and his explanation of how both are funda-
mentally constitutive of the human tragedy that undergirds all political relations. 
Put differently: by employing similar interpretive strategies as Nietzsche and 
 These roots are said to include individual figures such as Aristotle (Lang 2008), Nietzsche 13
(Frei 2001; Gismondi 2004), Weber (Pichler 1998; Turner and Mazur 2009), Schmitt (Pichler 
1998; Brown 2008; Scheuerman 2008a), and Freud (Schuett 2007); the broader German tradi-
tions of paleorealism (Honig 1995), liberalism (Shilliam 2007), and legal philosophy 
(Scheuerman 2008b; Jütersonke 2008); as well as tragedy (Lebow 2003), Judaism (Mollov 
2002) and Christianity (Loriaux 1992; Murray 1996).
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Freud in reading ancient texts, certain problems were bound to arise for Morgen-
thau in his quest for a tragic view of politics, such as: What are the proper roles 
of the will to power and love in the community? What can they hope to achieve? 
Is disaster always the end-point not only of the desire that makes politics and all 
its corruption possible but also even of humankind’s most ostensibly creative 
and positive emotion?  
Framing problems in this way granted Morgenthau the ability to compare di-
verse political phenomena across time and space, and thus allows him to postu-
late apparently timeless truths that are universally applicable. This, in turn, lends 
to his suggested method of dealing with contemporary political problems – the 
development of “the tragic sense of life” (Morgenthau 1946: 206) – the appea-
rance of ancient precedent and experience. In short, Morgenthau suggests that 
the man of Athens is, by and large, the man of today also, and if we know where 
the man of Athens went terribly wrong, perhaps we can avoid making similar 
mistakes in our own time. The atmosphere of nationalism, popular ideology and 
totalitarianism in which Morgenthau came of age seemed to intensify the urgen-
cy of solving such problems, and helped to drive him toward Nietzsche and 
Freud and their assumptions regarding the ‘tragedy of man’. Thus the historical 
circumstances – both political and intellectual – in which Morgenthau found 
himself helped to create the conditions in which he felt justified in modernizing 
part of the ‘erotic politics’ that has been the focus of the dissertation so far.  
As Stephen Turner and George Mazur (2009) point out, it is important to take 
note of the fact that in the study of the relations between the thought of various 
authors in which a number of thinkers act as sources for another, the issue of 
overdetermination – that is, the fact that the same ideas can be attributed to nu-
merous sources – will often arise. This does not, they add, necessarily create a 
problem for such a study. However, it does mean that comparing highly generic 
concepts appearing in two different authors’ work will usually have little value 
as evidence of the ‘dependent’ author’s intentions in his or her text, given that 
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definitive proof for the claim that X’s use of concept A influenced Y’s use of the 
same will be hard to demonstrate, particularly when Y makes no explicit refe-
rence to X. On the other hand, where the ‘like’ concepts are highly distinctive, 
and especially where they derive from the author’s discursive setting, their ap-
pearance suggests, prima facie, that the meaning of the terms for the author is 
the meaning conventional in that setting. 
Turner and Mazur thus commend Robert Schuett’s “strongly evidence-
based” (ibid: 479) discussion of Morgenthau’s indebtedness to Freud on the is-
sue of love and its role in human nature, and dismiss other interpretations of 
Morgenthau’s philosophical development offered by the likes of Lebow and 
Frei, whose arguments, they claim, rely more on generic similarities or psycho-
logical assumptions than on direct evidence of any “genetic relationship” bet-
ween Morgenthau and, say, Clausewitz or Nietzsche (ibid: 481). While there 
may perhaps be some basis for such criticism, Turner and Mazur are neverthe-
less essentially wrong in their final judgements, as I now hope to show. 
Schuett does indeed make a strong case that in 1930 Morgenthau grappled with 
Freud’s thought and that, in his later works, Freudian group psychology seems 
to have influenced his analysis of some issues (in particular the problem of 
‘identification’ of the individual with the nation and its associated problems, 
such as nationalism and imperialism). However, his claim that Morgenthau was 
at his core “a veiled Freudian” (2007: 64), in particular with regard to his 
conception of human nature as defined by selfishness and the animus dominan-
di, is open to significant objections. 
The first of these has to do with the aforementioned issue of overdetermination. 
Schuett states that Freud continuously referred to the ego instinct as hunger and 
the sexual instinct as love, quoting Freud’s statement that “[he] took as [his] 
starting-point a saying of the poet-philosopher, Schiller, that ‘hunger and love 
are what moves [sic] the world’” (ibid: 59). Schuett notes that Morgenthau also 
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used the terms ‘hunger’ and ‘love’ to describe the primary human drives in his 
1930 essay on the derivation of the political from the nature of man; and because 
Morgenthau was experimenting with Freud’s ideas at this time, and kept variants 
of the distinction in his later work, Schuett says, “we might well argue that Mor-
genthau’s anthropology stems from Freud’s pre-Thanatos instinct theory” (ibid: 
60). 
But Schuett’s choice of quotation is troublesome for his argument. For if Freud 
took Schiller as a starting point for his project, what is to prevent us from hypo-
thesising that Morgenthau did not do the same, and used Freud merely as an 
auxiliary in his quest to understand human nature? Schiller was, after all, a poet 
every German schoolboy learned by heart, and Morgenthau is sure to have read 
him long before he read Freud. Compounding the problem further is the fact that 
it was not only Schiller’s maxim that provided intellectual foundations upon 
which an understanding of the driving forces of human nature as hunger and 
love could be built, but also a long-standing and influential philosophical tradi-
tion. For as Freud conceded – in a rare acknowledgement of intellectual debt – 
his own ideas “were not entirely new. The incomparable significance of sexual 
life had [already] been proclaimed by Schopenhauer” (Freud 1925: 217). Fur-
thermore, Freud added, there was another philosopher whose “premonitions and 
insights often agree in the most amazing manner with the laborious results of 
psychoanalysis” (quoted in Kaufmann 1960: 472) – namely, Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Although Freud often declared in public that he had never read 
Nietzsche during his formative years (or indeed at all), out of concern for “the 
preservation of [his own] open-mindedness” (ibid.), the many references to, 
quotations from, and parallels with the latter’s work in Freud’s published and 
unpublished manuscripts seem to positively contradict this claim (Chapman and 
Chapman-Santana 1995; Lehrer 1995; Assoun 2002). 
Nevertheless, whether Freud was or was not influenced by Nietzsche is largely 
beside the point. Of more concern to us is the fact that both Freud and Nietzsche 
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developed their ideas about what they considered to be the primary human drive 
– in the one case, as ‘Eros,’ and in the other, as ‘will to power’ – with reference 
to ancient Greek thinking about love.  
According to Freud himself, “what psychoanalysis called sexuality was by no 
means identical with the impulsion towards a union of the two sexes or towards 
producing a pleasurable sensation in the genitals; it had far more resemblance to 
the all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato’s Symposium” (Freud 1925: 
218). Indeed, the very fact that the final development of Freud’s instinct theory 
rests on ancient Greek terminology – ‘Eros’ and ‘Thanatos’ – is a clear example 
of his foundational debt to classical culture; essentially, these terms act as lin-
guistic signifiers of the supposed universality of Freud’s theory, to wit, of its 
reach beyond fin-de-siècle bourgeois Europe through history to the ancients and 
beyond. The ‘Oedipus complex’ is yet another, more famous instance of the way 
in which Freud framed his thinking about human nature in terms taken from an-
cient Greek literature and in the conceptual structures he found, or at least belie-
ved he found, there.  
As for Nietzsche: many noted scholars have demonstrated his engagement with 
Greek ideas about love, particularly in terms of the centrality of Dionysus and 
the eroticism associated with the god, for Nietzsche’s understanding of Greek 
tragedy and philosophy (Nussbaum 1991; Babich 2006), and as they influenced 
his idea that “all nature was pervaded by an Eros that he called the will to po-
wer” (Kaufmann 1974: 255). Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche’s development of 
this idea “is full of allusions to Plato’s Symposium, which, almost certainly, sug-
gested these ideas to him” (ibid; cf. Cooper 2008).  
Given Nietzsche’s training as a classical philologist, this may not seem particu-
larly surprising; nevertheless we should remember that Nietzsche’s “most sho-
cking claim, from the point of view of traditional German aesthetics” was that 
tragic art, like all art, “is not only not pure of practical interest, it is actually the 
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outgrowth of a profoundly erotic interest” (Nussbaum 1991: 108). That is, al-
though the society in which Nietzsche lived and was educated was saturated 
with references to ancient civilisation, the novel way in which Nietzsche inter-
preted Greek culture and in particular Greek tragedy as influenced by eros pro-
ved very disturbing for his contemporaries. Despite their familiarity with the 
formal content of tragedy and other aspects of classical art, 19th century Euro-
peans had not viewed these things from the radical ‘Dionysian’ perspective 
Nietzsche presented. 
There are, in other words, significant similarities between Nietzsche and Freud 
in their understandings of human nature – similarities which are largely rooted 
in the fact that both men had, as a result of their idiosyncratic engagement with 
the ancient Greeks and with tragedy in particular, “rediscovered the autonomy of 
the dark and evil forces which, as manifestations of the unconscious, determine 
the fate of man” (Morgenthau quoted in Schuett 2007: 58; cf. Frei 2001: 100). 
Tragic eros acts as a reference point and as conceptual support for both 
Nietzsche and Freud in their philosophical endeavours, which were developed 
within an ‘interpretive community’  that could be said to have included Scho14 -
penhauer, Plato and, perhaps, many others besides. The primary interpretive 
strategy that links these authors is their emphasis on the significance and explo-
 Stanley Fish defines interpretive communities as essentially unknowable groups of individ14 -
uals that apply the same, or similar, interpretive strategies in their reading (or as he puts it, 
their ‘making’) of texts. He explains interpretive strategies in the following way: when ‘I’ be-
gin to read pastoral poetry, for example, “I am immediately predisposed to perform certain 
acts, to ‘find’, by looking for, themes (the relationship between natural processes and the ca-
reers of men, the efficacy of poetry or any other action), to confer significances (on flowers, 
streams, shepherds, pagan deities), to mark out ‘formal’ units (the lament, the consolation, the 
turn, the affirmation of faith, and so on). My disposition to perform these acts (and others: the 
list is not meant to be exhaustive) constitutes a set of interpretive strategies, which, when they 
are put into execution, become the larger act of reading. That is to say, interpretive strategies 
are not put into execution after reading (the pure act of perception in which I do not believe); 
they are the shape of reading, and because they are the shape of reading, they give their texts 
shape, making them rather than, as it is usually assumed, arising from them” (1980: 168).  
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ration of irrationality and in particular the theme of the erotic in tragedy, as well 
as the question as to how emotions like eros relate to politics, culture more gene-
rally, and, at the broadest level, to life itself. 
As the following chapter will make clear, Morgenthau identified with this ‘ero-
tic’ tradition of commentary on tragedy. For the moment, it is enough to note 
that he developed his ideas about human nature and in particular the animus do-
minandi in great measure, though not exclusively, in response to the ideas of 
both Nietzsche and Freud. That Morgenthau read Nietzsche prior to encounte-
ring Freud does not militate against this conclusion, for it is true that the drive 
for self-preservation that Morgenthau describes in his unpublished 1930 manus-
cript and elsewhere appears in Freud but definitely does not, in any significant 
sense, appear in Nietzsche. On the other hand, we need not believe that Morgen-
thau accepted Freud’s writings uncritically – his autobiographical remarks make 
this much clear (Morgenthau 1978a: 67) – or that he abandoned the insights he 
had earlier gleaned from Nietzsche (Frei 2001: 113). It is likely that he used both 
as malleable intellectual material to help form his own conclusions about human 
nature and the kind of politics it gives rise to – a likelihood lent credence by his 
conceptual clarifications of the two drives (selfishness and the will to power/
animus dominandi) in an article published in 1945. 
In ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, Morgenthau reproduces the same 
distinction between selfishness and the will to power which, though couched in 
slightly different terms, occurs in his 1930 essay on the derivation of the politi-
cal from the nature of man (as, indeed, it occurs in other, later works as well). 
Schuett, as we have seen, claims that this distinction is essentially Freudian, and 
insists that, “following Freud’s instinct dualism, the two instincts are [for Mor-
genthau] necessarily independent of each other and stand in fierce 
opposition” (2007: 60).  
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When viewed in the light of ‘The Evil of Politics’, however, Schuett’s conclu-
sion is clearly not justified. For according to Morgenthau, 
By setting in this way the desire for power apart from selfishness, 
on the one hand, and from the transcendent urges, on the other, one 
is already doing violence to the actual nature of that desire. For ac-
tually it is present whenever man intends to act with regard to other 
men. One may separate it conceptually from the other ingredients 
of social action; actually there is no social action which would not 
contain at least a trace of this desire to make one’s own person pre-
vail against others. (1945: 13-4) 
Thus the structure of Morgenthau’s thinking about ‘love’ and ‘hunger’ (or, in 
other words, the will to power and selfishness) is neither purely Nietzschean nor, 
as Schuett would have it, purely Freudian in character; it contains elements of 
both as well as its own original elements. In an intellectual climate in which 
Nietzsche and Freud stood out as hugely influential figures, Morgenthau, unsur-
prisingly, appears to have engaged with them both as interlocutors in the deve-
lopment in his own theory of human nature.  
It is therefore not really necessary to conduct paternity tests to discover exactly 
who Morgenthau’s “intellectual father” (Schuett 2007: 59) may be. A more fit-
ting analogy than this biological one is perhaps as follows. If, as Morgenthau 
claims, “the difference between international politics as it actually is and a ratio-
nal theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph and a 
painted portrait” (1978b: 7), where the portrait, unlike the photograph, does not 
show everything but rather only the human essence of the person portrayed, we 
might call the young Morgenthau a budding Impressionist; Morgenthau’s choice 
of colours, brushstrokes, subjects and themes may have been heavily influenced 
by the masters that went before him, but the hand that painted his theory of poli-
tics and the eye that guided it were none but his own.  
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It is also important to reiterate that Morgenthau turned to these thinkers not only 
for insights into human nature but also for guidance regarding the world of the 
ancients and in particular its peculiar creation, tragedy; their thoughts on these 
topics helped shape his own tragic vision of politics. It is of course true that 
Aristotle was another important source for Morgenthau in this regard, but the 
former’s cool, uninterrupted quest for rationality in tragic art and life per se ap-
parently required tempering by the investigation of ‘Dionysian’ eroticism that 
lay at the foundation of Nietzsche’s and Freud’s understandings of Greek 
culture, which Morgenthau himself made part of his political reasoning. Never-
theless, as we will see in the following parts of this chapter, Morgenthau’s un-
derstanding of the terms ‘love’ and ‘power’ are ultimately rooted, just as they 
were for Freud and Nietzsche, in the classical discourse on eros – which is per-
haps not too surprising in light of the facts that Morgenthau counted Plato’s 
Symposium (which he could read in the original Greek) among the ten books 
that meant the most to him (Frei 2001: 25, 113).  
 (ii) Morgenthau, Tyranny and War 
Before concluding this part of the chapter it would be wise to briefly mention 
the political context in which Morgenthau came of age, encountered the ideas of 
Nietzsche and Freud, and began developing his own ideas about politics in ear-
nest. This time was effectively coterminous with the life of the Weimar Repu-
blic. One event in Morgenthau’s life during this period is revealing of the effect 
that Weimar politics had on his philosophical outlook and on the political ques-
tions that he felt were pressing. In 1922, at the age of 18, Morgenthau watched 
Adolf Hitler speak in his hometown of Coburg. This was an experience that 
troubled him for the rest of his life. “I will never forget,” he said many years la-
ter, “the paralysis of will that took hold of me while I was listening to this 
man” (quoted in Frei: 21). For a long time after and indeed even before this 
event, however, street brawls between various political parties, anti-Semitic per-
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secution, assassinations, and general disorder had been tearing the civil society 
of Coburg apart.  
Young Morgenthau, sensitive boy as he was, was thus for long periods confron-
ted in his day-to-day existence by the frightening, unpredictable outcomes of the 
Weimar democracy and the challenges of extremism that the Germany of his day 
was faced with. The passion and violence of competing ideologies, the radical 
love of one’s own that bordered on madness, the perverse ability of charismatic 
leaders to persuade and even to hypnotise, to elicit from their listeners emotional 
responses that could then be manipulated for particular political programs, toge-
ther with the menace of tyranny constantly lurking in the shadows of democracy 
– all of these issues were, for Morgenthau, clear and immediate and posed real 
personal dangers from the very first days of his majority until the day he left 
Germany for Switzerland in February 1932. The dramatic events that shook 
Germany and the world in the years to come only proved to Morgenthau the en-
ormity of the political problems that, with the help of the insights he had gained 
from others along the way, he took it upon himself to attempt to solve or, at 
least, to mitigate through his scholarship. 
In summary, we can see that the historical context – both intellectual and politi-
cal – in which Morgenthau matured created an environment conducive to his at-
tempt to create a tragic vision of politics based upon the classical discourse of 
eros. Nietzsche and Freud can be said to have provided Morgenthau with a set of 
interpretive strategies for reading – or in Stanley Fish’s term, for ‘making’ – 
tragedy, the terminology and conceptual content of which he then used to frame 
the political problems that he himself witnessed. The ways in which he framed 
and attempted to explain these problems form the core of the discussion that fol-
lows. 
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Section Two: Morgenthau on Love and Power 
(i) Loneliness, Love and Power 
The concept of power is fundamental to Morgenthau’s intellectual approach to 
the study of international relations. The idea that on the international plane the 
immediate interest of a state is always power was for Morgenthau the “main si-
gnpost that helps political realism find its way through the landscape of interna-
tional politics” (1978b: 5). All foreign policy, he consistently argued, “is only 
the will to maintain, increase or assert [one nation’s] power” (2012: 118) vis-à-
vis other states and political organisations. 
In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau defines political power as all of those 
social relationships that serve to establish and maintain the control of man over 
man; accordingly its form can range “from physical violence to the most subtle 
psychological ties by which one mind controls another” (1978: 11). This book is 
in large part devoted “to the meticulous analysis of these different forms of em-
pirical power” (Rösch 2014: 8), and draws upon such historical examples as 
temporally and geographically dissimilar as the Peloponnesian and Vietnam 
wars to illustrate what he calls the “objective laws” of politics that have their 
roots in human nature and which have not changed “since the classical philoso-
phies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover [them]” (Morgenthau 
1978: 4).  
Another of Morgenthau’s major works, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, 
also deals with the issue of power, albeit from a different perspective. This book 
is, in essence, a polemic directed against what Morgenthau believes are dange-
rously optimistic visions of a world in which power relations can be eradicated. 
But already in his doctoral dissertation, many years prior to both Scientific Man 
and Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau was arguing that “[when] we assign 
the term ‘political’ to [an] activity … we mean by this that this activity is the 
expression of [an actor’s] will to power” (2012: 107). In short, for Morgenthau 
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the political realm was and would always be defined by the will to and exercise 
of power. This conviction runs like the thread of Ariadne throughout his labyrin-
thine corpus – without it, he himself says, the theoretical understanding of poli-
tics would be impossible (1978: 5). 
In light of all this, the importance of the concept of power in Morgenthau’s 
broader understanding of politics needs no further elucidation; its centrality to 
his theory is not in doubt. What does require exploration and explanation, on the 
other hand, is Morgenthau’s account of the link between power, politics and hu-
man nature, insofar as for him “[all] phenomena that we designate as political 
take us back to the human psyche as the source of the political” and, therefore, 
“the only way to gain insight into the nature of the political is to understand the 
nature of the human soul” (quoted in Frei 2001: 125). 
We are now led to consider the little-noted examination of the nature of humani-
ty in ‘Love and Power’, which, Ty Solomon writes, “constitutes some of [Mor-
genthau’s] deepest thinking about power itself and moves far beyond the well-
known discussions in his other works” (2012: 202). More to the point for the 
purposes of this thesis, the article in question also demonstrates the depth to 
which Morgenthau’s theory is indebted to the concept of ‘erotic politics’ that has 
been the focus of the dissertation thus far. 
In ‘Love and Power’ (1962a) Morgenthau lays out his own understanding of the 
primary roles these two phenomena play in defining the human condition, in de-
tail and in explicit contradistinction to the stunted, soulless conception of huma-
nity he alleges is the product of the modern mind, particularly as this is expres-
sed in the philosophical traditions of Marxism and Liberalism. For not only do 
moderns deny the organic and inescapable connection between power and love, 
he says; they are ignorant of the root of loneliness from which both stem – the 
soul, the only soil in which existential qualities such as loneliness can grow. 
Thus, Morgenthau argues, “[while] the modern mind denies the intrinsic relation 
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between the lust for power and human nature, transcending all historic configu-
rations, antedating them, as it were, and even determining them, it does not un-
derstand the nature of love at all;” and by doing so, he adds ruefully, it falla-
ciously sees in the power of one person over another “not an ineluctable out-
growth of human nature but only an ephemeral phenomenon, the product of a 
peculiar historic configuration, bound to disappear with the disappearance of 
that configuration” (ibid: 247).  
According to Morgenthau, we can rid ourselves of this dangerous illusion only 
once we understand love and power in the way they should be understood: na-
mely, side by side, as part and parcel of the same existential desire for wholeness 
– or, put differently, for community. In his words, we must recognise the para-
dox that “the lust for power is, as it were, the twin of despairing love” (ibid: 
249). It is only once we have acknowledged this fact, it seems, that we will truly 
be able to open our minds to “the tragic sense of life, the awareness of unresol-
vable discord, contradictions, and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of 
things and which human reason is powerless to solve” (1946: 206). 
But why do love and power loom so large in human life? And how and why 
exactly are they the same in all but name? In a manner owing much to Plato’s 
Aristophanes, Morgenthau claims that the ubiquity of power and love in the his-
tory of human relationships can be traced to the fact that loneliness is the quality 
that defines human beings qua human beings.  
“Of all creatures,” Morgenthau writes, “only man is capable of loneliness be-
cause only he is in need of not being alone, without in the end to escape being 
alone” (1962: 247). In this “existential loneliness,” the insufficiency of human 
beings to fulfill themselves manifests itself; being alone, man realises that “he 
cannot become what he is destined to be, by his own effort, in isolation from 
other beings” (ibid.). The awareness of insufficiency that is created in the indi-
vidual by this realisation is what creates both the longing for love and the lust 
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for power – in the same way, we might say, that an empty belly gives rise to 
hunger. For according to Morgenthau, relations of love and power are a human 
being’s natural means for overcoming loneliness, as a result of their capacity to 
duplicate a person’s individuality; they are the means to achieve a kind of spiri-
tual transcendence, or more precisely completion, in the communities they at-
tempt to make possible (Mollov 2002: 96).  
Morgenthau defines love as a psychological relationship marked by the com-
plete and spontaneous surrender of two human beings to one another, a mutual 
giving which nevertheless stops short of a complete abdication of their respec-
tive individualities. For although these two people may long to be together as 
one, Morgenthau argues, they must also feel the need to preserve their own and 
each other’s selves, if only for the sake of their love for one another. This argu-
ment, however, leads to a somewhat strange conclusion: namely, that it is love 
itself that stands in the way of its own consummation. That is, in order to conti-
nue loving each other, the lovers who desire union must nevertheless keep the 
defining points of their own individual characters and wills intact, for these are 
what constitute their mutual objects of desire. Morgenthau acknowledges this 
paradox, and sums up the phenomenon of love as “the most perfect union two 
human beings are capable of, without losing their respective 
individualities” (1962a: 248).  
The struggle to maintain one’s own individuality and the individuality of one’s 
romantic quarry in the face of eros, however, sows the seeds for the generation 
of a power relationship; for it is all too often, Morgenthau says (quoting Socrates 
in the Phaedrus), that “as wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves” (ibid.). 
That is, the hunger for union that drives a lover on towards the object of his af-
fection is a constant menace to the well-being and autonomy of the other person, 
insofar as it contains within itself a darker shade of desire which seeks to break 
down or destroy the individuality of one’s lover in order to incorporate that self 
into one’s own. Eros, as the need for self-completion, simultaneously seeks the 
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integrity of the beloved as well as his or her destruction – essentially, it wants to 
make one person out of two.  
Hence, for the continued satiation of eros (which, we can assume, belongs to 
both partners) the relationship of love is therefore necessarily infused with some 
quantum of power, in order for the lovers to create a unified will; without power, 
Morgenthau argues, love remains only a succession of exaltations. Love, then, is 
pure only when the wills of both A and B spontaneously reach perfect, natural 
symmetry; only then does love extricate itself from all vestiges of power. But 
given the inevitable – and, indeed, desirable – differences that exist between two 
people, such flawless symmetry cannot exist for any great length of time (except 
in the Liebestod, which unites the lovers in eternity at the price of their own in-
dividual annihilation).  Without power, which burns away some of these diffe-
rences of will and individual preference, a stable relationship of love cannot 
exist.  
In sum, then, with the aid of love man discovers another human being so like 
himself – “the Platonic other half of his soul” (1962a: 248) – and yet different 
enough from him that he is able, for a fleeting moment at least, to create the 
union that makes him feel complete and thereby satisfies his most basic human 
need. Nevertheless, he must rely, to a greater or lesser degree, on the psycholo-
gical machinations of power to maintain a context of interaction in which this 
feeling of reunion can be experienced continually.  
In a relationship defined by power, on the other hand, one person simply im-
poses himself upon another so that the will of the object of his power mirrors his 
own. Power is thus not only a doomed attempt to achieve communion in the ab-
sence of reciprocated desire; it is a focused attempt to “break down the barrier of 
individuality which love, because it is love, must leave intact” (ibid: 249). If the 
exercise of power succeeds in achieving its goal of domination, it will neverthe-
less be able to manufacture only an “artificial community” (ibid: 251) which 
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must forever remain a substitute for, and spite to, the real reunion that can only 
be built by love.  
The process of creating community, of forging a relationship of egalitarian love 
out of one based on domination and reluctant submission, is according to Mor-
genthau what constitutes the problem of political stability; and this, he says, is a 
crucial issue with which all political orders must come to terms (ibid: 250; cf. 
Morgenthau 2004: 15). No political society, he told his students in 1952, “can 
exist for any length of time in any harmonious and stable way which does not 
take into consideration both the desire for power and the desire for love” (quo-
ted in Mollov 1998: 98). All masters, on all levels of social interaction, have 
throughout history sought to solve the problem of community by basing their 
power upon the spontaneous consent of their subjects; they have always attemp-
ted to make the objects of their power come to love them – to forge them into 
their Platonic other halves, as it were. To prove his point, Morgenthau draws on 
the examples of Nazism and Stalinism and their continuous references to ‘the 
beloved leader,’ and notes also the conversations between Napoleon and de Las 
Cases on St Helena in which the fallen emperor bemoaned his fate and the fact 
that even in the fullness of his power he could still find nobody worthy of his 
trust or affection.  
These facts do not, however, serve to completely disqualify power as a strategy 
for overcoming the existential loneliness of the self. For if the object of one’s 
power can somehow be made to will also what oneself wills, not from induce-
ment or fear but from autochthonous consent, then one’s power will be based 
not on promises or threats but rather upon the respect, care and esteem of the 
other person for oneself – it will be based on love. Achieving this state of affairs 
relies on the master creating the external conditions for the object of his power 
so as to encourage the growth of real affection for him. Morgenthau believes this 
is possible; as such, for him, the power relationship can in some very rare ins-
tances forge a genuine community – that is, it can create a relationship of love. 
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Rather disturbingly, however, this rare relationship appears to occur, whenever it 
does occur, in the form of totalitarianism:  
One would misunderstand the nature of democracy and totalitaria-
nism as well as their relationship were one to suggest that totalita-
rian elections are necessarily and always a sham and that they never 
reflect the true will of the people. They may well reflect that will, 
as elections in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy undoubtedly have, 
expressing a consensus between the popular will and the govern-
ment. Here lies the decisive difference between traditional autocra-
cy and modern totalitarianism. Autocracy imposes its will upon an 
indifferent or hostile people; totalitarianism aims at, and may suc-
ceed in, governing with the consent of the governed. (Morgenthau 
1957: 717-8) 
Even so, the transformation of the unilateral imposition of power into the spon-
taneous mutuality of love remains, in a political sphere that is by its very nature 
defined by power, more of an ideal than an attainable goal. “The world conque-
ror can subject all the inhabitants of the earth to his will,” Morgenthau says, “but 
he cannot compel a single one to love him” (1962a: 250). The search for love 
therefore usually leads, in “the most passionate” of men, from a despair in lon-
ging for universal approval to blind and destructive hate; “the Genghis Khans, 
Hitlers, and Stalins lash out with unreasoning fury at their subjects whom they 
can dominate but whose love they cannot command” (ibid: 247). Political domi-
nation, Morgenthau concludes, is thus “a product of nature itself” (1945: 5).  
In light of all this, Morgenthau argues that it is the common quality of love and 
power that each contains an element of the other; “there is,” he says, “in even 
the crudest power relationships an irreducible element of love … Those who 
must use and suffer power would rather be united in love” (1962a: 250). 
According to Morgenthau, the need for love, the desire for spiritual completion 
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in an unforced and spontaneous union, is universal and born into every human 
being. The will to power is likewise present whenever people intend to act with 
regard to others. In fact, the will to power is inherent even to such phenomena as 
the mystic’s desire for union with the universe, the ambition of the mountaineer 
climbing a rock-face, the quest of the scholar seeking knowledge, and the drive 
of the poet to catch the essence of life in words – it is in other words all-perva-
sive, becoming political only when it touches upon other people as its objects 
(Pichler 1998). Thus Morgenthau told his students in 1952 that “[in] Napoleon 
you have the most impressive example of a man who comes closest to having 
absolute aspirations for power. He might have become a great religious mystic 
or a great lover, such as Don Juan” (quoted in Mollov 1998: 97-8). Despite their 
apparent differences in means, both love and power nevertheless possess, and 
are capable of attaining but for the briefest of moments, the very same end: the 
construction of a community in which a number of people share, as much as 
possible, the same identity, values and desires. 
Put differently, as definitive characteristics of human relationships, love and 
power exist on a vertical spectrum defined at the top by equality, good will, sha-
red gain, and mutual pleasure, and at the bottom by hierarchy, manipulation, ex-
ploitation, and domination. Power is embedded in the structure of love, and its 
influence acts as a kind of gravity to prevent love’s pure form from being reali-
sed for any great length of time. The desire for a loving relationship, on the 
other hand, is essentially what motivates the master’s attempts to change his en-
vironment through the use of power – and as such the power relationship is 
continually driven to push itself upwards, into the realm of love. Power’s near 
inevitable failure to achieve a loving union, however, usually gives rise to love’s 
perversion – hate – as the defining characteristic of the relationship it has built. 
“Master and subject,” Morgenthau concludes, “are at the bottom of their souls 
lovers who have gone astray” (1962a: 250). 
The longing for love and the will to power are, thus, genetically identical as res-
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ponses to the existential fact of human loneliness; it is only the environment in 
which they find themselves that differentiates them from one another. Where 
love is not reciprocated, power must be employed in its stead. In Morgenthau’s 
words: in its ultimate consummation, power “is the same as love, albeit love is 
corrupted by an irreducible residue of power. Love, in its ultimate corruption, is 
the same as power, albeit power is redeemed by an irreducible element of 
love” (ibid: 248). 
 (ii) Morgenthau’s Debts to the Ancients 
In order to make all of this clearer, and to prepare the ground for our discussion 
of freedom (and, in the following chapter, tragedy) in Morgenthau’s work, it is 
necessary to consider those instances in which Morgenthau deals explicitly with 
ancient thinking on eros in ‘Love and Power’. Both of these instances have been 
noted in passing above. In the first instance, Morgenthau cites Aristophanes in 
Plato’s Symposium as having provided “the classic description of the nature of 
pure love,” defining it in terms of “the desire and pursuit of the whole” (ibid: 
246). This Aristophanic conception of love has been considered in depth in the 
previous chapter, and it is not necessary to recount it here in full. It is sufficient 
to remind the reader that Aristophanes’ understanding of eros is essentially a 
tragic one, in which love is both the creator and the destroyer of life. Love, for 
Aristophanes, is at its core a renunciation of one’s law-defined humanity in the 
pursuit of a greater self – a pursuit which will almost always come to grief. Eros 
is a fundamentally ambiguous emotion that is linked via an inherently impious 
ambition to both joyous creativity and violent destruction.  
Both for Plato’s Aristophanes and Morgenthau, then, love is characterised by 
tragedy, and it is clear that the latter self-consciously draws on the former for 
philosophical inspiration. If Plato’s Aristophanes has given the “classic descrip-
tion” of pure love, as Morgenthau claims, then Aristophanes’ conception must 
be coterminous with what Morgenthau means by the term – for it is reasonable 
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to assume that the classic (not ‘classical’) description is a timeless description. 
We can therefore conclude that the Symposium forms the ground of Morgen-
thau’s discursive setting regarding love.  
But what should we make of the will to power? Is this, too, erotic? Morgenthau 
suggests that this is indeed the case. Briefly after his explanation of the Aristo-
phanic definition of love, Morgenthau quotes Socrates’ summary of the rhetori-
cian Lysias’ understanding of eros in the Phaedrus; “as wolves love lambs,” So-
crates says there, “so lovers love their loves” (ibid: 247). According to Morgen-
thau, this is the corrupted form of eros. The following excerpt from Socrates’ 
first speech in the Phaedrus helps to illuminate why Morgenthau should think 
this is the case: 
We must realise that each of us is ruled by two principles which we 
follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, 
the other is our acquired judgement that pursues what is best. So-
metimes these two are in agreement; but there are times when they 
quarrel inside us, and then sometimes one of them gains control, 
sometimes the other. Now when judgement is in control and leads 
us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is cal-
led sophrosune; but when desire takes command in us and drags us 
without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as 
hubris … The unreasoning desire that overpowers a person’s 
considered impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure in 
beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in hu-
man bodies – this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drives, takes 
its name from the word for force (rhōmē) and is called eros 
(237e-238c). 
It is important to point out that the form of love that Socrates is describing here 
is essentially the same as the ‘common love’ identified in the Symposium by a 
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number of speakers, including Aristophanes and indeed Socrates himself (cf. 
Phaedr. 243c-d). It is not what Socrates considers ‘true’ or ‘heavenly’ to be, for 
in this case Socrates is actually satirising Lysias’ speech on eros, which he 
considers erroneous.  
In the Symposium, we remember, common love is also associated with bodily 
love, heterosexuality, tyrants, community discord, impiety, sickness and infertili-
ty (the tale of Oedipus comes to mind), and is contrasted with a ‘heavenly love’ 
that is associated with intellectuality, homoeroticism, tyrannicide, communal 
harmony, productivity, health, great ambition and extraordinary feats (characte-
rised by the likes of Harmodius and Aristogeiton or Achilles and Patroclus). So-
crates (or more properly speaking, Plato) reproduces these same associations in 
great measure also in the Phaedrus.  
It seems quite clear, then, that common eros is largely equivalent to Morgen-
thau’s concept of the animus dominandi. It is ‘evil’ insofar as it treats people so-
lely as means and is therefore almost always detrimental to its object, creating as 
it does short-term relationships based on self-interest, domination, exploitation 
and manipulation (we can safely assume that a lamb is never happy in a wolf’s 
jaws). The animus is overpowering, omnipresent, and characterised by destruc-
tive hubris. Indeed, Morgenthau confirms this much: Socrates, he says, “pre-
sents a picture of the love relation which is tantamount to what we would call a 
relationship of power” (1962a: 247). 
It seems reasonable to conclude in light of all this that Morgenthau’s thoughts on 
love and power have been significantly influenced by the classical and particu-
larly Platonic discourse on eros, which distinguished between heavenly and 
common eros. For Morgenthau, these variations of eros correspond with love 
and the will to power, respectively. As we will see in the following chapter, So-
crates’ comparison of common eros and hubris in this regard is especially illu-
minating.  
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To summarise, in Morgenthau’s view love and the will to power are two shades 
of the same desire, which for the ancients went by the name of eros. Despite the 
ultimate identity of the longing for love and the will to power, however, the 
transformation of the unilateral imposition of power (‘common’ love) into the 
spontaneous mutuality of ‘heavenly’ love remains almost impossible. In the end, 
it is only through the establishment of true union, in love with another person or 
persons, that the loneliness of the individual self can be overcome. That much 
being so, pure love can appear only for the briefest of moments, and the rela-
tionships in which it can regularly manifest itself are always at risk of being 
completely corrupted by the common love that is the basis of power. This inabi-
lity to solve the riddle of life, Morgenthau says, is “the tragedy of both power 
and love” (ibid.)  
These thoughts feed into Morgenthau’s understanding of the human tragedy. As 
responses to our existential loneliness, neither love nor power can fully or fore-
ver satiate the human craving for wholeness, and their failure is what constitutes 
the tragedy that defines us. According to Morgenthau, “Christian ethics demands 
love, humility, the abnegation of self; man as a natural creature seeks the ag-
grandizement of self through pride and power. It is the tragedy of man that he is 
incapable, by dint of his nature, to do what Christian ethics demands of 
him” (1962b: 15). Put differently: all men are commanded to love and desire to 
be free, but we find man everywhere seeking to exploit and enslave – only to 
find himself in chains of his very own making. 
Human beings are, therefore, fundamentally corrupted creatures, doomed to lead 
Sisyphean lives in which unfulfilled longing and lack of achievement are central 
and intractable aspects. Even if, through the illusions of religion, the predestined 
failure of both love and power as real-world remedies for the human condition 
can for more than a moment somehow be overcome, death ultimately puts to an 
end all hope of spiritual satisfaction: 
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[In] the end, his wings seared, his heart-blood spent, his projects 
come to nought – despairing of power and thirsting for, and forsa-
ken by, love – man peoples the heavens with gods and mothers and 
virgins and saints who love him and whom he can love and to 
whose power he can subject himself spontaneously because their 
power is the power of love. Yet, whatever he expects of the other 
world, he must leave this world as he entered it: alone. (1962a: 251; 
cf. Plat. Phaedr. 248) 
This position is Morgenthau’s bleakest pessimism, and it forms the basis of his 
vision of man and politics. As Nicholas Rengger notes, the incompleteness of 
man is “a theme to which [Morgenthau] returns again and again … Human 
beings are necessarily and always imperfect and can never overcome 
this” (2005: 324, original emphasis). 
 (iii) Tyranny and Democracy, Power and Love 
Moving on to Morgenthau’s thoughts on democracy, we turn to a short and sore-
ly neglected essay published in 1957. Here, Morgenthau discusses the problems 
of freedom in a manner that hints at the erotic theory of politics he later makes 
explicit in ‘Love and Power’. He begins by quoting Abraham Lincoln’s Sanitary 
Fair Speech, made during the Civil War, in which Lincoln lays bare “the essen-
tials of the dilemma which has baffled the philosophic understanding of freedom 
and which has made it appear that there was always something left to be desired 
in its political realization” (1957: 714).  
Lincoln laments the fact that history lacks a satisfactory definition of liberty, no-
ting that while everybody has always claims to value liberty, they do not all 
mean the same thing by that word. For some, liberty may mean the ability for 
each to do as they please with themselves and the fruit of their labour; for 
others, it means the ability to do as they wish not only with themselves but with 
other people and their property also. Lincoln quite rightly claims that these two 
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ideas are very different, and in the end also incompatible; “it follows,” he says, 
“that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and 
incompatible names – liberty and tyranny” (ibid.). 
Morgenthau makes a similar line of argument. “The political master,” he says, 
“can have his freedom only at the price of the freedom of those who are subject 
to him; the latter can be free only if the master is made to sacrifice his freedom 
as a master” (ibid: 715). It follows from this that the citizens of any society pos-
sessing any sort of government cannot all be equally free – “universal and abso-
lute freedom is a contradiction in terms” (ibid.).  
But if power is a zero-sum equation, every society must somehow determine the 
kind and degree of freedom that each of its members will be able to enjoy. What 
shape such delineations take is determined by the kind of political justice that 
the political order seeks, insofar as “liberty cannot be defined without 
justice” (ibid.). Justice, in its turn, depends upon an understanding of political 
truth – or, more specifically, it depends upon an understanding of who is able to 
access this truth.  
Morgenthau argues that all historical attempts at realizing freedom have been 
derived from one of two conceptions of justice, namely the ‘minoritarian’ and 
the ‘equalitarian.’ The minoritarian conception of justice assumes that only an 
oligarchy, determined by birth, supernatural charisma, wealth or some other kind 
of distinction, is capable of recognizing the political truth. The majority under 
this system is thus indefinitely subject to the will of the few, for the presumed 
good of everybody. This philosophical tradition, according to Morgenthau, 
stretches from the systems devised by Plato and Aristotle to the aristocratic and 
Leninist justifications for their respective systems of government. 
Those who adhere to an equalitarian conception of justice, on the other hand, 
oppose all oligarchies on the ground that “no minority can be politically so wise 
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in comparison with the majority as to possess a monopoly of political 
wisdom” (ibid.). Not even a leader with truly supernatural abilities can bypass 
this problem, Morgenthau writes elsewhere, for since such a leader is “only like 
a god and not a god himself” (2004: 61), he is just as vulnerable to the corrup-
tive influences of power as is anybody else. Indeed, given that he has much 
more opportunity to succumb to temptation than does the average politician, 
precisely because his power is so great, he is at even greater risk of corruption 
than is usual for a human being. As a result of the distortions in judgement that 
power such as this inevitably engenders, the ‘truth’ of a charismatic leader’s po-
litical vision will at some point degenerate into illusion and will create some 
form of injustice. “In other words, even the most powerful human is not virtuous 
and wise enough to limit himself in the exercise of his power. And so the issue 
of political equality is not transcended by the emergence of a charismatic leader” 
(ibid.). 
Equalitarians believe that all members of society have access to some measure 
of political truth, however dimly, and from this it follows that while any given 
understanding of the public good should be able to come to the fore in a given 
society, no one truth should have the chance to prevail over others once and for 
all – not even that of a supremely talented leader who commands the love of his 
entire people. 
Morgenthau claims that within equalitarian societies, the social mechanism that 
has historically evolved to ensure the long-term stability of the volatile competi-
tion of political truths is the periodic majority vote. This democratic mechanism 
works to decide the issue of political truth, if only on each occasion for a brief 
period of time; each election is, in effect, at the same time the death of an old 
ruler and the birth of a new one. 
Popular elections also limit the opportunities for the abuses of power that human 
beings are always tempted to grab; the preferences of the electorate are always 
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present as limitations on the animus dominandi of elected politicians, since they 
are forced to keep these preferences in mind if they are to keep their own desires 
satisfied at the next round of elections. Other checks and balances must also be 
firmly grounded in equalitarian societies, however, or else the freedom of com-
petition essential to the proper functioning of democracy will be impaired and 
then corroded. 
This is because equalitarian societies can be threatened from within in other 
ways than the simple tendency of politicians to abuse their power. One of these 
is when people are forced, by circumstance or design, to choose from among 
candidates for office individuals whose policies are essentially identical and 
judged solely according to efficiency or charisma. In this case, democratic elec-
tions will have lost the ability to protect the freedom of the people, insofar as the 
people will then have no real choice left at all. Choosing men instead of policies 
hollows out the substance of democracy. 
A more insidious threat to freedom than this, however, is the tendency of all ma-
jorities to think and act as if their own will provided the ultimate standard of po-
litical truth. “The majority, as long as it lasts, tends to become the absolute mas-
ter, the tyrant, of the body politic, stifling in that body the vital spirit of questio-
ning and initiative and evoking instead the submissiveness of 
conformity” (1957: 719). The majority, in other words, often does what it can in 
the time available to it in government to cement itself in place as political ortho-
doxy. In theory, Morgenthau says, this tendency is not necessarily disastrous, as 
elections can effectively overthrow any given political orthodoxy in favour of 
another; indeed, “the content of political truth changes with every change in the 
majority” (ibid.: 720). In practice, however, the majoritarian claim to truth is li-
kely to deny, at least implicitly, the right of the minority to make itself the majo-
rity of tomorrow. This assumption thereby works to chip away at the minority’s 
democratic reason for being; its continuing existence, as a living reminder of al-
ternatives, implicitly contests the majority’s claimed monopoly on truth. 
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In the absence of effective laws and institutions to safeguard the freedom of all 
to express and pursue their own visions of the political truth, therefore, only a 
very small step remains to separate imperfect democracy, which is characterised 
by stunted or hindered competition, “from the destruction of competition itself, 
that is, totalitarianism” (ibid.: 718).  
These tendencies toward self-destruction, Morgenthau says, “are inherent in the 
dynamics of democracy itself” (ibid: 720). This is due to the fact that power re-
lationships require the subordination of others creates a situation in which suc-
cessful politicians are continuously striving, consciously or unconsciously, to 
undermine the very principle of equality that they claim to hold dear. Morgen-
thau once told his students that such a dynamic constitutes “a culminating para-
dox” of politics: “a just political order,” he said, “is based upon the principle of 
equality, but it is in the very nature of politics that it divides men on the basis of 
inequality” (2004: 61). This is compounded by the problem of modern libera-
lism, which fully believes in freedom but which, in its attempts to remedy the 
fact that people are everywhere enslaved, creates yet another paradox – “more 
shocking than the first for being the result of liberalism’s own efforts” (1957: 
720) – by forming institutions which limit the freedom of some people so as to 
preserve the freedom of others. Morgenthau concludes that “the philosophy of 
liberalism can provide no intellectual tools with which to master this 
dilemma” (ibid: 721). 
At this point, Morgenthau takes a significant step away from the position of Lin-
coln and the philosophy that he represented in the direction of his tragic vision 
of politics and the eros that underlies it. This is best demonstrated by returning 
briefly to the Sanity Fair Speech, where the President provides an interesting 
analogy to illustrate his points: 
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which the 
sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces 
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him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the 
sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not 
agreed upon a definition of the word liberty; and precisely the same 
difference prevails today among us human creatures, even in the 
North, and all professing to love liberty. (ibid: 714) 
Although, as we have seen, Morgenthau makes Lincoln’s dilemma his own, he 
subtly changes Lincoln’s analogy. For he does not speak of wolves and sheep 
and shepherds, but now of wolves and lambs only. This change is important to 
note for two reasons.  
First, the substitution of ‘lambs’ for ‘sheep’ appears to constitute a reference to 
the common eros described by Socrates in the Phaedrus – a form of eros which 
is, as we seen above, equivalent to Morgenthau’s conception of power. While it 
is true that ‘Love and Power’ was published much later than the article currently 
under discussion, there is no good reason as to why Morgenthau should want to 
alter Lincoln’s imagery; there is simply no rhetorical gain to be achieved by it. 
Indeed, the change dislocates the reader’s attention and on first reading comes 
across as a conspicuous stylistic error. Given that Morgenthau had much earlier 
meditated on the link between eros and the will to power in his readings of 
Nietzsche and Freud, and given that he was intimately familiar with Plato’s 
work, it seems more reasonable to conclude that rather than constituting a jar-
ring and rather obvious mistake, this substitution is an anticipatory manifestation 
of Morgenthau’s ‘erotic politics’, the theory of which Morgenthau later lays out 
in ‘Love and Power’.    
A second point, related to the first, is the fact that in Lincoln’s view, once the 
sheep is ‘liberated’ it is no longer subject to the wolf but now only to its she-
pherd; if the sheep and the wolf still have conflicting definitions of liberty, Ha-
rold White points out, it means that a new definition of the word must be sought. 
To Morgenthau, on the other hand, this situation means that the conflicting defi-
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nitions have to be reconciled, which he does “by identifying freedom and po-
wer” (1957: 724). Douglas Klusmeyer rightly notes that this apparently para-
doxical conception has clear antecedents in the classical Greek understanding of 
freedom, which “at the most basic level [is] derived from the dichotomy bet-
ween master and slave” (2010: 403-4). As we have seen in Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, the dichotomy that Klusmeyer refers to is inextricably intertwined 
with Greek sexuality and this created a central problem for Athenian masculinity 
and the love between men; in a sexual encounter, one man (or youth) was inevi-
tably worse off. These facts seem to add weight to the assumption that, in this 
discussion of democracy at least, Morgenthau has some theoretical form of ero-
tic politics in mind. 
Genuine democracy, Morgenthau says, must forever guard against its tendency 
to degenerate into tyranny, but the way in which it does so will “depend upon 
the values which society attributes, not in the abstract [as Lincoln would have it] 
but in the carving out of concrete spheres of action, to the freedom of the wolves 
and the lambs” (1957: 723). Since neither the lambs nor the wolves can be allo-
wed to go as far as they would like, “society must intervene, deciding the value 
it wishes to put upon their respective capabilities and interests and assigning to 
each a sphere of action” (ibid.). Sometimes this intervention may take the form 
of a clear decision settling the issue once and for – but we might suppose that 
this is yet another path to tyranny, for as he writes elsewhere, “the whole politi-
cal life of a nation, particularly of a democratic nation, from the local to the na-
tional level, is a continuous struggle for power” (1978b: 35). Hence the heal-
thiest and happiest social intervention is one that results in the formation of a 
multifaceted and ever-changing interplay of social forces that continuously 
strive to balance the myriad of competing desires within society. “It is upon that 
complex and shifting ground,” Morgenthau concludes, “that freedom 
rests” (1957: 723).   
Liberalism, with its promise of political salvation, nevertheless refuses to reco-
!256
gnise this fact. As Morgenthau put it in ‘Love and Power’, this kind of philoso-
phy “sees in the power of man over man not an ineluctable outgrowth of human 
nature but only an ephemeral phenomenon, the product of a peculiar historic 
configuration, bound to disappear with the disappearance of that 
configuration” (1962a: 247). As a result of this, liberalism is helpless in the face 
of those cunning wolves that manage to wriggle through the holes in the legal 
and logical fences that it erects to guard the sheep. It is for reasons such as this 
that Morgenthau believes it necessary for us to turn away from traditional libera-
lism, toward “the tragic sense of life [as] the awareness of unresolvable discord, 
contradictions, and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of things and 
which human reason is powerless to solve” (1946: 206). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the will to power is at the heart of Mor-
genthau’s political philosophy. This concept is heavily influenced by his reading 
of Plato’s dialogues. The will to power, in for Morgenthau, is the twin of des-
pairing; love and the lust for power are two shades of the same desire for whole-
ness. For the ancients this desire went by the name of eros. As responses to our 
existential loneliness, however, neither love nor the will to power (in other 
words, eros) can fully or forever satiate the human craving for wholeness. Their 
failure is what constitutes the existential tragedy of man. Human beings are at 
their core fundamentally corrupted creatures, doomed to lead Sisyphean lives in 
which unfulfilled longing and lack of achievement are central and intractable 
aspects. 
One of the ways in which this tragedy manifests itself is in the question of free-
dom. For Morgenthau, as for the Greeks, universal and absolute freedom is a 
contradiction in terms; power is a zero-sum equation, and hence not everyone 
can be a master of others. Liberals, who recognise and deplore human oppres-
sion, seek to liberate whenever possible those individuals they see in chains. In 
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the process of doing this, however, liberals must limit the freedom of the 
‘wolves’ to exercise their own power over others (the ‘lambs’). They must, in 
other words, engage in politics and indulge the evil of power. It may be a 
tragedy that liberals are stuck in this limbo between theoretical ideal and politic-
al reality, but it is a dangerous folly that they fail to recognise the fact that the 
exercise of power in some shape or form is an inescapable element of social ex-
istence. The tendency of democracy to degenerate into tyranny is inherent to the 
nature of government, and liberalism’s neglect of this fact makes society’s slide 
into despotism more likely. To best deal with these problems, Morgenthau sug-
gests, we need to turn to a tragic vision of politics. This tragic vision is the focus 




In the following discussion, I will build upon the conclusions reached in pre-
vious chapters. I will begin by detailing the connections that exist between Mor-
genthau’s thoughts on love and power and the theme of tragedy in his broader 
oeuvre. I will argue that international politics, for Morgenthau, theoretically 
boils down to the dichotomy between love and the lust for power and their root 
in the loneliness that defines the human soul. This is because these phenomena 
are the “elemental biopsychological drives by which … society is 
created” (Morgenthau 1978b: 30) – they are what create the urge for society and 
as a result give birth to all political orders, of whatever scope and level of com-
plexity they eventually come to possess. The tragedy of international politics is 
only a larger manifestation of the fundamental tragedy of man. 
This discussion will place us in a position to interrogate the ways in which Mor-
genthau’s philosophy relates to Thucydides’ History. This endeavour will form 
the core of the second section of the chapter. I argue there that although Morgen-
thau draws mostly upon the Platonic corpus for direct inspiration in theorising 
love and the will to power as twin tragic responses to man’s existential loneli-
ness, the Platonic corpus dealing with eros shared with Thucydides the same 
discursive setting in tragedy, and as a result, Morgenthau and Thucydides 
construct remarkably similar accounts of erotic politics. Morgenthau, in other 
words, found in Thucydides a philosophical forebear whose shared understan-
ding of the basic elements of human behaviour made selectively quoting from 
the History seem a natural and legitimate exercise.  
Section One: Eros and the Tragedy of Political Man 
(i) From the Domestic to the International  
The term ‘tragedy’ is abundant in Morgenthau’s writing, but it refers to very dif-
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ferent phenomena and occurs, often enough, without particularly satisfying or 
coherent definitions. This is, one suspects, the result of the fact that “[elevated] 
to the structure of existence, from a staged drama tragedy becomes [for Morgen-
thau] a special ‘sense of life’” (Paipais 2013: 851). That is, rather than subjec-
ting specific tragic plays to sustained interrogations, it is by drawing on the 
usually unstated (or understated) ideas that inform his tragic philosophy that 
Morgenthau identifies ‘the tragedy of power and love’, ‘the present tragedy of 
America’, ‘the tragedy of German-Jewish liberalism’, ‘the human tragedy’, and 
so on (Klusmeyer 2001; although cf. Morgenthau 1971b). Despite the generally 
underdeveloped conceptualization of tragedy in Morgenthau’s work, however, 
scholars generally agree that a number of ideas can be said to constitute the 
foundations of his ‘tragic philosophy’.  
Particularly prominent among these is the ethical problem of hubris, which has 
been explored most thoroughly by Ned Lebow in The Tragic Vision of Politics. 
According to Lebow, Morgenthau followed in the footsteps of the tragic poets, 
who believed that the cycle of hubris, ate, hamartia, and nemesis “would repeat 
itself as long as humans stride the earth” (2003: 65).  
This pattern of behaviour manifests itself not only in political action itself but 
also in the intellectual means to understand and engage in such action. For the 
will to power, as we have seen, is “of the same kind as the mystical desire for 
union with the universe, the love of Don Juan, [and] Faust’s thirst for know-
ledge” (Morgenthau 1945: 13). These attempts at pushing the individual beyond 
his natural limits towards a transcendent goal, towards self-completion and the 
feeling of divinity, also hold in common the fact that this goal can be reached in 
the imagination but never in reality. Trying to transcend the human condition in 
actual experience, Morgenthau warns, can only end “with the destruction of the 
individual attempting it, as the fate of all world conquerors from Alexander to 
Hitler proves and the legends of Icarus, Don Juan, and Faust symbolically illus-
trate” (ibid.).  
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On this view, the fate of the aspiring tyrant is as it is because the unethical na-
ture of the will to power, that incessant drive to dominate the world and every-
thing in it – the will to become god, as it were – inevitably encounters hatred, 
hostility and resistance. At one point or another, tragic thinkers believe, miscal-
culation or weakness will some day cause the proud to stumble and fall into the 
hands of their enemies, to whose power they will be subject and for whose mer-
cy they must hope. At the root of all power, therefore, lies “the very sin of pride 
against which the Greek tragedians and the biblical prophets have warned rulers 
and ruled” (Morgenthau 1978b: 13, emphasis added).  This ‘sin,’ it seems, 15
forms the ‘fatal flaw’ of tragic figures, and in this regard Morgenthau appears to 
have been influenced by Aristotle’s theory of tragedy.  
As Kostagiannis rightly points out, however, “[the] ethical dimension [to trage-
dy], important as it may be, is but one of the several aspects of tragedy to be 
found in Morgenthau. At another level, tragedy has for Morgenthau an existen-
tial dimension, one that is expressed through his anthropological 
assumptions” (Kostagiannis 2014: 515). The crux of this existential dimension 
of tragedy has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Love and the lust 
for power, as responses to the loneliness that is definitive of the human soul, 
both fail to achieve their aims, and insofar as this is true they exemplify Mor-
genthau’s statement that man, “suspended between his spiritual destiny which he 
cannot fulfil and his animal nature in which he cannot remain, … is forever 
condemned to experience the contrast between the longings of his mind and his 
actual condition as his personal, eminently human tragedy” (1946: 91). From 
this, the inescapable human tragedy based in the lonely soul of man, Morgen-
thau abstracts and extrapolates to describe as ‘tragic’ those political situations 
that present the same discrepancy between longing and lack of achievement that 
characterises the existential condition through love and power. As Frei notes: 
“[as] a corrective to an insipid faith in progress, the tragic calls attention first 
 ‘Rulers and ruled’ is Morgenthau’s equivalent of Thucydides’ ‘tyrant and tyrannicide’.15
!261
and foremost to the limits of human existence, eo ipso to the permanence of the 
abyss between desire and capacity, between the ought to be and the is, between 
ideal and reality” (2001: 187, original emphasis). 
We have seen this point already in our discussion of Morgenthau’s thoughts on 
the dilemmas of freedom, but it is no less common in his other work. In ‘The 
Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, for example, Morgenthau argues that it is 
the ubiquity of the will to power which, beyond any particular selfishness, 
constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action: “Here is the element of corrup-
tion and of sin which injects even into the best of intentions at least a drop of 
evil and thus spoils it. On a grand scale, the transformation of churches into po-
litical organizations, of revolutions into dictatorships, of love for country into 
imperialism, are cases in point” (1945: 14). Hence, we read in Politics Among 
Nations, judging by Robespierre’s motives, the Jacobin leader was one of the 
most virtuous men to have ever lived. Even so, it was the incorruptibility and 
barbaric extremism of his very ‘virtue’ that tied the fates of so many thousands, 
guilty as well as innocent, to the guillotine (1978b: 6).  
Indeed, although Morgenthau does not overtly acknowledge it as such, the 
French Revolution seems to constitute a perfect example of political tragedy – a 
claim for which Robespierre’s statement (in his speech on the principles of poli-
tical morality) that “the government in a revolution is the despotism of liberty 
against tyranny” seems concrete proof. Spoken during the chaotic depths of the 
Terror, there could hardly be a crueller paradox, or a larger lack between moral 
ideal and murderous reality, than what we find here. But, he says, that “national 
self-determination was to become the ideology of new imperialisms and social 
justice the ideological disguise of servitudes new and old was to be 
expected” (1975: 514). 
Morgenthau would elsewhere write more explicitly that what constituted the 
“tragedy of America” was the discrepancy between the ethos of the American 
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Revolution, which defined the domestic moral fabric of the country, and the fact 
that US foreign policy with regard to Indochina bore only “extremely remote re-
lations to that ethos” (1969: 14).  
Morgenthau argues that, having for the most part taken care of the protection of 
life in America, US policymakers concentrated their thoughts and efforts on 
creating the right conditions for the preservation of liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness of their countrymen. In so doing, however, they inappropriately erec-
ted the limited experience of the United States, bound to time and place, into 
one that held for people everywhere: “we assume,” he says of his adopted coun-
trymen, “that what we are allowed to take for granted all men take for granted, 
and that what we are striving for is the object of the aspirations of all 
mankind” (1971a: 202). 
This hubristic identification of the US national interest with the interest of all 
people, Morgenthau says, was based to a large extent on policymakers’ ignorant 
dismissal of the historic connection between democracy and the growth of the 
middle class. Nevertheless, the larger problems that it led to were more deeply 
rooted in a broader philosophical dilemma that was essentially the same as the 
one identified by Lincoln in his Sanity Fair Speech. For if the American and the 
Russian, or the American and the Vietnamese or Cambodian, were able to speak 
to each other they would speak in different tongues: 
and if they uttered the same words, those words would signify to 
them different objects, values and aspirations. So it is with 
concepts, such as democracy, peace, freedom, security. The disillu-
sion of differently constituted minds communicating the same 
words, which embody their most firmly held convictions, deepest 
emotions, and most ardent aspirations, without finding the expected 
sympathetic response, has driven the members of different nations 
further apart and strengthened their conviction of incompatibility of 
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their moral values and political interests. (ibid: 202) 
With ever increasing intensity, therefore, “each of the contestants in the interna-
tional arena claims his “way of life” to possess the whole truth of morality and 
politics which the others may reject only at their peril” (Morgenthau 1948: 99). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, this was especially true of the United States. During this 
tragic time, America found itself suspended between its longing for a free world 
community of democratic peoples, characterised by the pursuit and preservation 
of happiness and liberty, and the reality of its oppressive and imperial behaviour 
in poverty-stricken Indochina. The United States’ idealistic love for the peoples 
of the world had, as a result of the hubris inherent to US policymakers’ identifi-
cation of America’s historical experience with that of all other nations, degenera-
ted into a destructive lust for power over the peoples it claimed to care about but 
whose social needs and interests it utterly ignored. Despite professing, and ori-
ginally possessing, noble intentions, America had in this way stooped to commit 
“that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the biblical pro-
phets have warned rulers and ruled” (1978b: 13) – and as such it was forced to 
suffer the consequences, in the form of much lost blood, honour and treasure. 
It is quite clear, then, that Morgenthau interpreted events in Indochina as consti-
tuting scenes in a tragedy on an enormous scale, involving hundreds of millions 
of people, but a tragedy that was nonetheless in essence not altogether different 
to, for instance, the one that befell Creon and Antigone. Such an interpretation 
makes theoretical sense, given Morgenthau’s conviction that all reflection about 
political reality “must go back to the basis of everything pertaining to the politi-
cal realm … and this basis is man himself” (quoted in Frei: 119).  Nevertheless, 
it requires some explanation if we are to understand how Morgenthau can speak 
so easily of both the tragedies of individual tyrants such as Alexander, Napoleon 
and Hitler and the tragedy of America, in which power is diffuse and decision-
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making capabilities democratically mediated.  For there was, as Morgenthau 16
himself notes, “a difference between the national interests of France and the per-
sonal interests of Napoleon” (2004: 60) and it seems logical that there must also 
exist some differences in the shape of the tragedies that occur on different levels 
of analysis. 
According to Morgenthau, the will to power intrinsically “rejects boundaries” 
and “reaches out to the limits of the social world.” Society, as a result, must be 
“intrinsically based on moderation and limits” (quoted in Frei: 132). This is due 
to the fact that the struggle for spheres of influence will, as a result of the unli-
mited nature of the will to power, naturally tend to unfold into conflict and vio-
lence; recognizing this, and out of concern for their well-being and security, po-
werful people create norms and institutions, such as the taboo against murder 
and its codification in the legal system. These norms work to moderate and 
trammel the behaviour of individuals in ways that help to prevent dissatisfied 
members of a society from tearing the community apart. Lebow summarises it 
nicely: “norms, institutions and laws direct the struggle for power into ritualized 
and socially acceptable channels that prevent its otherwise violent and destruc-
tive consequences” (2003: 225). 
Most individuals within a community nevertheless find their own desire for po-
wer frustrated and unsatisfied in such circumstances. Rather than unsettling the 
status quo to remedy this situation, however, the common man instead attempts 
 It is very odd and somewhat disturbing that Morgenthau, in light of his own traumatic ex16 -
perience of Hitler, speaks of violent and megalomaniacal leaders in such heroic terms. Never-
theless, it was his opinion that “great deeds are valued more highly by Western man than great 
thoughts, and sometimes even bad action is more admired than sound thought. Napoleon’s 
standing in the estimation of posterity has hardly been impaired by his mistakes. He remained 
a hero even after he crossed the Njemen and courted disaster in Russia. But there are not 
many who remember Coulaincourt, the reflective observer who warned him in vain” (Mor-
genthau 1971b: 612). As Frei notes, Morgenthau himself confessed to being “fascinated” by 
all that was “great, exalted, eternal” (2000: 30). These heroic aspects of Morgenthau’s thought 
are important and deserve much more attention than I can give them here.
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to satisfy his desire for power by projecting his own aspirations onto the collec-
tive of the tribe or race or nation; he identifies with, and often enough partici-
pates in, the decisions made and actions undertaken by his rulers, and hence he 
is able to feel the pride or shame that come with the success or failure of these 
actions. By transferring his egotism to the nation, furthermore, the individual not 
only allows his suppressed aspirations some vicarious satisfaction, but also 
transforms the evil and immorality that defines the will to power into something 
noble and altruistic, namely, patriotism. This phenomenon is especially pre-
valent in the modern secular state, which has become the most exalted object of 
loyalty for most individuals and also the most effective organisation for wielding 
power over them (Morgenthau 1945: 15; 1978b: 94-5). 
As we know, Morgenthau’s thoughts on this issue are influenced by Freudian 
psychology. Freud fully articulated that what is forbidden for the individual wi-
thin a nation – namely, the limitless satisfaction of the pleasure principle – can 
sometimes be successfully pursued as a nation through the process of identifica-
tion, and Morgenthau accepted this idea. In contradistinction to the domestic 
sphere, he says, on the international plane there are few norms and institutions 
that can effectively restrain politics from descending into hostility and violence: 
“[the] state’s collective desire for power is limited, aside from self-chosen limi-
tations, only by the ruins of an old, and the rudiments of a new, normative order, 
both too feeble to offer more than a mere intimation of actual restraint” (1945: 
15). This fact allows the will to power of the masses to find an outlet – with re-
sults that are all too often tragic. It is also one of the most important factors dis-
tinguishing the struggle for power on the international level from the same 
struggle on the domestic level. 
Despite the twilight of functioning international morality, however, Morgenthau 
claims that man is and will always be a moral creature and hence must ground 
his actions in moral discourse. Like Hellenistic tyrants who self-identified with 
Dionysus, Asian emperors who claimed the Mandate of Heaven, and medieval 
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kings whose rule was legitimated by Divine Right, modern nation-states also 
feel obliged to make universalistic moral appeals in order to justify their own 
power or imperial expansion. In the unconstrained struggle for dominance bet-
ween states, therefore, all nations will be tempted “to clothe their own particular 
aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe” (1978b: 12). Mor-
genthau pointed out how European imperialists justified their conquests weaker 
peoples as a moral obligation in the name of ‘the white man’s burden’ and cited 
the Athenian argument that the strong are naturally compelled to dominate the 
weak as examples of this tendency (Klusmeyer 2011: 18). As we have seen, ho-
wever, it was this identification of the interests of one’s own people with the 
destiny of the world is symptomatic of hubris, and as such it is the first step on 
the path to nemesis; “it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment that, in 
the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations – in the 
name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself” (1978b: 13). The phenomenon 
of nationalism is thus the element distinguishing the struggle for power on the 
international realm from that struggle on the domestic level. 
Morgenthau realises, of course, that a nation is not an empirical object but rather 
an abstraction from a number of individuals who share certain characteristics in 
common. He recognises that it is these common characteristics that define these 
individuals as members of the same nation. But besides being a member of na-
tion “and thinking, feeling, and acting in that capacity,” Morgenthau says, “the 
individual … is also a human being pure and simple, and thinks, feels, and acts 
in that capacity” (ibid: 93). Therefore, when he speaks in empirical terms of the 
power of a nation, or of its foreign policy, Morgenthau only means “the power 
or the foreign policy of certain individuals who belong to the same nation” (ibid: 
94). In this way, then, via the process of collective identification of the masses 
with the nation and its individual representatives, the tragedy of the individual 
can be reproduced at the level of the state, insofar as the latter “serve as vehicles 
for the continuation of the struggle for power [between individuals] at a higher 
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level” (Kostagiannis 2013: 519).  
It seems clear that, for Morgenthau, hubris is indeed a psychological corruption, 
even a sin, for both individuals and states – and Lebow is right to point out its 
importance to his tragic vision of politics and the ethical element thereof. But 
hubris is also closely connected to the existential tragedy of humanity, which is 
defined by the inadequacy of either love or power to solve the problem of man’s 
spiritual loneliness. That is, hubris is related to Morgenthau’s tragic vision not 
only of politics, but also his tragic vision of man. As we have just seen, the cor-
ruption inspired by power that is constantly imperiling interpersonal relation-
ships is only “broadened and its intensity strengthened by the particular condi-
tions under which political action proceeds in the modern nation-state” (Mor-
genthau 1945: 15). In essence, it is not qualitatively different from that which 
affects the relations of love and power between individuals – which, as we 
know, are constitutive of the human tragedy.  
Section Two: Morgenthau and Thucydides 
(i) Morgenthau’s Engagement with the History 
In the previous chapter, we considered those two instances in which Morgenthau 
deals explicitly with ancient conceptions of eros in ‘Love and Power’. In the 
first instance, Morgenthau credits Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium as having 
provided “the classic description of the nature of pure love,” defining it in terms 
of “the desire and pursuit of the whole” (1962a: 246). In the second instance, 
Morgenthau quotes Socrates’ satirical summary of Lysias’ understanding of eros 
in the Phaedrus as exemplifying the ‘corrupted’ form of love that is decried by 
participants in the Symposium. Morgenthau explicitly states that this account of 
“love as commonly experienced” (ibid: 247) – that is, as wolves love lambs – is 
more or less coterminous with what he calls a relationship of power. These ero-
tic dynamics are also present, to some degree at least, in Morgenthau’s discus-
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sion of liberal democracy and the egalitarian freedom it strives to uphold. 
We have also considered the ways in which Morgenthau’s tragic vision of poli-
tics is rooted in the existential loneliness that defines the human condition. Via 
processes of collective identification, human beings tend to transfer their own 
individual will to power onto the nation and its representatives, which has the 
effect of pushing the state onto the path of hubris, recklessness and self-destruc-
tion. On the individual level, however, the will to power is one prong of the dua-
listic eros that is the soul’s natural response to overcoming the loneliness that 
defines it. The tragedy of international politics, in other words, is seeded in the 
human heart; the existential need for self-completion creates the urge for society, 
and as a result gives birth to all political orders, whatever scope and level of 
complexity they eventually come to possess. 
These discussions bring two points to the fore. First, Morgenthau’s understan-
ding of love and power as twin responses to the human condition is explicitly 
rooted in the classical, as it is refracted by the Platonic, discourse on eros. Se-
cond, given that the will to power lies at the root of the tragedy of international 
politics, and given that the animus dominandi is in essence a form of eros, Mor-
genthau’s broader vision of tragic politics is also based, at least in part, upon this 
same discourse.  
If we accept this much, we are forced to ask: did Thucydides also factor into 
Morgenthau’s thoughts on political eros? Do the two men share the same tragic 
vision of politics? 
On the face of it, the first question at least appears to require an answer in the 
negative. Douglas Klusmeyer (2011) argues persuasively that Morgenthau’s en-
gagement with the History is embarrassingly superficial. He points out that 
when Morgenthau quotes from the History, he does so without any attempt to 
contextualise the quotations that he chooses, and attributes the insights apparent-
ly gleaned from these statements not to the characters in the narrative who ac-
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tually pronounce them, but rather to Thucydides himself, without giving any 
reasons as to why he does this.  
In Politics Among Nations, for example, Morgenthau reiterates the idea that all 
social life is characterised by will to power. “The tendency to dominate,” he 
writes, “is an element of all human associations, from the family through the fra-
ternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the 
state” (1978b: 35). To support this claim, he appeals to Thucydides, who, appa-
rently, argued “that it is a necessary law of [men’s] nature that they rule where-
ver they can” (ibid: 36). As Klusmeyer demonstrates, however, this statement is 
not actually made in Thucydides’ authorial voice. Rather, it forms part of the ar-
gument used by the Athenian delegates to Melos to convince the Melians that 
any resistance to them would be futile. The ‘Athenian thesis’ thus essentially 
encapsulates “the moral logic of Athenian imperialism” (Klusmeyer 2010: 396; 
cf. Klusmeyer 2011), and not, necessarily, his own beliefs about the nature of 
humans in general. In light of this, Laurie Johnson Bagby (1994) argues that 
Morgenthau’s silence on the matter of context downplays the variety of ‘national 
characters’ in the History and streamlines Thucydides’ consideration of different 
human types into a concept of human nature based solely on the Athenians. 
A similar argument can be made regarding Morgenthau’s claim that Thucydides 
believed that “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states 
or individuals” (1978b: 8). Once again, this statement is not made in Thucy-
dides’ authorial voice; it occurs in a speech made by the Corinthians to the Spar-
tans in an attempt to convince them to enter into an alliance with Corinth against 
Athens. This argument is clearly made with a view to Corinth’s self-interest, and 
this obviously prejudices any naïve assumption that it is meant by Thucydides to 
convey a universal truth. To be fair to Morgenthau, however, his basic argument 
is not so much that Thucydides fully identifies with Corinthian sentiment. Ra-
ther, he is suggesting that Thucydides, like the Corinthians and many other as-
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tute observers and practitioners of international politics, seems to have held that 
“the idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics” (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, according to Klusmeyer (2011: 6), all this suggests that Morgen-
thau used the History as little more than a mine for his own theory’s mint; he 
found there exactly what he was looking for – support for his rational theory of 
politics – at the expense of discounting all the detail and narrative pathos that 
define the History. Sean Molloy concurs with this judgement, and adds that 
while Morgenthau’s method may be have been useful “in terms of the develop-
ment of [… his] vision of realism, … it is a misunderstanding of the nature of 
history” (Molloy 2004: 13).  
These are all cogent criticisms, but there is reason to believe that they are not as 
devastating as they first appear to be. For while it is true that Morgenthau does 
not adequately contextualise the statements he extracts from the Thucydides, 
and this definitely ranks as a methodological flaw in his writings, he neverthe-
less fully understands the challenges facing scholars dealing with historical 
works such as the History. “How do we avoid reading our meaning into the an-
cient texts and then extracting from them what we want to learn?” he once as-
ked. “How do we get at Thucydides’s many insights and make them relevant for 
our day?” (1968: 239). Morgenthau’s answer to these questions is, appropriately, 
that there is no easy answer to them; “no [theoretical] categories,” he wrote, 
“can emerge from the historical substance which have not been first in the mind 
of the observer, and the real issue is whether the categories employed are appro-
priate to the historic substance” (ibid.).  
But if Morgenthau was aware of these methodological problems, how can the 
objections raised by Klusmeyer and Molloy, who accuse him of falling precisely 
into these traps, be met? The most reasonable and simple answer to this question 
is that Morgenthau believed his own theoretical categories to be self-evidently 
‘appropriate to the historic substance’ under consideration and that the assump-
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tions that supported them were held by Thucydides also. This would explain 
why he did not feel obliged to engage with the broader context of the quotations 
he selected; Thucydides’ emphasis on power and interest in the History was, he 
thought, blindingly obvious, and if Thucydides recognised them in the historic 
substance that he wrote about, so too should we. 
This explanation is given weight by Morgenthau’s discussion of theory and Thu-
cydides, where he writes that: 
Theory is implicit in all great historiography. In historians with a 
philosophic bent, such as Thucydides and Ranke, the history of fo-
reign policy appears as a mere demonstration of certain theoretical 
assumptions which are always present beneath the surface of histo-
rical events to provide the standards for their selection and to give 
them meaning. In such historians of international politics, theory is 
like the skeleton, which, invisible to the naked eye, gives form and 
function to the body. What distinguishes such a history of interna-
tional politics from a theory is not so much its substance as its 
form. The historian presents his theory in the form of a historical 
recital, using the chronological sequence of events as a demonstra-
tion of his theory. The theoretician, dispensing with the historical 
recital, makes the theory explicit and uses historic facts in bits and 
pieces to demonstrate his theory. (2000: 45-6) 
Most important to note here is Morgenthau’s assertion that Thucydides’ History 
is not simply a historical narrative, but a historical narrative informed and gui-
ded by a theoretical understanding of international politics. This is, in fact, a 
warranted conclusion; as we have seen in Chapter Six, the broader narrative of 
Thucydides’ History was supported by an erotic theory of politics which itself 
owed much to the tragic tradition. 
Klusmeyer objects here to Morgenthau’s collapse of the distinction between 
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theory and narrative into one between explicit and implicit theorization on the 
grounds that “such a reading elides the ambiguities, paradoxes, disruptions and 
tensions abundant in Thucydides’ work” and “ignores the work’s powerful ef-
fects on the reader’s emotions” (2011: 6). Klusmeyer’s claim may in practice be 
well founded, but it does not invalidate Morgenthau’s argument. This is because 
creating a tragic theory of politics, which is Morgenthau’s stated goal, requires 
engaging in precisely what Klusmeyer thinks is problematic: namely, abstracting 
from the individualised suffering and ambiguities displayed on the tragic stage 
or related in the history books.  
In other words, Morgenthau ignores the issues Klusmeyer identifies not because 
they are unimportant per se, but because they are important to specific genres, 
namely tragedy and history (and, some might say in the case of Thucydides, tra-
gic history). He suggests that it is only with such a rational theory already in 
place that it is possible to write a specific tragic history; Thucydides, Morgen-
thau reasonably assumes, must have already had some sort of theory in mind in 
order to select certain facts and speeches for inclusion in his History at the ex-
pense of others, just as he needed such a theory to rationalise discussing the Si-
cilian expedition and the tyrannicides in the order and manner that he does (Co-
hen 1984). Tragic history and tragic theory therefore differ in important respects, 
but they are nevertheless inherently related; what distinguishes tragic history 
from theory is ‘not so much so much its substance as its form.’ With his tragic 
theory, we might hypothetically assume that Morgenthau could have written a 
tragic history full of the ambiguities, paradoxes, disruptions and tensions that 
would have affected his reader’s emotions in a manner which Thucydides would 
have approved of. 
If we accept this to be the case, the question remains as to what the ‘certain 
theoretical assumptions’ that Morgenthau believes Thucydides used as his stan-
dards to select events for inclusion in his History, and which thus form the core 
of the political theory that underlies the work, finally are.  
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(ii) Morgenthau and Thucydides on Erotic Politics 
As we have seen in passing above, one important theoretical assumption that 
Morgenthau identifies in Thucydides’ work is the existence of the will to power 
as one of the fundamental organising principles of human life. By quoting the 
statement of the Athenians at Melos in support of his claim that the tendency to 
dominate runs through all human associations, and by attributing the Athenian 
sentiment to Thucydides, Morgenthau must be implying that Thucydides, much 
like himself, uses the will to power (or something very much like it) as a theore-
tical linchpin to guide his thinking about international relations. The same is true 
of Morgenthau’s claim that interest, however defined, also plays a crucial role in 
explaining political outcomes for Thucydides.   
The question then arises as to whether or not Morgenthau’s beliefs about Thucy-
dides are justified. Does Morgenthau have good reasons to believe that Thucy-
dides held the will to power to be a fundamental explanatory factor in interna-
tional politics? If it can be shown that he does, then the charges that Morgenthau 
has misused or misunderstood the History should be dropped, and he could only 
be found guilty of the relatively minor infraction of intellectual sloppiness. I will 
now argue that Morgenthau does in fact have good reasons for his beliefs. 
In Chapter Six, I argued that there exists an erotic theory of politics in the Histo-
ry that is explicitly propounded by the character Diodotus but effectively 
confirmed by Thucydides himself. This theory runs as follows. Eros is the pri-
mary driver not only of political action but of human life per se; all people have 
an erotic impulse at the root of their consciousness that will stop at nothing to 
achieve its aims, and this extends naturally into their politics. Eros, goaded by 
hope, is responsible for much of the crime and catastrophe faced by the world; 
so long as poverty exists to give people the courage born of necessity, and so 
long as conditions of plenty exist to encourage in them ambition and hubris, the 
erotic impulse will continue to push people and the states they make up into pur-
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suing reckless and risky endeavours. The vicissitudes of fortune, however, will 
ensure that most of these ventures end in disaster. This is especially the case 
with political communities, Diodotus says, because the stakes played for are 
freedom or empire and, when all are acting together, each man irrationally ma-
gnifies his own capacity. Neither the death penalty nor any other kind of pu-
nishment can hope to prevent this tragic cycle; eros is by nature deaf to the 
claims of law and blind to the consequences of its crimes.  
As I hope to have demonstrated in Chapter Five, Diodotus’ theory of eros as the 
fundamental basis of human behaviour is clearly meant by Thucydides to apply 
also to Athens’ attempt at expanding its empire in the western Mediterranean. 
His detailed description of the launch of the Sicilian Expedition also tracks back 
to the first appearance of eros in Thucydides’ work (which occurs in the context 
of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in which he outlines his vision of the Athenian 
ideal). Thucydides portrays the men of Athens, as they prepare for the invasion 
of Sicily, as actively competing with one another for the ‘hand’ of their beloved 
city, like the erastes Pericles had earlier exhorted them to become. Tragically, in 
this case, the power of eros manages to break free from its bond to the Athenian 
community that Pericles had carefully constructed, to focus instead on the ‘city’ 
of individual gain. What had previously served as the engine of Periclean demo-
cracy now served the same role for aspiring tyrants, both individual and com-
munal. 
In light of this and the conclusions of the previous chapter, Morgenthau’s beliefs 
regarding the fit of his theoretical categories to the substance of the History do 
not seem at all unreasonable. It is worthwhile briefly recalling Chapter Eight, to 
substantiate this claim. Before doing so, however, it should be noted that the is-
sue of whether or not the idea of interest was important to Thucydides, as it was 
to Morgenthau, will not be considered here. This is because it is not central to 
this thesis, and it is in any case a very straightforward matter. Simply put, the 
concept of interest is a constant and self-evidently crucial element of the Histo-
!275
ry. We have seen this already numerous times in our previous discussions, and 
the issue resurfaces on many other occasions in the History, which, due to their 
distance from the central concerns of this thesis, we do not have the time or 
space to consider. Other scholars, however, have examined these instances in 
great depth and hence we need not trouble ourselves with it here (cf. Cohen 
1984; Lebow 2003). 
In Chapter Eight, we saw that there exists (in Morgenthau’s understanding) an 
irreducible element of love in even the crudest power relationships. All of those 
people who use or are subject to power would rather live in a union forged by 
love; these two phenomena differ not so much in terms of the goals that they 
seek – the construction of a community in which a number of people share, as 
much as possible, the same identity, values and desires – as in the means that 
they use to reach them.  
Love and power are comparable to the different versions of desire that we find 
in the Platonic discourse on eros; indeed, Morgenthau explicitly draws on this 
discourse for ‘the classic description’ of love to define his position on both love 
itself and the will to power. The will to power is only the twin of the longing for 
love – it is, we have seen, equivalent to ‘common’ eros, the hubristic twin of 
‘heavenly’ eros. Given that the will to power is for Morgenthau a kind of eros, 
we might therefore agree with him that the will to power, which he takes as the 
linchpin of his theory, is in fact an appropriate theoretical category with which to 
interpret Thucydides’ narrative of the Peloponnesian War, insofar as both he and 
Thucydides are attempting to understand and describe a dangerous erotic im-
pulse that drives individuals and communities into tragic situations. 
While it is true that the ‘Athenian thesis’ – which posits that man rules wherever 
he can – is not stated by Thucydides in his authorial voice, and that in this sense 
Morgenthau’s attribution of the quote to him is potentially misleading, the basic 
premise behind the statement is nonetheless implicit to the erotic theory of poli-
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tics implicit in the History. In Diodotus’ vision of the human tragedy, which 
Thucydides appears to share, empire and freedom are proclaimed as the greatest 
goods for political communities – and these are precisely what the Athenians at 
Melos, and indeed the Melians themselves, are trying to secure for themselves. 
Indeed, in Thucydides generally states “fight either to protect their own freedom 
or to secure domination over others” (Larsen 1962: 232). But empire (ruling 
over others) and freedom (ruling over oneself) are versions of the same good, 
namely, power. Power is the object of political eros for Athens and Melos alike, 
and its erotic pursuit is what draws these communities on toward their unhappy 
fates. This is, effectively, Thucydides’ anticipation of ‘the will to power.’ 
Both Thucydides and Morgenthau, furthermore, identify eros as being particu-
larly potent in democratic societies. As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, the da-
ring characteristic of the Athenians, which is praised by Pericles in his Funeral 
Oration, can be traced from its exemplary display in the current generation in 
their fight against the (allegedly) despotic Spartans who seek to take their city 
and its beautiful empire away from them, through their fathers, who turned back 
the Persians (and the hated tyrant Hippias) at Salamis and Marathon, to the love 
of one middle-class erastes for his noble eromenos that eventually delivered 
both to their dooms but which, in myth at least, gave birth to the Athenian de-
mocracy.  
Morgenthau too sees ‘common’ eros as a permanent fixture of democratic poli-
tics; “the whole political life of a nation, particularly of a democratic nation,” he 
says, “is a continuous struggle for power” (1978b: 35). But true love, or heaven-
ly eros, is just as important for this kind of society – indeed, it is what defines it. 
In democratic political orders, potential masters (the wolves) and their subjects 
(the lambs) can, theoretically at least, regularly and freely unite their wills 
through the mechanism of popular elections, and we remember that it is precise-
ly such spontaneous coalescence of wills that characterises love as an interper-
sonal relationship. Though power is certainly not absent from democratic poli-
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ties, Morgenthau points out in ‘Love and Power’ that a loving relationship also 
requires some quantum of power to maintain the stability needed for the sponta-
neous mutuality of two wills to regularly occur – in its absence, he says, love 
remains simply “a succession of precarious exultations” (1962a: 251).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examined the concept of tragedy in Morgenthau’s broader 
oeuvre. According to Morgenthau, human beings tend to transfer their own indi-
vidual will to power onto the nation and its representatives via the process of 
collective identification. Due to the amoral context of the international system 
and the psychological transformation of the will to power into noble patriotism, 
collective identification with the political community – e.g. nationalism – often 
has the effect of pushing the state onto the path of hubris, recklessness and self-
destruction. On the individual level, however, the will to power is one prong of 
the dualistic eros that is the soul’s natural response to overcoming the loneliness 
that defines it. The tragedy of international politics can therefore be traced back 
to the human heart; the existential need for self-completion creates the urge for 
society, and as a result gives birth to all political orders, whatever scope and le-
vel of complexity they eventually come to possess. The tragedy of international 
politics is the tragedy of man. 
We have also seen that the emphasis on political eros in the History ultimately 
confirmed but did not definitively shape Morgenthau’s own understanding of 
erotic politics. For while there is no direct evidence to suggest that Morgenthau 
drew upon Thucydides to any great extent for inspiration in his own theorizing 
on erotic politics, it is nevertheless very clear that the two men share a remarka-
bly similar understanding of the role of eros in politics and in human life more 
generally. As the discussions of Chapters Seven and Eight suggest, this is be-
cause they, like Plato and his Aristophanes, draw upon the tragic tradition of phi-
losophizing about political eros. We have seen, moreover, that Morgenthau was 
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conscious of these similarities; he therefore seems to have found in Thucydides 
an intellectual forebear whose shared understanding of the ‘elemental biopsy-
chological drives’ and their tragic effects on politics made selectively quoting 
from the History feel to him a natural and legitimate exercise. In sum, the dis-
cursive settings of the two authors were in one respect very similar – both were 
steeped in tragedy and its representations of eros – and this resulted in particu-




How can the study of tragedy enhance our understanding of international rela-
tions? 
This question has guided the current study, and now is the time to review the 
conclusions reached so far and to provide a full and explicit answer to it. This 
chapter is dedicated to this task, and is structured around three questions: first, 
what have we found in our study of tragedy in the work of Thucydides and Hans 
Morgenthau? Second, how do our findings matter for the discipline of IR 
(beyond issues of textual interpretation)? Third, in which directions can our fin-
dings be taken by further research?  
Summary of Findings 
(i) Overview 
The foregoing chapters have demonstrated that Thucydides and Morgenthau 
construct remarkably similar political theories based on their understanding of 
the role that eros plays in people’s lives and particularly in those parts of them 
concerned with politics. Both men believe that there exists a familial relation 
between eros and the longing for power; like force and fraud for Hobbes, these 
two are twins in the political philosophies of Thucydides and Morgenthau. Both 
men, furthermore, implicitly or explicitly draw upon tragic representations of 
eros when elaborating their political theories, although they seem to have been 
influenced by tragedy and tragic eros in subtly different ways. 
Tragic eros is defined not only by the fact that it is almost univocally associated 
with madness, unreason, and reversal of fortune through the transformation of 
self, but also by the fact that it fundamentally and unavoidably concerns the po-
lis. The reason why eros was one of the more important tragic emotions is that it 
was one of the more important political emotions in Athens. Erotic desire and its 
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effects on society were central to both the self-image of the democracy in that 
city and the image of its ideological arch-enemy, ‘the tyrant.’ Eros for the Athe-
nians was experienced not only in relation to objects such as human beings but 
also to abstractions such as ‘tyranny’ or ‘the city and its power.’ As such, and in 
its function as the ideal type of extreme emotion, it was used by the tragedians 
to catalyse and explore wider issues and conflicts relating to the polis. The eros 
of tragic figures opened up a realm of dark fantasy and troubling questions that 
could simultaneously excite, disgust, terrify and sadden those who observed it. 
And, as Plato suggested, this realm could also motivate. Tragic eros, that is, was 
not confined to the stage; its dynamics were also lived. The tyrannical eros of 
figures such as Xerxes, Oedipus and Clytemnestra had touched, or was imagined 
to have touched, the Athenians in their own historical (and mythological) expe-
rience.   
Given that some of the primary functions of tragedy were to interrogate the 
norms that democratic Athens took for granted and to work through the social 
issues of the age, it was natural that a political phenomenon as important as eros 
was to the Athenians should be explored upon their tragic stage. The centrality 
of male sexuality and masculinity to the Great Dionysia, and hence to tragedy, is 
in any case confirmed by the aetiology of the festival and the identity of the god 
in whose name it was ritually staged: the Great Dionysia was a festival comme-
morating the erotic suffering of the Athenians at the hands of Dionysus, an an-
drogynous god associated with sexuality and self-transformation in whose wor-
ship the performance of drama played a ritual part.  
In the History, all alike are led on by eros, hope and chance in the pursuit of po-
litical power; poverty and wealth are the conditions that most aggravate this 
problem, insofar as the one gives rise to the reckless audacity inspired by neces-
sity and the other to the greedy ambition born of insolence. Due to the vicissi-
tudes of fate, these erotic adventures end all too often in disaster, and there is no 
law that will prevent this from happening. This is especially so in the case of 
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communities and states, because when acting together individuals magnify their 
own capabilities and thereby tend to act irrationally.  
Thucydides suggests that only extraordinary individuals like Pericles (and, to a 
much lesser extent, Diodotus) acting with full knowledge of these behavioral 
tendencies can have any hope of mitigating the usual risks of audacity and arro-
gance that come with them. This fragile hope rests on a leader’s possession of 
virtue, foresight and political skill (and, in lesser leaders, the ability to lie well). 
Thus, like Athena in the Eumenides, Pericles yoked the destructive power of 
eros to the chariot of the state, thereby healing social divisions, consolidating the 
empire, and providing a safety-valve for the pursuit of individual interest 
through death in battle. It was at this point, Thucydides says, that Athens was at 
her greatest.  
But fortune can and usually does intervene with a vengeance. A disastrous 
plague struck Athens following the breakout of the war, and the deterioration of 
Athenian political life began almost immediately thereafter; Pericles died, the 
moral fabric of society disintegrated, and, as a result, politics became characteri-
sed by the struggle for power between violent, second-rate politicians. Eros 
broke free from its bounds and lurched the city on a tragic trajectory, to which 
attests the fate of Nicias, the doomed commander of an expedition cursed on ac-
count of the intrigues of politicians and the ignorant harshness of the demos – a 
disaster for which he never lusted but through well-meaning lies unintentionally 
encouraged.  
Thucydides’ theory owes a significant debt to the tragic tradition. His emphasis 
on and characterization of eros clearly echoes many tragedies in terms of its 
thematic centrality and ascribed qualities and dynamics. This is nicely summed 
up by the fact that, when describing the fateful moment that ‘eros fell upon’ the 
Athenians for empire in Sicily, he reproduces the language used by Aeschylus to 
describe the Greek’s unholy desire for pillaging Troy and her rich temples. The 
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dramatic narrative structure of the History, which is exemplified by but by no 
means limited to the Sicilian expedition, underscores this point and demons-
trates the extent to which Thucydides, consciously or not, crafted his work in 
line with many of the conventions of drama.  
The influence of tragedy in its broader social function is arguably also visible in 
the History. Thucydides, who had participated over a dozen times in the Diony-
sia and had likely seen Cratinus compare Pericles to Dionysus on the comic 
stage, returned to write his History in Athens in 404, the year of the production 
of Aristophanes’ Frogs. The Frogs, to recall, is a comedy that explicitly links 
the didactic value of tragedy and the problem of Alcibiades through the figure of 
Dionysus. In light of this discursive setting, the conclusion that Thucydides pro-
vides regarding the ultimate cause of the Athenian defeat – namely, the igno-
rance and factionalism that led to Alcibiades’ persecution and subsequent defec-
tion to Sparta – points toward the idea that the core meaning of the tragedy of 
Athens lies, for Thucydides, in the ironic fact that the Athenians had repeated in 
their politics the same kind of behaviour they mourned every year at the Great 
Dionysia, the behaviour that had brought erotic suffering to their ancestors. On 
account of their suspicion and ignorance, that is, the Athenians were blind to the 
fact that they had been led to attack the one extraordinary individual who could 
unify them, through eros, and hope to lead them to victory in their struggles. In 
doing so, they courted Alcibiades’ wrath and ensured that he would act as the 
agent of their destruction. 
For Morgenthau, on the other hand, politics is defined by his own version of 
eros, or what he calls ‘the will to power.’ Alongside ‘love,’ its mirror image, 
this urge is rooted in the loneliness of the individual human soul, and it is what 
gives birth to political communities in all their various shapes and forms. Politi-
cal power, the object of this desire, is effectively summed up in the position of 
the master in all of those social relations in which one person controls another. 
Such control can be obtained by all sorts of means, ranging from physical vio-
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lence through subtle psychological manipulation. The theoretical limitlessness 
of this animus dominandi has the consequence that those people subject to it 
(meaning, more or less, every person who will ever live) are always prone to 
hubris, or else ‘the sin of pride.’ Hubris, Morgenthau believes, is a corrupted 
state of mind in which people misjudge their capacities and fall into danger, on 
account of the irrational behaviour such misjudgement inspires and the mistakes 
and offences it ultimately leads to.  
Alongside love, the will to power is definitive of man’s existential tragedy; those 
individuals most intensely motivated by them are doomed to collapse into dys-
phoria, whether as the result of the catastrophes invited by the hubris the will to 
power typically produces or simply by languishing in the limbo that exists bet-
ween the ideal of loving communion and the reality of domination. The human 
tragedy is reproduced and at the international level via the process of collective 
identification with the nation and its representatives; indeed, it is intensified by 
the fact that the moral limits imposed on the will to power in domestic life are 
lacking on the level of the international and, to make matters worse, by the fact 
that the evil of the will to power is transfigured on this level and normalised as 
patriotism.  
Morgenthau, living some two and a half millennia after tragedy’s high-water-
mark, was obviously influenced by tragedy in a different manner to Thucydides, 
who had been born in the time of Aeschylus and began composing his History 
just after Euripides’ death. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Freud – all of these great figures and a host of lesser ones stood bet-
ween Morgenthau and the performance of the Great Dionysia. Given this dis-
tance, Morgenthau turned to some of these historical interpreters to help make 
sense of tragic drama. In his streamlined and formulaic use of the concept of 
‘tragedy’ and his emphasis on hubris as a kind of ‘fatal flaw,’ Morgenthau 
seems to have been influenced by Aristotle. Morgenthau’s identification of eros 
at the heart of the will to power – which is what generates hubris – and hence at 
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the heart of tragedy, on the other hand, was encouraged by his study of Freud, 
Nietzsche and, ultimately, Plato.  
Plato’s dialogues, in particular the Symposium and the Phaedrus, provided a 
bridge for Morgenthau to enter the ancient world of erotic politics. From this 
world he took the insights that the longing for community and the longing for 
power are impossible to separate, that this hybrid longing was tragically destruc-
tive, and that it was the most powerful and most ancient animating force of hu-
man action. These insights are very similar to those we find in Thucydides, a 
fact which should not be surprising given that he and the characters whom Plato 
represents lived and breathed the same air, an air on which wafted the stench of 
Athenian corpses rotting in Sicilian quarries. 
Although Morgenthau draws mostly upon the Platonic corpus for direct inspira-
tion in theorizing love and the will to power as tragic responses to man’s exis-
tential loneliness, Plato himself shared with Thucydides the same discursive set-
ting in tragedy. Both, furthermore, were intimately familiar with the phenome-
non of erotic politics and devoted much of their time to analysing it. While Mor-
genthau perhaps did not philosophically engage with Thucydides to the extent 
that he did with Plato, he nevertheless found in the author of the History an an-
cient member of his ‘interpretive community’ whose shared understanding of 
tragedy and of the animating factors of human behaviour made selectively quo-
ting from him seem natural and legitimate. Furthermore, given that the themes 
with which Thucydides dealt – ideological passion, tyranny and democracy, war 
and great reversals of political fortune – were so apparent in Morgenthau’s own 
time, and given that Thucydides insights seemed to chime so well with his own, 
Morgenthau considered it self-evident that there were “objective laws” of poli-
tics that had not changed “since the classical philosophies of China, India, and 
Greece endeavored to discover [them]” (1978b: 4).  
 (ii) Relevance to the Discipline 
!285
This summary of our main conclusions leads us to the question as to how these 
findings matter to the discipline beyond the issue of interpretation. To answer 
this question, however, we need to bring the issue of interpretation into sharper 
focus. There are two central points to make here. One concerns the question of 
whether and how the ancients can instruct us in politics. The other point, stem-
ming from the first, concerns the fact that, as constructivists have long pointed 
out, the notions actors have about themselves and their actions matter insofar as 
they shape social reality and, hence, foster certain patterns of belief and beha-
viour.  
Tragedy was not created to instruct us (that is, literate English-speaking people 
in the 21st century). Instruction, David Runciman points out, is “a deliberate and 
deliberative act, designed for the needs and expectations of those to be instruc-
ted” (2001: 85). Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides could not have known 
what the people reading their work two and a half thousand years later would be 
like, or of what would constitute their central concerns; as such, they cannot 
have designed their texts with the intention of instructing us in how to confront 
the problems we face primarily in mind. Similarly, we cannot construct our own 
texts with any realistic hope of addressing the needs and expectations of who-
mever or whatever inhabits the Earth in 4500 AD. Imagine, for instance, the 
confusion that Ned Lebow’s joke (that his colleague “rightly insists” that some-
thing called “tennis” [2003: 355] should be added to the list of fundamental re-
quisites for survival) would create for a simplified cyborg, the quantum proces-
sors of whom are programmed on obsolete New Chinese code, when faced by 
the problem of intergalactic warping!  
But overcooked witticisms such as the above do not prove that the tragedians 
did not intend to instruct at all. Indeed, in Chapter Three, we saw that one of the 
primary functions of tragedy in Athenian life was to do precisely this; to instruct 
and develop in the audience of Athenian spectators a critical and self-questio-
ning stance towards norms and behaviours typically taken for granted by them 
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whilst simultaneously reaffirming those same norms and behaviours in the broa-
der context of its performance. Eros was one of the vehicles by which these 
goals were accomplished, both textually (in the role it played in the dramas 
themselves) and practically (in the homosocial bonding inherent to the perfor-
mance of the festival). The tragedians clearly intended to instruct, if not so much 
in one particular formulaic lesson as a more general intellectual attitude (al-
though, of course, each play had its own specific social settings and concerns, 
such as marriage, justice, piety, fate, death, war, power, knowledge, or some 
combination of these and others). It may be that Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Eu-
ripides fully believed – and intended – their plays to be relevant for all time and 
to all people, but their dramas were written with the language, concepts, norms, 
concerns, and expectations of fifth century Athens first and foremost in mind. 
This is especially true in light of the fact that a tragedy was originally produced 
as a political and religious communal performance, complete with ritual, music 
and dramatic movement, not simply as a static text to be ‘made’ by individual 
readers. 
Thucydides, however, whose work was deeply influenced by the tragedians, ex-
plicitly states that his text is intended to be “a possession for all time,” insofar as 
it may be “judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of 
the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of hu-
man things must resemble if it does not reflect it” (1.22.4). What Thucydides 
claims to offer his readers is not so much a prediction of the precise details of 
future political action, but rather “a more generalized, essential truth, one which 
adheres to the constancy of the human situation” (Scanlon 2002: 132). Thucy-
dides believed that he could and did write for us, that is, because he believed 
that as long as human beings were human, the truth that he described would hold 
steady and future people such as ourselves could come to see this. 
This truth, as we know, is that human beings naturally tend to fall under the in-
fluence of an erotically charged impulse for freedom and rule (two sides of the 
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same coin of political power), which is led on into danger by the hope that their 
luck will not run out. This tendency is conditioned by poverty and wealth, which 
encourage audacity through necessity and greed through insolence; the poor 
want what they do not have and the rich want more than they have got. The dan-
ger of such behaviour is intensified in the case of collectives, because when ac-
ting together with others individuals tend to inflate their own capacities and act 
irrationally on account of this.  
Morgenthau was familiar with Thucydides’ theory, and he developed his own 
version of the same (albeit not so much with reference to Thucydides as to tra-
gedy and the Platonic dialogues). Morgenthau took from the world of the an-
cients the insights that the longing for community and the longing for power are 
impossible to separate, that this hybrid longing was tragically destructive, and 
that it was the most powerful and most ancient animating force of human action. 
The homoeroticism of Athenian democratic ideology, as well as the explicit em-
phasis that Thucydides placed on hope and fortune and the conditioning factors 
of poverty and wealth, were played down (although hope implicitly remained in 
mankind’s dreams of salvation) in Morgenthau’s philosophy, and were replaced 
by a stronger focus on the hubris that the will to power tended to produce. In 
Morgenthau’s work, while the nuclear missile had replaced the spear and the 
trophies of empire now extended into the heavens, the erotic tragedy of man re-
mained essentially the same. 
This all raises the question as to whether Thucydides’ erotic theory of politics, 
as the structuring principle of a work explicitly intended to be instructive ‘for all 
time,’ and Morgenthau’s development of a very similar set of ideas (influenced 
by the same discursive setting in tragedy), as ‘objective laws of politics’ that are 
rooted in ‘human nature,’ can indeed be relevant as such. In other words, was 
Morgenthau correct in his belief that ancients such as Thucydides, Plato and the 
tragedians (and the erotic politics with which they were so concerned) can be 
instructive to us? 
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There is, in fact, a good argument to be made that they can be. Paul Ludwig 
points out that much work in contemporary social science embraces a theoretical 
model of man as homo economicus, driven by rational self-interest. While such a 
model may have many useful functions (particularly in the context of modern 
capitalism), it does not pay heed to the fact that human beings are often motiva-
ted by intense emotions and desires that produce behaviour very difficult, if not 
impossible, to fully anticipate or reason with. Such behaviour, furthermore, of-
ten has dramatic consequences: 
To cite the simplest example: the political, social, and economic 
behavior of an ordinary taxpayer with a conservative investment 
portfolio is far easier to predict than the same variables in a com-
pulsive gambler who cannot resist letting everything ride on the 
next throw. Both agents are motivated by profit, at least in part, but 
the inner emotional experiences are so different that they produce 
radically different behavior. (Ludwig 2002: 16-7) 
Ludwig notes that Thucydides’ portrait of Athens is precisely of this kind; in the 
History, Athens is presented as a compulsive political gambler whose lust for 
empire, in the wake of Pericles’ death, leads it to hazard its entire existence on 
one roll of the dice in Sicily. Morgenthau’s erotic theory of politics differs from 
Thucydides’ History ‘not so much in substance as in form’ – the theory of the 
will to power explains how and why individuals and states can be led to psycho-
logical, emotional and behavioural extremes (particularly in and as a result of 
their desire for power) which jeopardise their own well-being. It seems reaso-
nable to agree with Ludwig that “erotic theory may have something new to say 
about ordinary motives under special circumstances” (ibid: 17).  
These ‘special circumstances’ are nowhere more apparent than in war, one of 
the most important institutions in international politics. As Carl von Clausewitz 
observed, “of all human activities, war most closely resembles a game of 
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cards” (1982: 27). Indeed, Clausewitz once wrote that, in its pursuit of power in 
central Europe, Prussia ought to follow the example of Frederick the Great, who 
had “resolved wholly to lose or wholly to win, like the gambler who risks his 
last penny” (quoted in Parkinson 2002: 48). Clausewitz’s advice clearly repro-
duces the logic (although it sits uneasily with the counsel) of Thucydides, who 
concluded that the disastrous pattern of erotically-charged men being led on by 
hope and fortune is especially prevalent among states, “because the stakes 
played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, 
each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity” (3.45.6).  
We need not search very far to find evidence of the tectonic consequences of this 
kind of behaviour. When Thucydides speaks dramatically of the Athenian defeat 
in Sicily as constituting “the greatest reverse” to befall any (Greek) army in his-
tory (7.76.7), one wonders what he would have made of the Soviet capture of 
Berlin or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some of the imme-
diate effects of World War II were just as extreme: decolonisation and an in-
crease in the number of states in the international system, a corresponding in-
crease in the incidence of conflicts fuelled by extremist ideology (including but 
not limited to nationalism), the emergence of superpowers, and all of the pro-
blems these immediate effects have given rise to. Indeed, the aftershocks of this 
war are still reverberating on every continent. 
This points to a second area in which erotic political theory may be of relevance 
to the discipline. Felix Wasserman perceptively wrote that “while already affec-
ting the individual as part of nature,” the motivational dynamics that Thucydides 
saw at work among his fellows in their day-to-day lives played an even more 
important part in their politics; “here the controls and restraints of reason are 
even more endangered by the pressures of group psychology – a field which was 
one of the great discoveries of Thucydides – and of issues far beyond any pri-
vate concern, such as the force we have been used to call ‘nationalism’ for the 
last two centuries, implying both the will to rule over others and the freedom 
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from foreign domination” (1956: 39). We have seen in Chapters Four through 
Six how central and powerful the emotional appetite of eros was in this regard 
for Thucydides; the myth of Aristogeiton and Harmodius, Pericles’ vision of ci-
tizenship, the revolt of Mytilene, and the disaster in Sicily – all of these were 
products of erotic politics, of patriotism and imperialism and the lust for power 
that undergirds both. 
Morgenthau had a similar understanding of the matter: 
The disillusion of differently constituted minds communicating the 
same words, which embody their most firmly held convictions, 
deepest emotions, and most ardent aspirations, without finding the 
expected sympathetic response, has driven the members of different 
nations further apart and strengthened their conviction of incompa-
tibility of their moral values and political interests. (1971b: 202, 
emphasis added)  
All too often, the conviction that one’s own moral values and political interests – 
one’s ideology, so to speak – are incompatible with others leads to the belief that 
they are superior to others (and, as such, that one has the right or even the duty 
to impose them on those who disagree, especially those whom it is in one’s per-
ceived interest to control). According to Morgenthau, this is, almost always, an 
erroneous and dangerous conclusion. It is, indeed, “the very sin of pride against 
which the Greek tragedians and the biblical prophets have warned rulers and ru-
led” (1978b: 13). Whether among the powerful or the powerless, chauvinistic 
ideologies tend to induce “the blindness of crusading frenzy [that] destroys na-
tions and civilizations” (ibid.). This is a predictable, if tragic, outcome of the 
will to power and there is almost nothing that can be done to stop it from happe-
ning at one point or another in the long march of time. 
Others too have noted the role of affection – romantic or otherwise – in cemen-
ting social bonds in the context of conflict and nationalism. Morgenthau quotes 
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the letter of John Durie to the British Ambassador in 1632 regarding the dire si-
tuation of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in his fight against the Catholics: “his 
authority is lost, and his abode will be no longer: for the love [of his subjects for 
him] which was at first is gone” (1962a: 250). Edmund Burke also mourned the 
loss of affection for a leader as a motivating factor in conflict (in this case the 
French Revolution):  
It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France 
… glittering like the morning star, full of life and splendour and 
joy. Oh! What a revolution! And what an heart must I have, to 
contemplate without emotion that elevation and that fall! Little did 
I dream, when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusias-
tic, distant, respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to carry 
the sharp antidote against disgrace concealed in that bosom! Little 
did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen 
upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour, 
and of cavaliers! I thought ten thousands swords must have leaped 
from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with 
insult … Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty 
to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, 
that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude 
itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom! The unbought grace of life, 
the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and he-
roic enterprise is gone! It is gone … the age of chivalry is gone. 
That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded: and 
the glory of Europe is extinguished forever. (1790: 112-3) 
Burke correctly understood that institutions can be “embodied” in persons, “so 
as to create in us love, veneration, admiration or attachment” (ibid: 115) to or 
for them, and he recognised that discourse was a central means of achieving this. 
This insight was, in fact, one of the main reasons he wrote about Marie Antoi-
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nette in the way that he did (cf. Furniss 1993; Locke 2006). Burke also correctly 
noted that the kind of reasoning with which some people attempt to banish the 
emotions from politics, either philosophically or practically, cannot by itself ful-
ly replace them (Burke 1790: 115).  
Burke’s conclusion that ‘the glory of Europe’ had disappeared for good after the 
French Revolution therefore comes as something of a surprise; his own logic 
suggests that the privileged position royalty enjoyed as the object of men’s poli-
tical affections could be replaced by something else without necessarily chan-
ging the terms of affective behaviour in any substantial way. And indeed, as 
Morgenthau would later observe, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries the secular state (or more precisely, the secular nation-state) would be-
come the most exalted object of loyalty for most individuals as well as the most 
effective organisation for wielding power over them. The results of this trans-
formation, he noted, were catastrophic, especially in those instances in which 
nation-states were ruled by tyrants, by some sort of ‘beloved leader’ (Morgen-
thau 1945; 1962a; 1978b). 
In the post-modern West, where economic models and calculators are in fact the 
general rule, the influence of the emotions in politics has recently begun to re-
gain serious attention. Of these emotions, pride, shame and the desire for re-
venge inspired by humiliation are the most relevant to erotic theory. This is be-
cause they are rooted in cultures of honour, which are, at least in the case of the 
Greeks, bound up with eros and its implicit masculinity. 
Notions of honour are characteristically gendered; in almost every society in 
which such systems function, the honour of men is qualified differently to the 
honour of women (Spierenburg 1998). Honour systems are also typically hierar-
chical; the various groups and individuals which belong to them are expected to 
play their assigned social roles and remain in their assigned social places. As in 
most other societies, men are expected to be ‘proper’ men, and women are ex-
!293
pected to be ‘proper’ women. ‘Proper’ here means the ‘hegemonic’ identities 
ranked above other identities widely considered ‘deviant’ or otherwise less ac-
ceptable (although women as a category are usually ranked as inferior to men; 
‘deviant’ men are often semantically and conceptually assimilated to women). 
Those who do not play their proper part in society – those who act dishonoura-
bly – are shamed, marginalised or otherwise punished by the community. 
Cultures of honour are often most pronounced in societies characterised by weak 
law enforcement, portable (and hence vulnerable) wealth, and economic uncer-
tainty. This is because male individuals in such societies by and large have to 
fend for themselves, and are responsible for protecting and exploiting their pro-
ductive and reproductive resources; insults and other challenges to their reputa-
tion must be met forcefully in order to maintain the image that they and their 
property are not ‘easy prey’ (Cohen and Nisbett 1997). Accordingly, the issue of 
‘manliness’ plays a crucial role in most honour cultures (Casimir and Jung 
2009). Given the environmental context in which such societies usually exist, 
corporeality, physical bravery, and a willingness to use (and skill in using) vio-
lence are often important factors in the construction of honour and ‘manliness.’ 
From ancient times, particularly honourable and powerful members of society 
(such as royalty) have been associated with awe-inspiring or aggressive animals 
such as lions, jaguars, rams, cocks and eagles (Blok 1981; Csapo 1997; McNel-
len 1997; Saunders 1998; Spierenburg 1998).  
Honour, of course, is related to shame. To feel shame is to recognise that “one’s 
image is vulnerable in some way, a reaction which focuses on the conspicuous-
ness of the self” (Cairns 1993: 2). Shame is related in complex ways to humilia-
tion. One of these relations is the tendency of those who are ashamed to look 
down and away from others: the term ‘humiliation’ stems from the Latin humus 
(‘earth’); to be humiliated is to be ‘treated like dirt,’ ‘tread upon’, ‘looked down 
upon’ or ‘dragged through the mud.’ The term is etymologically related to ‘hu-
mility’ (having a low estimate of one’s own importance), a quality that closely 
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resembles the emotion of shame. Humiliation, it follows, tends to afflict most 
profoundly those proud, ‘lofty’ selves who can be ‘put down’ or forced ‘off a 
high horse’ (Miller 1993; Lindner 2006). 
Humiliation, then, relies on real or assumed rank, and is related to shame insofar 
as it relies on self-conscious social visibility; somebody who is humiliated is 
thereby moved from one psychosocial position (honourable, higher) to another 
(dishonourable, lower). Honour is the baseline condition from which one is mo-
ved, and it is this baseline that forms a reference for action. Millers sums the is-
sue up well:  
Honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of humilia-
tion and shame, a sensitivity manifested by the desire to be envied 
by others and the propensity to envy the success of others. To sim-
plify greatly, honor is the disposition which makes one act to shame 
others who have greatly shamed oneself, to humiliate others who 
have humiliated oneself. (Quoted in Casimir 2009: 287) 
Consider, for example, the Greek adulterer from Chapter Two: having commit-
ted outrage, the adulterer was publicly subjected to sexual assault by the man 
whose honour he had infringed. Such a punishment was considered an appro-
priate and effective social control for the offender’s hubris, his self-assumed and 
self-asserted superiority. The offender was ‘put down’ from his psychosocial po-
sition as ‘better’ or ‘higher’ than the man whose wife he had defiled to a corres-
pondingly ‘worse’ or ‘lower’ position as a sexual pathic (as a ‘woman’ or 
‘satyr,’ so to speak). He was thereby not only shamed (his inappropriate beha-
viour was exposed to the eyes of the community); he was also humiliated. His 
punishment was a like-for-like trade for the degradation of his victim; it was the 
return of honour taken. What the community meted out to him was just retribu-
tion. 
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Evelin Gerda Lindner has argued convincingly that “the very core of humiliation 
is the process by which human beings subject aspects of their environment to 
control. This has the effect of subordinating that part of the natural or human en-
vironment to the judgements and wishes of the subjugator” (2001: 52). Subjuga-
tion, she says, leads to the instrumentalisation of that ‘piece of nature’ being 
subject to power (e.g. tilling a plot of land, domesticating an animal, punishing a 
person, enslaving a group of people). The exercise of power thereby denies or 
severely restricts agency to individuals who ordinarily would claim independ-
ence and self-sovereignty for themselves. This, in turn, makes these individuals 
feel less than human (or, in societies such as Athens, less than a man): “one of 
the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is 
forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless” (Lindner 2000: 5).  
As we have seen in Chapter Two, this active/passive distinction was central also 
to Athenian constructions of gender and sexuality. Sexuality in ancient Athens 
was largely a masculine phenomenon; the sexual deed was considered an action 
performed by one person on another, which took its meaning from the active 
(dominant, masculine) instrumentalisation of a passive (submissive, feminine) 
substance. This distinction was both reflected in and reproduced by eros as a 
broader social practice. Eros, to recall, was an all-powerful emotional appetite in 
its control over both the soul and the body; in the pursuit of beauty it destroyed 
its enemies in the individual’s mind – rationality and self-control – and com-
manded his obedience, as a man would break his wife. Eros, a male god who 
held sway over no less of an authority than Zeus, was the quintessential con-
queror; and, indeed, over time, in pictorial representations he took on the attrib-
utes of Heracles (the manliest of men). Eros was, in short, the definition of 
‘activity’; he was the divinised mirror image of Greek hyper-masculinity, of the 
‘superman.’  
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In a world of men in which eros was an active force, humiliation was a common 
occurrence. Any act that ‘womanised’ a man, that psychosocially ‘screwed’ and 
‘transgendered’ him, so to speak, was an act of humiliation. In a society in 
which honour (and the masculine identity with which it was deeply intertwined) 
was considered a zero-sum good such acts were frequent. Given conventional 
ideas of justice as a ‘like-for-like’ exchange between equals, such humiliation 
often requited vengeance that made the humiliating ‘actor’ the passive recipient 
of another’s action (which was often violent, as Aristotle’s advice to lecherous 
tyrants attests). The ‘actor,’ that is, was acted upon by his victim, who reaffirmed 
his masculinity in the eyes of society by feminizing his aggressor. This is pre-
cisely the reason why the adulterer in Athens was punished in the way that he 
was. It is no exaggeration to conclude that humiliation and vengeance in ancient 
Athens were essentially ‘homoerotic’; those men who had been humiliated – 
who had been, as it were, ‘screwed’ and ‘transgendered’ – regained their mas-
culinity by publicly emasculating their enemies, by making sure it was known 
that they had given their enemies ‘the finger’ (or the radish, as it were).  
All this is important because there are a number of societies in which ancient 
Greek views of gender and sexuality have very clear parallels in the Mediter-
ranean region, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa: 
All traditional Arab cultural regimes concur in considering the 
sexual order both binary and hierarchical at one and the same time. 
This order revolves around two poles: one pole, which is superior, 
active, and dominating, is made up of men, and the other pole, 
which is inferior and passive, is made up of wives, children, slaves, 
homosexuals, and prostitutes. One of the fundamental characterist-
ics of this asymmetrical polarity between the single sexual active 
and the multiple sexual passives is the construction of all sexual 
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passives in the image of the woman. (2005: 17; cf. Dunne 1998; 
Uhlmann 2005; King 2008) 
Honour and violence related to honour are, predictably, particularly pronounced 
in these societies (cf. Schneider 1971; Odeh 2010). Erotic theory, with its focus 
on extreme psychological states and its foundation in honour culture, seems to 
be in a good position to illuminate some of the motivations and dynamics of 
some contemporary violent conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. At least 
this holds insofar as the feeling of humiliation is “the atomic bomb of the emo-
tions” (Lindner 2006: xiii) on account of the lust for vengeance it provokes.  
Of course, humiliation and the desire for vengeance are not the sole (nor often 
even the primary) causes for political violence, and concerns about masculine 
honour are by no means confined to the Middle East. The US Military, for ex-
ample, self-consciously draws on the literature and culture of ancient Athens 
(including tragedy and Thucydides) for the education of officers and for the 
definition of its honour code (cf. Cook 2006; U.S. Department of Defense 
2007). A number of scholars have in fact argued that concerns about (implicitly 
male) honour are pervasive influences in the international system and the rela-
tions between states (Lebow 2008; Tsygankov 2012; cf. Harkavy 2000; Callahan 
2004; Löwenheim and Heimann 2008). Furthermore, it is unfortunately the case 
that “everywhere, in every known culture, women are considered in some de-
gree inferior to men” (Ortner 1996: 23), and this inequality is reflected in gender 
relations across the globe. However, despite the ubiquity of gender hierarchies, 
and “while honor and shame are prime motivators in many societies, [the] con-
fluence of high gender differentiation and situational emasculation puts Middle 
Eastern Islamic nations [in particular] at high risk for in-group male pushback 
against a humiliating international dominance hierarchy” (Thayer and Hudson 
2010: 48).  
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Of course, Islamist movements are as much a reflection of the transition towards 
globalised modernity and the social conflicts this has produced – “over the roles, 
rights, and privileges of men and women as well as the structure and status of 
the family” (Moghadam 2001: 126) – as they are responses to perceived politic-
al humiliations. But the anxieties of many men in the Middle East in regard to 
their experiences of and participation in international politics is tied up with 
concerns about masculinity. This fact is reflected clearly in the speeches of 
Osama bin Laden, who was (and still is) considered a hero for many people 
across the Muslim world (Bergen 2002), and whose actions have done much to 
shape the international political landscape of the 21st century. 
In a 1998 televised interview with Al Jazeera, bin Laden complained that the 
United States wanted to deprive Muslim men of their manhood. “We believe,” 
he said, “that we are men, Muslim men who must defend … the Holy Ka’ab … 
The rulers in [the Middle East] have been deprived of their manhood. And they 
think that the people are women. By God, Muslim women refuse to be defended 
by these American and Jewish prostitutes” (quoted in Ramazani 2001: 122). 
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, bin Laden repeated this logic when he 
said that what the United States was now experiencing was “but a fraction of 
what we have been tasting for decades: the umma [the global Muslim com-
munity] has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for over eighty years. Its 
sons have been slain, its blood has been shed, and its sacred places have been 
defiled” (2007: 193). 
As Ruth Seifert points out, in many cultures the female body is a metaphor for 
the community; an attack on the nation’s women is often considered an attack on 
the community itself, and vice versa (1996: 39). Such attacks usually carry with 
them serious consequences for men; a man’s failure to adequately respond to 
these outrages is to implicitly admit that he has ‘become a woman’ himself. This 
kind of gendered rhetoric is common in Arab politics, and bin Laden’s is no ex-
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ception (Momani, Badarneh and Migdadi 2009; Smiles 2008). In his view, being 
a ‘Muslim man’ means physical fighting: for the Ka’ab, the umma, the women 
of Islam; against injustice, humiliation, and emasculation at the hands of tyrants.  
The Abu Ghraib scandal (in which a significant number of imprisoned Iraqi men 
and women were sexually abused, raped or otherwise tortured by American 
guards) and Islamist responses to it dramatically illuminates the issue. Take 
‘Fatima’s letter’, for example; allegedly written by a female detainee abused at 
Abu Ghraib, this widely circulated letter described the humiliations of impris-
onment and called upon Muslim men to avenge Fatima’s disgrace. Her plea wsa 
not ignored; in one video produced by the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Iraq en-
titled Fatima’s Fiancée, a young Saudi suicide bomber is shown praying that 
upon his impending arrival in paradise God will “marry [him] to Fatimah, who 
was martyred after [the tyrants and apostates] had violated her honor.” Smiling 
and patting his explosive-packed vehicle, he tells the viewer that this is 
“Fatima’s dowry” (quoted in Hafez 2007: 108; cf. Tosini 2010: 281). Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, the (late) leader of al-Qa’eda in Iraq, appealed to similar sen-
timents when, having sawed off the head of his struggling American victim, he 
held up the grisly trophy to the camera and declared that “the dignity of men and 
women in Abu Ghraib and [elsewhere] is not redeemed except by blood and 
souls” (The Independent 2004). Many young Muslims from the around the 
world followed in these footsteps. 
Abu Ghraib was an enormous propaganda coup for al-Qaeda insofar as the out-
rage it caused helped to focus and mobilise violent opposition to the Allied oc-
cupation of Iraq. But invoking the imperatives of Arab and Muslim masculinit-
ies remains a key recruiting strategy of radical jihadists, and with the Middle 
East still a hotbed of violent extremism these masculinities are forged ‘in the 
heat of battle’ and disseminated over the internet (Awan 2007; Hafez 2007; 
Tosini 2010). The effects of this are already spilling over into other regions; the 
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individuals in the Buttes-Charmont terror cell responsible for the January 2015 
attacks in France, for example, seem to have engaged with this discourse, 
trained with jihadists in Syria, and socialised with other young French Muslims 
who “said they felt humiliated by the West. They never spoke of wanting to 
commit acts of terror but of being freedom fighters … The Kouachi brothers and 
Amedy Coulibaly are [part of this] new generation of radicals” (Boubekeur 
quoted in The Telegraph 2015; cf. Lindner 2006; Awan 2007; Nesser 2011: 186-
7). 
While an individual’s motivations for engaging in Islamic terrorism are usually 
multiple and overlapping (Pape 2005; Hoffman 2006; Kruglanski et al. 2009), it 
is nevertheless clear that a contributing factor to much of this violence is a sen-
timent similar to Aeschylus’s Furies: “a mother’s blood upon … the ground is 
gone,” they shriek at Orestes, “and you must allow me in return to … feed on 
you – a gruesome drink!” (Ag. 260-66). This is the sentiment of pride and hon-
our, of shame, humiliation and the lust for revenge – and as Aeschylus knew 
well, it has extremely destructive, self-perpetuating effects. An old hubris, as he 
said, tends to bring forth a new one; just as imperialism, like other political ex-
tremes, has its blowback (cf.; Cohen and Nisbett 1997; Johnson 2004; Ling 
2004; Danchev 2006; Saurette 2006; Limon 2007; Steele 2008; Fattah and 
Fierke 2009).  
This leads us to one final consideration. Responding to Hans Morgenthau’s tra-
gic vision of politics, Michael Oakeshott wrote that human life “is not tragic, ei-
ther in part or in whole: tragedy belongs to art, not to life” (quoted in Rengger 
2005: 326). Nicholas Rengger supports Oakeshott’s position and suggests that 
“the best ways of dealing with the dissonances of the world depend upon us ac-
cepting human life and its vicissitudes as it is and they are, neither trying to wish 
them out of existence … nor overly [romanticising] them … by talking of the 
‘tragic’ character of existence” (2005: 327). 
!301
As I hope to have shown in the body of this dissertation, tragedy does not, or 
more appropriately did not, belong only to art – Oakeshott was mistaken in this 
regard. Tragedy represented and explored real, live political issues in ancient 
Athens, one of which was the question of political eros. Thucydides, too, identi-
fied and represented tragic patterns of behaviour. Morgenthau likewise. As the 
foregoing discussion has made clear, such patterns of behaviour are also obser-
vable in the world today.  
Nevertheless, I agree with Rengger that the best way of dealing with the destruc-
tive behaviour we see repeated so often in the world is neither by trying to wish 
it away, nor by talki ng of its tragic character. I disagree, however, that we 
should resign ourselves to ‘accepting human life and vicissitudes as it is and 
they are.’ There is, I believe, another option available, and this is the transcen-
dence of tragedy. This transcendence is (very slowly and perhaps ultimately only 
partially) achievable in light of the facts that erotic politics neither necessitates a 
love of power nor is it an inevitable outgrowth of human nature. 
That the first claim is so is attested to even by ancient logic. Sappho, for ins-
tance, wrote that “some men say an army of horse and some men say an army on 
foot and some men say an army of ships is the most beautiful thing on the black 
earth. But I say it is what you love” (quoted in Kurke 2009: 161). If we were to 
accept Sappho’s claim that the definition of beauty varies among individuals (as 
is demonstrably the case), then we must also accept the idea that it is possible 
for people to love objects other than weapons and the power they bring. Thus 
Aristophanes suggests that it is possible for human beings to surrender to the 
“lust for peace” (eirene eros, Ach. 32). Socrates, too, rejected freedom and rule 
as the sole concern of love; wisdom, he argued in the Symposium, was much 
more beautiful than the worldly power represented by Alcibiades (and his body) 
could ever be.  
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Socrates believed that good men should devote their lives to the pursuit of wis-
dom, not power. His attempt to convince his beloved Alcibiades and the rest of 
the Athenians of this failed, however, and quite miserably so; Alcibiades became 
a reviled traitor (for a while) and Socrates himself was condemned to death for 
corrupting the youth. On the face of it, the irony of this outcome seems rather 
troublesome for the current argument; Socrates, driven by eros, led on by the 
hope that Alcibiades and the Athenians might change, and indulged by the good 
fortune of Alcibiades’ reciprocated affections, ended up forced by his outraged 
countrymen to put a cup of hemlock to his lips. Thucydides and Morgenthau 
would have found this all too predictable. 
Plato, however, seems to put a lot of the blame for this ‘tragedy’ on the trage-
dians themselves. By encouraging identification with tyrannical and subversive 
(as well as democratic and normative) points of view among the audience of 
spectators (which, of course, included Alcibiades), Plato believed that “those 
clever enchanters and tyrant-makers” planted in democratic men “a powerful 
erotic love, like a great winged drone, to be the leader of those idle desires that 
spend whatever is at hand” (Rep. 9.572-3). Plato believed that tragic drama pro-
duced certain kinds of behaviour in its spectators and performers that were ex-
tremely damaging to the polis. The poets, he said, were dangerous; all they did 
was “draw crowds, hire people with fine, big, persuasive voices, and lead their 
constitutions to tyranny and democracy” (Rep. 8.568).  
While Plato’s estimation of tragedy may have been harsh and exaggerated, it 
was not without some merit. Like Plato, we too must be wary of political drama. 
Erotic politics, as we know, is built upon the grounds of gender, sexuality and 
honour. Eros itself is a hyper-masculine emotional appetite, characterised by its 
psychological and physical domination of the subject experiencing it as well as 
the controlling behaviour that it produces in the subject toward the object of his 
or her desire. Eros, in short, is culturally represented as warlike. This is impor-
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tant insofar as the social representation of an emotion helps to shape what the 
emotion actually is. As ancient Athenian children learned the vocabulary of eros 
and the specific contexts in which it could be applied, they also learned particu-
lar ways of evaluating, feeling, and behaving with regard to it. 
Describing the ancient reality of erotic political behaviour as an eternal and im-
mutable ‘tragedy’ therefore actually helps to ensure that it remains one. As 
constructivists have long pointed out, the notions actors have about themselves 
and their actions matter insofar as they shape social reality and, hence, foster 
certain patterns of belief and behaviour. And so it is that as long as we consider 
the dynamics of erotic politics represented by tragedy not as ‘tragic’ but simply 
as tragic – as inevitabilities rooted in the ‘imperfection of man’ – they will, in-
evitably, remain so.  
Eros led on by hope and chance in pursuit of freedom and rule; the will to po-
wer; shame, humiliation, and revenge – none of these are tragic, and to claim 
that they are does indeed romanticise them. Nevertheless, all of them are certain-
ly ‘tragic.’ They are, in other words, both real and artifice; they depend for their 
actualization on certain socially constructed concepts and norms regarding iden-
tity, interest, reason and justice, particularly as they are manifest in the ancient 
idea of ‘man’ (cf. Paipais 2013). Herein lies the problem with the work of those 
who speak of ‘the tragedy of man.’ 
J. Ann Tickner observes that “Morgenthau’s definition of power, the control of 
man over man, is typical of the way power is usually defined in international re-
lations” (1988: 434). As we have seen, Morgenthau’s definition of power (and 
the desire for it) is rooted in the ancient conception of eros, understood as mas-
culine domination. Eros was the ultimate possession, the ultimate power; it was 
both the means and the end of Greek hyper-masculinity, which itself was deeply 
intertwined with Greek sexuality. Tickner’s observation that issues most clearly 
related to Morgenthau’s idea of power (such as conflict and security) tend to be 
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prioritised in the study of international relations and in foreign policy therefore 
seems a logical outcome of the Greek conceptions of masculine identity, sexuali-
ty and power that undergird Morgenthau’s tragic philosophy of power and the 
work that has taken it for granted. 
Kimberley Hutchings has convincingly argued that the intelligibility and norma-
lisation of war as a social institution – around which international relations theo-
ry and practice revolves – are dependent on certain properties of masculinity and 
discourse; “to the extent that masculinity becomes identified with a substantive 
set of properties that are grounded in the unchanging requirements of war and 
the military,” she says, “the formal properties of masculinity become subsumed 
in a particular story about its substantive content. The result is a focus on both 
masculinity and war as outcomes, rather than processes, as fixed and reified, ra-
ther than flexible and shifting” (2008: 394). And it is indeed the case that milita-
ries, and in particular the images of ‘the warrior’ they produce, have historically 
had a strong role to play in the construction of hegemonic masculinities around 
the world (Connell 1993; Barrett 1996; Hagemann 1997; Gill 1997; Sasson-
Levy 2003; Godfrey 2009). As Burke noted, such constructions provide ‘the 
cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise.’ 
They are, as such, particularly useful for states (Goldstein 2001; Streets 2004).  
But, as Hutchings (2008) argues, masculinities are not fixed and unchanging en-
tities. Take the case of hegemonic masculinity in England, for example. In most 
of pre-industrial England, “male honour depended on a reputation for violence 
and bravery” (Spierenburg 1998: 6). Over the last three hundred years, however, 
honour seems to have moved in the direction of ‘spiritualisation’ – that is, it has 
come to depend “on an evaluation of a person’s moral stature or psychological 
condition” rather than the physical response he or she gives to insults (ibid.). 
Robert Shoemaker (2002) has shown how the violence characteristic of the tra-
dition of London duelling, for instance, was (despite an increase in the lethality 
of the weapons with which it was conducted) dramatically reduced over the 
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course of the eighteenth century. This was due not only to the growing role of 
print culture in conducting disputes, but also – and more importantly – to chan-
ging norms of honour and masculinity that helped to delegitimise violence as a 
method of settling conflicts between men.    
Despite their noble intentions, previous contributors to the debate have failed to 
recognise this. They have failed to see that the erotic politics at the heart of ‘tra-
gic’ action is based upon a socially constructed system of gender, sexuality, and 
honour. By talking of ‘tragedy’ as a reality (whether eternal or even as one that 
might be possibly overcome), they implicitly validate and reproduce the dis-
course in which the identities and behaviour that undergird erotic politics make 
sense. In other words, they recreate the semantic and normative conditions in 
which ‘tragedy’ is bound to repeat itself. The ‘tragic vision of politics,’ in this 
sense, actually represents a kind of myopia, the unfortunate irony of which is of 
a pair with Thucydides’ view of the Athenian ‘tragedy’ as I outlined it in Chap-
ter Five: the historical blindness of the Athenians, Thucydides suggests, led 
them to repeat the same mistakes they swore to avoid every year at the Great 
Dionysia, and this had terrible consequences for them all.  
Directions for Further Research 
This conclusion leads us to briefly consider the question as to the directions in 
which our findings might be taken by further research. We best do so by retur-
ning to themes introduced at the beginning of this dissertation. 
“If the pacifist wants to see the truth,” Gilbert Murray wrote, “he must face the 
essential tragedy of life. Biologically the whole animal creation, or at any rate 
the carnivorous part of it, kills in order to live” (1929: 15). On Murray’s view 
the killing and exploitation that lies at the heart of every ecosystem is repro-
duced in the human species not only in its diet but also in its inter- and intra-
group relations. People kill one another for pleasure and power as well as for 
self-protection. For many people there is also even glamour in war, because in 
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prehistoric conditions, in which the deeper feelings of humankind were forged, 
competition ordinarily “took the form of physical battle of man against man, or 
man against beast, for the protection of himself or his group; and this ancient 
fact still naturally dominates our emotions and imaginations, and produces in-
stinctively the supreme admiration of the soldier” (ibid: 33).  In the tragedy of 
life there is not only predation and destruction, therefore, but also an “element of 
love, of love and sacrifice, love that will die to save its object […], a plain bio-
logical fact and necessity” (ibid: 16-7). In other words: the she-wolf will lay 
down her life to defend her cubs just as she will tear the lamb to pieces in order 
to feed them. It is this distinction, the distinction between different forms of love 
and desire, which provides a direction for further research.  
Eros is an emotion that is largely socially constructed, but it would be a mistake 
to conclude from this that it is “merely a construct, even a modality of 
power” (Wohl 2002: 127). It is, rather, based on biological impulses relating to 
sex and aggression; it is the social conditioning of such. Other forms of love and 
desire are in many respects the same. Filial love, for example, is clearly a crucial 
evolutionary adaptation necessary for the coherence (and hence the success) of 
small groups of humans with very slow rates of infant maturation. Experiences 
and expressions of filial love, however, often differ greatly between epochs, so-
cieties, family units, households and individuals (cf. Wheaton 1975). Cousin-
marriages (or the lack thereof) are a case in point (cf. Anderson 1986). 
Individuals have biological needs, and these biological needs translate into de-
sires and emotions which are deeply conditioned, structured, and in some in-
stances perhaps even produced by society (Röttger-Rössler and Markowitsch 
2009). Some desires may be more socially conditioned than others (compare the 
craving for carbohydrates to the craving for peer recognition), but all are experi-
enced and expressed within the context of humanity as a natural phenomenon. 
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One individual’s or one collective’s needs and desires can and clearly often do 
conflict with the needs and desires of others. There can be no disputing this ‘tra-
gic’ fact. But such conflict does not, necessarily, lead to cruelty and violence. 
Nor does it necessarily lead to domination and exploitation. Selfish aggression 
and violence among humans may, in some instances, have biological roots 
(Palmer 1989; Caspi et al. 2002; Nell 2006; McDermott et al. 2012). Similarly, 
hierarchical relations are, to a degree, necessary and unavoidable experiences in 
the life cycle (as in, for instance, the relation of very young children to their 
primary carers). But among humans there is, as Murray points out, a capacity for 
experiencing and expressing different kinds of love and desire which have not 
been socially conditioned to be consistently hierarchical and warlike. Reinhold 
Niebuhr recognised this, and argued that there is a ‘beyond tragedy’ in which 
qualities such as hope, faith, filial love and forgiveness render pessimism penul-
timate rather than ultimate (Niebuhr 1986, 2013; cf. Rice 2006).  
What further research needs to explore, then, are such alternatives to eros as the 
primary model for human relationships and social interaction. While the exist-
ence of humanity’s natural capacity for predatory aggression, cruelty and dom-
ination is inescapable and must be recognised as such, the social conditions that 
encourage such behaviour are not so determined. Interactions based on love can 
never be completely freed from considerations of interest, it is true, but it is 
equally clear that the weaker members of society are not different species to be 
preyed upon. We humans are not wolves, nor necessarily cannibals nor even 
carnivores. Indeed, as Milgram’s famous experiments demonstrated, if anything 
we are mostly sheep in wolves’ clothing. 
While Pandora may have long ago shut the lid on Hope, even if hidden from 
view it still continues to exist; if we wedge the jar back open, it might be goaded 
out (if only inch by inch). Many of the tools for achieving this are there. The 
duel, as we have seen, can be transformed into a law court. It is even possible to 
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imagine that the law court, as it were, might one day in the far distant future be 
transformed into a community of care and mutual respect, in which cooperation 
and deliberation are valued as highly as fruitful competition. The normative and 
institutional changes in Western Europe following the Second World War are, in 
some respects, a step in this direction. Humanity need not, and should not, re-
main mired in a world drenched by the blood and tears of tragedy. As Nietzsche 
once said: “One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.”         
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